Tinsley v. Flanagan

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided October 13, 2020·No. 2:15-cv-00185·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 B.K. by her next friend Margaret Tinsley, et No. CV-15-00185-PHX-ROS al., 10 ORDER Plaintiffs, 11 v. 12 Michael Faust, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 The parties have filed a Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of the Parties’ 16 Settlement Agreement. (Doc. 529.) This case was set for a bench trial to begin on August 17 25, 2020. On August 10, 2020, the parties filed a notice of settlement. (Doc. 521.) The 18 Court held a telephonic hearing on August 11, 2020, at which the parties recited the basic 19 principles of the settlement agreement. The Court raised concerns that the agreement was 20 too vague regarding Defendants’ timeline for compliance with the terms of the agreement 21 and consequences for any potential breach of the agreement, and ordered a Mediator be 22 selected. (Doc. 523.) The parties revised the settlement agreement to include a termination 23 date, and the Court reviewed the revised settlement agreement and raised additional 24 concerns. (Docs. 526, 528.) The revised settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) 25 attached to the parties’ Motion for Preliminary Approval as Exhibit 6 addresses the 26 concerns the Court had previously raised. 27 BACKGROUND 28 This Order (the “Preliminary Approval Order”) incorporates by reference the 1 summaries of the litigation and the Settlement Agreement in the Motion for Preliminary 2 Approval, and the definitions in the Settlement Agreement. In brief, this lawsuit was 3 initiated by Plaintiffs on behalf of children in Arizona state foster care custody in February 4 2015. Defendants are the Director of the Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) 5 and the Director of the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (“AHCCCS”), in 6 their official capacities. Plaintiffs “alleged systemic failures with respect to behavioral 7 health services, physical and dental health services, the availability of appropriate family 8 placements, and the timeliness of investigations of abuse and neglect exposed foster 9 children to an unreasonable risk of harm and violated their federal statutory rights.” (Doc. 10 529 at 1.) Plaintiffs sought class certification and declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 11 U.S.C. § 1983. 12 In September 2017, the Court certified the General Class,1 the Non-Kinship 13 Subclass,2 and the Medicaid Subclass.3 (Doc. 363.) Defendants appealed class certification, 14 and the Ninth Circuit stayed discovery for over 15 months and affirmed the certification of 15 the General Class and the Non-Kinship Subclass, but reversed the certification of the 16 Medicaid Subclass. (Doc. 418.) Defendants petitioned for certiorari, which was denied. 17 (Doc. 492.) On remand, the Court recertified the Medicaid Subclass in October 2019. (Doc. 18 461.) Defendants petitioned the Ninth Circuit for permission to file a second interlocutory 19 appeal, but were denied. (Doc. 493.) 20 Over the course of the litigation, the parties engaged in extensive discovery and 21 multiple rounds of expert discovery. After producing and analyzing over 1.5 million 22 documents and 48 expert reports, the parties were prepared to use over 1400 exhibits, 13 23 expert witnesses, and dozens of other witnesses at trial. (Doc. 529 at 3–4, Doc. 529-3 at ¶ 24 10, Doc. 514.) Two weeks before trial, the parties reached a settlement. (Doc. 521.) 25

26 1 All children who are or will be in the legal custody of DCS due to a report or suspicion of abuse or neglect. 27 2 All members in the General Class who are not placed in the care of an adult relative or person who has a significant relationship with the child. 28 3 All members of the General Class who are entitled to early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services under the federal Medicaid statute. 1 ANALYSIS 2 At the preliminary approval stage, a court “must make a preliminary determination 3 on the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the settlement terms and must direct the 4 preparation of notice of the certification, proposed settlement, and date of the final fairness 5 hearing.” Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth § 21.632 (2020). 6 I. Preliminary Settlement Approval 7 Under Rule 23(e), before approving a proposed settlement, the Court must evaluate 8 the proposed settlement for fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9 23(e)(2). At the preliminary approval stage, the Court need consider “only whether the 10 settlement agreement ‘appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive 11 negotiations,’ is fair, . . . has no obvious deficiency,” and “falls within the range of possible 12 approval.” Horton v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 266 F.R.D. 360, 363 (D. Ariz. 2009) (quoting In 13 re Nasdaq Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 176 F.R.D. 99, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). The Ninth 14 Circuit in particular “put[s] a good deal of stock in the product of an arms-length, non- 15 collusive, negotiated resolution, and ha[s] never prescribed a particular formula by which 16 that outcome must be tested.” Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 17 2009) (citations omitted). 18 A. Serious, Informed, Non-Collusive Negotiations 19 The parties have litigated this case vigorously and in good faith for over five years, 20 including extensive and disputed discovery, two interlocutory appeals to the Ninth Circuit, 21 and a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Dozens of expert reports were drafted 22 and served, and the parties argued in depth the merits of Plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions in 23 lengthy Daubert briefings. (Docs. 480–484, 489–490, 529-3 at ¶ 10.) The parties filed 24 hundreds of pages of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Docs. 510, 512, 25 515.) And Plaintiffs filed a detailed pre-trial brief on the merits of their substantive due 26 process claims. (Doc. 517.) By the time the parties reached settlement, the highly 27 experienced counsel representing each side demonstrated a thorough understanding of the 28 strengths and weaknesses of each claim. Class Counsel and the Class Representatives have 1 adequately represented the class throughout the length of the case, and adequately 2 represented the class for the purpose of entering into and implementing the Settlement 3 Agreement. 4 Furthermore, the parties had previously attempted settlement twice, but failed to 5 reach agreement, and this Settlement Agreement was the product of months of intense 6 arm’s length negotiation, involving both lawyers and principals, and multiple rounds of 7 proposed settlement language. (Doc. 529 at 10, Doc. 529-3 at ¶¶11–12.) The Settlement 8 Agreement appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations. 9 B. Fairness, Obvious Deficiency, and Range of Possible Approval 10 The Court must also consider whether the proposed settlement is fair, has no 11 obvious deficiency, and falls within the range of possible approval. Horton, 266 F.R.D. at 12 363. The Settlement Agreement contains no obvious deficiencies that would prevent 13 preliminary approval. Defendants have committed to making significant improvements to 14 the availability of behavioral health services, the timeliness of health care delivery, and the 15 availability of family foster care placement, among other improvements, and have 16 committed to performance measures that will show whether children are actually receiving 17 the services they are entitled to. This relief is adequate.

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