Toledo Business & Professional Women's Retirement Living, Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals
This text of 272 N.E.2d 359 (Toledo Business & Professional Women's Retirement Living, Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The taxpayer, a nonprofit corporation, owns and operates “low-rent retirement living apartments with attendant facilities for aged occupants.” The annual income maximum for occupancy is $5,250 for couples and $4,300 for individuals.
The “attendant facilities” include central, as well as individual kitchens, safety devices in the building, recreational activities designed for mental and physical therapy and advancement. Medical and nursing care are claimed to he available, but the record is thin as to the terms and conditions upon which it is furnished.
The argument for exemption is two-pronged. It is claimed that, by our decision in Carmelite Sisters, St. Rita’s Home, v. Bd. of Review (1969), 18 Ohio St. 2d 41, this court has adopted as the law the pronouncements contained in the dissenting opinion in Philada Home Fund v. Board of Tax Appeals (1966), 5 Ohio St. 2d 135. But if that claim is not well-founded, we are urged to promulgate those pronouncements as the law by a reversal in this case.
One barrier to the success of that argument was erected by the General Assembly in amending R. C. 5709.121 and enacting R. C. 5701.13,2 both in February 1968, after the [257]*257issues in the Carmehte case were framed. Those statutes represent the exercise of the constitutional power, which was recognized in the third paragraph of the syllabus of Denison University v. Board of Tax Appeals (1965), 2 [258]*258Ohio St. 2d 17, to determine exemptions from taxation. By their adoption, the General Assembly has marked for exemption from taxation “all property owned and used by a nonprofit organization exclusively for a home for the aged, as defined in” R. C. 5701.13, which established the criteria for a “home for the aged.”
Necessarily, that power is lodged exclusively in the General Assembly, and once it has chosen a specific subject for tax exemption, and defined the criteria, the function of the executive and judicial branches is limited to applying those criteria to a particular case, or to interpreting them if necessary. Any other interpretation of Section 2 of Article X of our Constitution would constitute an usurpation of the power thereby granted in favor of, and a co-sharing of that power by, those other branches.
Unlike the situation in Philada Home Fund v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra (5 Ohio St. 2d 135), In re Exemption of Real Property From Taxation by Lutheran Senior City (1967), 9 Ohio St. 2d 151; Crestview, Inc., v. Donahue (1968), 14 Ohio St. 2d 121, or even in Carmelite Sisters, St. Rita’s Home, v. Bd. of Review, supra (18 Ohio St. 2d 41), the taxpayer here frankly abjures the fact that any of its tenants or occupants will be afforded wholely or partially rent-free quarters if their financial plight would require it, or that the rents of some will be used to defray the costs of furnishing housing to others less fortunate financially. Thus, the taxpayer, while claiming to own and operate a home for the aged, does not meet the requirements of R. C. 5701.13, and therefore its property cannot be accorded tax-exempt status.
The taxpayer urges that R. C. 5709.121,3 effective Octo[259]*259ber 24,1969, vitiates the dissenting opinion in Philada Fund Home v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra (5 Ohio St. 2d 135). But its general language cannot be construed to affect the special requirements of E. C. 5709.12 and 5701.13, as amended and adopted respectively a year and one-half earlier.
A third barrier to the argument is that Carmelite Sisters, St. Rita’s Home, v. Bd. of Review, supra (18 Ohio St. 2d 41), decided that the institution therein involved was not an “employer” within the meaning of E. C. 4141.04(A)-, and thus was not liable to contribute to the unemployment compensation fund because its activities were “confined exclusively to the rendition of service for its charitable purposes.” E. C. 4141.01(B)(2)(h). Whether the Toledo Business & Professional Women’s Eetirement Living, Inc., is amenable to those statutes is not before us in this case. In view of the existence of E. C. 5709.12 and 5701.13, Carmelite cannot support the exemption of this taxpayer from property taxes.
The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, being neither unreasonable nor unlawful, is affirmed.
Decision affirmed.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
272 N.E.2d 359, 27 Ohio St. 2d 255, 56 Ohio Op. 2d 153, 1971 Ohio LEXIS 428, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/toledo-business-professional-womens-retirement-living-inc-v-board-of-ohio-1971.