Tobler v. P. J. Willis & Bro.

59 Tex. 80, 1883 Tex. LEXIS 109
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 6, 1883
DocketCase No. 1556
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 59 Tex. 80 (Tobler v. P. J. Willis & Bro.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tobler v. P. J. Willis & Bro., 59 Tex. 80, 1883 Tex. LEXIS 109 (Tex. 1883).

Opinion

Stayton, Associate Justice. —

This suit was brought by P. J. Willis & Bro. against Julius Tobler to recover the value of goods -sold by the plaintiffs to D. M. Winn, upon the written guaranty of 'Tobler.

There is no question made as to the sum due by Winn for goods ¡sold to him by the plaintiffs; but the guarantor denies his liability. [81]*81upon the ground that the terms of the guaranty were not complied with by the plaintiffs.

The written guaranty is as follows:

“ P. J. Willis & Bbothee,
“ Willis Building,
“ Galveston, August 17, 1880.
“ Hesses. P. J. Willis & Bbothee, Galveston :
“ Hy friend, Hr. D. H. Winn, doing business in Belton, Bell Co., Texas, desires to purchase of your house a general bill of merchandise amounting to the sum of three thousand dollars (§3,000). Should you sell and ship him this amount or any other amount less than this sum, I hereby agree, bind and promise to pay you for the same if Hr. Winn does not. Hr. Winn is to purchase his merchandise on open account and on regular terms, interest to be charged after maturity of bills; and so long as he continues to buy and purchase from your house, I am responsible for and promise to pay you any debit you may have against him to the extent or amount of three thousand dollars (§3,000). And should Hr. Winn not pay same, I agree and promise to pay said amount at your office in Galveston, Texas.
“Witness:
(Signed)
Thomas F. Lawson, W. S. Beadles.”
“Julius Tobleb.

This guaranty contemplated a future course of dealing between P. J. Willis & Bro. and D. H. Winn, and that for an indefinite period and succession of purchases; and this course of dealing was subject to be terminated at the wish of either party, there being no period fixed by the instrument itself during which the business or course of dealing to which the guaranty related should continue.

The extent of the guarantor’s liability was by the contract fixed at three thousand dollars ($3,000). The continuance of the dealing between the parties was to be “ so long as he continues to buy and purchase from your house.”

As Winn could not buy or purchase without the consent of the firm of P. J. Willis & Bro., whenever that consent was withdrawn the business necessarily terminated.

If the parties had intended to give Winn the right to buy for a• fixed period of time, it should have been so expressed in the instrument which created the guaranty.

It is true that a guarantor is entitled to stand upon the terms of his contract, for it is the only source of his liability.

Contracts of guaranty, however, are to .be construed as are. other [82]*82contracts, the object in all cases being to ascertain the real intention of the parties. If the contract be ambiguous, the court, by parol testimony, may inquire into the situation of the parties and their relation to the subject matter of the contract at the time the contract was made, in order to understand ivhat the parties meant by the language they have used in contracting.

The contract of guaranty now before, us is not ambiguous, and parol evidence could not be heard to show, in contradiction to its legal effect, that it was intended thereby, for a fixed period of time, to confer upon Winn the right to purchase goods from P. J. Willis & Bro. on credit, provided that credit did not exceed $3,000, as a condition upon which the liability of the guarantor should attach.

It is true, also, that where a contract is ambiguous, the course of dealing between the parties subsequent to the making of the contract, and in reference to the subject matter thereof, which includes correspondence between the parties, may be looked to; but ivhere there is no ambiguity in the contract, the rule which forbids the introduction of parol evidence to contradict it excludes all such testimony. ■ .

Such testimony may be received to show that the contract, by the agreement of parties, has been annulled or satisfied, and that a new one has been substituted in its place. The court below held that the preponderance of the evidence negatived the existence of such a contract as was set up by the appellant, and that holding, the evidence in reference thereto, as it appears from the statement of the judge, being conflicting, would be conclusive.

' The defense sought to be maintained below, as against the original contract of guaranty, cannot be sustained; and it. only remains to inquire whether or not that contract was ever annulled by the parties and another substituted in its place.

Prior to the 24th of January, 1881, Winn had sent orders to Willis & Bro. for goods;.they had declined to fill them, and on that day they wrote to Tobler the following letter:

“ Galveston, January 24, 1881.
“ Julius Tobler, Esq.:
Dear Sir — We have before us a letter of Mr. D. M. Winn, inclosing a statement of his business, of which we send you a copy. We see from his statement that his concern is doing no good, and think you will see the same when you look at it. As we hold your obligation to indorse for him for $3,000, we think the best thing for you and for us is for you to take hold and pay us up our money which is due, and let us wind up this account; we have got enough of it. [83]*83He puts in his own account as an asset, and a delivery wagon and a horse, etc.
u Let us wind it up and be done.
Tours truly,
P. J. Willis & Bro.”
To which Tobler replied by letter of date February 1, 1881.
“ Messrs. P. J. Willis. & Bro. :
Gentlemen, — In answer of your favor of 24th last month, would say I am surprised and disappointed at the turn affairs are taking. It was my understanding, but don’t remember whether it was so expressed in writing, that you were to give Mr. Winn a rolling credit for $3,000 for about three years, and I am informed that you refuse to comply with your part of the contract, by declining to fill any more of Mr. Winn’s orders, which places him in a very critical, or rather embarrassing condition, leaving him with a broken stock, without credit elsewhere to replenish, which will entail a serious loss to him. You were well aware and informed of the fact, that at the time you made the contract to furnish Mr. Winn with goods, that he had no money, and his only means of paying you was by the accumulation of profits, which would finally liquidate the original amount, if you had continued, according to agreement, to sell him. With a broken stock, with only a limited supply of those things most in demand, I don’t see how he can pay at once. It was my understanding that Mr. Winn was to have a rolling credit, and thus be kept employed to pay for the goods and finally come out ahead; it was also my understanding and intention to be ultimately responsible to you for any deficit that he might owe you in the event you complied with your understanding.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
59 Tex. 80, 1883 Tex. LEXIS 109, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tobler-v-p-j-willis-bro-tex-1883.