Tommy Dewayne Robertson a/k/a Tommy Robertson v. State of Mississippi

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-CP-00806-COA

TOMMY DEWAYNE ROBERTSON A/K/A APPELLANT TOMMY ROBERTSON

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/22/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. SMITH MURPHEY COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: PANOLA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TOMMY DEWAYNE ROBERTSON (PRO SE)

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/11/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND EMFINGER, JJ.

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Tommy Dewayne Robertson filed a motion for post-conviction collateral relief in the Circuit Court of Panola County, Mississippi, seeking relief from the circuit court’s partial revocation of his suspended sentence. Following the court’s dismissal of his claim for relief, Robertson appealed. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Robertson was indicted for aggravated domestic violence as a violent habitual offender in April 2021. On September 16, 2021, Robertson pled guilty to aggravated domestic violence as a non-violent habitual offender pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated

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section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2020). He was sentenced to serve a term of twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) as a non-violent habitual offender; but that sentence was suspended, and Robertson was placed on three years of supervised probation. ¶3. On June 22, 2022, the State filed a petition to revoke his suspended sentence based upon Robertson having committed a new felony offense, felony fleeing, while on probation. A revocation hearing was conducted on August 25, 2022, with Robertson and his attorney present. At the hearing, Water Valley police officer Toby Britt testified that on February 8, 2022, he observed a vehicle traveling at a speed of 98 miles per hour. Britt activated his blue lights to initiate a traffic stop. When the vehicle failed to stop, Britt turned on his siren and pursued the vehicle. Britt testified that his radar showed the vehicle reaching speeds up to 130 miles per hour. Britt testified that the driver was reckless in passing a truck going up a hill and passing a car in a curve. Britt indicated that the chase covered about eight miles before it came to a stop in the adjoining county. Britt testified that he drew and held his service weapon on the driver and had to instruct the driver to roll down his window four times before he complied. Britt told the court that the driver was talking on the phone during this time. When other officers arrived, Britt placed the driver under arrest and put him into the patrol car. Britt identified Robertson as the driver of the vehicle. ¶4. On cross-examination, Britt admitted that the incident occurred between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. and that there was not much traffic on the road at that time. According to Britt, the

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chase lasted approximately five to ten minutes. Britt admitted that he could not honestly say that Robertson was trying to evade him. On re-direct examination, Britt testified that there was some traffic on the road that night and that Robertson’s behavior placed those persons in danger. Britt also confirmed for the court that this entire chase occurred on a two-lane road and that he never saw Robertson apply his brakes at any point prior to stopping. Britt told the court that in his opinion, Robertson knew that he was trying to stop him. ¶5. Robertson testified in his own defense after being advised of his rights. Robertson testified that he was just speeding on his way home that night. Robertson said that he saw an oncoming car flash its headlights, which made him think there was a roadblock ahead of him. He then saw the blue lights flashing and pulled over. He admitted that he passed other vehicles along the way. According to Robertson, he told Britt he had been convicted of felony fleeing before, and that was not what he was doing this time. On cross-examination, Robertson testified that the car he was driving belonged to his girlfriend and that he was talking to her on the phone after he was stopped. Robertson stated that he was calling her to come get her car because he knew he did not have a driver’s license and would likely go to jail. ¶6. Officer Britt returned to the witness stand in rebuttal. He told the court that when he had stated that he could not say Robertson was trying to evade him, he meant that “Robertson did not try to turn off on any roads, side streets or anything.” Britt stated that he drove behind Robertson with his blue lights activated for over a mile while they were the only two vehicles

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on the road. After hearing the testimony and the arguments of counsel, the trial court found that the State had proved it was more likely than not that Robertson committed the crime of felony fleeing. The court revoked Robertson’s probation and sentenced Robertson to serve five years of his sentence as a habitual offender. ¶7. Robertson filed a motion for post-conviction relief contending that his probation was unlawfully revoked. The trial court summarily dismissed Robertson’s claim for relief, finding pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-11 (Rev. 2020) that it appeared from the face of the motion that Robertson was not entitled to any relief. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8. In Hardison v. State, 317 So. 3d 978, 982 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021), this Court held:

“This Court employs the clearly-erroneous standard of review when reviewing a trial court’s summary dismissal of a PCR motion.” Smith v. State, 291 So. 3d 1, 5 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Lofton v. State, 233 So. 3d 907, 908 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). We will affirm a court’s “summary dismissal of a defendant’s PCR motion ‘if he fails to demonstrate a claim procedurally alive substantially showing the denial of a state or federal right.’” Id. (quoting Moore v. State, 248 So. 3d 845, 848 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Id. (citing Lofton, 233 So. 3d at 908 (¶9)).

DISCUSSION

¶9. Robertson represents himself on appeal and raises several issues, which we address below. Robertson phrased his first issue as follows:

The trial court violated Robertson’s Fourth Amendment that requires arrest warrants be based upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation a requirement that may be satisfied by an indictment returned by a grand jury but not by the mere filing of criminal charges in an unsworn information signed

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by the prosecutor.

Robertson’s handwritten argument under this issue covers a total of ten lines. He makes no meaningful argument concerning the stated issue. Instead, he writes:

Robertson was violated because of this indictment signed by the prosecutor that held the revocation hearing. Not by the prosecutor that signed Petition to Revoke Probation.

He seems to contend that the prosecutor who signed the petition to revoke should have been the prosecutor at the revocation hearing. Robertson cites no authority for this assertion, and we are not aware of any such legal requirement. This issue is without merit. ¶10. The second issue raised by Robertson reads:

The trial court erred when Robertson was denied due process when the officer Toby Britt admitted at the preliminary hearing and also at the revocation hearing that he honestly could not say that Robertson was making any effort to evade him nor were there any other felony arrest as a result to this traffic stop.

Robertson contends that because Britt testified, at first, that he could not say Robertson was trying to “evade” him, the evidence at the hearing was not sufficient to support his revocation.1 As noted above, Britt explained he meant that Robertson had not tried to turn off the road they were on. In any event, in Rowell v. State, 347 So. 3d 231, 234-35 (¶¶15-16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022), this Court explained the elements required to prove felony fleeing:

To commit felony eluding, a driver must have first committed the misdemeanor of “Failure to Stop”:

1 We conduct a de novo review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a revocation. See Jackson v. State, 157 So. 3d 105, 106 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015).

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(1) The driver of a motor vehicle who is given a visible or audible signal by a law enforcement officer by hand, voice, emergency light or siren directing the driver to bring his motor vehicle to a stop when such signal is given by a law enforcement officer acting in the lawful performance of duty who has a reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver in question has committed a crime, and who willfully fails to obey such direction shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .

Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-72(1) (Rev. 2014).

The second part of the statute requires that a person must first be found “guilty of violating subsection (1).” It then adds an element, requiring proof that a person either “operat[ed] a motor vehicle in such a manner as to indicate a reckless or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property, or . . .

operate[d] a motor vehicle in a manner manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-72(2).

Britt’s testimony showed that all these elements were met. As noted above, because Robertson was speeding, Britt attempted to make a traffic stop by activating his blue lights and his siren. Robertson failed to stop and actually increased his speed up to 130 miles per hour. Robertson continued driving at excessive speeds and passing vehicles on a two-lane road. Britt testified that this was reckless behavior that placed those persons in danger. The pursuit covered about eight miles and lasted approximately five to ten minutes. Based upon our review of the evidence presented at the hearing, we find the evidence was legally sufficient to support Robertson’s revocation. This issue is without merit.2

2 Robertson again challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in his seventh assignment of error. He contends that the evidence proved nothing more than speeding and that he should have been found guilty of a technical violation of his probation. Based upon our finding that the evidence was legally sufficient to show that it was more likely than not that he was guilty of felony fleeing, this argument, too, is without merit.

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¶11. The third issue Robertson raised on appeal states:

The trial court erred in allowing two District Attorney’s to hold Robertson revocation. District Attorney Robert Schultze filed the petition to revoke Probation Sentence District Attorney Steven P. Jubera who signed unsworn information that had Robertson at revocation hearing were both in hearing as one.

Again, Robertson makes no meaningful argument concerning the issue as he stated it. Instead, he argues that the judge “must promptly conduct a hearing” to determine probable cause and that he did not waive that hearing. Robertson states that the judge allowed Britt to change his testimony. He mentions “[a]s an alternative ground for claiming absolute immunity” but does not explain or cite authority. Robertson merely mentions “1983” and “the threat of retaliatory lawsuits.” Because Robertson provides no meaningful argument and cites no supporting authority, we find he has waived appellate review of this issue. See Clark v. State, 387 So. 3d 1055, 1059-60 (¶¶13-14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). ¶12. The fourth issue raised by Robertson reads:

The trial court erred when the fact finder failed to issue a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reason for revoking Robertson PRS.

In support of these specific contentions, Robertson again makes no meaningful argument. Instead, in two sentences, he mentions only that he was given no discovery of the evidence against him and that he did not receive a preliminary hearing. Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(3), no issue not distinctly identified may be argued on appeal. While these issues are waived, they are also without merit. As for a preliminary hearing, because Robertson failed to raise this issue before the trial court prior to the final revocation

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hearing, he has waived this issue. See Jamison v. State, 332 So. 3d 892, 898-99 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022).3 Further, regarding pre-hearing discovery, Robertson was represented by counsel at the hearing, and neither Robertson nor his counsel raised this issue with the trial judge. This argument is without merit. ¶13. The fifth issue raised by Robertson states:

The trial court erred by not informing the probation officer of a violation; nor was a probation officer at the revocation hearing. The Probation Officer never conducted a presentence investigation nor submit a report to the court before trial court imposes sentence.

In this issue, Robertson contends that his probation officer did not conduct an investigation or interview him. Robertson contends that his probation officer did not know he was being revoked and was not at the hearing. Robertson cites no authority to support this claim of error, and we find no statutory requirement to support his claim. This issue is without merit. ¶14. In the sixth issue raised by Robertson on appeal, he states:

The trial court erred in Defect in the indictment, Cause No. CR2022-22-JMY2.

Robertson has never been convicted of strong armed burglary of automobile.

Also never talked to nor seen attorney Cory M. Williamson. Robertson was never afforded a fair opportunity to present a defense.

This issue appears to be unrelated to the present case. However, we take judicial notice of the records of the Circuit Court of Yalobusha County, Mississippi, in Cause No. CR 2022-22

3 We also note that the failure to conduct the preliminary hearing is not cause for reversal of Robertson’s revocation. See Phillips v. State, 236 So. 3d 840, 842 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).

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JMY2.4 In that cause, Robertson was indicted based on the felony-fleeing arrest made by Officer Britt, as described in Britt’s testimony at the revocation hearing in the present case. The records show that Cory M. Williamson, while not appearing in the present case, was appointed to represent Robertson on the Yalobusha County indictment. That charge was remanded to the files on April 13, 2023, as a result of the revocation and sentence in the present case. This issue is not relevant to the matter at hand and is, therefore, without merit.

CONCLUSION

¶15. We find the circuit court did not err by summarily dismissing Robertson’s claim for post-conviction relief. ¶16. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.

4 We may take judicial notice of court records filed on the Mississippi Electronic Courts system that are readily available and cannot be reasonably disputed. See Jackson v. State, 394 So. 3d 420, 432 (¶43) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024).