Tomblin v. Del Toro
This text of Tomblin v. Del Toro (Tomblin v. Del Toro) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
NICKY S. TOMBLIN,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-3782 (CJN)
JOHN C. PHELAN, Secretary of the Navy, et al.,
Defendant.
ORDER
Plaintiff Nicky Tomblin, a retired Navy midwife, initiated this APA action to challenge a
temporary, performance-based restriction that the Navy placed on her midwifery privileges. See
ECF No. 1 at 1 & ¶¶ 6–7. After filing the administrative record, Defendants moved for summary
judgment on the basis that the Navy’s restriction was neither contrary to law nor arbitrary and
capricious. See ECF No. 16 at 1.
Shortly before Tomblin’s combined cross-motion and opposition was due, her counsel
withdrew from representation. See Min. Order of Oct. 15, 2024; ECF No. 17. Tomblin then moved
for a temporary stay of the briefing schedule while she sought to retain new counsel, see ECF No.
18; the Court granted that motion and ordered Tomblin to file a status report by December 7, 2024,
apprising the Court of her efforts to obtain new counsel and proposing a revised briefing schedule,
if necessary. See Min. Order of Nov. 8, 2024. On that date, Tomblin filed a further motion “for
more time to obtain the appropriate legal counsel for my case,” “at least 1–2 months.” ECF Nos.
19, 20. The Court granted that motion and ordered a status report by January 12, 2025. See Min.
Order of Dec. 13, 2024. 1 After nearly four months had elapsed and Tomblin still had not filed a status report or
requested additional time in which to do so, the Court ordered her by April 30, 2025 to “file an
explanation in writing as to why this case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and D.C. Local Civil Rule 83.23.” Min. Order of Apr. 4,
2025. The Court also warned Tomblin that, if she did not “file a timely and adequate response,
this matter shall be dismissed without prejudice.” Id. The Clerk then mailed the Court’s order to
Tomblin. See id.
Tomblin did not file anything by the Court’s April 30, 2025 deadline, and so the Court—
“in view of the entire procedural history of the case”—now finds that Tomblin “has not manifested
reasonable diligence in pursuing” her claims. Bomate v. Ford Motor Co., 761 F.2d 713, 714 (D.C.
Cir. 1985). The Court will accordingly dismiss Tomblin’s case under Rule 41(b) for failure to
prosecute. Id.; see also Peterson v. Archstone Communities LLC, 637 F.3d 416, 418 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (“District courts have inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte for a plaintiff’s failure to
prosecute . . . .”). In keeping with the “default rule” in this court, the Rule 41(b) dismissal shall
be without prejudice. Robinson v. Hemingway, 2023 WL 8369934, at *2 (D.D.C. 2023) (citing
LCvR 83.23).
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 16, is DENIED AS
MOOT.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this case.
2 DATE: May 8, 2025 CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge
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