Tinsman v. Belvidere Delaware Railroad

25 N.J.L. 255
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
DecidedNovember 15, 1855
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 25 N.J.L. 255 (Tinsman v. Belvidere Delaware Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tinsman v. Belvidere Delaware Railroad, 25 N.J.L. 255 (N.J. 1855).

Opinion

The Chief Justice.

This action is brought to recover damages for an injury to the plaintiff’s reversionary interest in certain real estate. The property injured consists of a saw mill, eddy, and creek’s mouth, upon the river Delaware of which the plaintiff alleges that he was seized as reversioner, the property being in possession of certain tenants for years. The injury complained of is the construction, by the defendants, of their railroad, consisting of an embankment of lumber, stones, and earth, of great height and width, in the eddy and creek’s mouth, so that rafts cannot be landed, and lumber stored and secured for the use of the said mill in as secure and safe a manner as the tenants had been accustomed, and had a right to do.

That the act complained of is of a character naturally, if not necessarily, injurious to the reversion, cannot be [262]*262doubted. The value of a saw mill upon a river depends very much upon its convenience for landing and storing logs, and rafting the lumber when sawed. A deprivation, total or partial, of these advantages must affect in a greater or less degree the value of the property. And the injury to the reversion consists mainly in the fact, that the occupant of the property cannot land his rafts, or store his logs, or raft his lumber, with as much convenience as formerly.

It is no objection to the action by the reversioner, that the act complained of is also an injury to the tenant. Most torts which are injurious to the reversion, are prejudicial also to the tenant in possession; and in many cases they are an injury to the reversion, for the very reason that they do render the premises less convenient or beneficial to the occupant. Nor is it any answer to the complaint, that the injury complained of is one for which tho tenaiit may sue. The tenant and reversioner may each maintain his action for the self-same act, and each may recover for the injury they respectively sustain by reason thereof. The defendant is not thereby compelled to respond in damages twice for the same injury, but simply to compensate each of the parties injured, for the consequences of his tortious act. Bedingfield v. Onslow, 3 Lev. 209; Sedgwick on Dam. 142; Com. Dig. Action on the case for Nuisacane" B; 1 Chit. Pl. 72.

Nor is it an answer to the action by the reversioner, that the cause of the injury may by possibility be removed, or the nuisance abated before the determination of the tenancy for years. This' is true of all nuisances, and of many immediate injuries to the freehold itself. An action will lie by the reversioner for erecting a wall, whereby the plaintiff’s lights are obstructed. Jeffer v. Gifford, 4 Burr. 2141; Tomlison v. Brown, Sayer 215. For obstructing the flue of a chimney, thereby rendering the room unfit for habitation. 2 Chit Pl. 778. For divert[263]*263ing a stream of water, whereby the soil was impoverished. 2 Chit. Pl. 794. For throwing back water upon the land, so that it was rendered boggy and miry. Spenc. 536. For obstructing a way, whereby the enjoyment of the promises is rendered inconvenient. 2 Chit. Pl. 810. In all these eases it is apparent that, by possibility, the cause of the injury may bo removed before the estate of the tenant for years determines; yet while the nuisance or canse of complaint is continued, the premises are diminished in value, and the present value of the reversion is consequently diminished. The estate of the reversioner would sell for less. The law, therefore, regards him as sustaining an injury. And if the inheritance he in fact diminished in value, the reversioner may maintain an action for the injury, though there may have been no diminution in the amount of the rent, and no loss by a sale of the premises at a depreciated price.

In Shadwell v. Hutchinson, 3 Car. & P. 615, the action was brought by the reversioner for obstructing an ancient light, by erecting a roof over an uncovered space above the window, by means whereof the room was darkened, and rendered close, uncomfortable, unwholesome, and unfit for habitation. It was proved that the obstruction might be easily removed in the course of two or three days. Lord Tenterden said, I have no doubt that this is a case in which the reversioner may maintain an action, because it is an injury to the right that he complains of; and the effect of letting the obstruction stand might be, that, from the death of witnesses, evidence of its erection might be lost, and so the injury would become permanent. The plaintiff recovered nominal damages, one shilling.

A second action was subsequently brought for obstructing the same light, by a continuance of the same nuisance. The defendant pleaded a former recovery for the “ same identical grievances.” It w'as admitted that the obstruc[264]*264tion was the same as at the time of the former action. But lord Tenterden held that the complaint, being for a later and different period, the grievances were not the same, and the plaintiff had a verdict for £100 damages. A new trial was subsequently moved for, on the ground that there was no real substantial damage to the reversion, but only an ideal damage, for which the plaintiff had previously recovered, and that the continuation of the obstruction caused no new damage to the reversion, although it did to the possession. But the court refused the rule. Shadwell v. Hutchinson, 4 Car. & P. 333.

This case sustains the position, that the ' action may be brought by the reversioner, where no actual damage has been sustained by loss of tenants or diminution of rents, but for the mere maintenance of an erection prejudicial to the right of the reversioner; and that in such action more than nominal damages may be recovered.

In Baxter v. Taylor, 4 Barn, & Ad. 72, the Court of Rings Bench held that no action would lie by a reversioner for a mere entry upon land, though under a claim of right, on the double ground, that the injury is not so permanent as to injure the inheritance; and that, the wrongdoer could acquire no right, as against the landlord, while the premises remained in possession of the tenant.

And in Dobson v. Blackmore, 9 Q. B. 991, the same court held that an action would not lie by a reversioner for obstructing a public navigable river by means of a floating dock, and thereby incommoding the tenant in possession. But Denman, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, concedes that an action might lie for an obstruction of a permanent nature in the highway, by which the value of the premises would be lowered.

In Baker v. Sanderson 3 Pick. 348, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that an action would not lie by the owner of a mill occupied by a tenant, for an injury resulting from the wrongful erection of a dam by the [265]*265defendant, and throwing tho water back upon tho wheels of the plaintiff’s mill, unless plaintiff averred a loss of rent by reason of such injury.

This case is clearly inconsistent with the case of Shadwell v. Hutchinson, and, as I conceive, with souud principle.

If a permanent dam, under a claim of right, be constructed across the stream, whereby the water is unlawfully penned back upon the wheels of a mill of an adjoining proprietor, not only the present power, but the value of the mill is injured.

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Bluebook (online)
25 N.J.L. 255, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tinsman-v-belvidere-delaware-railroad-nj-1855.