Titus v. Minnesota Mining Co.

8 Mich. 183, 1860 Mich. LEXIS 34
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedMay 22, 1860
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 8 Mich. 183 (Titus v. Minnesota Mining Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Titus v. Minnesota Mining Co., 8 Mich. 183, 1860 Mich. LEXIS 34 (Mich. 1860).

Opinions

Manning J.:

Complainant claims, under a written contract, a right to eight hundred shares of unassessable stock in the Vulcan Mining Company, and has filed his bill for the stock against the Minnesota Mining' Company, an incorporation, alleging they are one and the same company, or that the Minnesota Company is the Vulcan Company under a new name.

The testimony in the case does not sustain their identity. On the contrary, it shows the two companies are not one and the same, but separate organizations, having nothing in common between them. The Vulcan Company is still in existence, and the owner of the' mining location purchased for it of the Baltimore Company.

It follows, as a necessary consequence, that for the stock in question the bill should have been filed against the Vulcan Company, instead of the Minnesota Company; and that it should have been filed by the Baltimore Company, unless complainant is a trustee for the stockholders of that company, under the agreement of the 21st November.

Is complainant a trustee under that agreement ? To solve this question recourse must be had to the agreement itself, which is a contract between the Baltimore Mining Company, by complainant as its president and agent, and Hickok & Co. and their associates. It is not a contract between the latter on one part, and Titus on the other. This is not pretended; nor is there any ground for such a claim, as complainant’s agency is stated in the contract 'itself. The leases to be assigned were the property of the Baltimore Company, and the eight hundred shares of unassessable stock were the consideration, in [216]*216part, of the, assignment, and must be regarded as the property of the company, unless by some act of the company the stock was to be severed from its effects, and to become the individual property of its stockholders. No act of the company making such severance or distribution of the stock, or authorizing’ it to be made by complainant, is shown; and the provision in the contract for the delivery of the certificates of the stock to complainant, to be in harmony with the other parts of the contract, and come within the scope of complainant’s authority, must be understood as an undertaking, and nothing more, on the part of Hickok & Co., and their associates, to deliver the certificates to complainant as the duly authorized agent of the company to receive them.

The supplementary agreement of Vm. Hickok, of the 23d November, is of no binding force whatever. There are several reasons why it should be discarded: 1st. It is an attempted alteration of the agreement of the 21st November, by Wm. Hickok alone, and not by Hickok & Co. and the other persons associated with him in that agreement; 2d. It is not supported or made binding by any new consideration passing between the parties to the original agreement; and, 3d. Its object would seem to be to give the unassessable stock to the shareholders of the Baltimore Company, instead of the company itself) and to create complainant a trustee to receive and make a pro rata distribution of it. As agent to sell, he had no authority, by contract or otherwise, -to make a partition or distribution of the proceeds of the sale among-the shareholders of the company. His authority “to make sale of the same (the leases), on such terms as he should think fit,” conferred no such power. If I am correct in this, then it was not in the power of the complainant and the other parties to the agreement of the 21st November, had they all joined in the supplementary agreement, to have changed it in the manner indicated by the [217]*217latter agreement. Nor does the supplementary agreement appear to have ever been ratified by the Vulcan Company. By its articles of association, it is provided, in express terms, that the 800 shares of unassessable stock shall be “transferred to the Baltimore Mining Company.’’

For the reasons stated I think the decree should be affirmed; and I should feel it to be my duty to refrain from expressing an opinion on the case made by the evidence, if I could see that the rights of any one not before us might be prejudiced by it, although the cause was disposed of in the court below on its merits.

It was insisted, on the argument, that the Minnesota Joint Stock Mining Company was formed by a majority of the shareholders of the Vulcan Company, for the purpose of appropriating to their use, land to the exclusion of the other shareholders of the Vulcan Company, a mining location that the Vulcan Company had contracted to purchase of the Ontonagon Company.

The questions, who should be parties to such a case, and what relief should be given, and against whom, I shall not discuss,' as ¡ I do not think the case itself is made out by the evidence.

By whom was the north half of location ninety-eight purchased? I use the word purchased as including contract to purchase, the sense in which it is used by the witnesses.

Galloway says in his testimony, that “Knapp was authorized by the Vulcan Company to make the purchase;” and that “he did so, as the matter was understood in the 'office of the company.”

As to Knapp’s authority to make the purchase for the Vulcan Company, Galloway is clearly mistaken, as appears from the resolution of the company under which Knapp acted, and the testimony of Hickok, Knapp, Barry, Pears-all, and C. E. Smith, all of whom were at the meeting of the stockholders at which the resolution was passed, [218]*218Galloway bimself acting as secretary to the meeting, and signing the record. By the resolution, Knapp was “instructed to make inquiries in Detroit and elsewhere, on his return, as to the possibility of purchasing the whole or a portion of the Ontonagon Company’s location, and to communicate to the company, as soon as possible, such information as he may be able to obtain on the subject.” No authority was given him to make any contract whatever.

The resolution was passed under the following, circumstances: Knapp, as agent of the Vulcan Company, had spent the preceding summer, with the workmen of the company in his charge, in making explorations for copper on the location purchased of the Baltimore Company, and had come to the conclusion that it was worthless for mining, and so stated to the stockholders at their meeting on the 20th September, at which the resolution was adopted. At the same time he called their attention to the Ontonagon 'Company’s location, which was for sale, and recommended its purchase. Ilickok and Galloway, as well as himself, were in favor of making the purchase. But the other stockholders were opposed to it — some, because the Baltimore Company would participate in the new adventure without contributing any thing toward the purchase; and others, because they were unwilling, from the experience they had already had, to embark in a new adventure, attended with so much hazard, and, requiring a still further outlay of money. To this last class belonged Barry, on whose motion the resolution was passed. His reason for offering it and asking its adoption by the meeting we will give in his own words. He says: “Mr. Ilickok evinced considerable feeling because his views were not favored by the meeting, and, in order to conciliate him, I suggested that time should be allowed to think and talk the matter over ; that I had no objection that Mr. Knapp, on his return to Detroit, might be directed to make in[219]*219quiries, and ascertain whether the purchase of No.

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Related

Wilhelm v. Byles
27 N.W. 847 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1886)
Bracken v. Cooper
80 Ill. 221 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1875)
Westcott v. the Minnesota Mining Company
23 Mich. 145 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1871)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
8 Mich. 183, 1860 Mich. LEXIS 34, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/titus-v-minnesota-mining-co-mich-1860.