Tony Robertson v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 28, 2005
• Docket: 01-04-00869-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued April 28, 2005

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-04-00869-CR

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TONY ROBERTSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from County Criminal Court At Law No. 12

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1213587

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

          A jury found appellant, Tony Robertson, guilty of misdemeanor assault. The trial court assessed punishment at 180 days’ confinement in jail and a $300 fine. The trial court suspended appellant’s sentence and placed him on two years’ community supervision. In one issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion to amend the information on the day of trial.

          We affirm.

Background

          On January 11, 2004, the complainant, Dion Alfred, went to a club with some friends. At about 1:00 a.m., Alfred decided to leave. The club was so crowded that Alfred had to walk sideways through the crowd to exit. Alfred accidently bumped into someone and excused himself. He then felt a push from behind. Alfred turned around and saw appellant flailing his arms and yelling, “You bumped me. You bumped me.”

          Alfred was about to ask appellant to calm down when appellant struck Alfred above his right eye. Alfred thought that appellant had struck him with a bottle but later learned that appellant had used his fist.

          On January 11, 2004, the State charged appellant by information with misdemeanor assault, alleging that he “did then and there unlawfully[,] intentionally and knowingly cause bodily injury” to Alfred by “striking the complainant with a bottle.” The State filed a motion to amend the information on March 31, 2004, requesting that allegations be added that appellant struck Alfred with his hand or with an unknown object. The trial court did not rule on the motion.

          On May 13, 2004, the State filed another motion to amend the information, requesting that an allegation be added that appellant committed assault with his hand. The trial court signed an undated order granting the motion.

          The first day of trial was May 24, 2004. The State approached the bench before the jury had been sworn in and explained to the court that, if appellant did not agree to the amendment of the information, the State would dismiss the case and re-file it. During the discussion, the trial court stated that it believed that double jeopardy had attached and would only allow a dismissal with prejudice. The court also stated that, if the motion to amend was granted, then appellant would have 10 days from the granting of the motion to object.

          Following a recess, the court conducted an in-camera hearing at which the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: This is Cause No. 1213587, the State of Texas v. Tony Robertson. We already have a jury, the jury seated—a jury panel seated. The State back on or about the 13th of May, 2004, filed a motion for leave to amend the information. The information—there was no ruling on that motion, whether it be granted or denied. State called it to my attention earlier this morning. I said I’m not going to allow it unless the defense agrees to it and he did say he did not agree to it.

We have now talked to the jury panel. The State has asked me to reconsider this motion. I asked [defense counsel] to talk to his client. If I should grant the motion, he would have ten days. If I should grant the motion over his objection, he has ten days in which to go to trial or else he may waive that ten days and go to trial today on the amended motion.

Do you understand what I’m saying?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do Sir.

THE COURT: Do you want to waive the ten days and go to trial today?

THE DEFENDANT: I want to go to trial today.

THE COURT: Sir?

THE DEFENDANT: I want to.

THE COURT: You want to waive the ten days?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir. Go ahead and get it over with.

THE COURT: Is that agreeable to you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. I’ll allow the amendment. Then I’ll sign it. And all it does is add a paragraph, change “hand” instead of “bottle.”

          The information was amended by adding a paragraph alleging that appellant struck Alfred with his hand. The jury found appellant guilty of the offense charged in the information. Appellant filed a motion for new trial, contending, inter alia, that it was error for the judge to amend the information on the day of trial. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.

Amendment of Information

          In his sole issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred in amending the information on the day of trial.

          An amendment is an alteration to the face of the charging instrument that affects the substance of the charging instrument. Eastep v. State, 941 S.W.2d 130, 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). An amendment can be accomplished by physical interlineation of the original indictment or by incorporating into the record, at the direction of the trial court and with the knowledge and affirmative assent of the defense, an amended version of a photocopy of the original indictment. Riney v. State, 28 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

          If an indictment is amended before trial, the defendant has an absolute right to request 10 days in which to respond to the amended indictment. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 28.10(a) (Vernon 1989). The failure to object to an indictment before trial waives any objection on appeal. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.14(b) (Vernon 2005).

          If an indictment is amended during trial, the defendant must object to the amendment or the objection is waived. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 28.10(b) (Vernon 1989). Alternatively, the defendant can request 10 days in which to respond to the mid-trial amendment. Collins v. State, 806 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). If an indictment is amended on the day of trial, the defendant must object to the amendment or the objection is waived. State v. Murk, 815 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

          Based on the record presented, we question whether appellant preserved his complaint that the trial court erred by amending the information on the day of trial. It is uncontested that appellant made no objection on the record to the trial court’s amendment of the information. In this regard, appellant avers the following in a footnote in his brief:

It is evident, although not explicit, from the record that Appellant objected to the amendment because there was a discussion off the record just before the State began its argument in support of its Motion to Amend. Moreover, there would not have been any discussion regarding the Amendment if it were agreed. Further, Appellant’s Pro Se Motion for New Trial assigns its reason for new trial to the trial court’s granting of the motion to amend over his objection.

(Emphasis added.)

          Though the dialogue between the State and the trial court quoted earlier in this opinion indicates that appellant did not agree with the amendment before the court recessed, the specific ground of appellant’s “objection” is not obvious from the context of the trial court’s comments on the record. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must make a timely and specific objection that is followed by an adverse ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Ramirez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 636, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). When objections and rulings are made during a sidebar conference that is conducted off the record, nothing is preserved for review. Wallace v. State, 822 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d). It is elemental that the complaint on appeal must comport with the objection lodged at the trial court level. See Guevara v. State, 97 S.W.3d 579, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

          From the record, we cannot discern whether appellant ever objected to the amendment on the basis that an information should not be amended on the day of trial, the complaint he now raises on appeal. See Bartley v. State, 789 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, pet. ref’d) (concluding that defense’s general objection to amendment of indictment was not sufficiently specific to preserve error). Moreover, appellant’s motion for new trial cannot serve to preserve his complaint. See Dixon v. State, 2 S.W.3d 263, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (stating that objection must be made at first possible opportunity).

          Further, it is unclear whether appellant remained opposed to the amendment after the recess. During the in camera hearing, the trial court stated that it had denied the motion to amend when appellant would not agree to amending the information. The trial court explained that the State had asked it to reconsider its ruling. The court revealed that it had requested defense counsel speak to appellant during the recess. The trial court then explained, “If I should grant the motion over his objection, he has ten days in which to go to trial or else he may waive that ten days and go to trial today on the amended motion.” At that point, appellant expressly waived the trial court’s offer to delay trial for 10 days and stated that he wanted to go to trial. Appellant made no objection to the trial court’s granting of the motion or amending of the information. The information was amended and the parties proceeded to trial without objection. In addition, defense counsel and the prosecutor disagreed at the hearing on the motion for new trial whether the defense had agreed to the amendment.

          Based on the record, we conclude that appellant has not preserved his appellate complaint. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

                                                         Conclusion

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                             Laura Carter Higley

                                                             Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Bland.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).