Tony James Strickland v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 23, 2007
• Docket: 12-06-00145-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

                NO. 12-06-00145-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

TONY JAMES STRICKLAND,       §          APPEAL FROM THE 420TH

APPELLANT

V.        §          JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE   §          NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Tony James Strickland, also known as Tony St. Louis, appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery.  In one issue, Appellant claims that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated because his conviction was based upon insufficient evidence.  We affirm.

Background

            On June 17, 2004, Appellant and three other men traveled to an on-campus apartment at Stephen F. Austin State University (“SFA”).  Once there, the group robbed at gun point Corey Goodall, a drug dealer and SFA scholarship athlete.  Because the stolen items included illegal drugs, Goodall did not report the crime.  Goodall’s roommate eventually contacted law enforcement.

            Appellant was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery.¹  A jury found Appellant guilty of the offense and sentenced him to fifteen years of imprisonment.  This appeal followed.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

            In his sole issue, Appellant alleges that his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution have been violated because his conviction was based upon legally and factually insufficient evidence.  Appellant’s legal and factual sufficiency discussions are the basis for his argument that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights have been violated, rather than independent grounds of appeal.  As such, the only issue on appeal is whether there has been a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Standard of Review

            The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that evidence be legally sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786-87, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).  Evidence is legally sufficient when an appellate court, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, determines that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789).  We must bear in mind that the jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony.  Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).  The jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.  Dudley v. State, 205 S.W.3d 82, 86-87 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2006, no pet.).  Likewise, reconciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the exclusive province of the jury.  Losada v. State, 721 S.W.2d 305, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

            Unlike legal sufficiency, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee that a conviction will be based upon factually sufficient evidence, as the term “factually sufficient evidence” is defined by Texas law.  See Wooley v. State, No. 14-06-00088-CR, 2007 WL 1266146, at *6 n.2 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] May 1, 2007, no pet. h.) (Hedges, C.J., concurring) (“[F]actual sufficiency review does not implicate federal due process concerns.”); see also Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 132-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (discussing the genesis of factual sufficiency review in Texas and its relationship, or lack thereof, to federal due process).  Therefore, even if Appellant’s conviction was based upon “factually insufficient evidence,” a federal due process violation would still not have occurred.²  See id.  Because the issue before us is whether Appellant’s federal due process rights were violated, we decide only whether the evidence supporting his conviction was legally sufficient.

Discussion

            Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding that Goodall was “in possession of or had a superior right to” the property alleged to have been stolen.

            Goodall testified about the property that was taken from his possession.  The stolen property was described by Goodall as a cellular telephone, approximately $700 to $1000 in cash, and “cocaine, crack, and ‘X’ pills.”  In support of Goodall’s testimony, the State presented prior testimony from Terry Moore, an accomplice to the robbery.³  Moore’s testimony included a statement that, during the robbery, Appellant went into a room of Goodall’s apartment and retrieved a “briefcase containing cocaine, crack, and ‘X’ pills.”  None of the stolen items were ever found by law enforcement, and, thus, were not available to be admitted into evidence.

            According to Appellant, the State’s evidence as to the existence of the property in question was based solely on information provided by Goodall.  Appellant argues that Goodall’s testimony and statements to law enforcement did not provide the necessary specificity to make him a credible witness.  Appellant also argues that Goodall could not be relied upon without corroboration, because he had previously made an inconsistent statement to law enforcement.  Specifically, when first questioned by the campus police, Goodall stated that he had been robbed and that the items taken were athletic jerseys.  It was not until later, after Goodall himself had been charged with possession of a controlled substance, that Goodall changed his story and gave a written statement to the campus police stating that the items stolen consisted of illegal drugs and money.

            Appellant’s argument is flawed for two reasons.  First, Goodall was not the sole source of eyewitness testimony as to the existence and possession of the property in question.  Moore’s testimony included a statement that, during the robbery, Appellant went into a room of Goodall’s apartment and retrieved a “briefcase containing cocaine, crack, and ‘X’ pills.”  This was evidence that the stolen property in question existed, that it was in Goodall’s possession, and that Goodall had a superior right to possession of these items. 

            Second, even if Goodall were the only source of eyewitness information regarding the stolen property, the evidence would still be legally sufficient.  Appellant presented no witnesses at trial.  To support his claim that the evidence was legally insufficient, he points out that Goodall gave prior inconsistent statements and that he was vague as to the exact amounts of money and drugs stolen. Thus, Appellant is essentially asking us to disregard the jury’s assessment of the credibility and weight of Goodall’s testimony and to substitute our own assessment.  We cannot do this absent manifest injustice, which is not present here.  See Barnes, 876 S.W.2d at 321.

            After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Goodall was in possession of or had a superior right to the property alleged to have been stolen.  Therefore, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding.  See Johnson, 871 S.W.2d at 186.  As such, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.

Disposition

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                                     JAMES T. WORTHEN   

                                                                                                                 Chief Justice

Opinion delivered May 23, 2007.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

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¹ See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03 (Vernon 2003).

² We do not address here whether the evidence of Appellant’s guilt was factually sufficient.

³ At the trial, Moore invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  As a result, the trial court allowed both parties to read to the jury sections of Moore’s testimony from a previous trial.