Tongue v. Sanofi

816 F.3d 199, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 4107, 2016 WL 851797
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedMarch 4, 2016
DocketNos. 15-588-cv, 15-623-cv
StatusPublished
Cited by214 cases

This text of 816 F.3d 199 (Tongue v. Sanofi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 4107, 2016 WL 851797 (2d Cir. 2016).

Opinion

BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge.

In these related cases, Plaintiffs allege that the pharmaceutical company Sanofi, along with its predecessor and three company executives, made materially false or misleading statements regarding its breakthrough drug, Lemtrada, designed to treat multiple sclerosis (“MS”). Plaintiffs allege that while Lemtrada was undergoing Phase III clinical trials prior to FDA approval, Sanofi misled investors by failing to disclose that the FDA had repeatedly expressed concern with Sanofi’s use of single-blind studies and had encouraged Sanofi to use double-blind studies in its clinical trials. Plaintiffs allege that these omissions misled investors and artificially inflated the value of Plaintiffs’ contingent value rights (“CVRs”), -specialized financial instruments whose value is tied to the achievement of certain “milestones.”

Plaintiffs’ allegations are predicated on §§ 10(b), 18, and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et [203]*203seq. (the “Exchange Act”); §§ 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of' 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (the “Securities Act”); and state blue sky laws. Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ appeal from the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Because we agree with the district court’s reasoning and holding, we write principally to examine the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Omnicare, Inc., v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, 135 S.Ct. 1318 (2015), decided after the district court rendered its decision.

BACKGROUND

A. Development of Lemtrada

Prior to 2011, Defendant Genzyme Corporation (“Genzyme”) was the owner of a promising drug called Lemtrada: Lemtra-da had not yet been approved by the FDA, but had shown potential as a treatment for victims of MS. The advantage of Lemtrada comes partially from its unique treatment cycle. While traditional MS treatments require a daily or weekly dosing regimen, Lemtrada only requires two annual treatment courses.

In part because of Lemtrada’s unique treatment design, Genzyme used a single-blind study in its early clinical trials. In a single-blind study, either the researcher or the patient does not know which drug was administered. By contrast, in a double-blind study, neither the patient nor the investigator knows which drug was administered. Lemtrada’s biannual - treatment regimen effectively precluded the use of double-blind studies, as patients would realize they were being required to undergo treatment far less frequently than under their normal drug. In what appears to have been among its earliest public reports on its Lemtrada clinical studies, Genzyme stated in the New England Journal of Medicine in 2008 that it was relying solely on single-blind studies for the trials.

At least as far back as 2002, the FDA expressed concern about the use of single-blind studies for Lemtrada, telling ILEX (the then-owner of Lemtrada that was acquired by Genzyme in 2004) in a teleconference that the use of single-blind studies in Lemtrada’s early clinical trials would “not provide substantial support for a BLA.”1 Joint App’x at 43. In 2004, the FDA again informed' ILEX in another teleconference that “[b]ecause of study design issues (open-label, small sample size) the [clinical trial] is unlikely to provide-substantial support for an sBLA.”2 Id. After Genzyme acquired ILEX, the FDA reiterated in a telephone call that the early clinical trial “will not be a pivotal study to support a license application.” Id.

In 2006, the FDA expressed more optimism for the drug’s approval based on the single-blind studies, saying that “a rater blinded (but patient not blinded). study may be adequate if the effect is large,” though the FDA again noted that it would “prefer double-blinded, controlled studies, especially for the pivotal trials.” Id. at 78. In 2007, the FDA sent a letter “strongly recommending]” Genzyme “use a double-dummy placebo control in your pivotal trials,” adding that “[t]he acceptability of your rater-blinded study will be a matter [204]*204of review. If your study results reveal an extremely large effect, then FDA may potentially accept this rater-blinded design for the pivotal trials.” Id. Notwithstanding this feedback, the FDA permitted Genzyme to enroll patients in Phase III clinical trials that were only single-blind studies. (Phase III is the final phase of trials prior to submission of the drug for FDA approval for public usage.)

The FDA’s concerns regarding the use of single-blind studies continued and were expressed to Genzyme during the Phase III trials. According to the FDA’s minutes of a meeting with Genzyme, the FDA expressed in March 2010 that it “was concerned by the potential bias introduced by the absence of blinding of patients,” and that “the bias introduced by unblinding physicians and patients remains a significant problem which will cause serious difficulties in interpreting the results of the trial.” Id. at 43. And in 2011, the FDA reiterated in a meeting with Genzyme that “the lack of doubleblinding has consistently concerned us. The lack of blinding remains a major concern.” Id. at 43-44. The FDA added that “despite, these previous concerns that have been communicated to you, there was little discussion of the unblinded design of the trials in the meeting material.” Id. at 44.

B.. Sanofi Acquires Genzyme

Defendant Sanofi is a global pharmaceutical company engaged in' the research, development, manufacturing, and marketing of healthcare products. In 2010, Sano-fi began an effort to acquire Genzyme. At the time, Lemtrada’s market worth was estimated at $14 billion worldwide. Gen-zyme initially rejected Sanofi’s offers, arguing that Sanofi undervalued Lemtrada’s business potential. Partially as a result of this contention, Genzyme and Sanofi began to negotiate a deal whereby Genzyme’s stockholders would be partially compensated by a financial instrument tied to the value of Lemtrada. The two parties eventually agreed that each shareholder would receive a cash payment of $74 per share, plus one CVR per share. The parties agreed to the terms of the acquisition and executed a Merger Agreement on February 16,2011.

Each CVR entitled the holder to cash payouts upon achievement of certain “milestones”'connected to the success of Lem-trada. The first milestone, called the “Approval Milestone,” entitled CVR holders to $1 per CVR if the FDA approved Lemtra-da for treatment of MS by March 31, 2014. The four other milestones, called the “Product Sales Milestones” entitled CVR holders to similar cash payments if Lem-trada achieved certain levels of global net sales. In addition, the second Product Sales Milestone, if met, compensated CVR holders an additional $1 per CVR if Lemtrada had failed to meet the Approval Milestone. The CVRs also contained a $1 per share payout for production milestones related to other drugs.

Sanofi initiated a tender offer on April 1, 2011, consisting of the $74 per share and one CVR per share. The tender offer was followed by a short-form merger on April 8, 2011.

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Bluebook (online)
816 F.3d 199, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 4107, 2016 WL 851797, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tongue-v-sanofi-ca2-2016.