T.J.R.-L. v. B.M. (Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court: JU-23-15.02).

• Court: Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama
• Decided: May 23, 2025
• Docket: CL-2024-0659
• Status: Published

Opinion

Rel: May 23, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025 _________________________

CL-2024-0659 _________________________

T.J.R.-L.

v.

B.M.

Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court (JU-23-15.02)

PER CURIAM.

T.J.R.-L. ("the father") appeals from a judgment of the Randolph

Circuit Court ("the circuit court") terminating his parental rights to

E.J.R.-L. ("the child"), who was born on February 26, 2017, and finding CL-2024-0659

that he had impliedly consented to the adoption of the child. We dismiss

the appeal in part and affirm the judgment in part.

Procedural History

On January 18, 2023, B.M. ("the mother") filed in the Randolph

Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") a petition to terminate the father's

parental rights to the child. The mother asserted in her petition, among

other things, that the father had abandoned the child; that her husband,

J.G.M. ("the stepfather"), "is the sole father figure the ... child has ever

known"; and that an adoption proceeding involving the child ("the

adoption action") was pending in the Randolph Probate Court ("the

probate court"). On June 1, 2023, the father filed an answer to the

termination-of-parental-rights petition and a counterclaim in which he

sought to establish his paternity of the child and requested an award of

joint legal custody of the child and visitation.

On November 7, 2023, the juvenile court entered an order

adjudicating the father's paternity of the child. After a trial on February

14, 2024, the juvenile court entered, on March 7, 2024, a judgment

terminating the father's parental rights to the child. On March 21, 2024,

the father filed a notice of appeal to this court. On March 27, 2024, the

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juvenile court entered, pursuant to Rule 28(A)(1)(c)(i), Ala. R. Juv. P., an

order finding that the record of the proceedings was not adequate for

purposes of appeal; accordingly, this court entered an order, pursuant to

Rule 28(B) and (E), Ala. R. Juv. P., transferring the appeal to the circuit

court for a trial de novo. On August 7, 2024, the circuit court entered a

judgment terminating the father's parental rights to the child. The

circuit court noted at the outset of the judgment that the stepfather had

initiated the adoption action in the probate court and that the adoption

action had been "transferred and consolidated with the termination

action on June 13, 2024, by order of the … probate judge." After

terminating the father's parental rights, the circuit court proceeded to

determine that the father had impliedly consented to the stepfather's

adoption of the child. The circuit court then stated: "The court finds that

[the stepfather's] adoption petition shall be transferred back to [the

probate court] to be finalized in accordance with the laws of this State."

On August 20, 2024, the father filed his notice of appeal to this court.

Issues

On appeal, the father asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction over

the appeal, that the termination of the father's parental rights is not

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supported by clear and convincing evidence, and that the circuit court's

finding that the father had impliedly consented to the child's adoption is

unsupported by the evidence.

Jurisdiction

We must first address the father's arguments as they relate to this

court's jurisdiction over the appeal. " '[J]urisdictional matters are of such

magnitude that we take notice of them at any time and do so even ex

mero motu.' " Wallace v. Tee Jays Mfg. Co., 689 So. 2d 210, 211 (Ala. Civ.

App. 1997) (quoting Nunn v. Baker, 518 So. 2d 711, 712 (Ala. 1987)). The

father asserts in his brief to this court that, because no dependency

proceeding related to the child was pending at the time the mother filed

her petition to terminate his parental rights, the juvenile court lacked

jurisdiction over the petition. At one time, the Alabama Juvenile Justice

Act ("the AJJA"), Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-101 et seq., vested juvenile

courts with jurisdiction over petitions to terminate parental rights only

when the petition arose out of earlier juvenile-court proceedings. See

W.B.B. v. H.M.S., 141 So. 3d 1062, 1063 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). However,

in 2014, the legislature amended the AJJA to provide that juvenile courts

have exclusive original jurisdiction over all petitions to terminate

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parental rights. See Ala. Acts 2014, Act No. 2014-350, § 1, p. 1299.

Section 12-15-114(c)(2), Ala. Code 1975, currently provides that juvenile

courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions to terminate

parental rights. Thus, the juvenile court had jurisdiction over the

mother's petition to terminate the father's parental rights even though

that petition did not arise out of a dependency proceeding.

The father further argues that, because an adoption action was

pending in the probate court, the juvenile court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction over the termination petition. This court has acknowledged

that "adoption actions in probate court and dependency and/or

termination actions in juvenile court are not the same causes of action

and that, in many instances, dependency or termination actions and

adoption actions occur simultaneously." T.C.M. v. W.L.K., 208 So. 3d 39,

44 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). The fact that an adoption action is pending in

a probate court does not divest a juvenile court of its exclusive original

jurisdiction over a petition to terminate parental rights. Accordingly, we

cannot conclude that the pendency of the adoption action in the probate

court at the time the mother commenced her termination-of-parental-

rights action in the juvenile court, without more, prevented the juvenile

5 CL-2024-0659

court from exercising jurisdiction over the mother's petition to terminate

the father's parental rights pursuant to § 12-15-114(c)(2).

The father also argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over this

appeal because, he says, the circuit court's judgment is nonfinal. The

record indicates that the circuit court's judgment is final as it relates to

the action to terminate the father's parental rights. That judgment

terminates the parental rights of the father and awards the mother

permanent custody of the child. See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-320.

However, the circuit court did not enter a final judgment in the adoption

action, finding only that the father had impliedly consented to the

adoption and purporting to transfer the adoption action back to the

probate court to finalize the adoption. See Ex parte W.L.K., 175 So. 3d

652, 656 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) (explaining that an order resolving an

adoption contest but not resolving the entire adoption action was an

interlocutory order under the former Alabama Adoption Code). 1

1The adoption action was commenced before January 1, 2024, and

is, therefore, governed by the former Alabama Adoption Code, Ala. Code 1975, former § 26-10A-1 et seq. See Ex parte H.W., [Ms. CL-2024-0382, Aug. 2, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2024). Because the appellate record does not contain the transfer order from the probate court, it is unclear whether the adoption action was transferred in whole or in part to the circuit court. See Ex parte A.M.P., 997 So. 2d 1008, 1017 (Ala. 2008) 6 CL-2024-0659

Accordingly, this court has appellate jurisdiction over only the final

judgment concluding the termination action; it does not have appellate

jurisdiction over the nonfinal judgment relating to the adoption action,

which is still pending. See Nettles v. Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.C.,

276 So. 3d 663, 669 (Ala. 2018) ("Once a final judgment has been entered

in a case, it is immediately appealable, regardless of whether it is

consolidated with another still pending case."). Accordingly, we dismiss

the appeal insofar as it seeks review of the nonfinal judgment entered in

the adoption action, and we proceed to consider only the appeal of the

final judgment entered in the termination action.

Standard of Review

In R.H. v. Madison County Department of Human Resources, 383

So. 3d 667, 672 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023), this court outlined the applicable

standard of review:

"Appellate courts must apply a presumption of correctness in favor of the juvenile court's findings based on ore tenus evidence presented in a termination-of-parental-

(discussing the various transfer mechanisms by which a juvenile court may acquire jurisdiction over an adoption action). Regardless of the transfer mechanism, the circuit court's judgment as it relates to the adoption action was not a final judgment because it did not approve or deny the adoption petition. See Ex parte W.L.K., supra.

7 CL-2024-0659

rights action and will reverse a juvenile court's judgment terminating parental rights only if the record shows that the judgment is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. J.C. v. State Dep't of Hum. Res., 986 So. 2d 1172, 1183 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). 'This court does not reweigh the evidence but, rather, determines whether the findings of fact made by the juvenile court are supported by evidence that the juvenile court could have found to be clear and convincing.' K.S.B. v. M.C.B., 219 So. 3d 650, 653 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016). Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that, 'when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion.' § 6-11-20(b)(4), Ala. Code 1975. 'Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a level of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence or the substantial weight of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id."

Analysis

Section 12-15-319(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

"If the juvenile court finds from clear and convincing evidence, competent, material, and relevant in nature, that the parent[] of a child [is] unable and unwilling to discharge [his or her] responsibilities to and for the child, or that the conduct or condition of the parent[] renders [him or her] unable to properly care for the child and that the conduct or condition is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, it may terminate the parental rights of the parent[]. In a hearing on a petition for termination of parental rights, the court shall consider the best interests of the child."

The circuit court determined, among other things, that the father

had abandoned the child, see § 12-15-319(a)(1); that the duration and

nature of the father's mental illness renders him unable to care for the

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needs of the child, see § 12-15-319(a)(2); that the father had failed to

provide for the material needs of the child or to pay a reasonable portion

of support for the child when he was otherwise able to do so, see § 12-15-

319(a)(9); and that the father had failed to maintain regular visits with

the child or to maintain consistent contact or communication with the

child, see § 12-15-319(a)(11).

The father first argues that the circuit court erred in concluding

that he had abandoned the child. "Abandonment" is defined in § 12-15-

301(1), Ala. Code 1975, as:

"A voluntary and intentional relinquishment of the custody of a child by a parent, or a withholding from the child, without good cause or excuse, by the parent, of his or her presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, or the opportunity for the display of filial affection, or the failure to claim the rights of a parent, or failure to perform the duties of a parent."

The mother testified that she and the father had been in a romantic

relationship at the time the child was born and that she and the father

had resided together, with the child, for approximately one year before

she and the father separated in 2018. According to the mother, she had

taken the child to visit the father every weekend at the home in Georgia

where he resided with his mother and his grandmother for approximately

five to six months, but, she said, she had discontinued those weekly visits

9 CL-2024-0659

after learning that the father's grandmother was caring for the child

every night when the father went to bars. The mother testified that,

between 2018 and 2020, she had initiated six visits between the father

and the child, that those visits had lasted for a couple of hours each and

had ended in arguments between her and the father, and that the father

had not contacted her to check on the child or asked to see the child after

those visits. The mother admitted that, sometime between 2018 and

2020, she had blocked the father's telephone number and had informed

the father that he could not visit the child without a court order and that,

shortly thereafter, the father had appeared at her house, unannounced,

on Easter in 2020, attempting to see the child. Additionally, the mother

admitted that, in 2019, she had sent the father a text message telling him

not to "come … around."

On July 24, 2020, the father filed a petition for legitimation and to

establish custody and visitation of the child in Carroll County, Georgia.

According to the mother, the father did not visit the child during the

pendency of the legitimation action, which was resolved on June 7, 2022,

when the Georgia court entered a judgment denying the father's petition.

She testified that the father had telephoned her on two occasions during

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the pendency of the legitimation action, that she did not believe that his

telephone calls were about the child, that one of the calls had occurred

shortly before the trial in the legitimation action, and that the father had

behaved aggressively and had used foul language toward her during

those calls. The mother admitted that she had sought to serve the father

with the termination petition by publication and had not attempted to

contact the father's family members, with whom he had previously

resided, because she was attempting to sneak the termination of the

father's parental rights past him.

The father testified that, after the parties separated, he had visited

the child every weekend for at least six months but that the mother had

stopped allowing him to see the child when he had informed her that he

had entered a new relationship. According to the father, because he had

been unable to contact the mother, he appeared at her house on Easter

2020. The father stated that the mother had allowed him to visit the

child approximately 6 to 10 times thereafter before she told him that he

would have to get the courts involved for him to see the child, which, he

said, had led him to commence the legitimation action. When asked

whether he could have appealed the judgment denying his legitimation

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petition or moved to set that judgment aside, the father answered in the

negative, based on the mother's having moved to Alabama.

The father argues that, because his efforts to contact and visit the

child were rebuffed by the mother, the circuit court erred in concluding

that his actions were voluntary or that they meet the definition of

abandonment. He cites B.B. v. J.P., 388 So. 3d 710 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023),

and K.G. v. J.T., 382 So. 3d 1257 (Ala. Civ. App. 2023), in support of his

argument that the evidence presented does not support the circuit court's

finding of abandonment. In B.B., this court determined that there was

evidence indicating that B.B. had made attempts to be involved in her

children's lives but that the children's custodian had denied her visitation

and contact with the children such that the conclusion that B.B. had

abandoned her children was not properly supported by the evidence. 388

So. 3d at 715. In K.G., this court determined that evidence indicating

that K.G. had made numerous efforts to contact her child but that she

had been blocked from having any contact with her child by the child's

custodial parent would not support a finding that K.G. had abandoned

her child. 382 So. 3d at 1261.

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In C.C. v. L. J., 176 So. 3d 208, 213 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015), this court

affirmed a judgment determining that C.C. had abandoned his child,

J.C., despite arguments by C.C. that J.C.'s mother had alienated him

from J.C. This court stated, in pertinent part:

"[C.C.] maintains that the evidence shows that, after he broke up with [J.C.'s] mother in 2010, [J.C.'s] mother had purposefully alienated him from [J.C.] and that he, therefore, had a good excuse for not visiting with, supporting, or otherwise parenting [J.C.]. Hence, [C.C.] argues, the juvenile court erred in finding that he had abandoned [J.C.]. However, from its own independent weighing of the competing and somewhat conflicting evidence, see Ex parte McInish, [47 So. 3d 767 (Ala. 2008)], the juvenile court reasonably could have determined that [J.C.'s] mother had done nothing to prevent [C.C.] from developing a parental relationship with [J.C.] and that [C.C.] had voluntarily, intentionally, and unjustifiably forgone a relationship with [J.C.], had failed or refused to financially support [J.C.], and had failed or refused to act as a parent toward [J.C.]. This court may not reweigh the evidence to overturn the judgment of a trial court. See Ex parte T.V., 971 So. 2d 1, 9 (Ala. 2007)."

176 So. 3d at 213. Additionally, in W.W. v. H.W., 384 So. 3d 663, 670

(Ala. Civ. App. 2023), this court concluded that the trial court's finding

that W.W. had abandoned his child was supported by the evidence

despite arguments that the child's mother, H.W., had blocked contact

between W.W. and the child. This court noted that the totality of W.W.'s

conduct, including his conduct before H.W. blocked his contact with the

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child and his failure to attempt to enforce his visitation rights with the

child, supported the finding that W.W. had abandoned the child. Id.

In the present case, the circuit court made findings of fact in its

judgment terminating the father's parental rights, including, among

other things, that, after the parties separated, the father was not

spending time with the child during their visits but, instead, was going

to downtown Carrollton, Georgia, to visit bars; that, after his weekly

visits had been discontinued, the father had essentially disappeared from

the child's life; that the father had failed to attempt to contact the mother

to check on the child or to otherwise promote a relationship with the child

following visits that had been initiated by the mother after his weekly

visits had been discontinued; that those visits that the mother had

initiated had lasted only a couple of hours, during which the father had

exhibited hostility toward the mother; and that the father had not

appealed the judgment in the legitimation action and had contacted the

mother only twice during the pendency of that action, which contacts

were not about inquiring into the well-being of the child and had resulted

in the father's using foul language toward the mother. Like in C.C., this

court cannot reweigh the evidence. Although evidence was presented

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indicating that the mother had made efforts to block contact from the

father, the circuit court's findings that the father had failed to pursue

contact and visitation with the child or to pursue a relationship with the

child at other times is supported by the evidence presented. Accordingly,

we cannot conclude that the circuit court erred in finding that the father

had abandoned the child.

Having determined that the evidence supports the circuit court's

finding of abandonment as a basis for terminating the father's parental

rights, we decline to address the father's argument insofar as he

challenges the remaining grounds cited by the circuit court in support of

the termination of his parental rights.

Conclusion

Insofar as the father challenges on appeal the circuit court's

judgment as it relates to the adoption action, we dismiss the appeal.

Regarding that portion of the circuit court's judgment relating to the

termination action, the judgment is affirmed.2

2The mother argues that the judgment terminating the parental

rights of the father moots his contest to the adoption petition because consent to an adoption is not required of a parent whose parental rights have been terminated. See Ala. Code 1975, former § 26-10A-10(a). 15 CL-2024-0659

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN

PART.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards and Hanson, JJ., concur.

Because we have no appellate jurisdiction over the judgment as it relates to the adoption action, we do not address this point. 16