Tippett v. Hart

Texas Supreme Court

Tippett v. Hart

501 S.W.2d 874, 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 98, 1973 Tex. LEXIS 215

CourtTexas Supreme Court

DecidedNovember 28, 1973

DocketB-4201

StatusPublished

Cited by41 cases

This text of 501 S.W.2d 874 (Tippett v. Hart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Tippett v. Hart, 501 S.W.2d 874, 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 98, 1973 Tex. LEXIS 215 (Tex. 1973).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

This suit was brought as one for actionable interference with contractual relations. As set out more fully in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, 497 S.W.2d 606, the plaintiff had contracted with an agency of the federal government to leave certain acreage ungrazed by cattle. The jury found that the defendant, with knowledge of the contract, willfully opened the plaintiff’s enclosed pasture and permitted his cattle to graze therein. The federal agency thereupon refused to pay the plaintiff under the agreement with the plaintiff.

We agree with the result reached by the Court of Civil Appeals (which affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff).

One of the questions raised by the defendant was that the contract between the plaintiff and the government had not been proved in the trial court. Our opinion, under the record, is that the contract was sufficiently proved. In passing upon the point, the Court of Civil Appeals stated in its opinion that the courts of Texas are required to take judicial notice of the administrative rules and regulations adopted by [all] federal departments, boards and commissions pursuant to stat *875 ute. The statement is overbroad and unnecessary to the opinion, and we are not to be understood as approving it.

The writ of error is refused, no reversible error.

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PER CURIAM.

This suit was brought as one for actionable interference with contractual relations. As set out more fully in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, 497 S.W.2d 606, the plaintiff had contracted with an agency of the federal government to leave certain acreage ungrazed by cattle. The jury found that the defendant, with knowledge of the contract, willfully opened the plaintiff’s enclosed pasture and permitted his cattle to graze therein. The federal agency thereupon refused to pay the plaintiff under the agreement with the plaintiff.

We agree with the result reached by the Court of Civil Appeals (which affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff).

One of the questions raised by the defendant was that the contract between the plaintiff and the government had not been proved in the trial court. Our opinion, under the record, is that the contract was sufficiently proved. In passing upon the point, the Court of Civil Appeals stated in its opinion that the courts of Texas are required to take judicial notice of the administrative rules and regulations adopted by [all] federal departments, boards and commissions pursuant to stat *875 ute. The statement is overbroad and unnecessary to the opinion, and we are not to be understood as approving it.

The writ of error is refused, no reversible error.

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501 S.W.2d 874, 17 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 98, 1973 Tex. LEXIS 215, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tippett-v-hart-tex-1973.

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