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Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX 21-AUG-2025 07:52 AM Dkt. 324 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I
JENNIFER TONE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Ann Ornellas Fernandes, MARY ANN K. BODE, in her capacity as attorney-in-fact for MARY ANN O. FERNANDES, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. ANNETTE HASHIMOTO and ALAN HASHIMOTO, Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, and JOHN DOES 1-20; JANE DOES 1-20; DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-20; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-20 and DOE GOVERNMENTAL UNITS 1-20, Defendants
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT (CASE NO. 5CC161000099)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER (By: Leonard, Presiding Judge, McCullen and Guidry, JJ.)
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Jennifer Tone as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Ann Ornellas
Fernandes (Fernandes) appeals from the March 1, 2022 First
Amended Judgment (Amended Judgment) entered by the Circuit Court NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
of the Fifth Circuit (circuit court).1 Defendants-Appellees/
Cross-Appellants Annette Hashimoto (Annette) and Alan Hashimoto
(Alan) (collectively, the Hashimotos) cross-appealed from the
Amended Judgment.
Annette is one of Fernandes' six adult children. In
June 2016, Fernandes filed a Complaint, naming Annette and Alan
as defendants, and alleging that Annette had made unauthorized
personal purchases using Fernandes' funds during the period of
time in which Annette had power of attorney to take actions on
Fernandes' behalf. The Hashimotos filed a counterclaim.
Following a bench trial, the circuit court entered judgment in
favor of Fernandes and against Annette, but awarded Fernandes
zero dollars in damages.
Fernandes' statement of the points of error lists
thirteen points, as follows:
Point of Error Number 1: The [circuit] court abused its discretion by allowing re-litigation of liability in an equitable accounting and damages hearing.
. . . .
Point of Error Number 2: The [circuit] court erred by allowing exhibits not seen by [Fernandes] [to be] introduced at trial.
Point of Error Number 3: The [circuit] court erred by disregarding orders in limine in the middle of the trial without prior notice to the parties.
1 The Honorable Randal G.B. Valenciano presided.
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Point of Error Number 4: The [circuit] court abused its discretion in the scope of its sua sponte questioning of the witnesses and rulings from the bench.
Point of Error Number 5: Whether the [circuit c]ourt erred in failing to presume fraud for transactions where a fiduciary failed to account for a given transaction made while she was acting in a fiduciary capacity.
Point of Error Number 6: The [circuit] court erred by failing to award costs as a matter of course to the prevailing party when summary judgment has been granted in favor of one party due to discovery misconduct[.]
Point of Error Number 7: The [circuit] court erred by relying upon exhibits introduced by [Fernandes] beyond the limited purpose of their introduction.
Point of Error Number 8: The [circuit] court erred in its failure to impose a constructive trust.
Point of Error Number 9: The [circuit] court erred by sua sponte stating that this lawsuit was an abuse of process without any cause of action to that effect pled by either party[.]
Point of Error Number 10: The [circuit] court abused its discretion by declining to award any damages to [Fernandes].
Point of Error Number 11: The [circuit] court erred by failing to dismiss Alan Hashimoto without prejudice.
Point of Error Number 12: The October 1, 2019 Findings of Fact [(FOFs)], Conclusions of Law [(COLs)], and Order are erroneous. In the alternative, [FOFs] 2, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41, 49, 53, 54, 55, 60, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, and 78 and the [COLs] were made in error.
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Point of Error Number 13: The [circuit] court erred by failing to admit the selected deposition testimony of Mary Ann O. Fernandes.
The Hashimotos argue on appeal2 that the circuit court
erred in entering judgment in favor of Fernandes: (1) "because
it is not supported by the record"; (2) "because the failure to
prove damages was a failure to prove an essential element of
each claim made against [Annette]"; (3) "because of collateral
estoppel based upon the Frow Doctrine"; (4) "based upon the
discovery master's recommendation"; and (5) "where the dismissal
of the counterclaim was without prejudice." (Formatting
altered.)
Upon careful review of the record, briefs, and
relevant legal authorities, and having given due consideration
to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties,
we resolve the above points of error and arguments as follows.
I. Fernandes' Appeal
(1) Fernandes' points of error 2, 4, and 7 are waived.
Fernandes contends, as point of error 2, that the circuit court
"allowed exhibits into evidence that had never been seen by Ms.
Fernandes' counsel" and "relied extensively upon those surprise
exhibits" in the FOFs and COLs. It appears that the exhibits
2 The Hashimotos' opening brief does not set forth specific points of error, as required by Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28, but purports to "incorporate by reference" the statement of points of error on cross-appeal that was filed under HRAP Rule 10(b)(4).
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referenced by Fernandes, Defendants' Exhibits "A" and "B," are
not in the record on appeal. Fernandes' contention of error as
to those exhibits is therefore waived. See Union Bldg.
Materials Corp. v. Kakaako Corp., 5 Haw. App. 146, 151-52, 682
P.2d 82, 87 (App. 1984) ("The law is clear in this jurisdiction
that the appellant has the burden of furnishing the appellate
court with a sufficient record to positively show the alleged
error" and "must include in the record all of the evidence on
which the lower court might have based its findings and if this
is not done, the lower court must be affirmed.") (citations
omitted).
Fernandes contends, as point of error 4, that the
circuit court abused its discretion in sua sponte questioning
witnesses during the bench trial, but agrees it "was not
specifically objected to" and seeks plain error review. "Legal
issues not raised in the trial court are ordinarily deemed
waived on appeal," and we thus decline to address this
contention. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Wailea Elua v. Wailea
Resort Co., 100 Hawaiʻi 97, 107, 58 P.3d 608, 618 (2002)
(citations omitted).
Fernandes contends, as point of error 7, that she
"offered Exhibits 23 and 151 into evidence for the limited
purpose of showing that a demand for an accounting was made,"
but the circuit court "relied extensively upon Exhibit 23 as
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proof of [Fernandes'] generous character." Fernandes withdrew
Exhibit 151, which was not received into evidence. And Exhibit
23, which was Fernandes' own exhibit, was received into evidence
without any objections by Fernandes and without any limitations
on its use. These contentions are therefore waived.
(2) Fernandes contends, as point of error 12, that
various FOFs and "the [COLs] were made in error." Fernandes'
blanket contention lacks merit in light of the unchallenged
FOFs. Circuit court FOFs,
are presumptively correct and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. An appellant's mere challenge of a finding does not [place] the onus of justifying it on this court. The party seeking to overthrow findings has the burden of pointing out specifically wherein the findings are clearly erroneous.
Campbell v. DePonte, 57 Haw. 510, 513, 559 P.2d 739, 741 (1977)
Fernandes fails to explain why each challenged FOF is
clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence. We
therefore decline to address these challenges. See Exotics
Haw.-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 116 Hawaiʻi
277, 288, 172 P.3d 1021, 1032 (2007) (Appellate courts are "not
oblig[ated] to address matters for which the appellants have
failed to present discernible arguments.") (citations omitted);
Stanford Carr Dev. Corp. v. Unity House, Inc., 111 Hawaiʻi 286,
296-97, 141 P.3d 459, 469-70 (2006) ("It is not the function of
appellate courts to second-guess the trier of fact where there
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is substantial evidence in the record to support its
conclusion.") (citations omitted).
(3) Fernandes contends, as point of error 3, that the
circuit court disregarded its order granting her motions in
limine by "allowing relitigation of every fact alleged in the
Complaint," "allowing inquiry into the fate of J.B. Fernandes'
financial records and explicitly stating that he would not
adhere to the findings of the discovery master," "allowing
extensive evidence not produced in discovery," and reevaluating
Annette's liability which "had been established."
"[A] trial court's ruling on a motion in limine is not
a final ruling on the admissibility of the evidence in question,
but only preliminary in nature, and subject to reconsideration
as the evidence in the trial is fully developed." Craft v.
Peebles, 78 Hawaiʻi 287, 296, 893 P.2d 138, 147 (1995) (citation
omitted). Here, Fernandes complains of areas of inquiry that
Fernandes' own counsel pursued at trial. While Fernandes
disagrees with a question regarding J.B. Fernandes' financial
record keeping, Fernandes' attorney asked questions on this same
topic. Fernandes also complains about cross-examination
questions asked by her own attorney.
Moreover, although Fernandes complains of evidence
(i.e., Defendants' Exhibits "A" and "B") not produced in
discovery, the circuit court admitted that evidence because
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those exhibits were originally created by Fernandes, and the
Hashimotos did not possess them before trial.
Fernandes' point of error 3 therefore lacks merit.
(4) Fernandes' points of error 1, 5, and 10
collectively contend that the circuit court erred in finding
that Fernandes failed to prove damages, and erred in entering
judgment in favor of Fernandes, due to Annette's default, but
awarding zero damages. "Generally, we do not disturb the
findings of the trial court on the issue of damages absent a
clearly erroneous measure of damages." Castro v. Melchor, 142
Hawaiʻi 1, 16, 414 P.3d 53, 68 (2018) (citations omitted).
The record reflects that the issue of damages involved
a dispute between Fernandes' testimony that Annette's purchases
were not authorized, and Annette's testimony that they were
authorized. The circuit court resolved this factual question in
favor of Annette, and Fernandes did not properly challenge
numerous consequential FOFs that support this decision.
Although Annette was defaulted on liability, that default did
not preclude Annette from contesting the amount of her liability
and damages. See Dela Cruz v. Quemado, 141 Hawaiʻi 338, 347, 409
P.3d 742, 751 (2018). Fernandes did not satisfy her burden of
proving the amount of damages "with reasonable certainty" and
without reliance on "mere speculation or guess." Ferreira v.
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Honolulu Star-Bull., Ltd., 44 Haw. 567, 576, 356 P.2d 651, 656
(1960).
We determine that the circuit court did not err by
awarding Fernandes zero damages.
(5) Fernandes contends, as point of error 13, that the
circuit court erred by not admitting Fernandes' deposition
testimony where her "lack of memory did not become apparent
until she actually testified at trial," and she "could not
remember basic, important information necessary for her to make
her case." We review the circuit court's ruling on the
admissibility of deposition testimony at trial under the abuse
of discretion standard. Wilart Assocs. v. Kapiolani Plaza,
Ltd., 7 Haw. App. 354, 361, 766 P.2d 1207, 1212 (App. 1988). "A
trial court's exercise of discretion in ruling on the
admissibility of depositions will be upheld unless an abuse of
discretion is manifest." Id. (cleaned up).
Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 32 governs
the use of depositions at trial, and Rule 32(b) requires a party
to designate and disclose such witness depositions "at least 30
days before trial." Here, Fernandes' counsel does not dispute
that he failed to satisfy HRCP Rule 32(b)'s requirement to
designate the deposition thirty days before trial. Fernandes'
request to designate the deposition testimony was therefore
untimely, and Fernandes' point of error 13 lacks merit.
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(6) Fernandes contends, as point of error 8, that the
circuit court erred in declining to impose the remedy of a
constructive trust because "there was a confidential
relationship," and Annette refused to uphold a promise to
reconvey the property to Fernandes or Anita, who is Annette's
sister.
A constructive trust arises where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it. A constructive trust will be imposed if a transfer of land was obtained in an abuse of a confidential relationship. . . . It is necessary that both a confidential relationship and reliance upon a promise to reconvey induced by that relationship be shown.
It is well established in this jurisdiction that a constructive trust will be imposed only when the evidence is clear and convincing.
Kam Oi Lee v. Fong Wong, 57 Haw. 137, 139-40, 552 P.2d 635, 637-
38 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The circuit
court's conclusion that Fernandes was not entitled to equitable
relief under the theory of constructive trust is a conclusion of
law that we review under the right/wrong standard. Maria v.
Freitas, 73 Haw. 266, 270, 832 P.2d 259, 262 (1992).
The record does not reflect that Fernandes produced
any evidence of a promise by Annette to reconvey the Hookipa
property to Fernandes or any other party. The January 29, 2010
quitclaim deed and Annette's "Hawaii General Durable Power of
Attorney" do not contain any promise that Annette must reconvey
the Hookipa residence to Fernandes or a third party. The
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quitclaim deed only reserved a life estate for Fernandes.
Moreover, Annette's testimony does not evidence a promise to
convey the property to her sister, Anita, or to any other family
member.
We therefore determine that the circuit court was not
wrong in declining to impose the remedy of a constructive trust.
(7) Fernandes' points of error 6 and 9 contend that
the circuit court erred in declining to award fees and costs
because Fernandes was the prevailing party, and "it is not an
abuse of process to pursue a claim that does not have merit."
We review the circuit court's denial of attorneys'
fees and costs under the abuse of discretion standard. Sierra
Club v. Dep't of Transp., 120 Hawaiʻi 181, 197, 202 P.3d 1226,
1242 (2009).
We determine that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in denying attorneys' fees and costs to Fernandes.
Even assuming that Fernandes can be considered the prevailing
party,3 we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its
discretion in this regard. It appears that the circuit court
did not make a finding that Fernandes committed the claim of
3 It is unclear whether Fernandes was a prevailing party in the underlying litigation, given Fernandes' failure to prove damages with reasonable certainty and the circuit court's consequent award of zero damages. See All. Platforms, Inc. v. Behrens, 305 P.3d 30, 35 (Kan. Ct. App. 2013) ("In the present case, [the plaintiff] failed to prove the damages element. . . . Thus, it is questionable whether [the plaintiff] prevailed on any of its claims.").
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abuse of process. It did, however, explain that "because the
statute of limitations had run[,] . . . the only way [Fernandes]
could sue [Annette] to get the property back was to figure out
an end run around the statute of limitations, and that's what
happened in this case." The circuit court therefore exercised
its discretion in denying fees and costs on the basis that, as
"[Fernandes] disclosed[,] . . . the true motivation for this
lawsuit was never the breach of fiduciary duty." See Bishop Tr.
Co. v. Cent. Union Church of Honolulu, 3 Haw. App. 624, 630, 656
P.2d 1353, 1358 (App. 1983) ("[T]he denial of costs to the
prevailing party is in the nature of a penalty for some fault on
his part in the course of litigation.") (citation omitted).
(8) Fernandes contends, as point of error 11, that the
circuit court "has limited discretion to deny a motion to
dismiss without prejudice," and erroneously required her "to
choose between litigating a case that she wanted dismissed" or
"requesting that it be dismissed with prejudice."
The record reflects that Fernandes is not aggrieved
because the Amended Judgment incorporates the May 12, 2021
"Order Granting [Fernandes'] Motion to Dismiss Alan Hashimoto
with Prejudice, Filed June 30, 2020." That order granted
Fernandes the precise relief that she sought in her June 30,
2020 "Motion to Dismiss Alan Hashimoto with Prejudice." This
contention therefore lacks merit.
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II. The Hashimotos' Cross-Appeal
(1) The Hashimotos generally assert that the circuit
court's judgment is "not supported by the record," and that
there are insufficient FOFs to support the judgment.
(Formatting altered.) The Hashimotos further assert that the
circuit court erred in entering judgment in favor of Fernandes
because it awarded zero dollars in damages. These arguments
lack merit, consistent with our discussion in part I, supra.
(2) The Hashimotos argue that judgment should have
been entered in favor of Annette because Alan was dismissed with
prejudice, and Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552 (1972) protects
against conflicting judgments with jointly liable defendants.
The Hashimotos' arguments regarding the applicability of Frow
were not raised before the circuit court. These arguments are
therefore waived, and we decline to address them on appeal.
(3) The Hashimotos next argue that the circuit court
erred by entering judgment in favor of Fernandes based on the
discovery master's default of Annette. Annette contends that
"the [d]iscovery [m]aster exceeded his authority," and that the
default of Annette "did not comply with Hawaii law where there
was no deliberate delay, no contumacious conduct, and less
drastic sanctions were available."
We review the circuit court's default sanction order
for an abuse of discretion. Weinberg v. Dickson-Weinberg, 123
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Hawaiʻi 68, 71, 229 P.3d 1133, 1136 (2010). The sanction "must
be commensurate with the offense" and "[a]bsent evidence of a
willful failure to comply or extensive prejudice to the
opposition, . . . the granting of an order striking a party's
pleadings constitutes an abuse of discretion." Id. at 75-76,
229 P.3d at 1140-41 (cleaned up). This court has previously
recognized that the "drastic sanctions of dismissal and default
judgment are authorized only in extreme circumstances." W.H.
Shipman, Ltd. v. Hawaiian Holiday Macadamia Nut Co., 8 Haw. App.
354, 361, 802 P.2d 1203, 1207 (App. 1990) (cleaned up).
The record reflects that the discovery master
defaulted Annette for not responding to Fernandes' September 5,
2017 discovery requests by the November 8, 2017 deadline, and
found Alan's hospitalization for burn injuries to be irrelevant
because Annette failed to timely respond to the discovery
requests. The discovery master denied reconsideration, finding
that Annette's February 8, 2018 discovery responses and
objections were untimely. The discovery master further ordered
that, due to Annette's default, "the fact that Annette Hashimoto
did not keep receipts, disbursements[,] and transactions
conducted on behalf of Mary Ann O. Fernandes is established."
The circuit court granted Fernandes' motion for
partial summary judgment and her motions in limine based on the
discovery master's default sanction.
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The record reflects that default was a
disproportionate penalty for untimely discovery responses since
no trial date had been set at the time of the discovery
disputes, Fernandes received an extension to file her pretrial
statement and had independently obtained many bank records
demanded from Annette,4 the discovery delays partially occurred
during Alan's one-month hospitalization for serious burn
injuries, and Annette eventually filed discovery responses. We
therefore conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion
by entering the July 29, 2019 order, which reconsidered the
April 15, 2019 order setting aside the discovery master's
rulings that defaulted Annette as to liability. See Weinberg,
123 Hawaiʻi at 76, 229 P.3d at 1141 (concluding that the family
court abused its discretion and the sanction of precluding
witnesses and documentary evidence for failing to meet pretrial
deadlines "was tantamount to entering a default" without any
finding of bad faith).
We further conclude, however, that this error was
harmless because the circuit court's judgment awarded zero
damages in favor of Fernandes. See Merrill v. Penrod, 704 P.2d
4 During the damages trial, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Mary Ann K. Bode (Bode) testified that, in 2015, Fernandes requested and received various bank records. Moreover, Annette gave Bode a box of records for Fernandes that included checks, bills, a ledger, and later provided Bode with tax returns from 2008 to 2014. The circuit court noted its concern that "all along the plaintiffs had the documents that they were complaining they never [had]."
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950, 959 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that any error in the
court's finding of negligence "was harmless" because "no damages
were proven to have resulted"); see also Takahashi v. Kualu, 17
Haw. 87, 88 (Haw. Terr. 1905) (stating that the defendant's
challenge to the trial court's ruling "does not require a
reversal of the judgment" because if the ruling "had been the
other way the judgment would still have to be for the plaintiff"
based on "the findings that were properly made by the trial
judge, and the amount of damages would have been as great and
perhaps greater"). We therefore decline to overturn the circuit
court's judgment on the basis of its default sanction against
Annette.
(4) The Hashimotos argue that the circuit court erred
"in entering judgment in favor of [Fernandes] and against [the
Hashimotos] on the counterclaim[s], where the dismissal of the
counterclaim[s were] without prejudice." (Formatting altered.)
The circuit court's Amended Judgment found in favor of
Fernandes, and against the Hashimotos, on all five of the
Hashimotos' July 26, 2016 counterclaims. As explained supra,
the Amended Judgment awarded zero damages and no fees or costs
to Fernandes. The Hashimotos contend that, because they "may
relitigate the claims in the [c]ounterclaim[s]," the circuit
court committed reversible error by "enter[ing] judgment in
favor of [Fernandes] and against the Hashimotos on the
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[c]ounterclaim[s], where res judicata would apply to the
[c]ounterclaim[s]."
The circuit court's May 4, 2017 order, which dismissed
the Hashimotos' counterclaims without prejudice for failure to
state a claim,5 is itself a judgment on the merits. See Caires
v. Kualoa Ranch, Inc., 6 Haw. App. 52, 57, 708 P.2d 848, 851-52
(App. 1985) (instructing that a dismissal for failure to state a
claim under HRCP Rule 12(b)(6) is a "judgment on the merits").
The Hashimotos did not appeal from the May 4, 2017 dismissal
order.
Moreover, the record reflects that the Hashimotos did
not subsequently seek leave to file any new or amended
counterclaims. In so doing, the Hashimotos elected to stand on
their original counterclaims -- i.e., the counterclaims that
were dismissed for failure to state a claim, and that were
thereby resolved on the merits in the circuit court's May 4,
2017 dismissal order. See Save the Bull Trout v. Williams, 51
F.4th 1101, 1109 (9th Cir. 2022) ("Dismissal for failure to
state a claim is a judgment on the merits for purposes of claim
preclusion. The judgment on the merits became final and
preclusive when [the appellants] abandoned their opportunity to
5 The order stated that Fernandes' "Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims for Failure to State Claims Upon Which Relief May be Granted is hereby GRANTED. Defendants Annette Hashimoto and Alan Hashimoto's Counterclaims shall be dismissed without prejudice." (Emphasis omitted.)
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amend.") (citations omitted). Under these circumstances, we
determine that the circuit court did not err in entering
judgment in favor of Fernandes on the previously dismissed
counterclaims.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the March 1, 2022
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, August 21, 2025.
On the briefs: /s/ Katherine G. Leonard Presiding Judge Matthew Mannisto, for Plaintiffs-Appellants/ /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen Cross-Appellees. Associate Judge
Lance S. Au, /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry for Defendants-Appellees/ Associate Judge Cross-Appellants.