Todd M. Treadway, a Minor, by Next Friend, Robert M. Treadway, His Natural Guardian and Father v. Robert Earl Ruckstuhl, Pitney-Bowes Corporation

Fifth Circuit

Todd M. Treadway, a Minor, by Next Friend, Robert M. Treadway, His Natural Guardian and Father v. Robert Earl Ruckstuhl, Pitney-Bowes Corporation

554 F.2d 249, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12854

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedJune 20, 1977

Docket76-4125

StatusPublished

This text of 554 F.2d 249 (Todd M. Treadway, a Minor, by Next Friend, Robert M. Treadway, His Natural Guardian and Father v. Robert Earl Ruckstuhl, Pitney-Bowes Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Todd M. Treadway, a Minor, by Next Friend, Robert M. Treadway, His Natural Guardian and Father v. Robert Earl Ruckstuhl, Pitney-Bowes Corporation, 554 F.2d 249, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12854 (5th Cir. 1977).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Six-year old Todd M. Treadway was riding his bicycle on April 8, 1974 when he collided with a car driven by appellant Robert Earl Ruckstuhl. Todd sustained severe leg injuries. He has undergone six operations. Todd and his father sued Ruckstuhl and Ruckstuhl’s employer, Pitney-Bowes Corporation, alleging that Ruckstuhl’s negligence caused the accident and that Ruckstuhl was acting within the scope of his employment for Pitney-Bowes. The jury returned a verdict against Ruckstuhl for $50,000. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Pitney-Bowes, however, apparently concluding that Ruckstuhl was not acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The judge entered judgment on the verdict. Ruckstuhl appealed; plaintiffs did not.

Ruckstuhl challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on liability and on damages, and he asserts that the judge’s instructions were erroneous. We reject Ruckstuhl’s claims. There was ample evidence to support the verdict, and the judge’s instructions, considered as a whole, fairly stated the governing standards.

Ruckstuhl also attempts to challenge the judgment in favor of Pitney-Bowes. Ruckstuhl did not cross-claim against Pitney-Bowes, and indeed, we know of no theory under which he would have been entitled to do so. Under the circumstances here, an employee has no right to indemnity from an employer who might be held vicariously liable to the same tort victim. 1 Although plaintiffs adopt Ruckstuhl’s arguments in regard to Pitney-Bowes’s liability, they did not appeal from the judgment in Pitney-Bowes’s favor. We therefore need not consider the sufficiency of the evidence on this issue. 2

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

1

. Any right to indemnification would appear to run in the opposite direction, favoring the employer against its employee. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 311 (4th ed. 1971).

2

. Ruckstuhl, a sales representative, had gone home to let out his dog arid was near his home when the accident occurred. He was returning to his sales route, but had not yet reached the freeway which he would not have had to leave had he not gone home.

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PER CURIAM:

Six-year old Todd M. Treadway was riding his bicycle on April 8, 1974 when he collided with a car driven by appellant Robert Earl Ruckstuhl. Todd sustained severe leg injuries. He has undergone six operations. Todd and his father sued Ruckstuhl and Ruckstuhl’s employer, Pitney-Bowes Corporation, alleging that Ruckstuhl’s negligence caused the accident and that Ruckstuhl was acting within the scope of his employment for Pitney-Bowes. The jury returned a verdict against Ruckstuhl for $50,000. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Pitney-Bowes, however, apparently concluding that Ruckstuhl was not acting in the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The judge entered judgment on the verdict. Ruckstuhl appealed; plaintiffs did not.

Ruckstuhl challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on liability and on damages, and he asserts that the judge’s instructions were erroneous. We reject Ruckstuhl’s claims. There was ample evidence to support the verdict, and the judge’s instructions, considered as a whole, fairly stated the governing standards.

Ruckstuhl also attempts to challenge the judgment in favor of Pitney-Bowes. Ruckstuhl did not cross-claim against Pitney-Bowes, and indeed, we know of no theory under which he would have been entitled to do so. Under the circumstances here, an employee has no right to indemnity from an employer who might be held vicariously liable to the same tort victim. 1 Although plaintiffs adopt Ruckstuhl’s arguments in regard to Pitney-Bowes’s liability, they did not appeal from the judgment in Pitney-Bowes’s favor. We therefore need not consider the sufficiency of the evidence on this issue. 2

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

1

. Any right to indemnification would appear to run in the opposite direction, favoring the employer against its employee. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 311 (4th ed. 1971).

2

. Ruckstuhl, a sales representative, had gone home to let out his dog arid was near his home when the accident occurred. He was returning to his sales route, but had not yet reached the freeway which he would not have had to leave had he not gone home.

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554 F.2d 249, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 12854, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/todd-m-treadway-a-minor-by-next-friend-robert-m-treadway-his-natural-ca5-1977.