T.K. v. D.O.

2026 Ohio 352

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 5, 2026
• Docket: 115177
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as T.K. v. D.O., 2026-Ohio-352.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

T.K., :

Petitioner-Appellee, : No. 115177 v. :

D.O., :

Respondent-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 5, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-25-116105

Appearances:

Maxwell Martin, for appellee.

D.O., pro se.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, P.J.:

Respondent-appellant D.O. (“appellant”), pro se, appeals the trial

court’s decision granting a civil stalking protection order (“CSPO”) in favor of

petitioner-appellee T.K. (“appellee”). Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm. On April 12, 2025, appellee made a police report regarding several

instances of concerning behavior by appellant. On April 21, 2025, appellee filed for

a CSPO. The order was granted ex parte, and the matter set for a full hearing, which

was held on April 30, 2025.

Appellee testified that she is employed as an elementary school

principal and was in her first year as principal of the subject elementary school.

Appellant is the parent of a child at that school. According to appellee, she first

encountered appellant on the second day of the 2024-2025 school year. Appellee

assumed appellant was school staff because he was wearing a “welcome back to

school” staff shirt. Appellant told appellee he was a parent of a student and “very

highly involved” so she would be “seeing a lot of him.” (Tr. 15.)

The second time appellee encountered appellant was in September

2024, when appellant approached appellee at a PTA meeting and told appellee that

“he hoped he didn’t have to roast me in front of other parents” like he did with the

principal at his other child’s school, whom appellant said he “humiliated” because

that principal tried to limit when parents could be on school campus. Id. Appellant

told appellee that if she tried to do the same, he would make it so that she would

“hope the floor would drop out below me so I could just disappear because if he has

to he will humiliate me in front of people.” (Tr. 15-16.) Appellee testified that this

interaction made her uncomfortable.

In the beginning of October, the principal encountered appellant in the

school drop-off line. Appellant told appellee that he did not recognize her because she was not wearing a dress, stating that he expected to, and wanted to, see her in a

dress. Again, appellee felt uncomfortable.

On October 15, 2024, appellee encountered appellant in the school

hallway where he told her, “I’m glad to see you in a dress again” and “I want to see

your legs. I expect to see you in a dress. I like to see your legs.” (Tr. 20–21.)

According to appellee, appellant was standing close to her when he made the

statements. Appellee described appellant’s tone as “definitely very sexually

intonated. In fact, when he made the comment, he gave a glance down and a glance

up seeing that I was in a dress” and was looking at her legs and body. (Tr. 23.) This

encounter made appellee “very uncomfortable.” (Tr. 24.) The principal contacted

the school’s human resources director and reported the interaction. She also took

her concerns to the school superintendent.

Appellee’s next encounter with appellant was in February 2025, at a

school board meeting. When appellee was standing up in front of the meeting,

appellant, who was sitting in the first row, asked, “Where is your dress tonight?”

(Tr. 26.) He also stated to appellee, “I expect to see you in a dress” and “I want to

see your legs in a dress.” (Tr. 27.) Appellee testified that the way the appellant

looked at her was “very concerning,” she felt “very uncomfortable,” and it “made

[her] skin crawl.” Id. At this point, appellee told appellant to “stop.” Id. After the

meeting, appellee immediately contacted the superintendent and indicated that the

situation was urgent. She also supplemented her previous complaint with human

resources. The school subsequently banned appellant from school grounds and

sent a memo to school staff indicating that appellant was not permitted to be in any

school building without 24-hour written notice from the superintendent.

Appellee testified that she became aware that appellant made a public

records request for information about her and was provided three months of

appellee’s badge swipe records, which showed when she arrived and left school

property. She also became aware that appellant had a felony record and had spent

time in prison. And, despite being banned, appellant continued to come on school

property, making at least three unpermitted visits to the school after the ban had

been implemented.

Appellee told the court that she had not been able to work for the last

week “because of the panic attacks” she had when she entered the school building,

the surrounding area, or the town where appellant lives. (Tr. 38.) Appellee testified

that she had sought medical treatment because of the panic attacks. When asked

whether appellant’s conduct caused her mental distress, appellee answered “yes”

and explained that she was in “fear” and “terrified” of appellant. Id. Appellee told

the court, “I fear for my life every day. I fear he is a violent person. I don’t know

what he might do because his behaviors, when I’ve put restriction or I’ve tried to

protect myself in seeking just a sexual harassment or a harassment board of policy

complaint and he got restrictions to the building, his reaction to that was not to

stop.” (Tr. 39.) According to appellee’s testimony, she was “terrified of this man”

because of his “repeated behaviors that started with the intimidation, the sexual

harassment comments. [The ban] was put in place and — to protect myself and the

students and staff at our school and he has violated it.” (Tr. 32-33.)

Appellant admitted to making comments to appellee about the way

she dressed but stated that he made the comments because he was “relieved” that

appellee was not wearing a skirt because he found skirts to be “inappropriate” and

thought that there should be a “wardrobe policy” for school staff. (Tr. 52.)

He showed the court pictures he had obtained of the principal where he testified he

thought her dress was inappropriate because her knees were bare.

Appellant admitted requesting records regarding appellee’s work

schedule, stating he sought the principal’s badge swipe records to show she was not

working the hours required by her contract. Appellant further admitted that he did

not have permission to be on school grounds after he was banned but testified that

he did not need permission despite the ban. Appellant admitted that he had a past

felony conviction for retaliation and had served time in prison. Finally, appellant

stated that he had recently pulled a petition to run for school board.

The trial court granted the CSPO for a period of five years, finding by

a preponderance of the evidence that appellant had knowingly engaged in a pattern

of conduct that caused appellee to believe that appellant would cause or had caused

her physical harm or mental distress. The court ordered that appellant must not be

present within 500 feet of appellee and ordered appellant not to abuse, harm, attempt to harm, threaten, follow, stalk, or harass appellee. The notice stated that

appellant must remain in his car if he had to provide transportation for his child.

The order also covered two of appellee’s family or household members.

Appellant appealed and raises one assignment of error for our review

in which he argues that the trial court’s decision to grant the CSPO was not

supported by the evidence. He does not challenge the scope of the CSPO.

R.C. 2903.214 governs protection orders to protect victims of

menacing by stalking. A petitioner can obtain a CSPO by filing a petition alleging

that the respondent violated R.C. 2903.211. Where there is a preponderance of the

evidence that the respondent committed a violation of R.C. 2903.211, the court is

empowered to issue a CSPO. M.J.W. v. T.S., 2019-Ohio-3573, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).

A “preponderance of the evidence” is “the greater weight of the evidence, or evidence

that leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of a contested fact is more

probable than its nonexistence.” State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 102 (1987).

When an appellant challenges whether the protection order should

have been issued, we consider whether the trial court’s decision was supported by

“‘sufficient competent, credible evidence.’” In re R.K., 2020-Ohio-35, ¶ 13

(8th Dist.), quoting In re E.P., 2011-Ohio-5829, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). But the decision

whether to grant a CSPO is well within the sound discretion of a trial court, and we

will not reverse its decision absent an abuse of that discretion. R.W.B. v. T.V., 2024-

Ohio-584, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Rufener v. Hutson, 2012-Ohio-5061 (8th Dist.).

An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.”

Abdullah v. Johnson, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.

R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) provides, in part, that

[n]o person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or a family or household member of the other person or cause mental distress to the other person or a family or household member of the other person. In addition to any other basis for the other person’s belief that the offender will cause physical harm . . . or mental distress . . . the other person’s belief or mental distress may be based on words or conduct of the offender that are directed at or identify a corporation, association, or other organization that employs the other person or to which the other person belongs.

In order to obtain a CSPO, the petitioner is required to establish, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent, by engaging in a pattern of

conduct, caused the petitioner to believe the respondent would cause the petitioner

mental distress or physical harm. The Ohio Supreme Court recently clarified that

even the mere belief that a respondent will cause the petitioner mental distress

“is grounds for showing a violation of the menacing-by-stalking statute to obtain a

[CSPO].” Z.J. v. R.M., 2025-Ohio-5662, ¶ 3.

In this case, appellant contends that the evidence did not establish a

pattern of conduct or show that he acted knowingly.

A “pattern of conduct” exists when there are “two or more actions or

incidents closely related in time.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). “In determining what

constitutes a pattern of conduct, courts must take every action of the respondent

into consideration, even if some of the actions in isolation do not seem particularly threatening.” R.W.B., 2024-Ohio-584, at ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing Lewis v. Jacobs,

2013-Ohio-3461 (2d Dist.).

Appellee testified that appellant made inappropriate comments to her

on several occasions between September 2024 and February 2025. Three of those

interactions were comments about appellee’s body, the way she dressed, and the way

appellant thought she should dress. Besides the words themselves, appellee testified

that appellant’s tone of voice and the way he looked at her caused her distress.

Appellee testified that she had panic attacks, sought medical treatment, and had not

been able to work for the week prior to the CSPO hearing because of appellant’s

harassing behavior. While at first appellee felt “uncomfortable” by appellant’s

behavior, appellant’s continued behavior left her in “fear” and “terrified,” especially

when she found out that appellant had accessed her badge swipe records, continued

to show up at school despite being banned from the premises, and after she learned

of appellant’s criminal history. Appellee testified, “I fear for my life every day. I fear

he is a violent person. I don’t know what he might do because his behaviors, when

I’ve put restriction or I’ve tried to protect myself in seeking just a sexual harassment

or a harassment board of policy complaint and he got restrictions to the building,

his reaction to that was not to stop.” (Tr. 39.)

Based on the totality of appellant’s actions, we find that the trial

court’s determination that appellee established a pattern of conduct is supported by

competent and credible evidence in the record. Appellant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to show

that he acted “knowingly.” According to appellant, his comments were not meant to

harass appellee but were made because he was “happy” that appellee was not

dressed like she was “at a beach.” (Appellant’s brief p. 12.) According to appellant,

he was “praising her” for “not wearing flash[y] and skintight clothing.” Id.

R.C. 2901.22(B) provides that a person acts “knowingly,” regardless

of his or her purpose, when the person is aware that his or her conduct “will probably

cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” “A person has

knowledge of circumstances when he [or she] is aware that such circumstances

probably exist.” Id.

Appellant first approached appellee on the second day of the school

year, telling her that if she tried to limit access to the school, he would humiliate her

like he had previously done to another school principal. Appellee continued to make

inappropriate and suggestive comments, remarking on the way appellee was

dressed, saying that he liked seeing her in a dress, liked her legs, and wanted to see

her legs. Appellant admitted he accessed records that showed when appellee arrived

and departed the school building. Appellant admitted that he went to the school

even after being banned from the premises, stating that he did not think he needed

permission to be on school property, despite knowledge of the ban. He also

admitted he had a felony record and had been to prison. Based on this, appellant’s repeated acts can be characterized as

nothing less than knowing attempts to cause appellee to believe that appellant would

cause her physical harm or mental distress.

Finally, appellant argues that his conduct is constitutionally protected

under the First Amendment. We disagree.

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in

part that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”

The First Amendment’s protections are not absolute. Certain classes of speech, such

as “‘threatening words, obscene speech, fighting words, speech that interferes with

the rights of others, speech that creates a clear and present danger, and defamatory

speech,’” are not covered by the First Amendment. J.B. v. O.S.Y., 2022-Ohio-3226,

¶ 86 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Plants, 2010-Ohio-2930, ¶ 46 (5th Dist.).

Ohio courts, including this court, have held that knowingly causing

another to believe one will cause physical harm or mental distress to him or her by

engaging in two or more actions or incidents closely related in time does not qualify

as protected speech. J.B. at ¶ 87; Kreuzer v. Kreuzer, 144 Ohio App.3d 610, 614

(2d Dist. 2001); State v. Benner, 96 Ohio App.3d 327 (1st Dist. 1994). In J.B., this

court noted that the menacing-by-stalking statute “does not chill constitutionally

protected speech or conduct.” Id., citing State v. Smith, 126 Ohio App.3d 193

(7th Dist. 1998). Here, the trial court issued the CSPO because appellant engaged in a

pattern of conduct that caused appellee to believe appellant would harm her or cause

her mental distress, not because appellant exercised his First Amendment rights.

The sole assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______ MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, PRESIDING JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR