Rel: December 19, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026 _________________________
CL-2025-0273 _________________________
F.D.
v.
Calhoun County Department of Human Resources _________________________
CL-2025-0276 _________________________
T.M.
Calhoun County Department of Human Resources
Appeals from Calhoun Juvenile Court (JU-23-737.02) CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
FRIDY, Judge.
F.D. ("the father") and T.M. ("the mother") appeal from a judgment
of the Calhoun Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") terminating their
parental rights to their child, T.D. ("the child"). For the reasons set forth
herein, we affirm the judgment.
Background
On January 23, 2025, the Calhoun County Department of Human
Resources ("DHR") filed in the juvenile court a petition seeking to
terminate the parental rights of the mother and the father on the grounds
that, among other things, they each had a history of excessive use of
alcohol or controlled substances of a duration or nature that rendered
them unable to care for the child, they had failed to provide for the
material needs of the child, they had failed to maintain regular visitation
with the child, they were unable or unwilling to discharge their
responsibilities to and for the child or their conduct rendered them
unable to properly care for the child and that conduct was unlikely to
change in the foreseeable future, and they had failed to put forth effort
to adjust their circumstances to meet the needs of the child. In the
petition, DHR noted that the juvenile court had previously found the
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child dependent. The juvenile court held a trial on the petition on April
3, 2025.
At the trial, Courtney Surrett, a caseworker with DHR, testified
that DHR became involved with the child in May 2023, after receiving a
report that the father was hiding from law-enforcement officials behind
a shed with the child, who was then two years old. When the father was
arrested, law-enforcement officials found that he had a syringe with him.
The father was arrested for having the syringe and for having
outstanding warrants, Surrett said. Because the mother was in a
rehabilitation facility, and had been for about four months, when the
father was arrested, the child was placed in foster care about five days
after DHR became involved. Surrett said that the child remained in the
same foster home at the time of the trial.
Surrett said that DHR provided the mother with parenting classes
and that the mother completed a psychiatric evaluation that DHR had
requested. DHR also directed the mother to complete the rehabilitation
program she was in when the child entered foster care, but she did not
do so, Surrett said. The mother relapsed within months of failing to
complete the rehabilitation program, and, later in 2023, she returned to
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the same rehabilitation facility. On that occasion, Surrett said, the
mother completed the program in November 2024. However, a drug
screen to which the mother submitted just a few months later indicated
that she had relapsed again.
Alexis Movitz, the coordinator of the Calhoun County family drug
court, testified that the mother, who was in the color-code drug-testing
program, participated in most of the drug screens she was asked to take.
Edward Akers, the director of the Calhoun County Drug Testing
Laboratory, testified that the results of the mother's drug screen to which
the mother submitted on January 2, 2025, indicated that she was positive
for benzodiazepine and opiates. The drug-testing laboratory's donor-test-
details log, a copy of which was submitted into evidence, indicated that
the results of the drug screen conducted on the mother the next day were
negative, as were the three other screens to which she submitted between
January 3 and January 15, 2025. Movitz testified that, after January 16,
2025, the mother had submitted to only one drug screen on February 12,
2025, the results of which were negative, and had missed twenty tests.
Surrett said that the father was incarcerated off and on throughout
the entire case and that DHR was unable to offer him any services while
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he was in jail. She said that, when he was released "later in the case," he
entered rehabilitation. Surrett said that DHR was eventually able to hold
an individualized-service-plan ("ISP") meeting for the father and that he
was directed to complete rehabilitation, participate in the color-code
drug-testing program, and complete a psychiatric evaluation. She
testified that the father did not complete the rehabilitation program.
Regarding the father's participation in the drug-testing program,
Movitz testified that, between September 2024 and trial, which was held
on April 3, 2025, the father did not submit to forty of the drug screens he
was supposed to take under the program. The drug-testing laboratory's
log pertaining to the father indicates that, from September 19 to October
28, 2024, the father had twelve drug screens, all of which were negative;
however, from October 31, 2024, through March 28, 2025, the father
submitted to only one drug screen. Akers testified that the results of that
screen, to which the father submitted on February 12, 2025, indicated
that he was positive for alcohol, amphetamines, methamphetamine,
Fentanyl, and marijuana.
Surrett said that, "a couple of weeks" before the trial on DHR's
termination petition, she learned that the mother and the father were
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found passed out in a pickup truck where drugs were found. The mother
was arrested for public intoxication, and the father was arrested for
possession of a controlled substance. Surrett said that she had heard that
the charges against the mother had been dismissed.
Surrett testified that she last communicated with the mother and
the father in January 2025. January 2025 was also the last time the
mother visited the child, Surrett said, and, after that visit, the mother
did not contact DHR to check on the child. She added that, at the time of
the trial, she did not know where the mother and the father were or if
they even had a house.
Surrett testified that neither the mother nor the father had
provided any material support like food or clothing for the child. Leon
Ziglar, the DHR child-support supervisor, testified that, during the
pendency of the child's case, the mother made one court-ordered child-
support payment and that she was $4,538 in arrears at the time of the
trial.
The father had not visited the child since October 2024, Surrett
said, and he had not contacted DHR to check on the child since January
2025. She said that the father had not given the child a Christmas
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present in 2024, and she did not believe that he had ever provided
material support such as clothing or food for the child. Ziglar testified
that the father's monthly child-support obligation was higher than the
mother's but that he had never made a payment and owed $10,765 in
child support.
Surrett said that, during the time she worked with the family, the
parents' employment had always been through their respective
rehabilitation programs. When the parents were not in rehabilitation,
Surrett said, she had not been notified that either was employed.
B.Y., the child's foster father ("the foster father"), testified that the
child had lived with his wife and him since May 2023, when the child was
almost three years old. At that time, the foster father said, the child was
"very much mentally and physically delayed." Since living with the foster
parents, who took the child to a number of specialists for treatment, the
foster father said, the child had "grown tremendously." The child would
also have what the foster father called night terrors two or three nights
a week when visitation was permitted. Once those visitations were
suspended, the foster father said, the night terrors improved.
7 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
The foster father testified that he and his wife would like to adopt
the child if the parental rights of the mother and the father were
terminated. He added that their bond with the child was as strong as
their bond with their biological child. If the child were to be removed from
their home, the foster father said, he believed that it would "severely set
[the child] back and delay him."
Surrett testified that she had seen the child at the foster parents'
house, where he had lived for nearly two years at the time of the trial.
She said that the child and his foster family had a bond and that she
believed that removing the child from the foster home would be
detrimental to him.
Regarding relative resources, Surrett testified that the mother
provided her with the names of her brother and her sister as possible
placements for the child. Surrett said that DHR ruled out the sister as a
relative resource because, she said, the sister lived with the child's
maternal grandmother, who had an "extensive drug history and criminal
charges." DHR ruled out the brother, Surrett said, because he did not
have enough space for the child and said that he was unable to take in
the child. DHR ran an Accurint search for other family members of the
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mother and sent letters to those people, but, Surrett said, none of them
responded. Additionally, she said, no one contacted DHR about being a
relative resource for the child. Surrett testified that DHR assessed the
father's brother as a possible resource but that he was ruled out because
he had a history with DHR and "some criminal history."
The mother and the father did not attend the trial.
On April 7, 2025, using a preprinted form, the juvenile court
entered a judgment finding that the mother and the father were unable
or unwilling to discharge their parental responsibilities to and for the
child. It also found that they were in such a condition or course of conduct
as to be unable to properly care for the child and that that condition or
course of conduct was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The
juvenile court further found that DHR had made reasonable efforts to
reunite the mother and the father with the child but that those efforts
had failed. Finding no viable alternative, the juvenile court terminated
the parental rights of the mother and the father and placed legal custody
of the child with DHR to facilitate adoption.
9 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
The father filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment,
which the juvenile court denied. The mother and the father filed notices
of appeal.
Standard of Review
A juvenile court's judgment terminating parental rights must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence. P.S. v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't
of Hum. Res., 143 So. 3d 792, 795 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). " 'Clear and
convincing evidence' is '[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence
in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction
as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the
correctness of the conclusion.' " L.M. v. D.D.F., 840 So. 2d 171, 179 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2002) (quoting Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4)). When ore tenus
evidence is presented to a juvenile court, its factual findings in a
judgment terminating parental rights are presumed to be correct. K.P. v.
Etowah Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 43 So. 3d 602, 605 (Ala. Civ. App.
2010). "The ore tenus rule is based, in part, on the unique position of the
trial court to personally observe the parties and witnesses and to assess
their demeanor and credibility." Lowery v. Lowery, 72 So. 3d 701, 705
(Ala. Civ. App. 2011). Furthermore, "[t]his court does not reweigh the
10 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
evidence but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact made by the
juvenile court are supported by evidence that the juvenile court could
have found to be clear and convincing." K.S.B. v. M.C.B., 219 So. 3d 650,
653 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016).
Analysis
In separate briefs, the mother and the father contend that clear and
convincing evidence did not support the juvenile court's judgment. When
nonparents have brought an action to terminate a parent's parental
rights, a juvenile court may terminate a parent's parental rights if the
party seeking the termination proves that one of the grounds for
termination specified in § 12-15-319(a), Ala. Code 1975, exists and that
no viable alternative to terminating the parent's parental rights exists.
See R.H. v. Madison Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 383 So. 3d 667, 672 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2023). "[P]arental rights may not be terminated, even if
sufficient statutory grounds exist, when some less drastic measure might
be employed to preserve the parental relationship without harming the
interests of the child." B.A.M. v. Cullman Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 150
So. 3d 782, 785 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).
11 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
The mother argues that DHR provided insufficient evidence to
terminate her parental rights. Specifically, she argues that she has
"shown herself to care for [the child] and has changed her circumstances."
In support of her position, the mother says that she had successfully
completed her drug-rehabilitation program, was participating in visits,
and had gainful employment and her own residence. Her assertion,
however, ignores much of the evidence presented.
The record indicates that DHR recognized that substance abuse
was a barrier to the mother's reunification with the child and directed
the mother to continue the rehabilitation program in which she was
enrolled when the child was taken into DHR's custody. The mother
dropped out of that program and relapsed. She enrolled in the same
substance-abuse rehabilitation program and completed it in November
2024. Within two months, however, the mother had relapsed again. In
short, the undisputed evidence indicates that, despite obtaining
treatment for substance abuse twice within eighteen months, the mother
relapsed twice and was found passed out with the father in a vehicle with
drugs in what appears to be a matter of weeks before the trial to
terminate her parental rights.
12 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
Furthermore, despite the mother's contention that she was
gainfully employed and had her own residence, Surrett said, the mother
did not remain in contact with DHR, and Surrett did not know where the
parents were at the time of the trial. Surrett also said that the mother
had been employed through her rehabilitation programs but that she had
never been notified that the mother had held a job outside of her
rehabilitation programs and she did not know whether the mother was
employed at the time of the trial. The mother had made only one child-
support payment during the litigation of this matter, and she was $4,538
in arrears when the trial was held, indicating that she did not have the
ability or the willingness to support herself and the child.
Based on the evidence, as well as the mother's failure to attend the
trial on the termination of her parental rights, the juvenile court could
have been clearly convinced that, despite efforts to rehabilitate herself,
the mother was unable or unwilling to adjust her circumstances or
change her conduct sufficiently to enable her to carry out her
responsibilities for the child or to demonstrate that she was able to
properly care for the child.
13 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
The mother also contends that DHR had failed in its duty to make
reasonable efforts to promote reunification between the child and her.
"Although DHR must make reasonable efforts to reunite a parent and
child, the parent must make himself or herself available to DHR and
must make an effort to address his or her issues and improve his or her
circumstances." A.M.F. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 75 So. 3d
1206, 1212 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). Additionally, DHR is not required to
duplicate services if those services have been unsuccessful. See K.W. v.
Lee Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 390 So. 3d 1080, 1092-93 (Ala. Civ. App.
2023); J.C. v. Cullman Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., [Ms. CL-2024-0763,
Mar. 21, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2025).
Based on the evidence, the juvenile court could have been clearly
convinced that continued efforts to treat the mother would not render her
able or willing to care for the child and that two relapses within eighteen
months, the latter relapse coming only two months after the mother
completed a treatment program, indicated that the mother's conduct or
condition was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. It also could
have been clearly convinced that the child's need for permanency and
stability outweighed giving the mother an additional opportunity to
14 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
improve her circumstances. The child had lived with the foster family for
nearly two years at the time of the trial and had formed a bond with the
family. The mother has failed to demonstrate that clear and convincing
evidence did not support the juvenile court's judgment terminating her
parental rights.
The father contends that DHR failed to offer him sufficient services
or make reasonable efforts to help him toward reunification. He argues
that, despite knowing that he had left the rehabilitation facility where he
had been receiving treatment, DHR did nothing to assist him with the
services that had been recommended for him in his ISP. The father also
says that, although he underwent a psychological assessment, DHR did
not discuss with him other services that he could work with to regain
custody of the child, which, he says, he was willing to do.
Like the mother, the father had a duty to avail himself of the
services that DHR offered to him and to put forth an effort to work toward
reunification. A.M.F., 75 So. 3d at 1212. However, the evidence indicates
that the father was incarcerated "off and on" throughout the litigation,
and DHR was unable to offer him services during his periods of
incarceration. The father had been arrested for possession of a controlled
15 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
substance just weeks before the trial of this matter, and the juvenile court
could have believed that, because of his history, the father was likely to
be incarcerated again. Evidence also showed that, when the father had
the opportunity to work toward reunification by completing his
rehabilitation program, he left the program early. Contrary to his
assertion that he maintained visitation with the child, the undisputed
evidence indicated that, from October 2024 until the time of the trial in
April 2025, the father had not visited the child. He also failed to maintain
contact with DHR, which did not know how to locate him when the trial
was held. It is also undisputed that the father had not paid any child
support despite a court order that he do so, and his child-support
obligation was in arrears more than $10,000. Finally, like the mother,
the father also failed to attend the trial in which his parental rights were
at issue.
Based on the evidence, the juvenile court could have been clearly
convinced that the chances of rehabilitation of the father were remote
and that offering him any further services would be futile. And again, the
juvenile court reasonably could have concluded that the child's need for
permanency and stability with the foster family outweighed providing
16 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
the father with further opportunities to work toward reunification.
Therefore, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court erred in
determining that DHR had made reasonable efforts to reunite the father
and the child and that those efforts had failed.
The father also contends that maintaining the status quo was a
viable alternative to the termination of his parental rights. The general
rule is that maintaining children in foster care indefinitely is not a viable
alternative to terminating a parent's parental rights, see, e.g., C.P. v.
Cullman Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 203 So. 3d 1261, 1270 (Ala. Civ. App.
2016). However, a juvenile court should maintain foster care without
terminating parental rights "when a child shares a beneficial emotional
bond with a parent and the custodial arrangement ameliorates any
threat of harm presented by the parent." B.A.M., 150 So. 3d at 786. Here,
there is no evidence of an emotional bond between the father and the
child.
To the extent that the father contends that the child could have
been placed with a relative, the evidence indicates that DHR rejected the
relatives that he and the mother named as possible resources for the
child. He does not make any argument that DHR's rejection of those
17 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
relatives was improper, and he does not contend that there were any
other relative resources. Based on the argument presented, the juvenile
court did not err in determining that no viable alternatives to
terminating the father's parental rights existed.
Conclusion
The record demonstrates that clear and convincing evidence
supports the juvenile court's judgment terminating the parental rights of
the mother and the father; therefore, we affirm the juvenile court's
judgment.
CL-2025-0273 -- AFFIRMED.
CL-2025-0276 -- AFFIRMED.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards and Hanson, JJ., concur.
Bowden, J., dissents, with opinion.
18 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
BOWDEN, Judge, dissenting.
The Calhoun Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") found that the
Calhoun County Department of Human Resources ("the Calhoun DHR")
had made reasonable efforts to reunite T.M. ("the mother") with T.D.
("the child"). Based on my review of the record, however, there is no
evidence that the Calhoun DHR made any effort to rehabilitate the
mother until it offered to provide the mother with color-code drug-testing
services in September 2024 -- more than 19 months after it took custody
of the child in May 2023. Although we have not yet defined how
"immediate" the state's "immediate duty" to attempt reunification is,
"immediate" cannot mean more than 19 months after the child enters
state custody. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 1
1I do not address the merits of the appeal of F.D. ("the father") because reversing the judgment terminating the mother's parental rights may render the termination of the father's parental rights unwarranted. See W.A. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 211 So. 3d 849, 853 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) ("[B]ecause we are reversing the judgment insofar as it terminated the father's parental rights and, therefore, the father may prove to be a suitable custodian who could supervise visitation of the mother and the child, which would be a viable alternative to terminating the mother's parental rights, we also reverse the judgment insofar as it terminated the mother's parental rights …."). 19 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
I. The significance of parental rights
Parental rights are God-given rights. Ex parte G.C., 924 So. 2d 651,
661 (Ala. 2005)(Stuart, J., concurring specially). They are also
fundamental constitutional rights. See § 26-1-6, Ala. Code 1975; E.P. v.
Etowah Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res, 42 So. 3d 1250, 1255 (Ala. Civ. App.
2010); Herring v. State, 100 So. 3d 616, 623–24 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). I
highlight the God-given, fundamental nature of parental rights to
underscore how important it is for the state to provide evidence that it
satisfied every element to terminate parental rights, in every
termination-of-parental-rights action that it brings. The state's
evidentiary burden is "high" and " 'given the constitutional rights of the
parents involved in [a termination-of-parental-rights] proceeding … it is
imperative that the parties completely develop the evidence at trial.' "
M.W. v. Marshall Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 399 So. 3d 287, 294 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2024)(quoting In re D.L.W.W., 617 S.W.3d 64, 92 (Tex. App. 2020)).
"We should not lose sight of the fact that the termination of parental
rights is the most Draconian of measures taken by the civil law, resulting
in a complete and permanent severance of the most precious of all human
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relationships." Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So. 3d 1117, 1143 n.14 (Ala. 2009)
(Murdock, J., dissenting).
II. The state's immediate duty to attempt reunification
When the state brings a termination-of-parental-rights action, it
must prove that it made " ' "a fair and serious attempt to reunify a parent
with [his or her] child." ' " P.R.P. v. Marshall Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res.,
419 So. 3d 1018, 1029 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)(quoting H.H. v. Baldwin
Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 989 So. 2d 1094, 1104 (Ala. Civ. App.
2007)(plurality opinion), quoting in turn State ex rel. A.C., 97 P.3d 706,
712 (Utah Ct. App. 2006)). We have described the state's duty to attempt
reunification as an "immediate duty" that arises as soon as the state
places the child in foster care. H.B. v. Mobile Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res.,
236 So. 3d 875, 882 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017). And we have articulated the
following summary to "clearly and concisely apprise[] [the state] of the
nature of its duties to act promptly and reasonably to reunite families":
" 'The natural starting point in any fair and serious attempt to rehabilitate the parent and to reunite the parent with the child is identification of that characteristic, conduct, or circumstance that renders the parent unfit or unable to discharge his or her parental responsibilities to the child. Once [the state] identifies the source of parental unfitness, the overarching goal of family reunification requires [the state] to communicate its concerns to the parent and to 21 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
develop a reasonable plan with the parent that is tailored toward the particular problem(s) preventing the parent from assuming a proper parental role. [The state] should use reasonable methods to achieve its plan of removing or reducing the identified obstacle(s) to family reunification "as quickly and as safely as possible." Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15- [312(b)]. Finally, at the termination of any rehabilitation process, DHR should determine the success of its efforts, using reasonable evaluation tools.' "
P.R.P. v. Marshall Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 419 So. 3d 1018, 1029 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2024)(citation omitted). Put even more simply, the state's
immediate duty to attempt reunification requires the state to (1) identify
the conditions rendering the parent unfit; (2) "develop a reasonable plan
with the parent that is tailored toward the particular problem(s)"
preventing reunification; and (3) use reasonable methods to achieve the
plan as " ' "quickly and safely as possible" ' " while evaluating the success
of those methods. Id. If the state fails to meet its immediate duty to
attempt reunification, it has failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite
a parent with his or her child, and the judgment terminating parental
rights must be reversed. Id. at 1030.
How can the state prove that it met its immediate duty to attempt
reunification? The best practice would be for the state to admit or elicit
testimony about the parent's individualized service plan ("ISP"), which
22 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
the Department of Human Resources ("DHR") -- the entity that brings a
termination-of-parental-rights action on behalf of the state -- must
develop for every family involved with child-welfare services. An ISP
covers all the above-listed requirements of the state's immediate duty to
attempt reunification; the ISP (1) identifies the "family's strengths and
needs";2 (2) articulates the "goals the child(ren) and family work toward
to reach the desired case outcome"; and (3) sets out the "steps to be taken
by individual child and family planning team members to authorize and
deliver services, and to measure progress toward goals." Ala. Admin.
Code (DHR), r. 660-5-47-.02(16).
DHR regulations about the creation of the ISP also ensure that the
state identifies and communicates barriers to reunification to a parent in
a timely manner. The initial ISP must be created within 30 days, and a
meeting with the child's parent about the initial ISP must be completed
30 days after that. Thereafter, an ISP review hearing must occur at least
every 180 days but can occur more often because an ISP team, which
monitors and evaluates the ISP, "reconvene[s] as frequently as is
2"Needs" are "[p]hysical or psychological conditions that will be addressed to reduce or eliminate risks to ensure a child's protection, sense of permanence, and sense of well-being." Ala. Admin. Code (DHR), r. 660-5-47.02(18). 23 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
necessary to revise and develop a new plan should it be found that steps
and services are not being implemented or are not effectively meeting
needs." Ala. Admin. Code (DHR), r. 660-5-47-.06(01).
DHR completes the ISP on a specific form, created by DHR, that
contains a wealth of information about what a parent must achieve to be
reunified with his or her child and how he or she should achieve it. The
ISP form captures "information about the ISP meeting," as well as
"demographics and for information on the family members." Ala Admin.
Code (DHR), r. 660-5-47.07(01). Most significantly, the ISP form records
the planned "services to meet identified needs and achieve desired
permanency goals." Id. A written copy of the ISP must be provided to a
parent "at the conclusion of the ISP meeting, and if this is not feasible,
the plan shall be distributed to the team within ten (10) working days of
the date the meeting was held." Ala. Admin. Code (DHR), r. 660-5-47-
.04(8). DHR's regulations also anticipate that the ISP form may be
presented to a juvenile court at every judicial review. Ala. Admin. Code
(DHR), r. 660-5-47-.04(9).
Considering the comprehensive nature of the ISP and DHR's own
regulations requiring the creation of ISPs, the state should introduce
24 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
evidence concerning the development, implementation, and review of a
parent's ISP at every termination-of-parental-rights trial; such evidence
is the strongest evidence to demonstrate that the state has met its
immediate duty to attempt reunification. Conversely, if the state does not
offer evidence about the development, implementation, and review of a
parent's ISP -- information that the same state entity that brings a
termination-of-parental-rights action has obligated itself to create and
maintain -- the trial court should presume that the state has not met its
immediate duty to attempt reunification.
III. The state did not provide evidence that it satisfied its
immediate duty to attempt to rehabilitate the mother
Where does all this leave the mother in this case?
Consider the timeline established by the evidence. When the
Calhoun DHR picked up the child because of the actions of the child's
father in 2023, the mother had been a participant in a residential drug-
rehabilitation program for four months. The mother, who had voluntarily
entered the program, then left the program because the child had been
placed in foster care. Months passed, but the Calhoun DHR did not
return the child to her custody. There is no evidence indicating that,
25 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
during that period, Calhoun DHR held an ISP meeting with the mother
or provided her with any services, and there is no ISP form in the record.
After voluntarily leaving the drug-rehabilitation program but still not
regaining custody of her child, the mother returned to drug use.
When the Calhoun DHR took the child into custody in 2023, the
only evidence that the state offered about the barriers to the mother's
taking custody of the child was testimony about the mother's
participation in the residential drug-rehabilitation program. The state
did not present evidence indicating that the mother had tested positive
for drug use when it took custody of the child. Nor did it present evidence
indicating that the mother's drug use had rendered her incapable of
exercising her parental duties. Furthermore, even if the Calhoun DHR
had identified the risk of the mother's drug use as a barrier to
reunification at the time it took custody of the child, the state did not
present evidence indicating that it had informed the mother of that fact
or that it had developed a plan to remove that barrier "as quickly and
safely as possible" after taking the child into its custody.
Sometime between June 14, 2023, and December 31, 2023, the
mother reenrolled in the same residential drug-rehabilitation program.
26 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
If the mother had completed the drug-rehabilitation program as directed,
would that be enough to regain custody? Presumably yes, based on the
evidence that the state provided about the barriers to the mother's
reobtaining custody.
Was it enough? Apparently not.
The mother completed the drug-rehabilitation program in
November 2024. Before and after achieving that goal, the mother tested
negative for drug use in 26 drug screenings. Nonetheless, after the
mother completed the drug-rehabilitation program, the Calhoun DHR
conducted an ISP meeting -- the first evidence of an ISP meeting in the
record -- and, during that meeting, the Calhoun DHR informed the
mother that it was unwilling to try to return the child to her custody. In
January 2025, the mother tested positive for drug use.
I recognize that the juvenile court could have reasonably found that
the mother's drug use, in the months leading up to the termination-of-
parental-rights trial, rendered her unable or unwilling to parent the
child. But there is not sufficient evidence indicating that the Calhoun
DHR met its immediate duty to attempt reunification when it took
custody of the child in May 2023. There are no ISP forms in the record
27 CL-2025-0273 and CL-2025-0276
that may have informed the juvenile court about the Calhoun DHR's
immediate actions to ameliorate the mother's drug problem, about any
steps that the mother had taken or failed to take to rehabilitate herself,
about a summary of the progress or lack of progress that the mother had
made toward reunification, or about the Calhoun DHR's assessment over
time about the necessity for and appropriateness of the child's placement
in foster care. Instead, the evidence indicates that the Calhoun DHR's
first attempt to provide services to rehabilitate the mother was in
September 2024, more than 19 months after it took custody of the child.
The state may have communicated its expectations to the mother and
may have attempted to provide services tailored to the mother's drug use
before that date, but if it did, it did not provide evidence of those efforts
at the trial on its termination-of-parental-rights petition.
" '[I]t is imperative that the parties completely develop the evidence
at trial.' " M.W., 399 So. 3d at 294.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.