[Cite as Tolani v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 2025-Ohio-5624.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
AJIT TOLANI, ET AL., :
Plaintiffs-Appellants, : No. 114356 v. :
MEDICAL MUTUAL OF OHIO, :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 18, 2025
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-23-975686
Appearances:
The Lee Law Firm, LLC, and Brian C. Lee, for appellants.
Frantz Ward LLP, Christopher C. Koehler, and Gregory R. Farkas, for appellee.
LISA B. FORBES, J.:
Ajit Tolani (“Ajit”) and Shruti Tolani (collectively, “the Tolanis”)
appeal the journal entry that granted Medical Mutual of Ohio’s (“MMO”) motion for
summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice the Tolanis’ claims for breach of
contract and bad faith. Because we find genuine disputes of material fact exist, including but not limited to whether Ajit made an intentional misrepresentation of
material fact entitling MMO to rescind the Tolanis’ health-insurance policy (the
“Policy”), we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
I. Facts, Procedural History, and Pertinent Exhibits
A. Background
This case concerns MMO’s recission of the Tolanis’ health-insurance
coverage. The parties do not dispute the following facts.
In 2015, Ajit was diagnosed with a life-threatening lung condition. He
is an Indian citizen and lived in India when he was diagnosed. The Tolanis moved
to Cuyahoga County, entering the United States using a B-2 visa on December 23,
2016.
On January 30, 2017, Ajit was approved for a double-lung transplant,
which would be performed at the Cleveland Clinic. Ajit purchased from MMO the
Policy, effective February 1, 2017. He did so using the Affordable Care Act Exchange
(“ACA Marketplace” or “ACA Exchange”), which allows people to compare and
purchase health insurance from different providers. On February 9, 2017, the
Cleveland Clinic sought approval from MMO to perform a double-lung transplant
on Ajit. On March 2, 2017, MMO informed Ajit that it was rescinding his coverage.
B. Procedural History
The Tolanis filed a two-count complaint in the Cuyahoga County
Court of Common Pleas, claiming that (1) MMO breached its contract by rescinding coverage and failing to provide a 30-day notice of rescission, and (2) MMO
rescinded coverage without reasonable justification, thereby acting in bad faith.
C. MMO’s Motion for Summary Judgment
MMO moved for summary judgment on both claims made by the
Tolanis, arguing that it had been entitled to rescind Ajit’s coverage. MMO attached
to its motion numerous documents, the following of which are particularly relevant
to this appeal.
1. The Policy
Ajit’s Policy had an enrollment period of one year, effective February
1, 2017. The Policy’s “Eligibility Requirements” stated, “In order to be eligible for
this coverage, you must . . . maintain your primary legal residence in the Service Area
and live there for at least six (6) months of each year.” The definition of “Service
Area” included Cuyahoga County.
The Policy also addressed “Termination of Coverage,” stating, in part,
that “[y]our coverage stops . . . [i]mmediately upon notice if” the policyholder
“materially misrepresents information provided to Medical Mutual . . . .” The Policy
established that MMO could rescind coverage, meaning “coverage may be legally
voided all the way back to the day the plan began to provide you with coverage, just
as if you never had coverage under the plan.” Per the Policy, “coverage can only be
rescinded if you . . . make[] . . . an intentional misrepresentation of material fact, as
prohibited by the terms of your plan.” 2. Recission Letter
MMO also provided the court a letter, dated March 2, 2017, which
informed Ajit that MMO was rescinding his coverage (“Recission Letter” or the
“Letter”). The Letter stated that “[e]ligibility for a Marketplace plan is specifically
outlined in 45 C.F.R. § 155.305 ‘Eligibility Standards.’” According to the Letter,
under these standards, “[a]n individual must intend to be in the service area of the
plan for the entire period for which enrollment is sought” and “must intend to reside
in the service area.” MMO had determined that Ajit did “not meet the residency
requirement for a Marketplace plan” because his “only intent for being in the area is
to receive medical care” and he “plan[ned] to leave the United States as soon as . . .
care is complete, estimated to be within 2 to 9 months.”
The Letter then explained that, because of a “misrepresentation of
material facts submitted to the Marketplace at the time of enrollment,” MMO was
exercising its “right to rescind.” The Letter stated that recission meant to “cancel or
discontinue coverage back to the original effective date of [the] policy as if the
coverage never existed.” On March 31, 2017, “coverage [would] be terminated with
a retroactive date of February 1, 2017, the date of your enrollment.”
3. Social Worker’s Note
Of particular relevance to MMO’s decision to rescind coverage is a
note, dated January 11, 2017, which summarized a social worker’s psychosocial
evaluation of Ajit (“Social Worker’s Note” or “the Note”). This evaluation was part
of the Cleveland Clinic’s assessment of Ajit as a candidate for a lung transplant. The Social Worker’s Note included information about Ajit’s relocation to the country,
immigration status, and plans.
Per the Note, Ajit “came to US with his wife, their 9 yo daughter and
his sister and uncle are staying here for the next two months.” The Note also said
that Ajit was “prepared that he may have to be here for 9 months” and that he
demonstrated “commitment to transplant time frame they expected was 9 months
. . . .” As to Ajit’s “Resident Status,” the Note classified him as a “Non-U.S.
Citizen/Non-U.S. Resident, Traveled to U.S. for Transplant.” As to what Ajit
expected to do after treatment, the Note stated, “Any moves planned: no.”
4. B-2 Visa Extension Applications
Several documents provided by MMO show that, after entering the
United States, Ajit twice requested that United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”) extend his B-2 visa. Ajit’s visa was originally set to expire on
June 22, 2017. The Tolanis submitted to USCIS an “Application to Extend / Change
Nonimmigrant Status,” dated June 12, 2017. Another extension request, dated
December 20, 2017, notes that USCIS granted the Tolanis’ first request until
December 22, 2017.
5. HHS Notice
MMO also provided the court a notice from the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS Notice”) that HHS appears to
have sent to Ajit on December 27, 2016. The HHS Notice purports to approve Ajit
to purchase health insurance using the ACA Exchange. The HHS Notice stated that Ajit was “[e]ligible to purchase health coverage through the Marketplace” and
provided “Next Steps,” including to “[c]hoose a health plan and make first month’s
payment.” Under the header “What should I do next?” the HHS Notice invited Ajit
to “[v]isit HealthCare.gov to compare plans side by side . . . .”
6. HHS FAQ
MMO also attached a list of “FAQs on the Marketplace Residency
Requirement” that HHS appears to have issued. (“HHS FAQ” or “the FAQ”). The
HHS FAQ states that “[f]or the purposes of § 155.305(a), ‘intends to reside’ means
that an applicant has a present intent to reside where he or she is living, and intends
to remain in the Exchange service area . . . .” The FAQ further provides that
individuals “visiting an Exchange service area for a transitory purpose, for example
. . . to obtain medical care . . . do not have a present intent to reside, and do not meet
the residency requirement for Marketplace Coverage . . . .”
7. Ajit’s Deposition
MMO provided Ajit’s deposition in which MMO extensively
questioned Ajit, including the following:
Q: [Y]ou intended to stay in the United States when you came in December of 2016, correct?
A: That’s right.
D. The Tolanis’ Opposition
The Tolanis also attached documents to their brief opposing summary judgment, including plaintiffs’ exhibits A, B, D, and E.1 MMO argues that
these documents are “not authenticated by an affidavit and are not admissible
summary judgment evidence.” While the four documents that MMO contends are
inadmissible did not contribute to this decision, we did consider Dr. Atul Mehta’s
affidavit, which was offered by the Tolanis and was not specifically objected to by
MMO.
1. Dr. Mehta’s Affidavit
Dr. Atul Mehta, Ajit’s treating physician, swore to and signed an
affidavit stating that Ajit needed a lung transplant and ongoing treatment.
Dr. Mehta’s “best estimate for Mr. Tolani’s recovery time [was] at least one year
from the date of the transplant with ongoing medical care and monitoring at
Cleveland Clinic extending beyond that point.” For this reason, “Mr. Tolani’s health
would not allow him to travel to India or to otherwise leave Ohio.”
E. Grant of Summary Judgment and Appeal
On August 16, 2024, the court issued a journal entry granting MMO’s
motion for summary judgment, dismissing the Tolanis’ claims with prejudice. The
court found that MMO’s coverage recission “did not constitute a breach of contract”
and plaintiffs’ bad-faith claim “fails as a matter of law because plaintiffs cannot
establish that there was no reasonable justification” for rescinding coverage. The
1 In order, these documents appear to be a scanned image of Ajit’s B-2 visa card
and a document labeled “Affidavit of Ajit Tolani” that does not appear to have been sworn to and signed in the presence of a notary public. See Glinsky v. Zeltman, 2023-Ohio- 4883, ¶ 8-9; R.C. 147.011. Also among these documents are Ajit’s Healthcare.gov application and a health-insurance policy that Ajit purchased from Anthem. court reasoned that “[b]ased on the evidence presented, there remain no genuine
issues of material fact that plaintiffs came to Ohio to obtain medical care and did not
intend to reside within the [service area] for the entire period for which enrollment
was sought.”
From this order, the Tolanis appealed, raising the following
assignments of error:
1. The trial court incorrectly granted MMO’s summary judgment finding that MMO did not breach their insurance contract with Ajit Tolani when they rescinded coverage.
2. The trial court incorrectly granted MMO’s summary judgment finding that Plaintiff-Appellants could not establish there was no reasonable justification for MMO’s determination that Ajit Tolani was not eligible for coverage through the ACA exchange.
II. Law and Analysis
“Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when no
genuine issue exists as to any material fact and, viewing the evidence most strongly
in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion
that is adverse to the nonmoving party, entitling the moving party to judgment as a
matter of law.” Madaras v. Applebee’s Neighborhood Grill & Bar, 2025-Ohio-169,
¶ 12, citing Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). A material
fact “‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law’ of the case.” Oko
v. Cleveland Div. of Police, 2021-Ohio-2931, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), quoting Turner v.
Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 340 (1993). “A factual dispute is ‘genuine’ only if ‘it
allows reasonable minds to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Huntington Natl. Bank v. Blount, 2013-Ohio-3128, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.), quoting Sysco Food Servs.
v. Titan Devs., 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4762, *7 (9th Dist. Oct. 25, 1995).
The movant for summary judgment has the “initial burden of
identifying specific facts in the record that demonstrate his or her entitlement to
summary judgment.” Madaras at ¶ 12, citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.2d 280,
292-293 (1996). “[D]etermining whether issues of disputed fact exist is different
from making findings of facts”; when a court does the former, “the evidence . . . c[an]
not be weighed, only reviewed . . . .” Smathers v. Glass, 2022-Ohio-4595, ¶ 32.
“We review summary judgment rulings de novo, applying the same
standard as the trial court.” Madaras at ¶ 12, citing Grafton at 105. “‘De novo review
encompasses an independent examination of the record and law without deference
to the underlying decision.’” Torres v. Concrete Designs, Inc., 2019-Ohio-1342, ¶ 48
(8th Dist.), quoting Gateway Consultants Group, Inc. v. Premier Physicians Ctrs.,
Inc., 2017-Ohio-1443, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).
Regarding what evidence we may consider when ruling on a motion
for summary judgment, this court has stated as follows:
[T]he materials a party may use to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment are generally limited to the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence and written stipulations of fact. Other types of documents may be introduced as evidentiary material only through incorporation by reference in a properly framed affidavit. Professional Bank Servs. v. Grossman DT, Inc., 2019-Ohio-2230, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing Dzambasow v. Abakumov, 2005-Ohio-6719, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). Submitted documents that have not been sworn, certified or authenticated by affidavit, in accordance with Civ.R. 56(C) and (E), generally have no evidentiary value and need not be considered by the trial court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Wolk v. Paino, 2011-Ohio-1065, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). Further, “‘[w]hile a court, in its discretion, may consider other documents than those specified in Civ.R. 56(C) if there is no objection, there is no requirement that a court do so.’” Mentch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Pub. Library Bd., 2018-Ohio-1398, ¶ 53, quoting Wolk v. Paino, 2010-Ohio-1755, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.).
Gurary v. John Carroll Univ., 2024-Ohio-3114, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.).
A. Assignment of Error No. 1 — Breach of Contract
Regarding their breach-of-contract claim, the Tolanis argue that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment to MMO because issues of fact exist.
According to the Tolanis, evidence in the record contradicts MMO’s assertion that
Ajit intended to depart the service area within two to nine months. Specifically,
Dr. Mehta’s affidavit states that Ajit’s recovery would prevent him from doing so
because he needed more than a year of follow-up treatment at the Cleveland Clinic.
The Tolanis also argue that Ajit’s immigration status did not render him ineligible,
as a matter of law, to purchase insurance using the ACA Exchange. Ajit maintains
that he did not make an intentional material misrepresentation and that MMO did
not have grounds, under the insurance contract, to rescind coverage.
In response, MMO argues that undisputed facts show that it did not
breach the Policy. Again, the Policy provided that “coverage can only be rescinded
if you . . . make . . . an intentional misrepresentation of material fact . . . .” Per MMO,
the evidence shows that Ajit materially misrepresented information when he
“certified to Medical Mutual through the Exchange application that he met all the
requirements and eligibility standards to be eligible to purchase a qualified health plan through the Exchange.” Under these circumstances, MMO reasons, the Policy
allowed recission.
As an initial matter, we find that MMO has not demonstrated with
undisputed facts that Ajit made any intentional misrepresentation of material facts
sufficient for MMO to rescind coverage. MMO has identified no inaccuracies in
Ajit’s application for health insurance. MMO did not provide any evidence
whatsoever regarding what information Ajit provided to Healthcare.gov or MMO
when he applied for coverage. To the contrary, although the Tolanis supported their
brief opposing summary judgment with a document that purports to be Ajit’s
Healthcare.gov application, MMO argues that the document has “no evidentiary
value and cannot be considered by the court” because it is unauthenticated. See
Civ.R. 56(C); Kent’s Excavating Servs. v. Leneghan, 2017-Ohio-1371, ¶ 13 (8th
Dist.).
We also find that MMO has not demonstrated with undisputed
evidence that Ajit was ineligible to purchase insurance using the ACA Exchange,
such that simply applying amounted to an intentional misrepresentation that
supported MMO’s recission of coverage. MMO’s assertion that Ajit materially
misrepresented that he was eligible to purchase health insurance through the
Exchange is at odds with the HHS Notice that informed Ajit that he was eligible for
coverage and could “[v]isit Healthcare.gov to compare plans side by side . . . .” From
this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could determine that Ajit was eligible. Again, the record is devoid of information about what the ACA Marketplace application
requested or what Ajit provided.
Nonetheless, MMO argues that Ajit was ineligible to purchase
insurance using the ACA Exchange. 45 C.F.R. 155.305(a)(1) and (a)(3) outline the
ACA Exchange eligibility standards pertinent to this appeal. 45 C.F.R. 115.305(a)(1)
requires that an applicant be “lawfully present in the United States, and . . .
reasonably expected to be . . . lawfully present for the entire period for which
enrollment is sought.” 45 C.F.R. 115.305(a)(3) requires an applicant to “[m]eet[] the
applicable residency standard” by obtaining insurance in the “service areas of the
Exchange in which he or she is living” and “[i]ntends to reside . . . .” The parties
agree that no case law defines these provisions. MMO contends that statements Ajit
purportedly made during his psychosocial evaluation, his use of a B-2 visa to enter
the United States, and the purpose of his entry — to obtain medical care —
demonstrate that he did not meet these ACA Exchange eligibility standards. We
address each in turn, beginning with C.F.R. 115.305(a)(3).
1. Intent to Reside in the Service Area
To be eligible to participate in the ACA Exchange, 45 C.F.R.
155.305(a)(3) requires a policyholder to “[m]eet[] the applicable residency
standard” by obtaining insurance in the “service areas of the Exchange in which he
or she is living” and “[i]ntends to reside . . . .” a. Psychosocial Evaluation
MMO argues that statements Ajit purportedly made to a social worker
during his psychosocial evaluation indicate that he had no actual intent to reside in
the service area. MMO’s claim in the Recission Letter that Ajit planned “to leave the
United States as soon as . . . care is complete, estimated to be within 2 to 9 months,”
appears to be based on the Social Worker’s Note, which discusses a two-to-nine-
month timeline. MMO does not reference any other information in the Recission
Letter to support its finding that Ajit intended to leave the service area after
treatment.
We find that the Note itself creates a genuine dispute of material fact
as to whether Ajit subjectively intended to depart the service area within nine
months. The Note states, in part, that Ajit “came to US with his wife, 9 yo daughter
and his sister and uncle are staying here for the next two months.” It is unclear from
this phrase whether only the sister and uncle intended to stay for two months or the
entire family did. The above language also says nothing about what the family
planned to do after two months passed. Also, it was known when the note was
written that Ajit’s care would not be completed within two months of the evaluation.
At that time, he had not even been scheduled for his lung transplant.
The Note additionally states that Ajit was “prepared that he may have
to be here for 9 months” and demonstrated “commitment to transplant time frame
they expected was 9 months . . . .” That Ajit acknowledged his treatment required
him to be in the service area for an estimated period does not necessarily indicate that he intended to depart the service area after that time passed. This is
demonstrated by the Note’s following statement: “Any moves planned: no.”
According to his treating physician, Ajit’s medical condition would
not have allowed him to leave the service area for at least a year after his lung-
transplant surgery. Dr. Mehta stated in an affidavit that his “best estimate for
Mr. Tolani’s recovery time is at least one year from the date of the transplant with
ongoing . . . monitoring at Cleveland Clinic extending beyond that point.” For this
reason, Dr. Mehta believed that “Mr. Tolani’s health would not allow him to travel
to India or otherwise leave Ohio.” Again, when Ajit applied for insurance and
participated in the psychosocial evaluation, his transplant had not been scheduled,
much less completed. Based on these documents alone, a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to whether Ajit intended to reside in Cuyahoga County for nine months
after the note was written or a full year after the surgery was completed.
b. B-2 Visa
MMO also argues that entering the United States on a B-2 visa
required Ajit — as a matter of law — to have no intent “to reside” in the service area.
B-2 visas are ordinarily effective for six months and require travelers to have a
residence in a foreign country that they have no intent to abandon. See 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(15)(B).
During his deposition, Ajit testified:
Q: [Y]ou intended to stay in the United States when you came in December of 2016, correct? A: That’s right.
MMO has not demonstrated that Ajit’s temporary-visitor status
precluded him from intending to reside in the service area. 45 C.F.R. 155.305(a)(3)
does not provide criteria an individual must meet to “reside” there. Further, B-2
visa holders can apply to extend their stays beyond six months. In 2017, Ajit did so,
and USCIS granted his request.
In support of its argument that Ajit was ineligible to purchase
insurance using the ACA Exchange, MMO asks us to consider a Healthcare.gov
webpage entitled “Immigration status to qualify for the Marketplace.” At the time
of this decision, this webpage provided a “list of who may qualify for the
Marketplace” that included “Individual[s] with Non-immigrant Status including
workers visas . . . student visas, U-visa, T-visa, and other visas.” (accessed Dec. 11,
2025) [https://perma.cc/A92C-5S2J]. MMO has not demonstrated that this
guidance is legally binding, nor that “other visas” cannot reasonably be read to
include B-2 visas. See S. Forest Watch, Inc. v. Jewell, 817 F.3d 965, 971 (6th Cir.
2016) (asserting that statutory interpretations in agency guidance documents are
persuasive authority).
c. Transitory Purpose
MMO also argues that Ajit did not intend to reside in the service area
as a matter of law because he came to the United States for a “transitory purpose,”
specifically, to obtain medical care. In support of this argument, MMO points us to
the HHS FAQ’s assertion that individuals “visiting an Exchange service area for a transitory purpose, for example . . . to obtain medical care . . . do not have a present
intent to reside, and do not meet the residency requirement for Marketplace
Coverage . . . .”
Again, MMO has not demonstrated that this agency guidance is
legally binding. See S. Forest Watch at 971. Even if it were, the guidance does not
address whether Ajit specifically intended to reside in the service area. On that issue,
a dispute of fact remains. The key question the guidance puts forth, in assessing
intent to reside for purposes of ACA Marketplace eligibility, is whether the
individual entering the service area “intends to remain” or is “visiting.” A “visit” is
defined, in part, as “a short stay.” Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/visit (accessed October 21, 2025) [https://perma.cc/
ASV8-SAY7]. See Finger v. Liberty Mut. Personal Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-2308, ¶ 33
(8th Dist.), quoting Commercial Intertech Corp. v. Guyan Interntl. Inc., 2001 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1556, *5 (11th Dist. Mar. 30, 2001) (“A dictionary definition ‘is a reliable
source for finding the plain and ordinary meaning of a word.’”). That Ajit’s
relocation to the United States was first inspired by a need for medical care does not
alone establish that he intended only a “short stay.”
For the reasons above, MMO has not presented undisputed evidence
that Ajit did not intend to reside in the service area for purposes of 45
C.F.R. 115.305(a)(3), such that his act of purchasing insurance using the ACA
Exchange amounts to an intentional misrepresentation of material fact. 2. Reasonable Expectation of Being Lawfully Present in the Service Area for the Entire Enrollment Period
45 C.F.R. 155.305(a)(1) states, in relevant part, that “a non-citizen
who is lawfully present in the United States, and is reasonably expected to be . . .
lawfully present for the entire period for which enrollment is sought” may purchase
insurance using the Exchange. MMO notes that B-2 visas are effective for six
months and that Ajit’s visa would lapse before his one-year coverage period ended.
On this basis, MMO argues that it was entitled to rescind Ajit’s coverage because he
had no reasonable expectation of being lawfully present in the service area for the
duration of the Policy and misrepresented that he did when he used the ACA
Exchange to buy coverage. We disagree.
It is uncontested that Ajit was lawfully present in the United States by
virtue of his B-2 visa when he applied for the Policy. As noted above, although B-2
visas customarily permit only six-month stays, USCIS may extend this period and
did so in 2017 for Ajit. MMO has identified no information showing that Ajit could
not have reasonably expected to obtain one or more extensions and remain lawfully
present in the service area for his yearlong coverage period. MMO has not
demonstrated with undisputed evidence that Ajit was ineligible to buy insurance
using the ACA Exchange under 45 C.F.R. 155.305(a)(1), much less that he knew he
was ineligible and proceeded despite that knowledge.
The court erred in granting MMO summary judgment on the Tolanis’
breach-of-contract claim because genuine questions of fact remain including, but not limited to whether Ajit intentionally made any material misrepresentation of
fact such that MMO was justified in rescinding the Tolanis’ Policy.
Accordingly, assignment of error No. 1 is sustained.
B. Assignment of Error No. 2 — Bad Faith
The trial court also erred by granting MMO summary judgment on
the Tolanis’ claim that MMO acted in bad faith by rescinding coverage without
reasonable justification. “[A]n insurer has the duty to act in good faith in the
handling and payment of the claims of its insured.” Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
6 Ohio St.3d 272, 275 (1983). “Where a claim for bad faith rests upon the same
allegations as a claim for breach of contract and there has been no breach of contract,
the bad-faith claim fails as a matter of law.” Shaut v. Natl. Cas. Co., 2021-Ohio-
2522, ¶ 54 (8th Dist.), citing Calianos v. Commerce Ins. Co., 29 Mass. L. Rep. 316,
16 (2011).
The Tolanis’ claim for bad faith is based on the same allegations that
support their claim for breach of contract, namely that MMO improperly rescinded
coverage based on Ajit’s alleged prior intentional misrepresentations. As we found
above, there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Ajit
misrepresented information to MMO. Whether MMO had a reasonable justification
for rescinding Ajit’s coverage turns in part on resolving that question. The trial
court, therefore, erred by granting MMO summary judgment on the Tolanis’ bad-
faith claim.
Accordingly, assignment of error No. 2 is sustained. Judgment reversed. Case remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellants recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________________ LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR