Tolsma v. Tolsma's Estate

183 Mich. 314
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 18, 1914
DocketDocket No. 109
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 183 Mich. 314 (Tolsma v. Tolsma's Estate) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tolsma v. Tolsma's Estate, 183 Mich. 314 (Mich. 1914).

Opinion

Moore, J.

Henry Tolsma, deceased, was a bachelor and a farmer. His sister Mina Tolsma presented a claim against his estate. Her claim is that for 18 years, 6 months, and 18 days she kept his house, doing all the housework, making butter, raising chickens, making garden, attended to the personal wants of her brother, washed and mended his clothes, cooked his meals and meals for his hired help, and upon occasions worked out of doors picked up grubs on a new clearing, driving a horse in haying, and doing various other sorts of work for which it was agreed, to state it in the language of the claim filed by her—

“By said Henry Tolsma, deceased, and the undersigned, that the services performed as aforesaid by the undersigned, Mina Tolsma, were to be compensated and paid for by him the said Henry Tolsma, deceased, and that as such compensation the said Mina Tolsma was to have and receive the land constituting. the farm and home of said deceased in payment of the services rendered as aforesaid.”

The commissioners allowed the claim at $1,650. The claimant appealed to the circuit court, and, from a verdict and judgment of $6,770 in her favor, the case is brought here by writ of error.

We quote from the appellant’s brief:

“We will divide our brief into the following heads:
[316]*316“First. Errors in the ruling of the court, made before submitting the case to the jury.
“Second. Error in overruling defendant’s motion to direct a verdict.
“Third. Error in refusing defendant’s request to charge.
“Fourth. Errors in the charge.”

1. Under this head counsel claims it was error to allow Mrs. Kakabaker to testify as to the value of the services rendered, because it was not shown she was competent. This witness testified that she had known claimant many years, and lived during the summer seasons on a farm adjoining Henry Tolsma’s farm; that she knew much about the work that claimant did; that she was acquainted with work of the character done by claimant, and thought she knew its value. We think the testimony was competent. See Ritter v. Daniels, 47 Mich. 617 (11 N. W. 409); Lathrop v. Sinclair, 110 Mich. 329 (68 N. W. 248); Fowler v. Fowler, 111 Mich. 676 (70 N. W. 336); Miller v. Township of Meade, 128 Mich. 98 (87 N. W. 131).

The claimant produced four receipts bearing her signature, the aggregate total of which was $230, and testified that she and one of her brothers found them in a tin can under the kitchen floor after Henry died, in the space about three feet high, between the earth and the kitchen floor, which space was reached by a trapdoor, and that certain other papers were found in another tin can, which, upon cross-examination, it developed were bank certificates of deposit, belonging to the dead brother, which certificates were turned over to the administrator. Miss Tolsma testified that the receipts bore her signature, and that they were made at the time the receipts bear date. It is claimed this testimony was incompetent because equally within the knowledge of the deceased, counsel citing the statute and Schratz v. Schratz, 35 Mich. 485.

It is clear that the testimony of finding the receipts [317]*317was not incompetent because that occurred after the death of Henry. In the case of Schratz v. Schratz, supra, the claimant was allowed to testify to the contents of letters which had passed between claimant and deceased. The court, in holding this testimony inadmissible, said:

“There could be no question, admitting the testimony to be true, but that the contents of the letters were within the knowledge of the deceased, equally as within that of the witness. The letters, if they could have been produced, would have been admissible, but their loss or destruction would not change the rule and permit the witness to testify as to their contents.”

In the instant case the witness did not testify to the contents of the receipts, but they were put in evidence. What we have cited from the case justifies this course.

The other assignments of error may be considered together, because, if there was any question to go to the jury at all, it was submitted in a very long charge, in which the theory of defendant was stated to the jury, and the rights of the defendant as to the applicable law were carefully guarded.

The substance of the claim of appellant is stated by its counsel as follows:

“The court erred in overruling defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. The court should have directed a verdict in this case at the close of defendant’s testimony, because the plaintiff did not show that there was any contract relations existing between the plaintiff and deceased, and did not prove a case to be submitted to the jury. * * * There is absolutely no testimony to show that plaintiff was to receive anything for her work, or that the deceased ever agreed to pay her anything, or that he ever recognized that he was indebted to her. We maintain that plaintiff has not made as strong a case as in the case of Robinson v. McAfee, 59 Mich. 375 (26 N. W. 643).”

Counsel also cite Rodgers v. Lamb’s Estate, 137 Mich. 241 (100 N. W. 440). A reference to the first-[318]*318named case shows, as will appear later, that it is not controlling. In the last-named case Justice Montgomery, speaking for the court, made use of this significant language:

“Passing by the discrepancy between these statements, there may be enough in the latter to indicate an admission on the part of decedent of an obligation to pay. But if we assume that there was a scintilla of evidence to carry the case to the jury, we see no escape from holding that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. There was no evidence of a mutual, open account. In re Hiscock’s Estate, 79 Mich. 537 (44 N. W. 947).”

On the trial it was stipulated that the value of the real estate was $7,000. In the instant case it is not questioned that claimant did the work for which she put in a claim, but it was urged as a defense on the part of the estate that claimant admitted she had been paid. We quote from the testimony of a contesting brother, Alfred Tolsma:

“Mina Tolsma is my sister. I had some talk with her after Henry’s death. I had something to do with closing up the estate in the first instance. It was during the time of the petitioning the court for the appointment of an administrator. I asked her if she was going to put in a claim, and she said, ‘No;’ that she had had her pay; that Henry had paid her; that she had receipts from him — she had given him receipts. She did not say how many. She said she had an arrangement with Henry that Henry had paid her $50 a year up to the last two or three years, and then he commenced giving her $80, and she had the butter and eggs and what she would sell. This talk was back of the house on Henry Tolsma’s place.”

Miss Tolsma denied this conversation or any like conversation.

The character of the work done by Miss Tolsma was testified to by Edward Tolsma, a brother of Henry, who all the time lived within a mile and a half of the claimant. We quote part of his testimony:

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Bluebook (online)
183 Mich. 314, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tolsma-v-tolsmas-estate-mich-1914.