T.O. v. County of Nevada

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: September 17, 2024
• Docket: 2:24-cv-01131
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 T.O., a minor through his No. 2:24-cv-01131 WBS AC Guardian Ad Litem Hannah Morris, 13 Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of 14 AMY WAYNE MORRIS, Deceased, and MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: S.O., a minor through his DEFENDANT WELLPATH, LLC’S 15 Guardian Ad Litem Hannah Morris, MOTION TO DISMISS Individually and as Personal 16 Representative of the Estate of AMY WAYNE MORRIS, 17 Plaintiffs, 18 v. 19 COUNTY OF NEVADA, a Governmental 20 Entity; WELLPATH, LLC, a Delaware limited liability 21 Company; SHERIFF SHANNON MOON; and DOES 1 through 10, 22 inclusive, 23 Defendants. 24 25 ----oo0oo---- 26 Plaintiffs T.O. and S.O. (“plaintiffs”) brought this 27 action against the County of Nevada (“County”); Wellpath, LLC 28 (“Wellpath”); County Sheriff Shannon Moon; and Does 1-10 seeking 1 damages for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 2 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 via theories of municipal and supervisory 3 liability. (See Compl. (Docket No. 1) ¶¶ 1-4, 24-87.) 4 Wellpath is a Delaware entity which “provides 5 correctional healthcare services at Wayne Brown Correctional 6 Facility in Nevada City, California” via a contract with the 7 County. (Id. ¶¶ 26-28.) Wellpath now moves to dismiss all 8 claims brought against it. 9 I. Factual and Procedural Background 10 Plaintiffs allege that the County and Sheriff Moon 11 detained their mother, Amy Wayne Morris, at Wayne Brown 12 Correctional Facility between January 15-16, 2023, after being 13 “charged with a crime.” (Compl. ¶¶ 34-35.) Plaintiffs claim 14 that defendants and their employees did not ask Ms. Morris about 15 her alcohol use or screen her for alcohol withdrawal. (Id. 16 ¶¶ 37-39.) Plaintiffs aver that defendants did not monitor Ms. 17 Morris for symptoms of alcohol withdrawal, which led to her 18 “suffering the symptoms of acute alcohol withdrawal” between 19 January 15-17, 2023. (Id. ¶¶ 39-41.) 20 On the morning of January 17, 2023, Ms. Morris went 21 into a seizure induced by alcohol withdrawal and “suffered blunt 22 force trauma injuries to her head.” (Id. ¶ 42.) Later that 23 morning, defendants’ employees encountered Ms. Morris 24 “unresponsive in her cell” and “transported [her] by ambulance to 25 Sierra Memorial Hospital where she was pronounced deceased” at 26 the age of forty. (Id. ¶¶ 43-44, 47.) The coroner who examined 27 her linked her death to alcohol withdrawal and blunt force trauma 28 to Ms. Morris’ head. (Id. ¶¶ 45-46.) 1 II. Standard of Review 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for the 3 court to dismiss claims in a complaint when those claims fail to 4 state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 12(b)(6). “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of 6 a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 7 In deciding such a motion, all material allegations of the 8 complaint are accepted as true, as well as all reasonable 9 inferences to be drawn from them. Id. 10 Dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to allege 11 “sufficient facts . . . to support a cognizable legal theory,” 12 id., or to state “a claim to relief that is plausible on its 13 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A 14 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 15 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 16 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 17 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare 18 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 19 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Although “legal 20 conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must 21 be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679. 22 III. Discussion 23 Plaintiffs seek to establish municipal liability for 24 violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments on the part of 25 Wellpath for failure to train its employees; the existence of an 26 unconstitutional custom, practice, policy; and ratifying the 27 decisions of the police officers and jail employees who caused 28 any constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 via theories 1 of municipal and supervisory liability. (Compl. ¶¶ 48-87.) 2 Wellpath now moves to dismiss the second and third claims of the 3 complaint. (See Mot. to Dismiss (Docket No. 23) at 6, 9, 14.) 4 Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for vicarious 5 liability, a local government or its contractor “may not be sued 6 under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or 7 agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 8 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “Instead, it is when execution of a 9 government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or 10 by those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent 11 official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an 12 entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. Neither party disputes 13 that Monell liability may attach to corporate entities such as 14 Wellpath. (See Opp’n to Mot. at 4 (Docket No. 24).) 15 A. Unconstitutional Custom or Policy 16 The parties do not dispute that plaintiffs’ second 17 claim against Wellpath may be based on allegations that it 18 exploits an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy; or that 19 Wellpath may liable for a failure to train its employees. 20 However, to establish Monell liability based upon an 21 unconstitutional custom or policy, plaintiffs must show “the 22 existence of a widespread practice that, although not authorized 23 by written law or express municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and 24 well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of 25 law.’” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) 26 (plurality opinion) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 27 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). 28 At the motion to dismiss stage, plaintiffs must do more 1 than simply allege that a Monell defendant “maintained or 2 permitted an official policy, custom, or practice of knowingly 3 permitting the occurrence of the type of wrongs” alleged 4 elsewhere in the complaint. AE ex rel. Hernandez v. County of 5 Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). Rather, the complaint 6 must allege “additional facts regarding the specific nature of 7 that alleged policy, custom[,] or practice.” Id. 8 It is unclear from the complaint exactly what practice 9 or practices plaintiffs rely upon to establish an 10 unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy causally related to 11 the conduct which this case concerns. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs 12 of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (holding that a 13 Monell claim lies where “the municipal action was taken with the 14 requisite degree of culpability and [plaintiff] must demonstrate 15 a direct causal link between the municipal action and the 16 deprivation of federal rights”). 17 Plaintiffs list, in shotgun fashion, thirteen so-called 18 “custom[s], practice[s] and polic[ies]” upon which plaintiffs’ 19 Monell claim is based. (Compl. ¶¶ 63-65.) Each of these is 20 couched in broad terms, such as “providing insufficient medical 21 coverage,” or “failing to promptly initiate medication treatment 22 for inmates suffering from alcohol withdrawal.” (Id.) If such 23 generalized descriptions were deemed sufficient, a plaintiff 24 would be able to survive a motion to dismiss a Monell claim in 25 just about every case alleging inadequate medical care under 26 § 1983. 27 Even where the policy or custom is adequately specified 28 in the complaint, plaintiffs also “must ordinarily point to a 1 pattern of prior, similar violations of federally protected 2 rights, of which the relevant policymakers had actual or 3 constructive notice.” Hyun Ju Park v. City & County of Honolulu, 4 952 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2020); see, e.g., Perryman v. City 5 of Pittsburg, 545 F. Supp. 3d 796, 800-02 (N.D. Cal. 2021) 6 (considering prior incidents in deciding whether Monell complaint 7 adequately identified pattern of past violations); Hughey v. 8 Drummond, No. 2:14-cv-00037 TLN AC, 2017 WL 590265, at *4-5 9 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2017) (same); Bagley v. City of Sunnyvale, 10 No. 16-cv-02250 LHK, 2017 WL 344998, at *14-15 11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017) (dismissing Monell claim because 12 plaintiff failed to “allege any facts that indicate that the 13 [city’s] police force is regularly taking actions involving 14 excessive force or unlawful arrests” and instead “only [pled] 15 actions related to his own arrest and prosecution”). 16 One similar prior incident does not plausibly suggest 17 the existence of “a widespread practice . . . so permanent and 18 well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of 19 law.” Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (quoting Adickes, 388 U.S. at 20 167-68). “[R]andom acts,” Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 21 (9th Cir. 1995), or “isolated or sporadic incidents,” Trevino v. 22 Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996), are insufficient to 23 prove the existence of an unconstitutional custom or practice. 24 Rather, plaintiffs must prove that the custom or practice in 25 question has “sufficient duration, frequency[,] and consistency 26 that [it] has become a traditional method of carrying out 27 policy.” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918. 28 Regarding the number of prior cases, the Ninth Circuit 1 has suggested that one or two prior similar incidents, standing 2 alone, do not suffice to prove the existence of an 3 unconstitutional custom or practice. See Davis v. City of 4 Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1989) (one incident 5 cannot establish a practice); Meehan v. County of Los Angeles, 6 856 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1988) (two incidents cannot establish 7 a custom). But the law does not establish a precise number of 8 previous lawsuits which must be alleged to overcome a motion to 9 dismiss. See Gonzalez v. County of Merced, 289 F. Supp. 3d 10 1094, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (O’Neill, J.). 11 To determine whether this history of previous lawsuits 12 is sufficient to plausibly allege a policy, custom, or practice 13 at the pleading stage, the court considers all of the relevant 14 factors, including (1) the number of prior lawsuits; (2) the 15 allegations in those lawsuits, including the degree of similarity 16 between the facts alleged in the prior lawsuits and the facts 17 alleged in the action under consideration; (3) the timing of the 18 prior lawsuits; (4) the disposition of the prior lawsuits; and 19 (5) the number and identity of defendants in the prior lawsuits, 20 including whether the municipality itself was a defendant and 21 whether any of the defendants in the prior lawsuits were the same 22 as the defendants in the case under consideration. See Lesher v. 23 City of Anderson, No. 2:21-cv-00386 WBS DMC, 2021 WL 5744691, at 24 *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2021). 25 Here, plaintiffs identify several lawsuits against 26 Wellpath or a predecessor entity to show a pattern of similar 27 violations of federally protected rights of which it had actual 28 or constructive notice. (See Compl. ¶¶ 6-18). The previous 1 cases in which Wellpath was alleged to have committed § 1983 2 violations were all relatively recent, having been filed in the 3 last decade. However, none of the vignettes plaintiffs cite 4 contain an instance of somebody in government custody suffering 5 injury or death due to alcohol withdrawal. See, e.g., Deloney v. 6 County of Fresno, No. 1:17-cv-01336 LJO EPG, 2018 WL 1693383, at 7 *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2018) (dismissing similar claims against 8 unrelated entity); Paris v. Conmed Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., No. 9 6:14-cv-1620 TC, 2017 WL 7310079, at *1-5, *12-16 10 (D. Or. Nov. 17, 2017) (denying summary judgment to subsidiary of 11 Wellpath where decedent passed away due to untreated sepsis as 12 opposed to substance-related withdrawal), report and 13 recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 664807, at *1 14 (D. Or. Jan. 31, 2018); Hanna ex rel. Henderson v. County of 15 Fresno, No. 1:14-cv-00142 LJO SKO, 2014 WL 6685986, at *1-2 16 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2014) (granting in part and denying in part 17 motion to dismiss third amended complaint which names no 18 corporate entities such as Wellpath). Moreover, plaintiffs fail 19 to reference any verdict or judgment against Wellpath or any 20 related entities in their complaint.1 21 For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that 22 plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against Wellpath for 23 Monell liability based on unlawful policy, practice, or custom. 24 1 In argument, plaintiffs reference cases not mentioned 25 in the complaint to attempt to establish an unconstitutional pattern or practice on behalf of Wellpath. See, e.g., Estate of 26 Miller v. County of Sutter, No. 2:20-cv-00577 KJM DMC, 27 2020 WL 6392565, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2020). If plaintiffs want to rely on such cases to establish a pattern or practice, 28 those cites are better included in the complaint. 1 B. Failure to Train 2 To state a claim for failure to train under Monell, 3 plaintiffs must show that (1) the existing training program is 4 inadequate “in relation to the tasks the particular officers must 5 perform”; (2) the relevant officials were “deliberate[ly] 6 indifferen[t] to the rights of persons with whom the police come 7 into contact”; and (3) the inadequacy of the training “‘actually 8 caused’ a deprivation of [plaintiffs’] constitutional rights.” 9 Merritt v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 10 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 11 489 U.S. 378, 388, 388-91 (1989)). 12 The complaint lacks any specific references to 13 Wellpath’s training programs for its employees or alleged 14 deficiencies therein. Plaintiffs do not explain how the alleged 15 unconstitutional policies or customs addressed above necessarily 16 also evince a lack of training. They aver that Wellpath 17 exhibited deliberate indifference to Ms. Morris but only by way 18 of conclusory statements. (See Compl. ¶¶ 51-53.) 19 Plaintiffs have provided no factual allegations as to 20 (1) how Wellpath’s employee training is inadequate, (2) how the 21 relevant officials have been deliberately indifferent to the 22 rights of Anderson citizens, or (3) how the inadequacy of the 23 training caused the alleged deprivation of plaintiff’s 24 constitutional rights. See Merritt, 875 F.2d at 770. In fact, 25 plaintiffs have provided no factual allegations whatsoever 26 regarding the Wellpath employee training program. 27 Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to state a 28 cognizable claim of failure to train under Monell against 1 Wellpath. 2 C. Ratification 3 “Ratification . . . generally requires more than 4 acquiescence.” Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 5 743 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d in part on other 6 grounds, 575 U.S. 600, 610-17 (2015). The Ninth Circuit has 7 “found municipal liability on the basis of ratification when the 8 officials involved adopted and expressly approved of the acts of 9 others who caused the constitutional violation.” Trevino, 99 10 F.3d at 920. To show ratification, plaintiffs must demonstrate 11 that the municipality’s “authorized policymakers approve[d] a 12 subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.” Christie v. Iopa, 13 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 14 at 127). 15 Plaintiffs allege that Wellpath ratified 16 unconstitutional conduct. (Compl. ¶¶ 70-71.) However, they have 17 not identified any officers, directors, executives, or managers 18 of Wellpath who approved the employees’ actions and the basis for 19 such approval. See Trevino, 99 F.3d at 920. Such conclusory 20 pleading, absent any supporting factual allegations, does not 21 sufficiently state a Monell claim. See Hicks v. County of 22 Stanislaus, No. 1:17-cv-01187 LJO SAB, 2018 WL 347790, at *6 23 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2018) (recommending dismissal of ratification 24 claim where complaint contained no factual allegations to support 25 claim that defendant county “approved, ratified, condoned, 26 encourage, sought to cover up, and/or tacitly authorized” conduct 27 of police unit), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-cv- 28 01187 LJO SAB, 2018 WL 646129, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2018). em IE I RO OS INE OS OEE IRIE Om IRIE RE ONE ONO IIE OIE IRIE IE IG (OS EE IIIB EES eee

1 Plaintiffs have therefore failed to state a cognizable 2 claim of ratification under Monell against Wellpath. 3 For all the foregoing reasons, the court will dismiss 4 the second and third claims against Wellpath for municipal 5 liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 6 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Wellpath’s motion to 7 dismiss plaintiffs’ second and third claims against it (Docket 8 No. 23), be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. Plaintiffs have 9 | twenty days from the date of this Order to file an amended 10 complaint, if they can do so consistent with this Order. 11 | Dated: September 17, 2024 tleom ah. A. be—~ 12 WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 29 2 In their opposition, plaintiffs suggest that they 26 should be allowed to proceed on the threadbare allegations in the complaint at least until they have had the opportunity to conduct 27 some limited discovery to develop facts to support their Monell claims. (Opp’n at 8-9.) The law does not permit plaintiffs to 28 | so proceed. 11