1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TONG MYUNG PARK, Case No. 25-cv-07366-JSC
8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 9 v. TO DISMISS, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY, AND PLAINTIFF’S 10 RANDALL LEE CURTIS, et al., MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 11 Defendants. Re: Dkt. Nos. 9, 12, 14
12 13 Plaintiff, who is unrepresented by counsel, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit arising 14 from an early 1990’s criminal prosecution during which he was detained pre-trial and convicted 15 for perjury. Plaintiff’s 1995 conviction has not been overturned. There are three categories of 16 defendants: (1) inspectors, deputy District Attorneys (“DAs”), and supervising DAs who worked 17 at the San Mateo County DA’s Office at the time of Plaintiff’s prosecution, all sued in their 18 individual capacity; (2) the County of San Mateo, the San Mateo County DA’s Office, and the San 19 Mateo County Counsel’s Office (“County Defendants”); and (3) Christina Corpus, the Sheriff of 20 San Mateo County at the time of Plaintiff’s detention, sued in her official capacity. (Dkt. No. 1.)1 21 Plaintiff brings claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest and imprisonment, Due Process 22 violations, deliberate indifference to safety, and municipal and supervisory liability for the same. 23 Pending before the Court are three motions. Defendants’ motion to dismiss argues all 24 claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, a statute of limitations, and absolute immunity. (Dkt. No. 25 9.)2 Plaintiff moves for leave to amend his complaint for the sole purpose of changing Defendant 26 1 Record citations are to material in the Electronic Case File (“ECF”); pinpoint citations are to the 27 ECF-generated page numbers at the top of the documents. 1 Hall’s middle name. (Dkt. No. 14.) Plaintiff also moves to “disqualify[] the Office of San Mateo 2 County Counsel from representing individual Defendants” Curtis, Dirickson, Wasserman, Pitt, 3 Dinkelspiel, and Hall “in their personal capacities.” (Dkt. No. 12.) Plaintiff asserts these 4 defendants have non-waivable conflicts of interest with the County and the County is prohibited 5 from representing former employees. 6 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss, 7 without leave to amend, and DENIES Plaintiff’s motions. Drawing all reasonable inferences from 8 the allegations in Plaintiff’s favor, Heck v. Humphrey bars Plaintiff’s claims regarding defects in 9 his prosecution that necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. Any claims not barred by 10 Heck are barred by the statute of limitations because the claims accrued nearly 30 years ago and 11 are not tolled. The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify because the Office of County 12 Counsel has authority to represent individual defendants and there is no conflict of interest in the 13 County doing so. Given amendment would be futile, the Court does not grant leave to amend. 14 BACKGROUND 15 I. The Complaint’s Allegations and Claims 16 In 1993, Plaintiff was a party to a civil harassment lawsuit. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 26; Dkt. No. 2- 17 1.)3 The judge presiding over the lawsuit sent a letter to the San Mateo DA’s Office which, in 18 Plaintiff’s words, was “compelling” the DA to investigate Plaintiff for perjury. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 26.)4 19 Then, “acting on this referral,” investigators at the DA’s office “lured the Plaintiff to the District 20 Complaint on file; Plaintiff’s original complaint is the operative pleading. 21 3 On its own motion, the Court takes judicial notice of Plaintiff’s attached filings, orders, and judgments from the civil harassment suit and Plaintiff’s criminal case in state court. See Fed. R. 22 Evid. 201(b), (c)(1); U.S. v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases, as well as the records of an inferior court in other 23 cases.”) The Court, however, does not take judicial notice of the allegations or factual findings from those cases for their truths. M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 24 1483, 1491 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[A] court may not take judicial notice of proceedings or records in another cause so as to supply, without formal introduction of evidence, facts essential to support a 25 contention in a cause then before it[.]”) 4 The Complaint cites this letter as “Exhibit I.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 26.) Exhibit I is labeled “State 26 Mateo County State Civil Court Docket Record of Judge McGinn Smith’s Order Compelling Perjury Investigation of the Plaintiff.” (Dkt. No. 2 at 1.) Exhibit I is a docket report of Plaintiff’s 27 civil harassment suit with an affixed seal of a San Mateo County court clerk. (Dkt. No. 2-1 at 33- 1 Attorney’s Office via a letter … and interrogated him for four hours in custodial like settings 2 [sic].” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 27; Dkt. No. 2-1 at 38) 3 Prosecutors subsequently brought perjury charges against Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 28; Dkt. 4 No. 2-1 at 40.) Defendant Curtis, an inspector with the DA’s Office at the time, “personally 5 signed a seven-count felony complaint charging Plaintiff with perjury.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 28; Dkt. No. 6 2-5.) Defendant Paul Wasserman’s name was at the top the complaint, but he did not sign it. (Dkt. 7 No. 1 ¶ 29.) Plaintiff alleges the felony complaint “failed to name a victim or allege an injury of 8 any victim” and “contained no factual allegations, no personal knowledge, and no supporting 9 affidavit.” (Id. ¶¶ 33, 41.) 10 On February 15, 1994, Defendant Curtis obtained a search warrant for Plaintiff’s home. 11 (Id. ¶ 36.) Defendant Curtis and other officers executed the search warrant a day later. (Id.) 12 Plaintiff was arrested on February 19, 1994 and was present for a preliminary hearing where he 13 was represented by counsel and the government explained the charges and evidence against him. 14 (Id. ¶ 38; Dkt. No. 2-2.) During pretrial detention, Plaintiff was “systematically denied access to 15 law libraries” and assaulted by a fellow inmate. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 39, 40.) 16 Plaintiff was convicted of six counts of perjury following a bench trial where he was 17 represented by counsel. (Dkt. No. 2-1 at 2.) Plaintiff contends the evidence at trial pertained to 18 his false live testimony, whereas the indictment alleged perjury in a written affidavit. (Dkt. No. 1 19 ¶ 48.) Plaintiff therefore claims Defendant Hall, the trial prosecutor, committed a “fraud on the court” because he “knowingly prosecuted Plaintiff based upon a factually and legally baseless 20 Complaint/Information and for an uncharged crime.” (Id.) Plaintiff was released on parole in 21 1998. (Id. ¶ 38). Since then, “Plaintiff provided [Defendants] notice of the[se] constitutional 22 violations through multiple grievances, FOIA requests, and a Brady motion beginning in 2023.” 23 (Id. ¶ 5.) 24 Plaintiff also attaches nearly 600 pages of exhibits. (Dkt. No. 2.) For example, Plaintiff 25 attaches reports from two handwriting experts dated April 2023 who conclude Defendant Curtis, 26 and not a prosecutor, signed the information in his criminal case. (Dkt. Nos. 2-4, 2-5.) In June 27 1 California Public Records Act request to the San Mateo County DA’s Office for documents or 2 evidence that “directly relate to or support a finding of factual innocence with respect to my 1995 3 perjury conviction.” (Dkt. No. 2-6 at 18; Dkt. No. 2-7 at 7.) Plaintiff’s motion was denied 4 following a hearing. (Dkt. No. 2-6 at 14.) The DA’s office responded to the records request 5 saying it “declines to disclose any records … because no such records exists [sic] which relate to 6 or support a finding of your factual innocence.” (Dkt. No. 2-7 at 14.) 7 Plaintiff also attaches the docket report of a case in the Northern District of California in 8 which Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on March 2, 1998. (Dkt. No. 2-7 at 21.)5 On 9 August 1, 2000, the court “dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of subject matter 10 jurisdiction, due to the fact that the petitioner was released from custody since March 10, 1998.” 11 (Id. at 17, 22.) From the docket report, it appears Plaintiff filed two motions to “reopen to the 12 original habeas corpus proceeding” in 2002, which were denied, and in 2004, Plaintiff filed a 13 “request … for the court to reassess its position and amend its order” dismissing the case, which 14 was also denied. (Id. at 22-23.) 15 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings causes of action for (1) malicious prosecution; 16 (2) a Due Process claim based on defects in the charging documents; (3) a Due Process claim 17 styled “conviction on an uncharged offense and fraud on the Court;” (4) a Fourth Amendment 18 claim that Plaintiff’s arrest warrant lacked probable cause, (5) municipal liability against San 19 Mateo County for “policies, customs, and practices” of “failing to adequately train and supervise its prosecutors and inspectors” on the constitutional obligations allegedly violated by prosecutors; 20 (6) an “unlawful initiation of prosecution” claim based on Defendant Curtis’s signing the 21 complaint; (7) a Brady claim against DAs who “suppressed material exculpatory evidence;” (8) a 22 Fourth Amendment claim his pretrial detention was invalid because the prosecution’s initiation 23 was unconstitutional; (9) a Fourth Amendment claim based on a “pre-dawn, no-notice” search of 24 25
26 5 On its own motion, the Court takes notice of the order and docket report Plaintiff attached as exhibits to his complaint from his federal habeas case. (Dkt. No. 2-7 at 17-23); see Fed. R. Evid. 27 201(b), (c)(1). The Court does not take notice of any factual findings for their truth or adopt any 1 Plaintiff’s home executed pursuant to a search warrant; (10) a claim against former Sheriff Corpus 2 predicated on Plaintiff’s assault by an inmate, alleging policies that created a “deliberate 3 indifference to safety;” (11) Monell liability against the County of San Mateo and the County 4 DA’s Office for allowing investigators to sign criminal complaints; and (12) supervisory liability 5 against the Chief Deputy DA at the time of Plaintiff’s prosecution. 6 Plaintiff prays for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Plaintiff requests a 7 “declaratory judgment that the conviction is void solely as to its collateral consequences … 8 because the conviction was obtained through unconstitutional conduct[.]” (Dkt. No. 1, Prayer For 9 Relief 1.) He also seeks a “permanent injunction enjoining” all Defendants from “enforcing any 10 collateral consequences of the Plaintiff’s 1995 conviction” and from “engaging in any future 11 investigative, prosecutorial, or law-enforcement practices that are similarly unconstitutional.” (Id. 12 Prayer for Relief 2.) Finally, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys’ 13 fees and costs. (Id. Prayers for Relief 3-5.) 14 DISCUSSION 15 Plaintiff’s complaint must state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 16 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept 17 Plaintiff’s allegations as true and make all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, but need not accept as 18 true conclusory allegations or conclusions of law. Id. at 678. And in civil rights cases where the 19 plaintiff is unrepresented by counsel, courts “have an obligation to construe the pleadings liberally 20 and to afford the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 21 1987), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012). 22 I. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 23 A. Heck v. Humphrey Bars Counts I through IV, VI, and VIII 24 When a plaintiff “seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether 25 a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or 26 sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the 27 conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 1 See id. at 484–487 (malicious prosecution claim barred because an element required the 2 prosecution to end in plaintiff’s favor); Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 3 (9th Cir. 1998) (false arrest and imprisonment claim required there be no probable cause for a 4 crime, which necessarily implied the conviction for that crime was invalid); see also Smithart v. 5 Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“There is no question that Heck bars 6 [Plaintiff]'s claims that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and brought unfounded 7 criminal charges against him. … [Plaintiff] may challenge the validity of his arrest, prosecution 8 and conviction only by writ of habeas corpus. … To the extent that [Plaintiff] wishes to invalidate 9 his … conviction, whether expressly or by implication, we affirm the district court’s dismissal.”) 10 The Ninth Circuit has applied Heck’s bar to Fourth Amendment claims challenging the 11 “search and seizure of evidence upon which criminal charges are based.” Harvey v. Waldron, 210 12 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000). There, the court reasoned:
13 a § 1983 action alleging illegal search and seizure of evidence upon which criminal charges are based does not accrue until the criminal 14 charges have been dismissed or the conviction has been overturned. Such a holding will avoid the potential for inconsistent determinations 15 on the legality of a search and seizure in the civil and criminal cases and will therefore fulfill the Heck Court's objectives of preserving 16 consistency and finality, and preventing “a collateral attack on [a] conviction through the vehicle of a civil suit.” 17 18 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 484). To fulfill the objectives of Heck, the 19 Ninth Circuit has applied Harvey’s phrase “upon which criminal charges are based” to bar claims 20 challenging searches and seizures that are causally linked to criminal charges being brought and 21 convictions being secured. For example, Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2007) held 22 Heck and Harvey barred Section 1983 claims challenging a deceptive search warrant application 23 for a search that revealed “evidence that triggered the police investigations and state 24 prosecutions.” Id. at 583–85. Similarly, Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607 (9th Cir. 25 2011) rejected claims challenging the probable cause for a search warrant where the search 26 resulted in “the discovery of the assault weapon found in [plaintiffs’] home, which formed the 27 basis for their [guilty] plea and conviction.” Id. at 611–12. But Heck and Harvey do not bar 1 conviction or verdict. Compare id., and Whitaker, 486 F.3d at 583–85, with Jackson v. Barnes, 2 749 F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases where Section 1983 claims based on searches 3 and seizures were not Heck-barred because the plaintiffs pled nolo contendre, meaning “their 4 convictions were in no way the result of” the challenged evidence). 5 1. Malicious Prosecution Claim (Count I) 6 “Federal courts rely on state common law for elements of malicious prosecution.” Mills v. 7 City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019). Under California law, the elements of 8 malicious prosecution are “the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the 9 defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff's, favor; (2) was brought without 10 probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.” Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 11 3d 863, 871 (1989) (cleaned up). 12 Heck squarely bars Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim. The first element of this claim 13 is the prosecution was “pursued to a legal termination in his … favor.” Id. This is identical to the 14 claim barred in Heck, where “one element that must be alleged … [was] termination of the prior 15 criminal proceeding in favor of the accused.” 512 U.S. at 484. Accordingly, if a trier of fact 16 found this element of malicious prosecution was met, it “would necessarily imply the invalidity of 17 [Plaintiff’s] conviction.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. So, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s malicious 18 prosecution claim without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. 19 2. “Unlawful Seizure and False Imprisonment” Claim (Count IV) 20 Heck also bars Count IV, which alleges Defendant Curtis “caused Plaintiff to be arrested 21 and imprisoned based on a warrant that was unsupported by a sworn complaint establishing 22 probable cause.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 70.) Exactly like the claim barred in Cabrera, Count IV requires a 23 trier of fact to find there was no probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for the then-alleged crime, which 24 would “necessarily imply” Plaintiff’s conviction for the same crime was invalid. 159 F.3d at 380. 25 Plaintiff “may challenge the validity of his arrest, prosecution and conviction only by writ of 26 habeas corpus.” Smithart, 79 F.3d at 952. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Count IV, without 27 leave to amend. 1 3. Claims Regarding the Charging Documents and Initiation of the 2 Prosecution (Counts II, III, VI, and VIII) 3 Heck bars Count III, which contends the conviction itself was based on an “uncharged 4 offense” and a “fraud on the Court” because the trial prosecutor used “incompetent hearsay 5 evidence of testimonial perjury … despite the fact that the charging documents … only alleged 6 perjury by written affidavit.” (Id. ¶ 66.) Count III is therefore an attack on the conviction itself 7 and the evidence upon which it is based, so a judgment in Plaintiff’s favor would “necessarily 8 imply the invalidity of his conviction.” 512 U.S. at 487; cf. Whitaker, 486 F.3d at 583–85 (Heck 9 and Harvey bar challenge to search revealing “evidence that triggered the police investigations and 10 state prosecutions”); Szajer, 632 F.3d at 611–62 (Heck and Harvey bar challenge to search warrant 11 resulting in “the discovery of the assault weapon found in [plaintiffs’] home, which formed the 12 basis for their plea and conviction”). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Count III, without leave to 13 amend. 14 Similarly, Harvey bars Counts II, VI, and VIII because they challenge defects in the 15 documents “upon which criminal charges [and the conviction] are based.” 210 F.3d at 1015. 16 Count II alleges a Sixth Amendment violation because the charging documents were so “devoid of 17 facts” that they did not provide adequate notice of the nature and cause of the accusations against 18 him, meaning Plaintiff could not prepare an effective defense. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 63.) Count VI is 19 labeled “unlawful initiation of prosecution,” and is predicated on the argument Defendant Curtis 20 signed the charging document, which constituted “fraud upon the court” and violated Plaintiff’s 21 due process rights because Plaintiff was not prosecuted by a “constitutionally proper authority.” 22 (Id. ¶¶ 77-79.) Count VIII, in turn, relies on the same defects because it claims Plaintiff’s “two- 23 year pretrial detention constituted an unlawful seizure” because the “fraudulent and void 24 complaint” formed the basis of Plaintiff’s arrest warrant. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 88.) Harvey bars these 25 claims because they amount to “a collateral attack on [a] conviction through the vehicle of a civil 26 suit.” 210 F.3d at 1015; see also People v. Fritz, 54 Cal. App. 137, 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921) 27 (holding a defendant waives objections to an information, including objections to a prosecutor’s 1 criminal case). 2 Plaintiff’s argument “when a plaintiff is no longer in custody and habeas relief is 3 unavailable, Section 1983 may proceed to grant a declaratory or injunctive relief invalidating the 4 conviction without violating Heck” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 2) is unavailing. Plaintiff’s cited cases, Nonnette 5 v. Small, 316 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2002) and Spencer v. Kenma, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), are inapposite 6 because they address parole-related exceptions to the Heck bar. Plaintiff is not challenging a 7 parole decision here, and unlike parolees in those cases, habeas relief was available for Plaintiff’s 8 claims, so Heck bars his claims.6 9 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Counts II, III, VI, 10 and VIII without leave to amend. 11 4. Brady Claim (Count VII) 12 Heck bars Count VII, which is predicated on violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 13 (1963). Plaintiff contends three prosecutors “knowingly suppressed material exculpatory 14 evidence, including evidence related to Plaintiff’s factual innocence and Defendant Curtis’s 15 improper role and bad faith.” (Id. ¶ 85.) Plaintiff contends Brady requires prosecutors to disclose 16 material, exculpatory evidence “even after conviction and without a formal request” and “[t]his 17 unconstitutional suppression continues to this day under the office of Defendant Wagstaffe.” (Id.) 18 Plaintiff then cites five Supreme Court cases for the notion “[t]he said suppressed Brady materials 19 by the said Defendants meets the Schlup/McQuiggin actual innocence gateway presenting a 20 federal question to this Court, thereby excusing due diligence and other procedural defaults.” (Id.) 21 All five cases involved habeas corpus petitions in federal court.7 In any event, Brady claims 22 6 In the same vein, Plaintiff also appears to rely on those cases for the argument he is not 23 challenging the conviction itself, but instead is seeking an injunction preventing the government from engaging in similar misconduct and from the collateral consequences of his conviction. (See, 24 e.g., Dkt. No. 10 at 4 (“The type of relief sought does not require vacating the conviction[.]”). Given the limited application of Nonnette and Kenma to cases involving parolees, they cannot be 25 interpreted to authorize Plaintiff’s requested relief. Additionally, Plaintiff’s prayer for declaratory relief is premised on the invalidity of the conviction because he asks the Court to issue a 26 “declaratory judgment that the conviction is void solely as to its collateral consequences … because the conviction was obtained through unconstitutional conduct[.]” (Dkt. No. 1 Prayer for 27 Relief 1) (emphasis added). 1 “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction” because a successful Brady claim requires “a 2 reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 3 proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 4 Fundamentally, the inquiry under Brady “turns on the cumulative effect of all suppressed evidence 5 favorable to the defense,” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 420 (1995), which is precisely the kind 6 of claims Heck and Harvey forbid. Cf. Szajer, 632 F.3d at 607 (claims cannot challenge evidence 7 that “formed the basis for their [guilty] plea and conviction”); Barnes, 749 F.3d at 760 (framing 8 the inquiry as whether “convictions were … the result of” the challenged evidence). So, the Court 9 dismisses Count VII, without leave to amend. 10 5. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims 11 Plaintiff’s remaining claims are for an unlawful search of Plaintiff’s home (Count IX), for 12 supervisory and municipal liability (Counts V, XI, and XII), and for being denied access to the jail 13 law library before trial.8 To the extent Plaintiff’s law-library claim challenges his inability to 14 prepare for or represent himself at trial, it is barred by Heck because the proper vehicle for a Sixth 15 Amendment claim is a writ of habeas corpus. Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812–818 16 (1975) (recognizing, on a direct appeal, the right to self-representation is a Sixth Amendment 17
18 Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986). 8 It is unclear which cause of action Plaintiff’s law-library claim falls under because Plaintiff does 19 not specifically re-allege this detail under a cause of action. (See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 57-101.) Plaintiff’s complaint characterizes this claim as a “violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth 20 Amendment due process rights under the United States Constitution, and in violation of Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 39.) 21 Faretta held a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to represent himself at trial. 422 U.S. at 812. But Plaintiff was represented by counsel at his bench trial, (Dkt. No. 2-1 at 2), so it is 22 unclear how Faretta relates to Plaintiff’s alleged denial of library access.
23 More likely, Plaintiff is claiming he was denied “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts[, which] requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of 24 meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from person trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). An access-to-courts 25 claim requires Plaintiff to show an “actual injury,” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996), that is, “the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to 26 pursue a legal claim” such as “direct appeals,” “habeas petitions,” or Section 1983 claims. Id. at 352. Because the Court must liberally interpret Plaintiff’s pleadings, the Court will assume 27 Plaintiff’s access-to-courts claim is tied to an ability to pursue a legal claim related to his 1 right); Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004) (“Despite its literal applicability, however, § 2 1983 must yield to the more specific federal habeas statute[.]”). 3 Next, Heck does not bar Count IX, which contends “Defendants Curtis and other officers 4 executed a pre-dawn, no-notice search of Plaintiff’s home” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 5 (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 91.) Unlike Plaintiff’s other claims, Count IX challenges the manner in which the 6 search was conducted and the seizure of personal property, rather than the evidence revealed or the 7 impact the search had on the outcome of his case, because Plaintiff emphasizes the search was 8 “pre-dawn” and “no-notice.” (Id.) The record does not indicate what evidence, if any, was 9 revealed from this search. So, on the record before the Court, and giving Plaintiff the benefit of 10 the doubt, Heck does not bar Count IX because a favorable judgment on this claim would not 11 “necessarily imply” the invalidity of Plaintiff’s conviction. Cf. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 12 689, 695–699 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding Heck did not bar claim that police used excessive force 13 after plaintiff had committed the acts upon which his conviction was based because “the record 14 does not reflect which acts underlay his plea and therefore his § 1983 claim is not necessarily 15 inconsistent with his conviction”); Smithart, 79 F.3d at 952–53 (holding Heck did not bar claim 16 police used excessive force “during the course of an arrest which resulted in Smithart’s criminal 17 conviction”). So, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count IX on the basis of 18 Heck. 19 Finally, based on the analysis above, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for supervisory 20 and municipal liability (Counts V, XI, and XII) to the extent they rely on claims barred by Heck. 21 In other words, Heck does not bar Counts V, XI, XII to the extent they rely on Plaintiff’s Count IX 22 (“Pre-dawn” and “No-Notice” search), Count X (“Deliberate Indifferent to Safety”), or what 23 remains of Plaintiff’s claim regarding access to the jail’s law library. 24 B. The Statute of Limitations Bars Any Claim Not Barred by Heck 25 “Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action, but in several respects relevant here 26 federal law looks to the law of the State in which the cause of action arose. This is so for the 27 length of the statute of limitations: It is that which the State provides for personal-injury torts.” 1 “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by 2 reference to state law. … Under those principles, it is the standard rule that [accrual occurs] when 3 the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, … that is, when the plaintiff can file suit 4 and obtain relief[.]” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (italics and alteration in original) (cleaned up). 5 Although California currently has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury 6 cases, Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. § 335.1, Plaintiff’s claims that are not Heck-barred are subject to the 7 one-year statute of limitations that was in effect until 2003. See Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of 8 Los Angeles, 631 F.3d 1031, 1041, 1041 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011). That is because California’s 9 “[s]tatutes of limitations do not begin to run until a cause of action accrues,” Fox v. Ethicon Endo- 10 Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal.4th 797, 806 (2005), but the accrual dates for all of Plaintiff’s remaining 11 claims, which is determined by federal law, occurred in the 1990s. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391 12 (“Under the traditional rule of accrual … the tort cause of action accrues, and the statute of 13 limitations commences to run, when the wrongful act or omission results in damages. The cause of 14 action accrues even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable.”) 15 (cleaned up). 16 Further, under California law, “equitable tolling ‘reliev[es] plaintiff from the bar of a 17 limitations statute when, possessing several legal remedies he, reasonably and in good faith, 18 pursues one designed to lessen the extent of his injuries or damage.’” Cervantes v. City of San 19 Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Addison v. California, 21 Cal. 3d 313, 317 20 (1978)). “A plaintiff's pursuit of a remedy in another forum equitably tolls the limitations period if 21 the plaintiff’s actions satisfy these factors: 1) timely notice to the defendants in filing the first 22 claim; 2) lack of prejudice to the defendants in gathering evidence for the second claim; and 3) 23 good faith and reasonable conduct in filing the second claim.” Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1275. “When 24 a motion to dismiss is based on the running of the statute of limitations, it can be granted only if 25 the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to 26 prove that the statute was tolled.” Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 27 1980). 1 not barred by Heck is barred by the statute of limitations because Plaintiff filed his complaint on 2 September 2, 2025–long after the statute of limitations had run. For instance, Count IX accrued 3 “[o]n February 15, 1994” when Defendant Curtis and other officers searched Plaintiff’s home and 4 “seiz[ed] personal property.” (Id. ¶ 36). Count X accrued at the time of Plaintiff’s assault during 5 pretrial detention. And regardless of how one construes Plaintiff’s claim regarding access to jail 6 law libraries, the statute of limitations began running, at the very latest, when Plaintiff was 7 released from parole in 1998, that is, when he was free from any constraints on library access and 8 therefore able to “file suit and obtain relief.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. For these same reasons, 9 Plaintiff’s claims for municipal and supervisory liability also fail because they are predicated on 10 the same alleged constitutional violations and the failure to train prosecutors on those 11 constitutional obligations.9 12 Plaintiff also has not sufficiently alleged equitable tolling. Plaintiff alleges he sought three 13 remedies prior to filing the instant lawsuit: “Plaintiff provided [Defendants] notice of the 14 constitutional violations through multiple grievances, FOIA requests, and a Brady motion 15 beginning in 2023.” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 5.) To the extent these remedies were sufficiently similar to his 16 claims here, Plaintiff sought these remedies at the earliest in 2023–again, long after the statute of 17 limitations barred Plaintiff’s claims. (Id.; Dkt. No. 2-6 at 21 (Brady motion filed on June 4, 2025); 18 Dkt. No. 2-7 at 7, 14 (“California Public Records Act Request for Evidence of Factual Innocence” 19 received on June 24, 2025 and responded to on July 2, 2025).) “Tolling” a statute of limitations 20 does not re-open a statute of limitations that has already passed; that is why equitable tolling 21 requires “timely notice to the defendants.” See, e.g., Cervantes, 5 F.3d at 1275 (emphasis added). 22 So, Plaintiff’s claims are not equitably tolled because “the assertions of the complaint, read with 23 the required liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Jablon, 24 614 F.2d at 682. 25 9 Defendant argues Plaintiff’s supervisory claims would also fail for an independent reason: 26 absolute immunity shields prosecutors from suits over their “general methods of supervision and training” and over training regarding constitutional obligations because those are “directly 27 connected with the prosecutor’s basic trial advocacy duties.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 1 Plaintiff’s other arguments why the statute of limitations does not bar his claims are 2 unavailing. Throughout his complaint and opposition brief, Plaintiff contends (1) he “could not 3 have reasonably discovered the factual basis for these claims until February 13, 2025,” (2) “the 4 County’s refusal to produce exculpatory evidence constitutes fraudulent concealment that 5 triggered the ‘cause and prejudice’ standard;” (3) tolling occurs “where the government’s 6 misconduct deprives the plaintiff of a timely filing opportunity;” (4) “extrinsic fraud- here, the 7 DA’s intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence – allows a court to set aside procedural 8 bars;” (5) a miscarriage-of-justice exception applies; and (6) there is no statute of limitations for 9 “Fraud-on-the-Court” claims. (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 5, 52; Dkt. No. 10 at 6, 8-9.) 10 Plaintiff’s first argument appears to invoke California’s “discovery rule,” under which a 11 cause of action does not begin to accrue “until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, 12 the cause of action.” Fox, 35 Cal. 4th at 806. Under the rule, “the plaintiff discovers the cause of 13 action when he at least suspects a factual basis, as opposed to a legal theory, for its elements, even 14 if he lacks knowledge thereof.” Norgart v. Upjohn Co., 21 Cal. 4th 383, 397 (1999). California’s 15 “discovery rule” does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims because it governs the date of accrual, which 16 “is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace, 539 U.S. at 17 388 (italics in original); see Fox, 35 Cal. 4th at 807 (noting the rule is an “exception to the general 18 rule of accrual” and “postpones accrual”).10 19 Even if the Court applied the “discovery rule,” “the court places the burden on the plaintiff 20 to show diligence,” id. at 808 (cleaned up), that is, “to show he was not negligent in failing to 21 discovery his injury sooner.” Cleveland v. Internet Specialties West, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 24, 22
23 10 Courts sometimes use the term “toll” to mean a delay of accrual, but these are distinct concepts. For instance, the same Fox opinion describes the “discovery rule” as meaning a statute of 24 limitations “will be tolled until such time as a reasonable investigation would have revealed its factual basis.” Id. at 803 (emphasis added). Despite this characterization, the California Supreme 25 Court has made clear the “discovery rule” is a rule about the accrual date of a cause of action, not tolling. See, e.g., Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 7 Cal. 4th 926, 931 (1994) (noting the 26 “discovery rule” is a “close cousin” of tolling principles); Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1109 (1988) (“The discovery rule provides that the accrual date of a cause of action is delayed 27 …”). 1 31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). Plaintiff claims he did not receive a transcript of his preliminary hearing 2 until February 13, 2025 because all previous court clerks told him the transcript was “destroyed.” 3 (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 52.) But Plaintiff fails to explain why he failed to suspect defects in his prosecution 4 as it progressed nearly 30 years ago. At the hearing, Plaintiff stated he did not have legal training 5 in 1995, but the “discovery rule” hinges on when Plaintiff “suspect[ed] a factual basis, as opposed 6 to a legal theory,” for his claims. Norgart, 21 Cal. 4th at 397. Plaintiff was present at the 7 preliminary hearing where the government explained the charges and evidence against him, (see 8 generally Dkt. No. 2-2), and Plaintiff received a bench trial where he was represented by counsel. 9 (Dkt. No. 2-1 at 2.) And given the nature and timing of the preliminary hearing, nothing in the 10 hearing transcript could have informed Plaintiff of facts that occurred after the hearing, which is 11 virtually his entire prosecution and period of detention. (See generally Dkt. No. 2-2.) 12 Plaintiff’s other five arguments as to why the statute of limitations does not bar his claim 13 are unavailing because none of Plaintiff’s cited rules and cases pertain to Section 1983 claims. The 14 “cause and prejudice” standard in Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988) is exclusively for habeas 15 cases, and Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) is also a federal habeas case. So, these cases do 16 not allow the Court to set aside procedural bars in civil cases. The Court also could not locate a 17 case “Carrier v. United States, 319 U.S. 493 (1943).” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 5).11 Next, Hazel-Atlas Glass 18 Co v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 328 (1944) and United States v. Throckmorton, 58 U.S. 61 19 (1878) addressed fraud in civil proceedings and said nothing about a statute of limitations for 20 Section 1983 claims. And to the extent Plaintiff argues his criminal conviction was fraudulently 21 obtained, this would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” meaning his 22 “complaint must be dismissed.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. 23 So, based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s law- 24 library claim and Counts V, IX, X, XI, XII. 25 // 26 11 There is a 1943 case with a similar reporter, McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943), but this 27 case interprets the Fair Labor Standards Act. And there is a Fifth Circuit case with the same name, 1 C. Plaintiff’s Request for a Stay is Denied 2 Finally, in his opposition brief, Plaintiff requests a “stay of the proceedings” in the event 3 the Court determines Heck bars his claims. (Dkt. No. 10 at 4.) The Court denies Plaintiff’s 4 request. The failure to allege a cause of action is not a basis for a stay. At the hearing, Plaintiff 5 suggested he recently appealed a state court’s denial of his motion to vacate the judgment in his 6 criminal case. This does not justify a stay because the Court’s dismissal of Heck-barred claims is 7 without prejudice; if his conviction is invalidated, Plaintiff may bring a new lawsuit with those 8 claims, except for his false arrest claims. See supra, Section I.A; Wallace, 549 U.S. at 392–97.12 9 D. Plaintiff’s Motions to Disqualify and for Leave to Amend 10 1. Motion to Disqualify 11 Plaintiff moves to disqualify the Office of San Mateo County Counsel from representing 12 the individual Defendants because (1) California Government Code Section 811.9(a) does not 13 authorize the office to represent the individual Defendants, and (2) there is a non-waivable conflict 14 of interest between the County and the individual Defendants because, in defending the Monell 15 claim, the County may argue the official was not acting within the scope of his employment and 16 the individual Defendants will argue the opposite.13 The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s application to 17 file a late reply. (Dkt. No. 18.) 18 Neither argument warrants disqualification. First, California Government Code Section 19 811.9(a) neither authorizes nor forbids representation here because it only addresses defenses for 20 12 Wallace noted the Heck bar “delays what would otherwise be the accrual date of a tort action 21 until” the conviction is set aside. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 392. In other words, claims that are Heck- barred are not barred by the statute of limitations because, under Heck, those claims never accrued 22 to begin with. Wallace, however, announced an exception to this accrual rule for false arrest claims “where the arrest is followed by criminal proceedings.” Id. at 397. Unlike other Section 23 1983 claims, such false arrest claims accrue “before the existence of [] the related criminal conviction,” i.e., the conviction that erects the Heck bar. Id. at 396–97. Accordingly, the statute 24 of limitations for pre-conviction false arrest claims “begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process.” Id. So, here, if Plaintiff’s conviction becomes 25 invalidated, he would not be able to bring false arrest claims in a new lawsuit because those claims accrued when he was detained pre-trial nearly 30 years ago. 26 13 As a preliminary matter, Defendants objects to Plaintiff’s motion because Plaintiff did not attach a declaration in support of the motion’s factual contentions. The Court overrules Defendants’ 27 objection because the only factual contention in Plaintiff’s motion is that the individual 1 “judges, subordinate judicial officers, and court executive offers of the superior courts.” Cal. Gov. 2 Code § 811.9(a). By contrast, Section 825 contemplates the County’s authority to represent the 3 individual Defendants because it provides “if an employee or former employee of a public entity 4 requests the public entity to defend him or her” against claims arising out of the scope of their 5 employment. Id. § 825(a). Second, there is no actual conflict of interest here because all 6 Defendants argued and prevailed on theories unrelated to the scope of employment, namely Heck 7 and the statute of limitations. 8 2. Motion for Leave to Amend 9 Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the Complaint for the sole purpose of replacing the middle 10 name of Defendant Stephen Hall, whom Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the same day he filed the 11 motion for leave. (Dkt. Nos. 13, 14.) One factor a court considers is whether the amendment 12 would be futile because the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss; “[f]utility 13 alone can justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 815, 818 14 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Plaintiff’s amendment would be futile because, as the Court ruled above, 15 Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Hall (Counts III and VII) would be barred by Heck. (See Dkt. 16 No. 1 ¶¶ 65-68, 83–85.) 17 CONCLUSION 18 Based on the analysis above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion and DISMISSES 19 Plaintiff’s claims as to all Defendants, without leave to amend. Plaintiff’s claims, read with the 20 required liberality, are barred by Heck v. Humphrey and the statute of limitations. And the Court 21 DENIES Plaintiff’s request to stay this case while he pursues other efforts to vacate his 1995 22 conviction. Plaintiff already unsuccessfully attempted to vacate his conviction pursuant to Penal 23 Code section 1473.6, People v. Park, No. A169048, 2024 WL 4862152, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 24 18, 2024), reh'g denied (Dec. 5, 2024), review denied (Jan. 29, 2025), and through a writ of error 25 coram nobis, People v. Park, No. A162603, 2021 WL 5979286, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 26 2021). In any event, the dismissal of his claims as barred by Heck is without prejudice to his 27 bringing those claims in a new lawsuit if his conviction is vacated. 1 separate judgment will be entered. 2 This Order disposes of Docket Nos. 9, 12, 14, 18, 19. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 Dated: November 21, 2025 5 6 ne 7 AC@QUELINE SCOTT CORLE United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 a 12
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