Toomire v. Town & Country CV-01-24-B 01/31/02 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Michael P . Toomire
v. Civil No. 01-24-B 2002 DNH 034 Town & Country Janitorial Services, Inc.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Michael Toomire filed a complaint against her former
employer. Town & Country Janitorial Services, Inc., Town &
Country's owner and president, Daniel Thompson, and co-owner Paul
Thompson. Toomire bases her claims on Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and
New Hampshire state law. On March 30, 2001, I dismissed
Toomire's Title VII claims against Daniel Thompson and Paul
Thompson, her claims based on N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A, and
her wrongful discharge claim. Toomire's remaining claims are
against Town & Country, and include sexual harassment and
retaliation under Title VII, and breach of contract. Town &
Country challenges these remaining counts in a motion for summary
judgment. I. BACKGROUND1
Town & Country performs janitorial services for commercial
clients and provides water and fire restoration services. In
1992, Toomire began working at Town & Country on a part-time
basis after being recruited by Paul Thompson. Toomire worked
primarily in sales, with some customer service responsibilities.
Thompson served as Toomire's supervisor.
Toomire began a consensual romantic relationship with
Thompson in 1993. Shortly thereafter, Thompson moved into
Toomire's home, and the two resided together for over a year.
Eventually, Thompson moved out, but the two continued their
romantic relationship.
In 1995, Toomire left Town & Country to find a job with
benefits, but returned to Town & Country in the spring of 1996 as
a full-time employee. After negotiating the terms of her
employment with Thompson and Town & Country's president, Daniel
Thompson (Paul Thompson's brother), Toomire agreed to return to
1 I construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Toomire, the non-moving party, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. See Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining the operation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56) (citation omitted).
- 2 - Town & Country with a flexible schedule that allowed her: time
off to care for her severely ill child; a fixed salary;
commissions; medical insurance; vacations and holidays; 10%
equity in the company at the end of Toomire's first year of
employment; a credit for laundry services; automobile expense
reimbursement; use of a company vehicle; and a cellular
telephone. Toomire's responsibilities included customer service,
sales, marketing, human resources, and quality management.
Thompson continued to serve as Toomire's supervisor.
Thompson directed work-related threats at Toomire throughout
their relationship, and used Toomire's employment at Town &
Country to coerce her to have sexual relations with him. For
example, Thompson told Toomire that she would be fired if she did
not have a personal relationship with him, stating "I hired you.
I'll fire you." On numerous occasions, Toomire complained to the
company president, Daniel Thompson, about Thompson's behavior.
Specifically, Toomire complained that Thompson yelled, cursed,
"got in her face" at work, and threatened to terminate her
employment. Toomire did not, however, complain of any sexually
inappropriate behavior on Thompson's part because she felt
ashamed.
- 3 - In response, Daniel Thompson told Toomire that Thompson did
not have the authority to fire her. On at least one occasion,
Daniel Thompson responded to Toomire's complaints about
Thompson's behavior by saying, "Don't worry about it. You know
what he's like." In addition, Daniel Thompson once told Toomire,
"My brother has abused every woman who has walked through the
door. You could go away, the business could close, but my
brother will always be my brother." Daniel Thompson also once
witnessed Thompson tell Toomire that he had an "attitude
problem... when [he] had to deal with bitches like [her]," but did
nothing in response. Toomire reasonably believed that Thompson
had sufficient control over his brother to bring about her
termination.
Toomire ended her romantic relationship with Thompson in
October 1997, but admits to having sexual intercourse with him on
at least two occasions between October 1997 and February 1998.
Additionally, she spent a weekend with Thompson in Chatham,
Massachusetts, in January 1998. Toomire claims she saw Thompson
outside of work to alleviate the hostile work environment at Town
& Country, and because she feared that she would lose her job if
she refused.
- 4 - Thompson's inappropriate behavior in the workplace continued
after Toomire terminated her personal relationship with him.
Between October 1997 and March 1998, Thompson directed unwelcome
sexual advances at Toomire, including grabbing her breasts,
touching her legs and crotch, exposing his genitals, and asking
for oral sex. Toomire asked Thompson to stop but did not report
the sexual conduct to Daniel Thompson, as she continued to be
embarrassed. In December 1997, Daniel Thompson began acting as
Toomire's supervisor.
On March 5, 1998, Thompson assaulted Toomire in the Town &
Country breakroom. Thompson slammed his chest into Toomire,
causing her to hit the door with her right shoulder and upper
arm. Toomire immediately reported the altercation to Daniel
Thompson. Toomire visited the Columbia Portsmouth Regional
Hospital later that day and was diagnosed with a right shoulder
contusion and right neck trapezius strain. In a follow-up visit,
Toomire was diagnosed with a separated shoulder and referred to
an orthopedic specialist.
On March 10, 1998, Toomire reported the assault to the
Greenland Police Department and filed a Domestic Violence
Petition against Thompson with the Portsmouth Family Court.
- 5 - After a March 12 , 1998 hearing, a final domestic violence restraining order was issued which precluded Thompson from
working at the Town & Country office where he would be in contact
with Toomire. After the restraining order was issued. Town &
Country unilaterally reduced Toomire's work hours and eliminated
or significantly reduced many of her former responsibilities.
Toomire also was precluded from communicating with employees and
her computer access was restricted.
On March 19, 1998, Thompson filed a motion to amend the
final restraining order, arguing that the portion of the order
which prohibited him from entering Toomire's place of employment
was unduly burdensome to him and Town & Country. Toomire refused
to accede to the granting of the amendment, even though Daniel
Thompson threatened to fire her if she did not. On April 23,
1998, the court held a hearing and subsequently issued an order
modifying the restraining order to allow Thompson limited access
to the Town & Country offices. The amendment required Toomire to
work Monday through Friday from 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., and
allowed Thompson access to the office between 5:00 p.m. and 8:30
a.m.
- 6 - On April 24, 1998, Toomire found her business cards in the
waste basket when she arrived at work. Later that day, Daniel
Thompson asked Toomire to turn in her pager. He also told her to
leave the Town & Country offices after he had a disagreement with
her about her use of a particular telephone. Toomire did not
return to Town & Country during the following three business
days, and on April 30, 1998, Daniel Thompson mailed her a letter
notifying her that she had been terminated.
Toomire alleges that Town & Country violated Title VII by
allowing her to be sexually harassed at her place of employment.
More specifically, she alleges both that Town & Country made
submission to Thompson's conduct a condition of her employment
and that she was forced to work in a hostile work environment.
As a result, she claims to be the victim of both quid pro quo and
hostile work environment harassment. Toomire also alleges that
Town & Country violated Title VII's anti-retaliation provision
when it reduced her job responsibilities and ultimately
terminated her employment after she opposed Thompson's
harassment.
Toomire further charges that Town & Country has in several
respects breached an employment contract that existed between
- 7 - them. Under the terms of her employment, Toomire states that she
was entitled to commissions on certain sales and renewal
contracts, and that Town & Country still owed her some of these
commissions at the time of her discharge. Similarly, Toomire
states that Town & Country agreed to give her a 10% ownership
interest in the business at the end of her first full year of
employment. Finally, Toomire alleges that Town & Country
breached her employment contract by firing her without following
the progressive discipline procedures outlined in its employee
manual.
On July 29, 1998, Toomire filed a charge of discrimination
with the New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights ("NHCHR"), and
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). On
October 21, 2000, Toomire received a right-to-sue letter from the
EEOC. On January 17, 2001, Toomire commenced this action.
Defendants subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. On March 30, 2001, I issued an order dismissing
Toomire's Title VII claims against Daniel Thompson and Paul
Thompson, her claims based on N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A, and
her wrongful discharge claim. Town & Country now moves for
summary judgment on Toomire's remaining claims against it under Title VII and state law.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). A genuine issue is one "that properly can be resolved
only by a finder of fact because [it] may reasonably be resolved
in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A material fact is one that affects the
outcome of the suit. See i d . at 248.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non
movant. See Navarro, 261 F.3d at 94 (citation omitted). The
party moving for summary judgment, however, "bears the initial
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for
its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion,
- 9 - the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "produce evidence on
which a reasonable finder of fact, under the appropriate proof
burden, could base a verdict for it; if that party cannot produce
such evidence, the motion must be granted." Avala-Gerena v.
Bristol Mvers-Squibb Co., 95 F.3d 86, 94 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). While courts must exercise restraint
in granting summary judgment in cases where the nonmoving party
must prove "elusive concepts such as motive or intent
. . . summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party
rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences,
and unsupported speculation." Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc.,
40 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1994) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). I apply this standard in resolving the
defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Ill. DISCUSSION
A. Toomire's Sexual Harassment Claim
Town & Country argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment on Toomire's Title VII sexual harassment claim because
there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, and, as
- 10 - a matter of law, Toomire's claim is inadequate. Specifically,
Town & Country submits that "Toomire suffered no unwelcome sexual
harassment from Paul Thompson as Toomire and Paul Thompson were
engaged in a long term voluntary consensual sexual relationship."
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 3. Town & Country's
argument fails.
Town & Country relies upon Campbell v. Masten, 955 F. Supp.
526 (D. Md. 1997), to support the proposition that Toomire has no
basis for a Title VII sexual harassment claim because she at one
time had a consensual sexual relationship with Thompson.
Campbell is readily distinguished, however, as the plaintiff
therein complained neither of a hostile work environment nor that
submitting to unwanted sexual conduct was made a condition of her
employment. See Campbell, 955 F. Supp. at 529-30. The court
noted, "negative employment actions which follow on the heels of
a consensual relationship gone sour do not constitute quid pro
quo sexual harassment unless they are linked in some way to other
or further 'unwanted' sexual advances." I d . at 530 (emphasis
added).
Here, in contrast, Thompson directed such "other or further
'unwanted' sexual advances," i d ., toward Toomire "anywhere from a
- 11 - couple of times a day to multiple times a week." These advances
occurred both during their consensual relationship, and after
Toomire terminated the relationship. Thompson's advances
consisted of grabbing Toomire's breasts, touching her legs and
crotch, exposing his genitals and asking for oral sex, and
responding to work related requests by pulling down the zipper of
his pants, holding his penis in his hands and making explicit
sexual comments. Thompson also directed work-related threats at
Toomire, and used his supervisory status to coerce her into
having sexual relations with him. Moreover, Thompson's conduct
was physically threatening, and culminated in a physical assault
on Toomire that required her to seek medical attention.
"The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the
alleged sexual advances were ''unwelcome.'" Meritor Sav. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). The First Circuit has
defined unwelcome advances as "uninvited and offensive or
unwanted from the standpoint of the employee." Chamberlin v. 101
Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 784 (1st Cir. 1990). Submission to
unwanted sexual advances does not eviscerate unwelcomeness. See
Matthew Bender, Employment Discrimination § 46.03 [2] [c] (2d ed.
2001); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. Thus, Toomire and Thompsons'
- 12 - personal relationship did not give Thompson unrestrained license
to harass and threaten Toomire in the workplace. See Babcock v.
Frank, 729 F. Supp. 279, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding previous
consensual sexual relationship did not bar Title VII sexual
harassment claim based on unwelcome physical and verbal sexual
advances).
Toomire complained to Daniel Thompson on several occasions,
making it clear that Thompson's behavior was unwelcome. See
Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988)
(stating that an inquiry into unwelcomeness includes whether the
plaintiff gave clear signals that the behavior was unwanted).
Due to her embarassment, Toomire did not specifically tell Daniel
Thompson about Thompson's sexually inappropriate behavior, but
she did complain about his abusive behavior in general, as well
as his threats to terminate her employment. Daniel Thompson
acknowledged awareness of his brother's inappropriate behavior,
but took no steps to remedy it. If a jury accepts the facts
given by Toomire as true, it could find that Thompson's behavior
created a hostile work environment, see Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 897,
and that Thompson made a sexual relationship with him a condition
of Toomire's employment, see Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
- 13 - 524 U.S. 742, 751-52 (1998). Therefore, summary judgment in
favor of Town & Country on Toomire's sexual harassment claim is
not appropriate.
B. Toomire's Retaliation Claim
Town & Country next argues that Toomire's retaliation claim
fails because prior to the date that Toomire's employment with
Town & Country ended (April 24, 1998), she had not opposed an
unlawful employment practice within the meaning of Title VII's
anti-retaliation provision. First, Town & Country points out
that Toomire had not filed a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC before April 24, 1998. Next, it argues that although
Toomire obtained a restraining order against Thompson after he
assaulted her, obtaining a restraining order does not constitute
protected activity under Title VII. Finally, Town & Country
disputes Toomire's charge that she was fired from Town & Country,
and instead says that she abandoned her job.
In relevant part. Title VII's anti-retaliation provision
provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . .
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
- 14 - testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, Toomire must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that: (1) she engaged in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse action
is causally connected to the protected activity. White v. N.H.
Pep't of Corr., 221 F.3d 254, 262 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting
Hernandez-Torres v. Intercontinental Trading, Inc., 158 F.3d 43,
47 (1st Cir. 1998)). If Toomire establishes her prima facie
case, the burden of production shifts to Town & Country, who must
respond by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the adverse employment action. See King v. Town of Hanover,
116 F.3d 965, 968 (1st Cir. 1997). If Town & Country meets its
burden of production, the presumption of retaliation falls away
and Toomire must prove that Town & Country's explanation is
actually a pretext concerning a retaliatory motivation. See i d .
_____ In her objection to Town & Country's motion for summary
judgment, Toomire alleges that she engaged in protected
activities when she complained to Daniel Thompson about his
brother's behavior and when she filed a restraining order against
- 15 - Thompson. She further alleges that as a result of her
participation in protected activities, her job duties were
reduced, her hours were unilaterally changed, and she was
ultimately terminated.
I conclude that Toomire has established a prima facie case
of retaliation. First, she engaged in protected activities when
she complained to Daniel Thompson about Thompson's behavior in
the workplace and when she obtained a restraining order from the
Portsmouth Family Court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Toomire's
complaints to Daniel Thompson about Thompson's intimidating and
abusive behavior in the workplace unquestionably qualify as
protected activity. See White, 221 F.3d at 262 (internal
complaint is protected activity).
Town & Country, however, argues that filing for a
restraining order is not a protected activity taken in opposition
to an unlawful employment practice under Title VII's anti
retaliation provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (protecting an
employee from discrimination resulting ". . . because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice. . .").
Although legislative history casts no light on what employee
activities Congress intended to cover in the retaliation
- 16 - provision, courts have tended to focus "less on the opposing act
than on its context. . . See Matthew Bender, Employment
Discrimination § 34.03. The First Circuit has developed a
balancing approach whereby the purpose of § 2000e-3(a), "to
protect persons engaging reasonably in activities opposing . . .
discrimination," is weighed against "Congress' desire not to
unduly constrict employers in personnel decisions." I d . (citing
Hochstadt v. Worcester Found, for Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d
222, 231 (1st Cir. 1976)). Viewed in this light, Toomire engaged
in a reasonable activity opposing discrimination when she sought
a restraining order in response to sexually based physical
violence in her workplace. When Toomire's petition for a
restraining order is considered in conjunction with her
complaints to Daniel Thompson about Thompson's workplace
behavior, a reasonable factfinder could determine that Toomire
has met the first prong of her prima facie case.
Second, Toomire alleges that her job duties were reduced or
eliminated subsequent to the issuance of the restraining order
which prohibited Thompson from entering the Town & Country
offices. More specifically, Toomire's contact with employees was
restricted, she was prohibited from doing public relations, and
- 17 - was denied access to the computer. Toomire further alleges that
she was terminated just one day after the amended restraining
order was issued. These changes in the condition of her
employment constitute adverse employment actions. See White, 221
F.3d at 262 ("Adverse employment actions include demotions,
disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to promote,
unwarranted negative job evaluations, and toleration of
harassment by other employees.") (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
In order to complete her prima facie case, Toomire must
"point to evidence in the record that would permit a rational
factfinder to conclude that the employment action was
retaliatory." King, 116 F.3d at 968; see Hoeppner v. Crotched
Mountain Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 31 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1994) . "One
way of showing causation is by establishing that the employer's
knowledge of the protected activity was close in time to the
employer's adverse action." Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13,
16 (1st Cir. 1994). Immediately following the issuance of the
March 12, 1998 restraining order, Toomire's responsibilities were
reduced or eliminated. Furthermore, the amended restraining
order was granted just one day prior to her termination. These
- 18 - adverse actions were sufficiently close in time to Toomire's
complaints to support causation. See i d . For these reasons,
Toomire has successfully met her burden of adducing trial-worthy
evidence that her reduction in job duties and ultimate
termination was causally connected to her complaints.
Toomire has met her initial burden, so the burden shifts to
Town & Country to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse employment actions. See King, 116 F.3d at 968. Although
Town & Country has denied that any adverse employment action
occurred, it has not articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason to rebut Toomire's charges. Accordingly, its motion for
summary judgment on her retaliation claim must fail.
C. Toomire's Breach of Contract Claim
1. Unpaid Wage Claim - Commissions
Town & Country denies that it agreed to pay Toomire
commissions on any sales or renewals after January 1, 1997. It
admits that before this date, it paid Toomire commissions,
although Toomire, and both Thompsons "continually had an ongoing
disagreement as to what contracts Toomire would receive
commissions on." Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 21.
Town & Country argues that Toomire's claim to commissions is
- 19 - barred by the statute of frauds, which applies inter alia to
contracts that cannot be performed within one year. N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 506:2. Based upon this doctrine. Town & Country
argues that because Toomire has asked the court to award her the
amount due on commissions she would have earned more than one
year after she commenced her employment, any agreement between
Town & Country and Toomire concerning commissions constitutes a
contract that could not be performed within one year.
The short answer to Town & Country's claim is that the
statute of frauds does not apply to Toomire's oral employment
contract because, like all such at-will agreements, it is capable
of being fully performed within one year through death or lawful
termination by either party. See Ives v. Manchester Subaru,
Inc., 126 N.H. 796, 799 (1985); Rosenthal v. Fonda, 862 F.2d
1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1988) (applying exception to commission
agreement).
2. Unpaid Wage Claim - Equity Interest
Town & Country disputes Toomire's allegation that the terms
of her employment entitled her to a 10% equity ownership interest
in the business. Although both parties have asserted facts to
support their respective positions, the outcome of this dispute
- 20 - hinges upon whether a written document, signed by a Town &
Country representative, exists. See N.H. R.S.A. 506:2 (requiring
that for a contract to be enforceable, it must be in writing, or
there must exist "some note or memorandum thereof," and "signed
by the party to be charged or by some person authorized by him,"
unless performance could be completed within one year). Because
Toomire would not have received the 10% equity interest until the
end of her first year of full time employment with Town &
Country, the agreement is subject to the statute of frauds.
In this case, a written document exists which fulfills the
necessary criteria. In March 1998, Thompson found himself barred
from the Town & Country premises pursuant to the restraining
order obtained by Toomire. On March 19, 1998, Thompson filed a
Motion to Amend Final Orders in the Portsmouth Family Court,
asking the court to alter the terms of the restraining order to
allow him access to Town & Country premises when Toomire was not
at work. He referred therein to Toomire as "an employee and also
a minority shareholder (10%) of Town & Country...the corporation
which is owned and operated by the Defendant, Paul Thompson and
his brother Dan[iel] Thompson." Defendant's Exhibit D (emphasis
- 21 - added).2 The document is signed by Thompson's attorney. Celeste
Biron. It is apparent from affidavits and memoranda submitted by
Town & Country that Thompson filed the motion because it was in
Town & Country's interest. Because Celeste Biron acted on behalf
of both Thompson and Town & Country when she signed this
document, it satisfies the statute of frauds. I therefore deny
Town & Country's request for summary judgment on Toomire's equity
ownership claim.
3. Toomire's At-Will Employment Status
Town & Country disputes Toomire's position that its employee
manual altered the terms of her employment from that of an at-
will employee, with the result that Town & Country breached an
implied employment contract by terminating her without following
the procedure detailed in the manual.3 Town & Country argues
that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether
2Neither party has cited this document in reference to this claim. However, it qualifies as a "note or memorandum" of the equity ownership agreement between Toomire and Town & Country, and it is therefore appropriate that I rely upon it when analyzing the statute of frauds issue.
3 The manual contains procedures for disciplinary action to be taken by Town & Country in response to prohibited conduct. The manual states that Town & Country will issue a verbal warning and written notice before terminating an employee.
- 22 - Toomire reasonably believed that the policy detailed in the
employee manual constituted the terms of her employment. I
agree.
In Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., the New Hampshire
Supreme Court discussed whether employee handbooks could alter
the at-will status of employees by creating a contractual
obligation on the part of employers to warn or to provide a
hearing to employees before discharge. See 130 N.H. 730, 737-40
(1988). The court stated that New Hampshire law provides no
basis for assuming that customary rules of contract formation
would not be followed when analyzing cases involving employee
handbooks. I d . at 739. It also noted that an employer could
avoid the issue of altering the status of at-will employees by
"announcing in the written policy itself that it was not an
offer, or a policy enforceable as a contractual obligation." Id.
at 742; see also Butler v. Walker Power, Inc., 137 N.H. 432, 435
(1993) (finding that an employee handbook did not alter terms of
at-will employment status because employer had included a
disclaimer).
In this case. Town & Country included a disclaimer in its
employee manual specifically stating that it "does not alter the
- 23 - fact that employment is 'at will' and may be terminated, with or
without cause, by either party, at anytime." Town & Country's
employee manual clearly states that it does not alter the terms
of its employees' at-will status. Therefore, Town & Country was
not obligated to issue Toomire a verbal or written warning before
terminating her employment. Summary judgment in favor of Town &
Country on this claim is appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
I deny Town & Country's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
No. 16) with respect to Toomire's Title VII sexual harassment and
retaliation claims, and her breach of contract claims pertaining
to unpaid wages. I grant Town & Country's Motion for Summary
Judgment with respect to the portion of Toomire's breach of
contract claim where she argues that her employment status had
been altered by an employee manual.
SO ORDERED.
Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge
January 31, 2002
- 24 - cc: Jennifer A. Lemire, Esq. Christopher W. Keenan, Esq. Martha Van Oot, Esq.
- 25 -