NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COLIN J. TITUS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SIERRA M. TITUS :
:
Appellant : No. 88 MDA 2026
Appeal from the Order Entered December 29, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s):
201903737
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., LANE, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.* MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 9, 2026 Sierra M. Titus (“Mother”) appeals from the order which denied her petition to modify custody, denied the cross-petition to modify custody filed by Colin J. Titus (“Father”), maintained the prior award of shared legal and physical custody to parties over their daughter, A.T. (“Child”), but imposed an alternate custody schedule. After careful review, we affirm.
Mother and Father were married from 2015 until 2019, and Child was born in 2017. Father initiated these proceedings in 2019 by filing a complaint for custody. Since then, the parties have been in and out of court repeatedly due to the filing of numerous petitions to modify custody, petitions for special relief, petitions for contempt, petitions for counsel fees, and a prior appeal to this Court. The trial court has described the parties as a “high conflict family,”
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
with significant fighting, yelling, and disparagement between Mother and Father in front of Child. Trial Court Opinion, 2/11/26, at 11-12. Given the extensive record before us, we will detail only the factual and procedural history relevant to this appeal.
In 2020, the trial court awarded the parties shared legal custody over Child, with primary physical custody to Mother, and partial physical custody to Father. In 2023, Father filed a petition for modification. Following a custody trial, the court entered an order on February 16, 2024, wherein it granted Father’ petition, awarded the parties shared legal and physical custody over Child, and established an alternating, two-week physical custody schedule. Mother appealed, and this Court affirmed the custody order. See Titus v. Titus, 329 A.3d 654 (Pa. Super. 2024) (unpublished memorandum).
In February 2025, Mother filed a petition to modify custody, requesting primary physical custody of Child. In September 2025, Father filed a cross- petition to modify custody, also requesting primary physical custody of Child. In the interim, Father obtained a temporary protection from abuse order against Mother on behalf of Child based upon claims of physical abuse, which claims were ultimately deemed to be unfounded. See N.T., 11/24/25, at 282, 310, 312-16, 390-91, 397-99; see also N.T., 11/20/25, at 188-89, 219-20, 222-23. Nonetheless, Mother agreed to engage in parenting classes through the Family Service Association, and the parties agreed to participate in
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functional family therapy1 through Vision Quest. See N.T., 11/24/25, at 391- 92; see also N.T., 11/20/25, at 33-34, 221-23; Custody Stipulation, 5/12/25.
Relatedly, we note that Child has been enrolled in individual therapy at Red Bird Mental Health Services (“Red Bird”) since the initial custody proceedings. In May 2025, Mother filed a petition for special relief wherein she requested that the court terminate Child’s therapy at Red Bird, and that the parties either agree upon a new therapist or submit alternative providers for the court’s consideration. In July 2025, the trial court entered an order directing that Child continue to receive therapy at Red Bird, but ordered that Red Bird assign Child a new, female therapist. See Order, 7/2/25.
On November 20 and 24, 2025, the trial court conducted a custody trial regarding the parties’ cross-petitions for modification. Both parties were present and represented by counsel. Mother testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of: Bree Riley, Ph.D. (“Dr. Riley”), a clinical psychologist who testified as an expert in clinical and forensic psychology; Rebecca Ciliberto (“Ms. Ciliberto”), a case manager at the Family Service Association; and Janice Puhak (“Ms. Puhak”), Child’s elementary school teacher for the 2024-25 school year. Father testified on his own behalf and
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1 Functional family therapy “assists family members in learning new skills to
be able to improve communication, reduce blame and negativity in the family and hopefully be able to move forward.” N.T., 11/20/25, at 76. Although the parties participated in therapy between July 2025 and November 2025, the trial court ultimately suspended functional family therapy due to the parties’ conflicted behavior during the sessions. See Order, 11/24/25.
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presented the testimony of Mindy Jenkins (“Ms. Jenkins”), the family’s therapist through Vision Quest. Additionally, the court interviewed Child in camera in the presence of counsel for both parties.2 By order entered on December 29, 2025, the trial court denied the parties’ respective petitions for modification, and maintained the provisions of the February 16, 2024 custody order, including the award of shared legal and physical custody of Child, with the notable exception that the parties would follow a new physical custody schedule. See Order, 12/29/25, at ¶ 9. The court issued a contemporaneous opinion addressing the custody factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).3 The trial court found that factors (2.1)(i) and (ii) weighed in Father’s favor, factor (8) weighed Mother’s favor, and the remaining factors were either neutral or inapplicable. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/25, at 5-7. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal, along with a concise
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2 We note with displeasure that Child’s in camera interview, as well as the custody trial exhibits, were not included in the certified record and were not transmitted as a supplement despite an informal request by this Court. While Child’s in camera interview, as well as the trial exhibits, remain absent, this does not hamper meaningful appellate review. Nevertheless, we pointedly remind counsel that the appellant bears the responsibility to make sure that the record forwarded to an appellate court contains those documents necessary to allow a complete and judicious assessment of the issues raised on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1921 Note (providing that the “[u]ltimate responsibility for a complete record rests with the party raising an issue that requires appellate court access to record materials”) (citation omitted).
3 The contemporaneous opinion is paginated continuously with the trial court’s
order, but it is docketed separately. As such, we cite to the opinion as a separate document.
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statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), and the trial court filed a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a reasoned and supported analysis of the factors under [section] 5328[(a)] in denying Mother’s request for primary physical custody of [C]hild?
2. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by deeming multiple factors under [section] 5328[(a)] “neutral” or “not applicable” without explanation or analysis in denying Mother’s request for primary physical custody of [C]hild?
3. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in weight [sic]
the factor set forth in [section] 5328(a)(2.3)(i) against Mother without factual findings or explanation, despite the trial court finding that, “it has become a situation of Father and [Child] v.
Mother?”
4. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in weigh[ing] the factor set forth in [section] 5238(a)(2.3)(ii) against Mother where the trial court’s opinion contains no findings identifying conduct by Mother constituting attempts to turn [C]hild against [Father]?
5. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by failing to completely address evidence and testimony regarding [C]hild’s tantrums and behavioral struggles, as well as Mother’s demonstrated ability to appropriately manage and support the [C]hild during those episodes?
6. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by issuing an internally inconsistent . . . opinion that criticizes Father’s conduct and communication with Mother while simultaneously weighing the factors regarding cooperating and conflict against Mother without reconciling those findings?
7. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by making adverse credibility findings against Mother, specifically, that Mother “never admits when she is wrong about anything” and fails
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to take responsibility, where such findings are directly contradicted by Mother’s testimony?
8. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by finding that Mother attempted to exclude Father form [sic] a public parade, where the record establishes that Mother did not exclude Father and the finding is unsupported by competent evidence?
9. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion in its analysis of the factor set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(3) by relying exclusively on the testimony of [Ms.] Jenkins, without addressing that she met with Father and [C]hild approximately one month before ever meeting Mother, thereby undermining the neutrality and reliability of her opinions?
10. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by failing to address Mother’s request for continued therapeutic intervention for [C]hild, resulting in an order that is silent as to therapy and leaves [C]hild without ongoing therapeutic support?
11. Did the trial court err and abuse its discretion by issuing an order that lacks sufficient specificity, including the failure to clearly set forth exchange times and logistical details necessary to minimize conflict and ensure enforceability?
Mother’s Brief at 4-5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted, issues reordered for ease of disposition).
We review Mother’s issues on appeal according to the following standard and scope of review:
Our standard of review over a custody order is for a gross abuse of discretion. Such an abuse of discretion will only be found if the trial court, in reaching its conclusion, overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment which is manifestly unreasonable, or reaches a conclusion that is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will as shown by the evidence of record.
In reviewing a custody order, we must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record, as our role does not include making independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility
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and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the trial court who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record.
We may reject the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.
Rogowski v. Kirven, 291 A.3d 50, 60-61 (Pa. Super. 2023) (cleaned up). It is not our function “to determine whether the trial court reached the ‘right’ decision; rather, we must consider whether, based on the evidence presented, given due deference to the trial court’s weight and credibility determinations, the trial court erred or abused its discretion.” King v. King, 889 A.2d 630, 632 (Pa. Super. 2005) (cleaned up).
Child custody actions are governed by the Child Custody Act (“Act”), 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5321-5340. The paramount concern in a child custody case is the best interests of the child based on the consideration of all factors that legitimately affect the child’s physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual wellbeing. See Landis v. Landis, 869 A.2d 1003, 1011 (Pa. Super. 2005). Section 5323(a) delineates the types of custody that a trial court may award: (1) shared physical custody; (2) primary physical custody; (3) partial physical custody; (4) sole physical custody; (5) supervised physical custody; (6) shared legal custody; and (7) sole legal custody. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(a).
When awarding any form of custody, the trial court is required to consider the child’s best interests pursuant to the following factors set forth in section 5328(a):
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(a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant factors, giving substantial weighted consideration to the factors specified under paragraphs (1), (2), (2.1) and (2.2) which affect the safety of the child, including the following:
(1) Which party is more likely to ensure the safety of the child.
(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or member of the party’s household, which may include past or current protection from abuse or sexual violence protection orders where there has been a finding of abuse.
(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement with protective services).
(2.2) Violent or assaultive behavior committed by a party.
(2.3) The level of cooperation and conflict between the parties, including:
(i) which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact between the child and the other party or parties if contact is consistent with the safety needs of the child; and
(ii) the attempts by a party to turn the child against the other party, except in cases of abuse where reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the safety of the child. A party’s good faith and reasonable effort to protect the safety of a child or self shall not be considered evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with the other party. A party’s reasonable concerns for the safety of the child and the party’s reasonable efforts to protect the child shall not be considered attempts to turn the child against the other party. A child’s deficient or negative relationship with a party shall not be presumed to be caused by the other party.
(3) A willingness and ability of a party to prioritize the needs of the child by providing appropriate care, stability and continuity for the child, considering the parental duties
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performed by the party on behalf of the child in the past and whether the party is willing and able to perform the duties in the future, and attend to the daily physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of the child.
(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s education, family life and community life, except if changes are necessary to protect the safety of the child or a party.
[repealed by amendment]
(6) The child’s sibling and other familial relationships.
(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the child’s developmental stage, maturity and judgment.
[repealed by amendment]
[repealed by amendment]
[repealed by amendment]
(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
(12) Each party’s employment schedule and availability to care for the child or ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements.
[repealed by amendment]
(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member of a party’s household.
(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member of a party’s household.
(16) Any other relevant factor.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).4 The trial court is required to consider all of the factors listed in section 5328(a) when entering a custody order. See J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 652 (Pa. Super. 2011). As the finder of fact, the trial court determines which factors are most salient and critical in each particular case. See E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d 451, 468 (Pa. Super. 2019). After the trial court has reached a decision regarding custody, the court must delineate the reasons for its custody decision either on the record in open court, or in a written opinion or order. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(d). However, “there is no required amount of detail for the trial court’s explanation; all that is required is that the enumerated factors are considered and that the custody decision is based on those considerations.” M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa. Super. 2013).
As Mother’s first six issues are related, we will address them together.
In each of these issues, Mother complains that the trial court’s opinion did not contain sufficient detail and explanation in its assessment of the section 5328(a) custody factors. In Mother’s first two issues, which she discusses together, she complains that “the trial court assigned weight to the custody factors without explaining how the evidence supported those conclusions.” Mother’s Brief at 7. Mother asserts that “the trial court repeatedly labeled
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4 Our General Assembly amended section 5328(a) on June 30, 2025, with an
effective date of August 29, 2025. As the subject custody proceedings occurred after the effective date of the amendments, they apply here.
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statutory factors neutral without further analysis.” Id. at 9. Mother points to selective testimony and evidence presented in the case, which she contends contradicts a neutral finding by the trial court on factors (3), (4), and (10). Mother argues that a trial court is required to “demonstrate[] a reasoned and well-delineated analysis of the [section 5328(a)] factors,” and that, in the instant case, the trial court erred or abused its discretion because it did not specifically discuss the testimony and evidence identified by Mother in its opinion. Id. at 12.
In her third issue, Mother acknowledges that the trial court provided some explanation in its opinion for finding that factor (2.3)(i) weighed against her, but she nevertheless argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion based on its “failure to explain why this factor weighed against Mother” in the opinion in light of evidence of ongoing conflict between the parties. Id. at 13.
In her fourth issue, Mother contends that the trial court erred and abused its discretion because the trial court’s opinion, “offered no specific factual basis for [the trial court’s] conclusion that factor [(2.3)](ii) weighed against Mother.” Id. at 14. Mother again points to certain evidence and testimony in the record, and claims that “[r]ather than acknowledging this evidence, the trial court simply declared that factor [(2.3)](ii) weighed against Mother without identifying any conduct by Mother that would support such a confusion [sic].” Id.
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In her fifth issue, Mother claims that the trial court erred and abused its discretion because its opinion “is entirely silent regarding [C]hild’s tantrums and Mother’s parenting during those moments.” Id. at 20. According to Mother, “[b]y omitting discussion of this testimony [in its opinion], the trial court failed to consider relevant evidence bearing directly on [C]hild’s welfare.” Id.
In her sixth issue, Mother asserts that the trial court erred and abused its discretion because its opinion “failed to identify conduct by Mother that would justify weighing . . . factor [(2.3)] against her.” Id. at 23. Mother complains that the opinion is “inconsistent” and is deficient because it “provided no explanation how a factor addressing cooperation and encouragement of the child’s relationship with the other parent could weigh against Mother . . ..” Id. at 24.
Based on our review, we discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court with respect to the adequacy of its opinion. As explained above, “there is no required amount of detail for the trial court’s explanation.” M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 336. Rather, “all that is required is that the enumerated factors are considered and that the custody decision is based on those considerations.” Id. Here, in its opinion, the trial court did precisely what it was required to do. The court considered each of the section 5328(a) custody factors, decided whether the factors were applicable or inapplicable to the instant proceedings, and articulated its considerations of the applicable factors
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in a manner that informed the parties of the reasons for the custody award (i.e., whether the court weighed the factor as neutral between the parties or in favor of one party or the other). See Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/25, at 5- 7. Contrary to Mother’s assertion otherwise, the trial court was not required to provide a lengthy analysis for each custody factor detailing each and every piece of testimony and evidence that could have potentially related to that factor. See M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 336. Accordingly, we conclude that Mother’s first six issues merit no relief.
In her seventh issue, Mother contends that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by making credibility determinations that were adverse to her. Specifically, Mother challenges the trial court’s finding that she “never admits when she is wrong.” Mother’s Brief at 15 (quoting Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/25, at 6). Mother again points to selective testimony in the record which she claims contradicts this finding, including testimony by Dr. Riley “that Mother was cooperated [sic] and engaged throughout the evaluation process,” and that Ms. Ciliberto “testified that Mother was receptive, compliant and actively engaged in parenting services.” Id. Mother contends that these statements “contradict any narrative of rigidity or refusal to accept responsibility.” Id. Mother also points to select text messages between her and Father, and she claims that these texts “showed [her] efforts to communicate effectively with Father.” Id.
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The trial court considered Mother’s seventh issue and determined that it lacked merit. The court reasoned:
. . . Mother claims the trial court abused its discretion in making credibility findings against Mother, finding that she never admits when she is wrong and fails to take responsibility.
However, the trial court has considered the testimony of several witnesses, including Mother and Father, as well as others and can state, without condition that Mother does not admit when she is wrong nor does she take responsibility for her actions. The trial judge has seen and heard the witnesses and has observed their demeanor as well as other evidence when assessing credibility.
Further, Mother refused accountability for her actions that were captured on video. Mother refused accountability for physical injuries to [Child] that were submitted as photographic evidence.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/11/26, at 14-15.
Based on our review, we discern no gross abuse of discretion by the trial court in making its credibility determinations regarding Mother. As explained above, with regard to issues of credibility of witnesses, “we must defer to the trial court who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand.” Rogowski, 291 A.3d at 60-61; see also In re Estate of Presutti, 783 A.2d 803, 806 (Pa. Super. 2001) (holding that, to the extent that there are discrepancies between the testimony and evidence adduced by the parties, the resolution of such discrepancies is within the province of the trial court). Mother asks this Court to reject the trial court’s credibility determinations as to Mother, and to reweigh evidence and testimony in the alternate manner that Mother proposes. This we cannot do, as we must defer to the trial court judge who was able to observe Mother first-hand throughout these extensive custody proceedings, assess her demeanor and testimony, and determine whether
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such testimony was credible in light of other evidence and testimony presented in the custody trial. Accordingly, Mother’s seventh issue merits no relief.
In her eighth issue, Mother contends that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by finding that she tried to exclude Father from seeing Child at a public parade because Child was in Mother’s custody. Mother claims that “[t]his was a mischaracterization of the testimony presented at the custody trial.” Mother’s Brief at 16. Mother clarifies that she did not prevent Father from attending the parade itself; rather, she attempted to prevent him from attending “the festival activities after the parade because Mother did not want Father following her and [C]hild around.” Id.
The trial court considered Mother’s eighth issue and determined that it lacked merit. The court reasoned:
. . . Mother contends that she did not exclude Father from a public parade. The finding by the court was that Mother tried to exclude Father from seeing [C]hild at a public parade. While Mother eventually did not succeed in excluding Father, she in fact did tr[y] to exclude him from seeing his daughter in a public parade. Most importantly, this is only one fact in a myriad of factors which was viewed by the court as precluding Mother from being awarded primary custody of the minor [C]hild.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/11/26, at 15.
Based on our review, we discern no gross abuse of discretion by the trial court in making its factual findings regarding Mother’s conduct at the parade. As explained above, with regard to the trial court’s factual findings, “we must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of
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record, as our role does not include making independent factual determinations.” Rogowski, 291 A.3d at 60-61. Mother asks this Court to reject the trial court’s factual findings in favor of the alternate findings that she proposes based on her qualification that she only attempted to exclude Father from one aspect of the parade—the after-parade festivities. We decline to do so, as the record supports the trial court’s factual finding regarding Mother’s conduct in relation to Father’s general attendance at a public parade with public festivities. See N.T. Custody Trial, 11/20-24/25, at 327-28 (wherein Father testified that Mother told him that he could not go to the public festival after the parade, even though it was Father’s custody time with Child and he was merely permitting Mother to take Child to the parade). Accordingly, Mother’s eighth issue merits no relief.
In her ninth issue, Mother contends that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by “improperly elevat[ing] the testimony of [Ms.] Jenkins . . . while disregarding significant, contrary professional testimony.” Mother’s Brief at 17. Mother points out that “Ms. Jenkins testified that she met with Father and [C]hild approximately one month before ever meeting Mother.” Id. According to Mother, this “circumstance . . . raises legitimate concerns regarding neutrality and the weight of [Ms. Jenkins’] conclusions.” Id. Mother submits that because “much of [Ms. Jenkins’] observation[s] involved [C]hild either with Father individually or with both parents present together,” “Ms. Jenkins did not conduct a comparative evaluation of [C]hild’s functioning with
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Mother alone versus Father alone.” Id. Mother asserts that “[t]he trial court suggested that [C]hild appeared more stable with Father,” and in relation thereto, Mother claims that “Ms. Jenkins’ testimony . . . did not establish that [C]hild was more stable with Father than with Mother.” Id. at 17-18.5 The trial court considered Mother’s ninth issue and determined that it lacked merit. The court reasoned:
Mother contends that the trial court relied exclusively on the testimony of [Ms.] Jenkins. However, the court considered the testimony of [Ms.] Jenkins, the therapist who saw Mother, Father and the child in family therapy. She stated she would not testify to which parent was more stable and consistent. She did testify that she believed that [C]hild is emotionally better when with Father. She further testified that if there was a change in custody that it would benefit [C]hild to be with Father. She also stated there were concerns expressed by her with Mother’s continued behavior. Mother may not agree with Ms. Jenkins’ testimony, but this court found her believable.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/11/26, at 15-16 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Based on our review, we discern no gross abuse of discretion by the trial court in crediting the testimony of Ms. Jenkins. As explained above, with regard to issues of credibility of witnesses, “we must defer to the trial court
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5 In her concise statement, Mother limited her challenge to the trial court’s
reliance on Ms. Jenkins’ testimony to the fact that “she met with Father and [C]hild approximately one month before ever meeting Mother, thereby undermining the neutrality and reliability of her opinions.” Concise Statement, 1/12/26, at ¶7. However, in her appellate brief, Mother attempts to raise additional and unrelated bases upon which to challenge Ms. Jenkins’ testimony. As these additional bases were not raised in the concise statement, we decline to address them. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (providing that issues not included in the concise statement are waived).
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who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand.” Rogowski, 291 A.3d at 60-61; see also Presutti, 783 A.2d at 806. Mother asks this Court to reject the trial court’s determination that Ms. Jenkins was credible. However, we must defer to the trial court who was able to observe Ms. Jenkins first-hand and to assess her testimony in light of other evidence and testimony presented in the custody trial. Moreover, as the trial court explained, it did not rely on Ms. Jenkins testimony exclusively; rather, the court merely considered it. Accordingly, Mother’s ninth issue merits no relief.
In her final two issues, Mother challenges the trial court’s custody order.
In her tenth issue, Mother claims that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to address Child’s need for continued therapeutic intervention in the custody order, despite testimony that Child had previously engaged in therapy and services that lapsed prior to the custody trial. According to Mother, the absence of any discussion of therapy in the custody order constitutes an abuse of discretion.
The trial court considered Mother’s tenth issue and determined that it lacked merit. The court reasoned:
Mother asserts . . . that the court did not address Mother’s request for continued therapeutic intervention for [C]hild. This argument is somewhat disingenuous since Mother filed a petition to prevent [C]hild going to counseling because Mother no longer wanted the male counselor. The court, in its order of November 24, 2025, suspended family functional therapy because of the loud and consistent bickering by the parents during the therapy. Prior [to that], by order entered June 24, 2025, the court required [C]hild to attend therapy at Red Bird. There is no petition or motion filed by either party requesting court intervention on this
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issue. Also, whether there is a therapist has no direct bearing on Mother’s request to be awarded primary custody . . ..
Trial Court Opinion, 2/11/26, at 16-17 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Based on our review, we find no merit to Mother’s tenth issue. As noted above, the issue of Child’s therapeutic needs was addressed by the trial court in its July 2, 2025 order, where it directed that Red Bird assign a new, female therapist for Child. See Order, 7/2/25. In her petition to modify custody, Mother did not include any request for therapy for Child. See Petition to Modify Custody, 2/21/25, at ¶¶ 1-7. Rather, in her petition, Mother sought a ruling that she be awarded primary physical custody of Child, and that Father’s award of custody be reduced to partial physical custody. See id. Thus, the issue of therapy for Child was not before the court during the custody trial. See In the Int. of M.B., 514 A.2d 599, 600 (Pa. Super. 1986) (holding that courts cannot rule on matters not before them). Accordingly, as Mother never requested the relief she now complains of not receiving, her tenth issue merits no relief.
In her final issue, Mother contends that the custody order entered on December 29, 2025, “lacked specificity, and this created ambiguity regarding the exchange times for the parties’ respective periods of custody.” Mother’s Brief at 21-22. Mother submits that the custody order is deficient because it “does not identify the precise time when custody transfers occur . . .” Id. at 22.
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The trial court considered Mother’s final issue and determined that it lacked merit. The court reasoned:
Mother contends that the order from which she appealed lacks specificity, including failure to set forth exchange times and logistical details necessary to minimize conflict and endure enforceability. The order from which Mother appealed refers to the order dated February 16, 2024. That order contains the specificity which Mother seeks[,] including exchange times and logistical details.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/11/26, at 17 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Based on our review, we find no merit to Mother’s final issue. A plain reading of the December 29, 2025 custody order reflects that it was intended to slightly modify the prior custody order, entered on February 16, 2024, which was to remain in place as the controlling custody order. In this regard, the December 29, 2025 custody order specifically states, in bold typeface: “All language not inconsistent with this order from the prior order of February 16, 2024 shall remain in full force and effect and be the controlling order of this family.” Custody Order, 12/29/25, at ¶ 8 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Thus, the trial court made clear that the February 16, 2024 custody order is controlling—to the extent it does not conflict with the provisions of the December 29, 2025 custody order.
Notably, whereas the December 29, 2025 custody order is silent as to exchange times, the February 16, 2024 custody order provides the places and times for custody exchanges:
7. Custody Exchanges:
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When the child is not in school: Exchanges shall occur at the residence of the party in custody. The party coming into custody shall ensure that the child is picked up from the residence of the party in custody.
The party who is to have custody on a weekday when there is no school shall receive custody of the child at 10:00 a.m.
When the child is in school: The party coming into custody shall ensure that the child is picked up from the school and/or bus stop.
Order, 2/16/24. As the parties are bound to follow the custody exchange provisions in the February 16, 2024 custody order, which specifies the places and times for such exchanges, we conclude that Mother’s final issue merits no relief.
In sum, as none of Mother’s issues merit relief from this Court, we affirm the December 29, 2025 custody order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/9/2026