Todd Ferry v. Pace

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: December 8, 2025
• Docket: 25-1380
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-1380 __________

TODD FERRY, Appellant

v.

CYNTHIA PACE, PSP TROOPER; NORTHERN BEDFORD COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; B. E. K. ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-00260) District Judge: Honorable Stephanie L. Haines ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) November 13, 2025

Before: MATEY, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 8, 2025) ___________

OPINION * ___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM

Todd Ferry appeals pro se from three decisions entered by the District Court in

this civil-rights action that he brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons that

follow, we will affirm.

I.

In 2022, while Ferry was in Pennsylvania state prison for offenses unrelated to this

case, he was charged in a criminal complaint with numerous counts stemming from his

alleged molestation of his ex-girlfriend’s minor daughter, B.E.K., in 2014. Trooper

Cynthia Pace of the Pennsylvania State Police authored the criminal complaint’s affidavit

of probable cause. The affidavit was based on Pace’s interview with B.E.K.’s mother, as

well as B.E.K.’s interview at the Children’s Advocacy Center in Johnstown,

Pennsylvania.

It appears that, in 2024, those criminal charges against Ferry were dismissed on

speedy-trial grounds. Later that year, he filed in the District Court a pro se § 1983

complaint against Pace, B.E.K., and the Northern Bedford County School District

(“NBCSD”). Ferry’s complaint alleged that B.E.K.’s accusations were false and

defamatory, that Pace had failed to investigate those accusations, and that NBCSD (the

district where B.E.K. had attended school) had, in response to a subpoena, provided Ferry

with the wrong address for B.E.K. In light of these allegations, Ferry sought $75 million

in damages.

The District Court screened Ferry’s complaint and dismissed it with prejudice

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

2 be granted. In doing so, the District Court concluded that “the [c]omplaint lacks any

substantive argument or facts to support the bald-faced assertions against Defendants that

they committed wrongs against him.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 9, at 4. Ferry subsequently filed

a “Motion to Correct Error and Reopen Case” (which the District Court construed as a

motion for reconsideration) and a “Motion for Reconsideration” (which the District Court

construed as a second motion for reconsideration). The District Court denied those two

motions in separate orders. In the order denying the second motion for reconsideration,

the District Court clarified that it was declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Ferry’s state-law claims. This appeal followed, which challenges all three of the District

Court’s decisions.

II.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise

plenary review over the District Court’s decision dismissing Ferry’s complaint. See

Herrera v. Agents of Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 132 F.4th 248, 254 n.5 (3d Cir. 2025).

And we review the District Court’s decisions denying his motions for reconsideration for

abuse of discretion, exercising de novo review over the District Court’s legal conclusions

and reviewing its factual findings for clear error. See United States ex rel. Schumann v.

Astrazeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 848 (3d Cir. 2014). Reconsideration is

warranted only if the movant shows that (1) there has been “an intervening change in the

controlling law,” (2) there is new evidence that bears on the district court’s underlying

decision, or (3) there is a “need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent

manifest injustice.” Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d

3 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999). We may affirm a district court’s decision on any basis

supported by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per

curiam).

III.

To survive dismissal, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face” by alleging facts that “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (citation to quoted case

omitted). A pleading that merely “offers labels and conclusions” or “tenders naked

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” is insufficient. Id. at 678 (alteration

in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, we agree with the District Court

that Ferry’s complaint failed to meet the Iqbal standard. The question that remains is

whether the District Court should have granted Ferry leave to amend his complaint.

“Pro se plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to amend their complaints unless

it clearly appears that the deficiency cannot be overcome by amendment.” Montanez v.

Price, --- F.4th ----, No. 23-2669, 2025 WL 2846695, at *14 (3d Cir. Oct. 8, 2025)

(precedential) (quoting Weaver v. Wilcox, 650 F.2d 22, 27 (3d Cir. 1981)). In this case,

the Clerk of this Court directed Ferry to address in his brief “whether the District Court

erred in concluding that amendment of his complaint would be futile.” 3d Cir. Dkt. No.

11. But Ferry’s brief ultimately devoted little, if any, space to that issue. Indeed, the

closest that his brief came to discussing amendment is when it stated the following: “If

[the District Judge] wanted actual facts of the case, she could [have] contacted plaintiff

4 with a letter asking for all facts that favored the plaintiff. Plaintiff would [have] complied

. . . .” 3d Cir. Dkt. No. 14, at 5.

Assuming for the sake of argument that Ferry has preserved the amendment issue,

we cannot conclude that the District Court committed reversible error by not affording

him leave to amend his complaint. For one thing, Ferry cannot bring a § 1983 action

against B.E.K., as she is not a state actor. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir.

2009). Furthermore, despite Ferry’s filing two motions for reconsideration and having

had the opportunity to address amendment in his brief, he has not provided any factual

allegations that might state a viable constitutional or federal claim against Trooper Pace

or the NBCSD. 1 And in the absence of a viable constitutional or federal claim, it was

appropriate for the District Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Ferry’s state-law claims. See Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000).

In view of the above, we see no reason to disturb the District Court’s decision

dismissing Ferry’s complaint or its subsequent decisions denying his motions for

reconsideration. Accordingly, we will affirm those decisions.

1 In reaching this conclusion, we have considered all the constitutional and federal claims that Ferry raised or may have intended to raise against Trooper Pace and the NBCSD. To the extent that Ferry might have intended to raise a malicious-prosecution claim against Trooper Pace, such a claim would fail because, inter alia, none of Ferry’s filings (either in the District Court or in this Court) includes non-conclusory allegations that Trooper Pace’s affidavit of probable cause was prepared “maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing [Ferry] to justice.” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2020). 5