Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 264 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CR-25-152
TONY BOYKINS Opinion Delivered April 29, 2026
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 35CR-11-445]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JODI RAINES DENNIS, APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge
Tony Boykins appeals the Jefferson County Circuit Court’s order denying his
petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal
Procedure. On appeal, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1)
adequately advise him of the ramifications of not testifying at trial; (2) advise him that
there was a police dash-cam video of another suspect at the scene of the crime on the day
of the murder; (3) effectively cross-examine witnesses; and (4) call crime-scene witnesses
who would have exonerated him. We affirm.
On July 27, 2011, Boykins shot and killed Brian Keith Smith with a handgun
during a physical altercation between Smith and Boykins’s brother, Terrell. Boykins was
charged in the Jefferson County Circuit Court with first-degree murder and possession of a
firearm by certain persons. Boykins was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to forty years’ imprisonment in the Arkansas Division of Correction for the murder and
given a ten-year enhancement for the use of a firearm. He appealed the conviction, and this
court affirmed on September 4, 2013. Boykins v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 463.
Boykins filed a timely, verified petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37
on November 4, 2013, and a verified amended petition on August 26, 2014, making the
same four arguments he brings on appeal. Because Boykins’s trial counsel, Greg Robinson,
was ill and could not physically appear to testify at a hearing, Robinson and Boykins were
deposed. Boykins filed a motion for a ruling on the pleadings and submitted the transcripts
of the deposition testimony as the only evidence for consideration. The circuit court
entered an order noting that the transcripts did not appear complete and directed the
parties to amend them and to file memoranda in support of their respective positions on
the Rule 37 petition. After neither party filed either an amendment or memorandum, the
court entered an order on November 14, 2024, dismissing Boykins’s petition with
prejudice:
Boykins’s allegations are without factual support. No supporting testimony was provided referencing who should have been called to testify at the jury trial, what that testimony would have been, or how it would cast a reasonable doubt that, but for counsel’s errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Mere allegations are insufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel is effective. Lane v. State, 2019 Ark. 5, 564 S.W.3d 524.
Petitioner has failed to meet the Strickland standards and is not entitled to relief.
Boykins appealed.
2 We do not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the circuit court’s
findings are clearly erroneous. Johnson v. State, 2018 Ark. 6, at 2, 534 S.W.3d 143, 146. A
finding is clearly erroneous when the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is
left with the definite and firm conviction that the circuit court made a mistake. Id., 534
S.W.3d at 146. In reviewing a circuit court’s denial of postconviction relief on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, we look at the totality of the evidence to determine
whether the circuit court clearly erred. McClure v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 487, at 6, 698
S.W.3d 698, 703.
The benchmark question to be resolved in judging an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim is whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Norris
v. State, 2013 Ark. 205, at 2, 427 S.W.3d 626, 631. We assess the effectiveness of counsel
under a two-prong standard as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Id., 427 S.W.3d at 631. Under the Strickland test, a
petitioner must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense to the extent that the petitioner was deprived of a fair
trial. Id., 427 S.W.3d at 631. A petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the test, and it is
unnecessary to examine both components of the inquiry if the petitioner fails to satisfy
either requirement. Morgan v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 238, at 6, 666 S.W.3d 161, 166.
A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance must first show that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed to the petitioner
3 by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id., 666 S.W.3d at 166. There
is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance, and a petitioner has the burden of overcoming this
presumption by identifying specific acts or omissions of trial counsel that, when viewed
from counsel’s perspective at the time of the trial, could not have been the result of
reasonable professional judgment. Id., 666 S.W.3d at 166.
To meet the second prong of the test, a petitioner must show that there is a
reasonable probability that the fact-finder’s decision would have been different absent
counsel’s errors. Delamar v. State, 2011 Ark. 87, at 4. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Hartman v.
State, 2017 Ark. 7, at 3, 508 S.W.3d 28, 31.
Boykins first argues that the circuit court clearly erred in denying his Rule 37
petition because Robinson failed to adequately advise him of the ramifications of not
testifying at trial. Boykins claims that Robinson testified in his deposition that he was not
sure if he had spoken with Boykins about his right to testify or not testify. Robinson said in
his deposition that he could not remember advising Boykins of his right not to testify—the
trial occurred in 2012—but he said that he presumably did “because I can’t imagine talking
to a client and not explaining that right to him.”
The trial record confirms that Robinson did advise Boykins of the right to testify in
open court:
4 ROBINSON: The other thing we’ve talked about ever since I’ve become your lawyer, Tony, is whether or not you would testify at your own trial. We’ve talked about that several times, haven’t we?
BOYKINS: Yes, we have.
....
ROBINSON: Have you made a decision on whether or not you want to testify at your own trial?
BOYKINS: Yes, sir.
ROBINSON: Do you want to testify today?
BOYKINS: No, sir.
ROBINSON: Will you say that again?
ROBINSON: And that’s your decision based on what you know about the case?
ROBINSON: And it was freely and voluntarily made. Nobody’s offering you anything for not testifying?
Further, Boykins’s own deposition testimony confirms that Robinson advised him about
testifying. Boykins testified that Robinson advised him not to take the stand due to
Boykins’s criminal history: Boykins said that, when he was seventeen, he “shot a guy.”
On this record Boykins was clearly advised by his trial counsel of his right to testify
or not to testify.
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Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 264 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION IV No. CR-25-152
TONY BOYKINS Opinion Delivered April 29, 2026
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 35CR-11-445]
STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE JODI RAINES DENNIS, APPELLEE JUDGE
AFFIRMED
WENDY SCHOLTENS WOOD, Judge
Tony Boykins appeals the Jefferson County Circuit Court’s order denying his
petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal
Procedure. On appeal, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1)
adequately advise him of the ramifications of not testifying at trial; (2) advise him that
there was a police dash-cam video of another suspect at the scene of the crime on the day
of the murder; (3) effectively cross-examine witnesses; and (4) call crime-scene witnesses
who would have exonerated him. We affirm.
On July 27, 2011, Boykins shot and killed Brian Keith Smith with a handgun
during a physical altercation between Smith and Boykins’s brother, Terrell. Boykins was
charged in the Jefferson County Circuit Court with first-degree murder and possession of a
firearm by certain persons. Boykins was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to forty years’ imprisonment in the Arkansas Division of Correction for the murder and
given a ten-year enhancement for the use of a firearm. He appealed the conviction, and this
court affirmed on September 4, 2013. Boykins v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 463.
Boykins filed a timely, verified petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 37
on November 4, 2013, and a verified amended petition on August 26, 2014, making the
same four arguments he brings on appeal. Because Boykins’s trial counsel, Greg Robinson,
was ill and could not physically appear to testify at a hearing, Robinson and Boykins were
deposed. Boykins filed a motion for a ruling on the pleadings and submitted the transcripts
of the deposition testimony as the only evidence for consideration. The circuit court
entered an order noting that the transcripts did not appear complete and directed the
parties to amend them and to file memoranda in support of their respective positions on
the Rule 37 petition. After neither party filed either an amendment or memorandum, the
court entered an order on November 14, 2024, dismissing Boykins’s petition with
prejudice:
Boykins’s allegations are without factual support. No supporting testimony was provided referencing who should have been called to testify at the jury trial, what that testimony would have been, or how it would cast a reasonable doubt that, but for counsel’s errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Mere allegations are insufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel is effective. Lane v. State, 2019 Ark. 5, 564 S.W.3d 524.
Petitioner has failed to meet the Strickland standards and is not entitled to relief.
Boykins appealed.
2 We do not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the circuit court’s
findings are clearly erroneous. Johnson v. State, 2018 Ark. 6, at 2, 534 S.W.3d 143, 146. A
finding is clearly erroneous when the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is
left with the definite and firm conviction that the circuit court made a mistake. Id., 534
S.W.3d at 146. In reviewing a circuit court’s denial of postconviction relief on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, we look at the totality of the evidence to determine
whether the circuit court clearly erred. McClure v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 487, at 6, 698
S.W.3d 698, 703.
The benchmark question to be resolved in judging an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim is whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Norris
v. State, 2013 Ark. 205, at 2, 427 S.W.3d 626, 631. We assess the effectiveness of counsel
under a two-prong standard as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Id., 427 S.W.3d at 631. Under the Strickland test, a
petitioner must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense to the extent that the petitioner was deprived of a fair
trial. Id., 427 S.W.3d at 631. A petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the test, and it is
unnecessary to examine both components of the inquiry if the petitioner fails to satisfy
either requirement. Morgan v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 238, at 6, 666 S.W.3d 161, 166.
A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance must first show that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed to the petitioner
3 by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id., 666 S.W.3d at 166. There
is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance, and a petitioner has the burden of overcoming this
presumption by identifying specific acts or omissions of trial counsel that, when viewed
from counsel’s perspective at the time of the trial, could not have been the result of
reasonable professional judgment. Id., 666 S.W.3d at 166.
To meet the second prong of the test, a petitioner must show that there is a
reasonable probability that the fact-finder’s decision would have been different absent
counsel’s errors. Delamar v. State, 2011 Ark. 87, at 4. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Hartman v.
State, 2017 Ark. 7, at 3, 508 S.W.3d 28, 31.
Boykins first argues that the circuit court clearly erred in denying his Rule 37
petition because Robinson failed to adequately advise him of the ramifications of not
testifying at trial. Boykins claims that Robinson testified in his deposition that he was not
sure if he had spoken with Boykins about his right to testify or not testify. Robinson said in
his deposition that he could not remember advising Boykins of his right not to testify—the
trial occurred in 2012—but he said that he presumably did “because I can’t imagine talking
to a client and not explaining that right to him.”
The trial record confirms that Robinson did advise Boykins of the right to testify in
open court:
4 ROBINSON: The other thing we’ve talked about ever since I’ve become your lawyer, Tony, is whether or not you would testify at your own trial. We’ve talked about that several times, haven’t we?
BOYKINS: Yes, we have.
....
ROBINSON: Have you made a decision on whether or not you want to testify at your own trial?
BOYKINS: Yes, sir.
ROBINSON: Do you want to testify today?
BOYKINS: No, sir.
ROBINSON: Will you say that again?
ROBINSON: And that’s your decision based on what you know about the case?
ROBINSON: And it was freely and voluntarily made. Nobody’s offering you anything for not testifying?
Further, Boykins’s own deposition testimony confirms that Robinson advised him about
testifying. Boykins testified that Robinson advised him not to take the stand due to
Boykins’s criminal history: Boykins said that, when he was seventeen, he “shot a guy.”
On this record Boykins was clearly advised by his trial counsel of his right to testify
or not to testify. To the extent that Boykins contends Robinson’s advice affected his
decision, the advice was simply a matter of reasonable trial strategy, which is not a ground
5 for ineffective assistance of counsel. Walden v. State, 2016 Ark. 306, at 6, 498 S.W.3d 725,
730.
Moreover, even assuming error on the part of Robinson, Boykins has failed to
demonstrate prejudice in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The trial record
reflects that four witnesses testified that they saw Boykins shoot Smith. Boykins, 2013 Ark.
App. 463, at 7. As such, Boykins has failed to show that the outcome of his trial would
have been different had he testified that he did not shoot Smith.
Boykins also argues that the circuit court clearly erred in denying his Rule 37
petition because Robinson failed to advise Boykins that there was a police dash-cam video
of another suspect at the scene of the crime at the time of the murder. Robinson testified
that he remembered cross-examining witnesses about the presence of a man in red at the
scene on the basis of dash-cam footage. The record transcript of the trial confirms this. The
record also reflects that Robinson used a still photograph from the dash-cam video during
his cross-examination at trial. Robinson also testified in his deposition that he would have
shown the footage to Boykins if he had it. On this evidence, it is clear that Boykins was
aware of the dash-cam video. Conclusory allegations to the contrary that are unsupported
by facts do not provide a basis for an evidentiary hearing or postconviction relief. Henington
v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, at 6, 403 S.W.3d 55, 60.
To the extent Boykins complains of Robinson’s use or lack of use of the dash-cam
video, we have repeatedly held that matters of trial strategy, even if the strategy proves
improvident, are not grounds for granting postconviction relief. Robinson v. State, 2014
6 Ark. 310, at 7, 439 S.W.3d 32, 39. Finally, as stated above, there were four eyewitnesses
who testified that Boykins shot the victim. Boykins has failed to present any reason that
Robinson’s failure with regard to the dash-cam video, if there was a failure, prejudiced him.
Next, Boykins contends that the circuit court clearly erred in denying his Rule 37
petition because Robinson failed to effectively cross-examine witnesses, specifically arguing
that he was prejudiced because a suspect known to the prosecution was not “brought in
and made known to him or the jury.” The trial record demonstrates that Robinson did in
fact cross-examine witnesses about a potential suspect. Further, Robinson testified that his
cross-examination at trial was restricted by the circuit court because Boykins’s brother,
Terrell, who could have testified to the matter, decided not to testify on the morning of
trial. This court affirmed the circuit court’s restriction. Boykins, 2013 Ark. App. 463, at 1.
Therefore, the circuit court did not err in finding that Robinson’s performance was not
deficient. Moreover, Boykins does not explain how he was prejudiced. Four witnesses
testified that they saw Boykins shoot the victim. Accordingly, Boykins has failed to show
that more vigorous cross-examinations of witnesses would have altered the outcome of the
trial.
Finally, Boykins argues that the circuit court clearly erred in denying his Rule 37
petition because Robinson failed to call witnesses—specifically, his brother Terrell—who
were present at the crime scene and would have exonerated him. First, with regard to
Terrell, Robinson’s deposition testimony is clear that he had spoken with Terrell (and
Boykins’s mother) multiple times and had planned to call Terrell as a witness. On the
7 morning of trial, Terrell refused to testify. Although Robinson could have called Terrell as
a hostile witness, his decision not to do so was a strategic trial decision. The reviewing
court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. Sartin v. State, 2012 Ark. 155, at 2, 400 S.W.3d
694, 696. We conclude that counsel’s strategy was reasonable given the particular
circumstances presented. The fact that the strategy was unsuccessful does not render
counsel’s assistance ineffective. Green v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 130, at 15, 595 S.W.3d 423,
434.
Second, Boykins does not provide the names of any additional witnesses or explain
the substance of the testimony they would have provided. When a petitioner alleges
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call witnesses, it is incumbent on the
petitioner to name the witness, provide a summary of the testimony, and establish that the
testimony would have been admissible into evidence. Wertz v. State, 2014 Ark. 240, at 4,
434 S.W.3d 895, 900 (citing Moten v. State, 2013 Ark. 503). To demonstrate prejudice, the
petitioner is required to establish that there was a reasonable probability that, had counsel
performed further investigation and presented the witness, the outcome of the trial would
have been different. Joyner v. State, 2021 Ark. 78, at 5, 621 S.W.3d 124, 129. Boykins has
failed to do this.
In sum, because the alleged deficiencies claimed by Boykins amount to no error or
to trial strategy, or because Boykins failed to show that the verdict would have been
8 different, he has failed to meet his burden to obtain Rule 37 relief on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
THYER and BROWN, JJ., agree.
Ronald L. Davis, Jr. Law Firm, PLLC, by: Ronald L. Davis, Jr., for appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: A. Evangeline Bacon, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.