Tome v. Marshall

7 Navajo Rptr. 569
CourtUnited States District Court
DecidedNovember 4, 1998
DocketNo. SR-CV-67-95
StatusPublished

This text of 7 Navajo Rptr. 569 (Tome v. Marshall) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States District Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tome v. Marshall, 7 Navajo Rptr. 569 (usdistct 1998).

Opinion

ORDER

Judge Lorene Ferguson presiding.

THIS MATTER came before this Court on a Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer. The Plaintiffs are also seeking sanctions and further injunctive relief. Upon review of the record and upon having conducted a hearing, this Court makes the following findings:

1. In SR-INJ-776-72, a default judgment was entered on December 12, 1974 and the Court ordered a permanent injunction in which the only named Defendant was Raymond Marshall and in which the court ordered the following:

Mr. Marshall be permanently restrained and enjoined horn verbal and physical harassment of Plaintiffs.
Mr. Marshall be permanently restrained and enjoined from “interfering with or encroaching upon the grazing rights of the Plaintiffs [and Mr. Marshall shall] forever refrain from trespassing onto Plaintiffs’ customary grazing use area, and shall cease any and all attempts at constructing any buildings upon Plaintiffs’ customary grazing area....”
Mr. Marshall [shall] remove trailer house and all related structures and any and all equipment from the present disputed site, at the earliest convenience, to any location near his mother’s customary grazing area, provided he shall obtain proper permission and consent before relocating.
Defendant shall abide by any and all established grazing and homesite regulations and he shall make all necessary arrangements with the appropriate authorities, to graze his allowable sheep units of 20 sheep units near his birthplace as allowed pursuant to his father’s grazing permit and 10 sheep units at Oak Springs as allowed from that original grazing permit obtained horn his spouse’s side, and Defendant shall make any and all necessary arrangements to utilize his dual purpose grazing permit on a yearly rotating basis of six months at or near his birthplace near his mother’s customary grazing area and six months at or near the Oak Springs area, and all appropriate authorities shall be notified of the arrangement at the earliest convenience.1

[570]*5702. In SR-INJ-776-72, the Defendant Raymond Marshall failed to appear and the Court found that sufficient cause had been shown that the Defendant should utilize the said permit according to customary usage of the original permits, mainly on a yearly rotating basis of six months near the disputed area and six months in the Oak Springs area. Mr. Raymond Marshall is the only named Defendant in SR-INJ-776-72. Plaintiff was represented by Charley John.

3. In SR-OSC-181-75, an Order to Show Cause was issued to Mr. Raymond Marshall by Judge Joe Benally on July 25, 1975, which was not served, and by Judge Homer Bluehouse on August 08, 1975, which was served upon Mr. Marshall on the same day.

4. In SR-INJ-776-72, an order for summary judgment contempt and for seizure was issued by Judge Charley John, and it is not clear whether he was counsel for the Plaintiffs previously. On October 19, 1978, Mr. Marshall was ordered to jail for 90 days by Judge Charley John.

5. Judge Perry Garnenez denied Mr. Marshall’s motion to correct error on October 24, 1979, ordering that summary judgment remain.

6. In SR-CV-312-84, regarding SR-INJ-776-72, an Order was issued on January 10, 1986 by Judge Harry Brown ordering Raymond Marshall and “all relatives and members of his household” to comply with the permanent injunction issued on December 12, 1974. This is the first time other individuals were named Defendants. Also for the first time, the Court began to specify the area as “all relatives and members of his household who occupy and reside on the customary grazing land of the Plaintiff situated east of Mitten Rock and west of the east wing of the Shiprock peak.” The Court further ordered Raymond Marshall and “all relatives and members of his household” to comply with the permanent injunction issued on December 12, 1974 as follows:

a. Not to verbally, physically harass plaintiffs.

b. Not to encroach or trespass upon grazing areas of plaintiffs.

c. Cease any and all construction of buildings or other structures upon the grazing area of plaintiffs.

d. Remove, within 20 days, from the date of this Order, mobile home and any and all other structures erected on the said grazing area of the plaintiffs.

7. A motion for reconsideration was filed and Shiprock District Court Judge Harry Brown denied the motion on February 14, 1986. Mr. Raymond Marshall filed a motion for stay of execution with the Navajo Nation Supreme Court. The Navajo Nation Supreme Court issued an order on March 19, 1986 denying the motion with the following language:

a. Order from which the motion is based confirms the validity of an Order issued on December 12, 1974.

b. Appellant stipulated on January 08, 1988 that he failed to comply with the December 12, 1974 Order and he had been found in contempt.

c. No bond was deposited by Appellant Marshall to protect interest of the Appellees.

[571]*571d. It is not in the best interest of the judicial system to delay a valid order.

8. This Order was followed with a memorandum decision issued on May 05, 1986. In this decision, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court stated:

The Appellant’s argument that because the customary use area referred to in the injunction is not described by boundaries, therefore the injunction should be vacated, is without merit. The parties know the area is disputed and the injunction enjoins the appellants from encroaching and constmcting on the disputed area. The appellants are imputed with knowledge of the disputed area, therefore specifying boundaries in the injunction is unnecessary. Should the parties desire further clarification, then the District Court is the proper forum for that purpose only. The District Court has discretion to clarify that issue without invalidating the permanent injunction.

FORCIBLE ENTRY and DETAINER and MOTION for INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

This action came to this Court as a Forcible Entry and Detainer Action. This action is based totally upon the Permanent Injunction entered on December 12, 1974. While it is the intent of a Forcible Entry and Detainer action to be swift and immediate, this Court, while reviewing the record in its entirety, finds the case has a history plagued with disparity. In order to do justice, this Court has carefully reviewed the record.

In Malone v. Yazzie, 1 Nav. R. 88 (1994), the Navajo Nation Supreme Court decided a case involving an on-going dispute over a grazing permit and a home-site lease. The Court stated:

A review of the record reveals broader issues than what was originally presented to the Court. The dispute over the homesite lease and grazing permit is a part of a bigger dispute between the parties on appeal, and others, concerning use rights to the land. A decision on the issues of the grazing permit and the homesite lease alone, will not settle the entire matter. For that reason, we believe that the bigger dispute concerning the various parties’ alleged interests in the land must be decided before the grazing permit and homesite lease issues can be resolved.

Id. at 89. Such is the case here.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
7 Navajo Rptr. 569, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tome-v-marshall-usdistct-1998.