Tomasena Dureeka Rivers v. County of Kern, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TOMASENA DUREEKA RIVERS, Case No. 1:25-cv-01684-JLT-CDB

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DISCHARGING DECEMBER 4, 2025, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 13 v. (Docs. 3, 4-8) 14 COUNTY OF KERN, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 15 Defendants. TO DISMISS ACTION WITH PREJUDICE AS TIME-BARRED 16 (Docs. 1, 3) 17 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD 18 19 Plaintiff Tomasena Dureeka Rivers (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 20 initiated this action with the filing of a complaint on December 1, 2025, against Defendants County 21 of Kern, State of California, Kern County Department of Human Services (“KCDHS”), California 22 Department of Social Services (“CDSS”), KCDHS Director Lito Morillo, Program Director 23 Valerie Rangel, and Appeals Specialist Bethany Wade (collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 1). For 24 the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends this action be dismissed as time-barred. 25 I. Discharging Order to Show Cause (Doc. 3) 26 On December 4, 2025, the undersigned ordered Plaintiff to show cause (“OSC”) in writing 27 why this action should not be dismissed as time-barred. (Doc. 3). The undersigned noted in the 28 1 California Code of Civil Procedure § 335.1, and no tolling provisions appear applicable. See id. 2 at 4-5. Plaintiff was ordered to file a response to the OSC within 21 days from the date of service 3 of the order. Id. at 5-6. 4 On December 16, 2025, Plaintiff timely filed a response to the OSC. (Doc. 4). Therein, 5 Plaintiff represents that she seeks enforcement of a unspecified court order issued on October 2, 6 2018, and argues that “Defendants’ ongoing refusal to comply with [the order] constitutes a 7 continuing and present violation, not a completed past act.” Id. at 1. Plaintiff asks the Court 8 to forbear from dismissing on timeliness grounds and permit this matter to proceed for 9 enforcement of the aforementioned judgment. Id. at 2. 10 Thereafter, Plaintiff filed two notices of supplemental evidence in support of her response 11 to the OSC as well as supplemental notices of “ongoing harm” and for “enforcement and relief.” 12 See (Docs. 4-9). In the first supplemental notice, Plaintiff represents the October 2, 2018, court 13 order referenced in her response to the OSC is a final decision issued on that date by an 14 administrative law judge (“ALJ”) (Jodie Berger) of the State of California Department of Social 15 Services (“CDSS”). See (Doc. 5). In her supplemental notices of ongoing harm, Plaintiff reaffirms 16 that Defendants have failed and refused to fully comply with the state court order. See (Docs. 7, 17 8, 9). 18 In light of Plaintiff’s timely response to the OSC, the Court’s December 4, 2025, OSC 19 (Doc. 3) is discharged without the imposition of sanctions. For the reasons set forth below, the 20 undersigned will recommend this action be dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiff’s claims are 21 time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. 22 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 23 Plaintiff names as Defendants County of Kern, State of California, KCDHS, CDSS, 24 KCDHS Director Lito Morillo, Program Director Valerie Rangel, and Appeals Specialist Bethany 25 Wade. (Doc. 1 at 1). Plaintiff brings this civil rights action under Section 1983, alleging 26 Defendants’ wrongful actions resulted in the wrongful termination of public benefits, interference 27 with medical care, emotional distress, financial harm, and violation of her due process rights. Id. 28 1 distress, and punitive damages of $100,000.00 against individual Defendants Rangel and Wade. 2 Id. at 4. Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief requiring Defendants to implement the ALJ decision 3 and comply with lawful orders, for grant of declaratory relief affirming her rights under the ALJ 4 order, Section 1983, and the State of California Constitution, and for reasonable attorney’s fees 5 and costs. Id. The complaint is signed and dated December 1, 2025. Id. 6 Plaintiff alleges that on October 2, 2018, an ALJ issued a lawful decision ruling that 7 Plaintiff is in a separate household for Cal-works and CalFresh eligibility purposes. Id. ¶ 10. She 8 alleges that despite the ALJ’s decision, on October 31, 2018, KCDHS unlinked Plaintiff’s 9 CalFresh benefits in violation of the ALJ order. Id. ¶ 11. Beginning in 2018 and continuing 10 through 2024, Plaintiff experienced Medi-Cal disruptions and denials due to Defendants’ failure 11 to implement the ALJ decision, actions of which resulted in loss of medical care, emotional 12 distress, financial harm, and permanent physical injury. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. Plaintiff alleges she 13 repeatedly sought compliance from Defendants, but they failed to follow the ALJ decision. Id. ¶ 14 14. 15 Plaintiff asserts five causes of action. In Claim 1, she asserts a Fourteenth Amendment due 16 process violation under Section 1983, alleging Defendants deprived her rights to due process by 17 failing to follow the ALJ’s lawful order and that Defendants’ actions were arbitrary, capricious, 18 and caused harm to Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. In Claim 2, Plaintiff asserts a Fourteenth Amendment 19 equal protection violation under the Section 1983, alleging Defendants treated Plaintiff differently 20 than similarly situated individuals without justification, violating her right to equal protection. Id. 21 ¶ 18. In Claim 3, she asserts a negligence/gross negligence claim, alleging Defendants owed her 22 a duty of care to follow lawful orders and administer benefits properly, and that Defendants 23 breached that duty, resulting in foreseeable harm, including medical disruption, financial loss, and 24 emotional distress. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. In Claim 4, she asserts a claim for intentional infliction of 25 emotional distress, alleging Defendants’ conduct was extreme and outrageous and intended to or 26 recklessly caused severe emotional distress. Id. ¶ 22. In Claim 5, she asserts a claim for failure to 27 enforce the ALJ decision under “WIC § 10962,” alleging that Defendants ignored a lawful 28 1 administrative hearing order in violation of California law requiring counties to follow such 2 decisions. Id. ¶ 23. 3 III. Screening Requirement 4 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must conduct an initial review of a pro se 5 complaint proceeding IFP and shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the 6 allegation of poverty is untrue, or that the action or appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state 7 a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 8 immune from such relief. See Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal required 9 of in forma pauperis proceedings which seek monetary relief from immune defendants);; Barren 10 v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a 11 claim); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court has discretion to 12 dismiss IFP complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)). If the Court determines that a complaint fails 13 to state a claim, leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint 14 can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 15 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 16 In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading 17 standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). The complaint must contain “a short 18 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recital of the elements of a 20 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 21 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A 22 complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack 23 of cognizable legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri 24 v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff must allege a minimum 25 factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each defendant fair notice of what 26 the plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, e.g., Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of 27 the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 28 1 true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 2 However, although a court accepts as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court 3 need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[A] complaint [that] 4 pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability … ‘stops short of the line 5 between the possibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 6 Courts may deny a pro se plaintiff leave to amend where amendment would be futile. 7 Flowers v. First Hawaiian Bank, 295 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, 8 Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990)); see Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 9 66 F.3d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to 10 amend is proper only if it is clear that the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment or after the 11 pro se litigant is given an opportunity to amend). 12 IV. Discussion 13 Having completed a preliminary screening of Plaintiff’s complaint and considering 14 Plaintiff’s representations in her responses to the OSC (Docs. 4-8), the undersigned finds that this 15 action is time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations for the federal and state law claims 16 advanced, and Plaintiff has not shown she is entitled to equitable tolling to enlarge the statute of 17 limitations to state her claims. 18 A time-barred claim may be dismissed at the screening stage when expiration of the 19 applicable statute of limitations is apparent on the face of the complaint. See Belanus v. Clark, 20 796 F.3d 1021, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at 21 Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the 22 ground that it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations only when “the running of the statute 23 is apparent on the face of the complaint”); Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1275 (9th 24 Cir. 1993) (claim may be dismissed under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on the ground that 25 it is barred by the statute of limitations “if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required 26 liberality, would not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled”). “A complaint cannot 27 be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would 28 1 v. United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995)). 2 The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is based on state law. Canatella v. Van De 3 Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007). Federal courts in California have held that the state's 4 statute of limitations for personal injury actions, which is two years, applies to Section 1983 claims. 5 Id. (applying two-year statute of limitations to the plaintiff’s breach of privacy- and 6 confidentiality-based claims); see Cal. Code Civ. P. § 335.1. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s § 1983 7 claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure § 8 335.1. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); e.g., A.G. v. Cnty. of Siskiyou, 9 No. 2:24-cv-01375-DJC-CKD, 2024 WL 4682417, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2024). Accrual of § 10 1983 claims is dictated by the “discovery rule” which provides that a claim has accrued “when the 11 plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action and the cause of 12 that injury.” Gregg v. Hawaii, Dept. of Public Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2017). This 13 does not mean that a plaintiff must be aware of the full extent of the injuries for accrual to occur 14 and a plaintiff must still be “diligent in discovering the critical facts.” Bibeau v. Pac. Nw. Rsch. 15 Found. Inc., 188 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999). 16 Here, Plaintiff alleges that on October 31, 2018, KCDHS unlinked her CalFresh benefits 17 in violation of an order of an ALJ from the State of California Department of Social Services 18 (“CDSS”) rendered on October 2, 2018, on Plaintiff’s eligibility to state welfare benefits. (Doc. 1 19 ¶¶ 10-11); see (Doc. 5). She alleges that “[b]eginning in 2018 and continuing through [2026], 20 [she] experienced Medi-Cal disruptions and denials due to Defendants’ failure to implement the 21 ALJ decision” thereby resulting in Plaintiff’s alleged harm. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 12-13); see (Doc. 7 at 1) 22 (alleging that “[f]rom 2018 through 2026, Defendants have failed and refused to fully comply with 23 the [ALJ’s] judgment and rulings entered in Plaintiff’s favor.”). 24 As the undersigned noted in the OSC, these allegations show that Plaintiff’s claims accrued 25 on October 31, 2018, when KCDHS unlinked her welfare benefits in violation of the ALJ’s order, 26 and therefore the two-year statute of limitations would have run well before the complaint was 27 filed on December 1, 2025. Gregg, 870 F.3d at 887; Cal. Civ. Code § 335. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s 28 1 3063245, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2023) (dismissing complaint with prejudice as time-barred 2 under California statute of limitations where plaintiff alleged California Department of 3 Transportation terminated his SNAP benefits “more than 16 years after his employment was 4 terminated.”); Rogers v. City of Grover Beach, No. 2:18-10590 PSG (ADS), 2020 WL 5868038, 5 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020) (recommending dismissal of all of plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, 6 including for a due process violation, as time-barred under California’s two-year statute of 7 limitations which “expire[d] two years from the time plaintiff knows or has reason to know of his 8 injury[.]”), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5847302 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2020). 9 Although Plaintiff pleads that she “experienced Medi-Cal disruptions and denials” 10 “through 2024,” this pleading does not extend the two-year statute of limitations such that her 11 complaint filed in 2025 would be timely. That is because a claim under section 1983 “‘accrues,’ 12 and the statute of limitations begins to run, ‘[w]hen the plaintiff has a complete and present cause 13 of action, that is, when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.’” Cobb, 2023 WL 3063245, at 14 *3 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)). As noted above, Plaintiff’s claim accrued 15 on October 31, 2018, when Defendant KCDHS unlinked her welfare benefits in violation of the 16 ALJ’s order, notwithstanding that she alleges suffering harm resulting from the allegedly 17 unconstitutional conduct of Defendants at various times thereafter. 18 To proceed on her claims, Plaintiff must either establish that her claims accrued at a later 19 date and/or that the limitations period for those claims should be equitably tolled. “Equitable 20 tolling under California law ‘operates independently of the literal wording of the Code of Civil 21 Procedure’ to suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental 22 practicality and fairness.’” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lantzy v. 23 Centex Homes, 31 Cal.4th 363, 370 (2003)). “Application of California’s equitable tolling doctrine 24 requires a balancing of the injustice to the plaintiff occasioned by the bar of his claim against the 25 effect upon the important public interest or policy expressed by the ... limitations statute.” Id. 26 (quoting Lantzy, 31 Cal.4th at 371). For purposes of determining applicability of equitable tolling, 27 lower courts are directed to consider the extent to which defendant had notice of the instant claims 28 1 in an earlier action, prejudice to the defendant, and the plaintiff’s good faith in filing the second 2 claim. Azer v. Connell, 306 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 2002). 3 As the undersigned acknowledged in the OSC, Plaintiff’s complaint includes a notice of 4 rejection of claim dated September 19, 2025, representing that the Kern County Board of 5 Supervisors rejected Plaintiff’s claims submitted on August 5, 2025, and provided six (6) months 6 from the date the notice was deposited in the mail to file a court action on the claim. (Doc. 1 at 7 5); see (Doc. 3 at 5). At the time of the OSC, Plaintiff did not address this notice letter in her 8 complaint, nor did she allege whether her claims are tolled such to inform the Court whether any 9 tolling statutes are applicable to the circumstances. Thus, it appeared Plaintiff’s claims are time- 10 barred under the statute of limitations absent any indication Plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling. 11 See (Doc. 3 at 5). 12 Indeed, upon review of Plaintiff’s response to the OSC, including her supplemental notices 13 in support thereof (Docs. 4-8), Plaintiff fails to show that she is entitled to equitable tolling. 14 Plaintiff’s response alleging that “Defendants have failed and refused to comply with the October 15 2, 2018[,] order” and that “[t]he ordered relief has not been fully implemented, and Defendants 16 remain out of compliance to this date” confirms that Defendants’ adverse decision in unlinking 17 her benefits in violation of the ALJ’s order on October 31, 2018, triggered her right to relief and 18 thereby commenced the statute of limitations as of the date of that adverse decision. See (Doc. 7 19 at 1, 3). Nor does Plaintiff’s response compellingly characterize her claim as a “continuing 20 violation” for purposes of expanding or invoking equitable tolling principles to enlarge the statute 21 of limitations to state her claims under § 1983. See Flynt v. Shimazu, 940 F.3d 457, 462 n.3 (9th 22 Cir. 2019) (“Rather than ‘one on-going violation,’ a continuing violation is really ‘a series of 23 repeated violations.’ … And ‘[b]ecause each violation gives rise to a new cause of action, each 24 [violation] begins a new statute of limitations period as to that particular event.’”) (citing Knight 25 v. Columbus, 19 F.3d 579, 582 (11th Cir. 1994)) (emphases added). 26 Moreover, Plaintiff’s reliance on Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 27 113-14 (2002) for the proposition that “[w]here noncompliance persists, enforcement relief 28 1 see (Doc. 4 at 1), is unfounded and unconvincing. Morgan addressed whether acts of workplace 2 discrimination and retaliation that fall outside of Title VII’s statutory time period for filing charges 3 are actionable under Title VII. The court there noted that hostile environmental claims under Title 4 VII “are different in kind” from discrete acts of workplace discrimination and involve “repeated 5 conduct” such that a single act of harassment “may not be actionable on its own.” Morgan, 536 6 U.S. at 115. Instead, “[a] hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts 7 that collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice’” under Title VII. Id. at 117. Thus, 8 contrary to Plaintiff’s asserted proposition, Morgan did not hold even generally that “[w]here 9 noncompliance persists, enforcement relief remains timely and is not barred by statutes of 10 limitation applicable to new causes of action.” (Doc. 4 at 1). Rather, the court’s reasoning in 11 Morgan was linked expressly to the language of Title VII and the unique nature of the accrual of 12 a claim for hostile work environment. 13 In contrast here, Plaintiff’s claim—for redress based on Defendants’ failure to comply with 14 a state ALJ’s order regarding a discrete act of Medi-Cal benefit disruption and denial in or about 15 October 2018—is unlike a hostile work environment claim as Plaintiff’s claim was actionable on 16 its own without resort to separate, subsequent acts. See Lewis v. Salazar, No. 1:10–cv–01281– 17 OWW–DLB, 2011 WL 3813103, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2011) (finding § 1983 claim time- 18 barred, noting that “[t]he fact that an alleged violation of law causes continuing impacts does not 19 warrant application of the continuing violations doctrine.”) (citing Knox v. Davis, 260 F.3d 1009, 20 1013 (9th Cir. 2001)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim accrued in October 2018 when Defendants 21 allegedly unlinked his benefits in violation of the ALJ order, and any subsequent failure of 22 Defendants to implement the ALJ’s order appears to reflect decisions that resulted from the 23 implementation of that policy to unlink Medi-Cal benefits. See Carranza v. Lewis, No. 15-cv- 24 00682-YGR (PR), 2017 WL 1050538, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2017) (finding continuing 25 violation theory does not apply because plaintiff’s “due process claims arise out of a series of 26 discrete acts … [which] are ‘individualized decisions that resulted from implementation of a 27 policy’ to which the continuing violation doctrine does not apply. … Therefore, the date of accrual 28 1 would be when [p]laintiff was originally validated [as a gang member] on July 28, 2009, and not 2 on May 14, 2014, the day before he was found to be inactive.”) (internal citations omitted). 3 Additionally, Plaintiff’s reliance on the notion that “federal courts retain inherent and 4 continuing authority to enforce their judgments and compel compliance through civil contempt 5 and related sanctions[,]” see (Doc. 4 at 1) (citing United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 6 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947), is inapplicable here. Plaintiff asks the Court to enforce the decision 7 of an ALJ of the State of California, rather than a federal court order. See (Doc. 5 at 3-7) (decision 8 of State of California Department of Social Services ALJ Jodie Berger dated October 2, 2018). 9 Therefore, Plaintiff has not presented a valid order of this Court for which she seeks enforcement. 10 Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend that this action be dismissed with prejudice 11 as time-barred. 12 13 Remainder of This Page Intentionally Left Blank

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Conclusion, Order, and Recommendation 2 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 3 1. The Court’s December 4, 2025, order to show cause (Doc. 3) is DISCHARGED. 4 And it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 5 1. This action (Doc. 1) be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred; and 6 2. The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case. 7 These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 8 || assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after 9 || being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 10 || objections with the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, “Objections to 11 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without leave 12 || of Court and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. 13 || To the extent a party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the 14 record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the 15 || exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be disregarded by 16 || the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 17 || 636(b)(1)(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result in the 18 || waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 19 ll IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: _ January 29, 2026 | Wr bY 21 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28