Toni Wiggins v. FedEx Office and Print Services, Inc.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 28, 2023
• Docket: 8:22-cv-02320
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT 11 ) 12 TONI WIGGINS, ) Case No.: SACV 22-02320-CJC (DFMx) ) 13 ) ) Plaintiff, 14 ) ) v. 15 ) ORDER SUA SPONTE REMANDING ) ACTION TO STATE COURT 16 C.T. CORPORATION SYSTEM – ) ) 17 FEDEX and DOES 1 to 50, ) ) 18 ) Defendants. ) 19 ) ) 20 21 22 On September 27, 2022, Plaintiff Toni Wiggins, proceeding pro se, filed suit 23 against Defendant FedEx Office and Print Services, Inc. (erroneously named “C.T. 24 Corporation - FedEx” in the complaint) in the Superior Court of California, County of 25 Orange. (See Dkt. 1 [Notice of Removal, hereinafter “Notice”]; Dkt. 1-1 [Complaint, 26 hereinafter “Compl.”].) The complaint appears to concern return and refund policies for 27 copying services from FedEx and includes claims for (1) breach of contract, 1 damages,” and (6) “causation.” (Compl. [page 3 of PDF].) The complaint also includes 2 an intentional tort claim and seeks exemplary damages. (See id. [pages 5–6 of PDF].) 3 FedEx alleges that it was served on November 28, 2022, (see Notice ¶ 5), and it removed 4 the action to this Court on December 28, 2022, invoking diversity jurisdiction, (see 5 id. ¶ 7). 6 7 A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to a federal district court 8 if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the action. See 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1441. Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over cases that are between diverse 10 parties and involve an amount in controversy that exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 11 1332. Principles of federalism and judicial economy require courts to “scrupulously 12 confine their [removal] jurisdiction to the precise limits which [Congress] has defined.” 13 Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941). Indeed, “[n]othing is to 14 be more jealously guarded by a court than its jurisdiction.” United States v. Ceja-Prado, 15 333 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). The defendant 16 removing the action to federal court bears the burden of establishing that the district court 17 has subject matter jurisdiction over the action, and the removal statute is strictly 18 construed against removal jurisdiction. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th 19 Cir. 1992). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 20 removal in the first instance.” Id. 21 22 Federal courts have a duty to examine their subject matter jurisdiction whether or 23 not the parties raise the issue. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed, Inc., 24 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] district court’s duty to establish subject matter 25 jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ arguments.”). “The court may—indeed 26 must—remand an action sua sponte if it determines that it lacks subject matter 27 jurisdiction.” GFD, LLC v. Carter, No. CV 12–08985, 2012 WL 5830079, at *2 (C.D. 1 2 FedEx stated in its notice of removal that “when a complaint is unclear and does 3 not specify ‘a total amount in controversy,’ the jurisdictional minimum may be satisfied 4 by claims for special and general damages, attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages.” 5 (Notice ¶ 11 [citation omitted].) They then cite case law on recovery in cases involving 6 claims like those that Wiggins brought in an attempt “to make a plausible allegation that 7 the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” (Id. ¶ 13 [emphasis 8 omitted]; see also id. ¶ 11–20.) 9 10 FedEx misses the mark. The complaint is clear about the total amount in 11 controversy. Under the “jurisdiction” section of the form complaint, Wiggins checked 12 boxes indicating that the “action is a limited civil case” and that the “amount demanded 13 . . . exceeds $10,000 but does not exceed $25,000.” (Compl. [page 2 of PDF] [emphasis 14 added].) The removal statute provides that “the sum demanded in good faith in the initial 15 pleading shall be deemed to be the amount in controversy,” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2), and 16 unless there is a strong basis to infer bad faith, courts presume that the sum demanded is 17 indeed the amount sought, see Burns v. Windsor, 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994); 18 Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 871 (6th Cir. 2000). FedEx offers no 19 basis suggesting bad faith in its notice, and the Court sees no evidence of bad faith in the 20 complaint either. Indeed, that the sum sought jurisdictionally renders a case a limited 21 civil case in the California court system only buttresses the conclusion that the sum stated 22 is in good faith. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 85–89.1 23 24

25 1 Wiggins did indicate $25,000 in the line marked for “[t]he amount of exemplary damages sought” and “$1.8 per day” as attorney’s fees. (See Compl. [pages 3, 6 of PDF].) Because Wiggins is proceeding 26 pro se, the Court reads the allegations liberally and construes them as seeking no more than the $25,000 27 jurisdictional maximum for a limited civil case, as Wiggins had indicated on the first page of the complaint. Even if these amounts were in fact separate and then aggregated together, however, the total 1 Plaintiffs are “the master[s] of [their] complaint[s].” Balcorta v. Twentieth 2 || Century-Fox Film Corp., 208 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000). If plaintiffs “do[] not 3 || desire to try [their] case[s] in the federal court,” they “may resort to the expedient of 4 suing for less than the jurisdictional amount, and though [they] would be justly entitled to 5 ||more, the defendant(s] cannot remove.” St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab. Co., 6 U.S. 283, 294 (1938). That is in fact what happened here. Accordingly, the Court 7 sponte REMANDS this case to Superior Court of California, County of Orange. 8 9 10 DATED: March 28, 2023 Ko | je ul 12 CORMAC J. CARNEY 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28