Tomer v. Aiken

101 N.W. 769, 126 Iowa 114
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedDecember 15, 1904
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 101 N.W. 769 (Tomer v. Aiken) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tomer v. Aiken, 101 N.W. 769, 126 Iowa 114 (iowa 1904).

Opinion

Ladd, J.—

i Negligence-diagnosis. Only two errors are argued, but these involve tbe twelve points raised in appellants’ belief. Tbe one challenges tbe propriety'of a hypothetical question, and the °^er the sufficiency of the evidence to support |jje verdict On the 26th day of June, 1902, the plaintiff undertook to repair the tin roof on his house. When descending from the porch, he placed one foot on a stepladder about five feet high, which slipped, and he fell to the ground. The outer end of the collar bone, or clavicle, was dislocated from the shoulder blade, or scapula, •or, technically speaking, the dislocation was of the clavicle [116]*116from the acromion process. Dr. Aiken was called, but refused to treat the patient unless another physician were present. The family explained that they had been unable to get any one else, and the physician then sent for Dr. Trout to assist him. Upon his arrival, Tomer was examined, and, according to four witnesses, the physicians announced that the collar bone had been fractured or broken. Two of these were uncertain of the language used, while the physicians testified they concluded that it'was a'dislocation only, and .Dr. Aiken that he had explained to Tomer that the collar bone was broken away from the scapula; and in this he is confirmed by another witness. While the physician, in trying to explain the injury so as to be within the comprehension of those not familiar with medical terms, may have been misunderstood, yet the evidence was such as to leave the question as to whether the case was properly diagnosed an open one for the" jury’s determination.

2 Negligent Treatmenttreatment: If it be conceded, however, that the physicians declared it a case of fracture of the clavicle, rather than dislocation, they are not liable, unless improper treatment followed. No • one claimed on the trial that the clavicle had been fractured, nor was'there any evidence that the dressing applied was adapted peculiarly to remedying that defect. If suitable at all, it was as appropriate to the reduction of a dislocation. In these circumstances there was no occasion to submit the issue raised in the first count of the petition that, because of a mistake in the diagnosis, the plaintiff had been treated for a fracture, rather than a dislocation, to the jury. If the treatment was such as reasonable skill and care exacted for the cure of a dislocated clavicle, defendants were not liable, regardless of what their diagnosis may have been; otherwise they were.

[117]*117„ 3. Negligence: evidence. [116]*116II. Was the dressing such as should have been used in reducing the dislocation and. securing rearticulation ? Ordinarily, little difficulty is experienced in reducing the dislocation. The trouble is to retain the bones in a position so [117]*117that articulation will be effected. Tbe narrow extremity of tbe articulating surface, tbe movability of tbe ° . shoulder, tbe contraction of tbe muscles, and the possibility of ligaments falling between, render tbe result somewhat experimental. In applying the dressing difficulty is experienced in securing a purchase which will bold the bones on tbe same level. Dr. Eoss, upon whose testimony as an expert plaintiff relied, freely admitted that “ there is no assurance under any form of treatment that the bone is going to stay there,” and testified farther that “ the results are not always satisfactory under any form of treatment, but the majority of them get well. Complete is more difficult than incomplete dislocation, but are sometimes successful. The majority are successful under modern methods.” In this view all the physicians concurred. Failure to effect a cure under such circumstances furnishes no evidence of want of care or skill. The patient suffered considerable pain, but this, as the evidence shows, may have been incident to the character of the injury.

4. Same The accident occurred on Wednesday, and Dr. Aiken did not call again until the Sunday following, and not again a week from that day. If the injury required no attention during the intervals, he was not chargeable for neglect, if any there was; and in determining whether he was negligent Dr. Boss’s custom in his own practice cannot be accepted as the criterion. That must necessarily depend upon the custom or practice in similar localities in the treatment of such injuries. But if Aiken was negligent in not attending his patient as frequently as he should, this was no fault of Trout. He had nothing to do with the case after the first dressing was applied, and was in no. way responsible for anything that happened thereafter, unless resulting from some defect therein; and the jury should have been so instructed.

[118]*1185. Improper treatment evidence: [117]*117III. The dressing was put on at about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, and in the evening plaintiff’s attendant tried to [118]*118reach Aiken, but could not do so, by telephone. She then telephoned for Dr. Trout, who responded that ^ , , .. . 1 . ne could not come, and., upon a second inquiry, that he was in bed, and could not come. Without other showing save that Tomer was suffering much pain, which is usual in such cases, Dr. Boss was asked, in substance, whether, under the circumstances disclosed, it would be proper treatment for a doctor to refuse to attend a patient. There was no claim that any relapse or evil'consequences resulted. Another physician in fact called and thinned the wad under the arm. The employment of Trout had terminated at the completion of the dressing, lie had the perfect right to refuse to be employed farther, especially while the attending physician was still in charge of the case. Moreover, he was not advised that Aiken, who was at home, but temporarily without telephone connection, could not he found. As the case stood then, Aiken knew nothing of plaintiff’s wish that .he call, and did not learn of it until Sunday, the day he had set for his next visit; and Trout was not in plaintiff’s employment, and was under no legal obligation to' attend him. Manifestly, then, the objection to the question should .have been sustained. That the answer, consisting of a somewhat extended discourse on medical ethics, was prejudicial, we entertain no doubt.

TV. If defendants were negligent, it was in the method of dressing' adopted. This was described by Dr. Aiken as follows:

6. Improper Treatment expert evidence. The end of the bone had been forced through the capsule. There was only the thin skin over the end of the bone; skin was almost broken through, and bleeding; had started through the skin. We examined it carefully, and the end of the bone seemed sharp. That was our first impression, but we made up our minds it was simply the cartilage pressing there. 'We reduced it. We prepared adhesive plasters, bandages, and compresses; elevated the shoulder upwards and outwards; reduced the dislocation; put a small firm compress over the [119]*119clavicle, just as near as we could to tbe injured skin; then took a wide strip of adhesive plaster, put it down across bis chest,- brought it over this pad, carried it to one side of the wound in the skin, brought the pressure on there to keep the clavicle down, then fastened it clear down his. back.

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Bluebook (online)
101 N.W. 769, 126 Iowa 114, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tomer-v-aiken-iowa-1904.