Tiven T. Singh a/k/a Tiven Tyrone Singh v. State of Mississippi

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: March 14, 2023
• Docket: 2022-CP-00273-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2022-CP-00273-COA

TIVEN T. SINGH A/K/A TIVEN TYRONE APPELLANT SINGH

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/16/2021 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT P. KREBS COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TIVEN T. SINGH (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/14/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND McCARTY, JJ.

McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. A man pled guilty to robbery, and his sentence included a period of post-release

supervision. He stopped reporting, so a warrant was issued for his arrest. After he was

picked up, his post-release supervision was revoked, and the remainder of his sentence was

reinstated. He now appeals, arguing procedural errors occurred in his revocation. Since he

absconded from supervision, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2. In 2014, Tiven Singh pled guilty to one count of robbery. The trial court sentenced

him to a term of fifteen years with three years to serve and the remainder on post-release

supervision. ¶3. But Singh did not follow the terms of his PRS. On March 29, 2016, the trial court

issued a warrant for Singh’s arrest based on allegations that he “failed to report to MDOC

since August 2015,” did not “pay MDOC as directed,” and “failed to start making payments

60 days from [his] release[].” According to Singh, he was only arrested and detained over

a year later, on October 5, 2017.

¶4. On November 16, 2017, the trial court held a revocation hearing. At no time during

the hearing did Singh refute the State’s allegations that he had failed to report or follow the

other directives of his PRS terms. In fact, he admitted to them. The trial court then ordered

his PRS revoked and that he serve the remaining twelve years of his sentence in MDOC’s

custody.

¶5. Singh then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. He argued his revocation hearing

was untimely held because he was detained for more than thirty days. He also argued the

trial court exceeded its authority by imposing the full unserved portion of his sentence.

¶6. The circuit court denied Singh’s petition, finding the PCR petition was untimely filed.

The circuit court also held that state law allows a court to impose any or all of a sentence

when a person on PRS absconds from supervision for six months or more. Singh then

appealed, and the case was assigned to us for decision.

DISCUSSION

The circuit court properly denied Singh’s PCR petition.

¶7. Singh argues his PCR petition was erroneously denied. Specifically, he argues the

trial court violated his due process rights by failing to hold a timely revocation hearing and

2 by imposing the full amount of his suspended sentence.

¶8. But Singh is not the first appellant to raise this exact issue before our Court. In one

case, a man pled guilty to robbery. Dortch v. State, 338 So. 3d 155, 156 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App.

2022). He was sentenced to “serve eight years in the custody of the Mississippi Department

of Corrections followed by seven years of post-release supervision—five years reporting and

two years non-reporting.” Id. As a result of his failure to report, an arrest warrant was

issued. Id. He was arrested on August 5, 2020. Id. at (¶2). On August 18, the trial court

held a revocation hearing. Id. During the hearing, he never refuted the State’s allegations.

Id. The judge then ordered that his PRS be revoked and that he spend five years in MDOC

custody. Id. Dortch then appealed, arguing that the court improperly revoked his PRS

because of the length of time between the issuance of his arrest warrant and his revocation

hearing, which was held after the thirty-day period, and there was no good cause shown for

the delay. Id. at (¶8).

¶9. We ultimately concluded the trial court had discretion to revoke Dortch’s probation

despite the thirty-day time limit under state law. Id. at 158 (¶9). In making this ruling, this

Court relied on Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-37.1 (Rev. 2015), which declares

“if a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence, that a probationer or a person under

post-release supervision has committed a felony or absconded, the court may revoke his

probation and impose any or all of the sentence.” Id. The law defined what constituted

absconding: “[A]bsconding from supervision means the failure of a probationer to report to

his supervising officer for six (6) or more consecutive months.” Id.

3 ¶10. While Dortch’s revocation hearing was held more than thirty days after the issuance

of his arrest warrant, our Court found that the fact he had absconded constituted good cause

for any delay. Id. Quoting section 47-7-37.1, we held that “[n]otwithstanding any other

provision of law to the contrary,” when a court concludes “a probationer or a person under

post-release supervision” has absconded, “the court may revoke his probation and impose any

or all of the sentence.” Id. at (¶9).

¶11. It is undisputed that Singh absconded and utterly failed to report pursuant to the PRS

terms or satisfy the other PRS conditions. Indeed, he admitted so during his revocation

hearing. As clearly stated under section 47-7-37.1, this gave the trial court discretion to

revoke Singh’s PRS and impose “any or all” of his remaining sentence.1 While Singh takes

issue with his revocation hearing being held more than thirty days after his detainment, the

reality is that by absconding, he shed the procedural safeguards of those statutory timelines.

¶12. Finding no error in the revocation, the circuit court’s order denying his PCR petition

is affirmed.

¶13. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR.

1 While the circuit court ruled Singh’s PCR claims were time-barred, the State correctly points out “under the UPCCRA, claims of unlawful probation or PRS revocation are excepted from the three-year statute of limitations and are not subject to the time bar.” And “it is clear that a trial court judgment may be affirmed on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial court.” Askew v. Askew, 699 So. 2d 515, 519 n.3 (Miss. 1997).