Hart, J.
(after stating the facts). 1. It is first urged that the judgment must be reversed because the court permitted A. J. Witt, private counsel for the children of the deceased, to be in the grand jury room during the time it was inquiring into the charge against the defendant. It is not contended that he was present while the grand jury were deliberating or voting on the charge. The contention of counsel has been decided adversely to him in the case of Bennett v. State, 62 Ark. 516.
2. Counsel for the defendant assigns as error the action of the court in giving certain instructions, and in refusing others asked by him. He saved the following exception to the refusal to give- said instructions:
“Of which said instructions, the court gave the ninth and eleventh, and refused to give any of the others. To the refusal of the court to give instructions numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,10,12,13,15 and 16, as asked by the defendant, the defendant at the time excepted, and asked that his exceptions be noted of record, which was accordingly done.”
The court, on its own motion, gave nineteen instructions, and counsel for the defendant saved the following exceptions to the giving of the said instructions: “To the giving of instructions numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, \7, 8, 10,12,13,14,15, 16,17, 18,19 and 20 by the court, on his own motion, the defendant at the time excepted, and asked that his exceptions be noted of record, which was accordingly done.”
It has been uniformly held by this court that a general exception to certain instructions will not be entertained on appeal, if any of them be good. It is equally well settled that a general exception to the refusal to give several instructions requested collectively will not be considered on appeal, if any of them are bad. Johnson v. State, 84 Ark. 95; Atkins v. Swope, 38 Ark. 528, 539; Geary v. Parker, 65 Ark. 521, 525; Young v. Stevenson, 75 Ark. 181, 183; Matthews v. State, 84 Ark. 73; Owens v. State, 86 Ark. 317, 333; St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Hambright, 87 Ark. 614, 623. In the application of this rule, without setting out the instructions given and those refused, it may be said that some of the instructions asked by the defendant were argumentative, and others were faulty because they singled out facts, and were properly refused by the court, and it is conceded by the defendant that some of the instructions given by the court were correct.
3. It is claimed by counsel for the defendant that the court erred in permitting Doctor Brown to testify that Mr. Davis told him that he took the defendant’s pistol away from him in his wine cellar. Counsel for defendant, in his cross examination of Doctor Brown, had brought out the fact that early on Monday morning preceding the day of the killing that John B. Davis had come to Ms house with a shotgun and a pistol, and that they had. gone to Pocahontas and turned over the pistol to the assistant prosecuting attorney. Many questions were asked Doctor Brown by the defendant in regard to this pistol, and what was done with it. Doctor Brown was also asked in detail as to the movements and conversation of himself and Davis on that day. Besides this, the defendant proved by other witnesses that the deceased had told them that he had taken the pistol away from the defendant at his wine cellar. Under these circumstances, we do not think that any prejudice'resulted to the defendant, and it is well settled that a judgment will only be reversed for prejudicial errors.
4. The court did not err in allowing parol proof to be made as to what defendant testified to before the coroner’s jury. The evidence on the part of the State tends to show that the defendant voluntarily testified before the coroner’s jury, and the evidence now complained of was introduced for the purpose of contradicting the evidence given by the defendant on the trial of the case. The point is expressly so ruled in the case of Caughron v. State, 99 Ark. 462.
Neither did the court err in permitting the State to prove by the testimony of members of the coroner’s jury contradictory statements made by witnesses for defendant before the coroner’s jury. Caughron v. State, supra.
5. It is next assigned as error by counsel for the defendant that the'court erred in permitting Jesse Cagle to testify that on the Sunday evening preceding the killing on Tuesday that the deceased had told him that a son of the defendant had pleaded terribly hard with him for the pistol, and that he had refused to give it to him, saying that he had won it in a victory. The court did not err in admitting this testimony. Cagle was a witness for the defendant, and in his direct examination the fact was developed that the defendant and deceased had had a quarrel in the wine cellar on Sunday morning, and the witness was asked all about this quarrel, and stated that Davis had told him at that time that the defendant had tried to shoot him, and that he had taken a pistol away from Mm. Everything that occurred in the wine cellar was brought out and introduced in evidence by the defendant. It is well settled that cross examination should be permitted as to all matters developed on direct examination, and it may be extended into all circumstances surrounding or affecting the transaction which the witness has detailed in Ms direct examination.
6. Anme Tiner was a witness for the defendant. She was the wife of Dee Tiner, a son of the defendant, and they had been separated some time prior to the killing. She had resided in the family of Doctor Brown, a son-in-law of the deceased, for about four years prior to her marriage. She was asked this question: “Was Doctor Brown in any way instrumental in 'your separation?” And, over the objection of the State, the court refused to permit her to answer the question. The defendant set out that they would have proved in answer to the question that Doctor Brown was the immediate cause of the separation between herself and husband, and that she had confessed to her husband her criminal intimacy with Doctor Brown. That the deceased had asked her to repudiate that statement, and had declared that he would have the, statement at any cost, and that tMs fact was communicated to the defendant prior to the difficulty. In the first place, it may be said that these answers were not responsive to the question asked. The particular objection made by the counsel for the defendant to the court’s action in refusing to allow the witness to answer the question is, that the deceased had made a threat against the defendant, and tMs threat had been communicated to Mm. The defendant was allowed to introduce evidence of other threats that had been made by deceased and communicated to the defendant, and no attempt was made by the State to disprove them. The defendant was also permitted to prove by other testimony, which was not disputed, that bad blood existed between defendant and deceased on account of the separation of Dee Tiner and Ms wife, and that the deceased had threatened the life of defendant. Therefore, the testimony refused was only cumulative of the other testimony which was admitted, and .which the State did not contradict.
7.
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Hart, J.
(after stating the facts). 1. It is first urged that the judgment must be reversed because the court permitted A. J. Witt, private counsel for the children of the deceased, to be in the grand jury room during the time it was inquiring into the charge against the defendant. It is not contended that he was present while the grand jury were deliberating or voting on the charge. The contention of counsel has been decided adversely to him in the case of Bennett v. State, 62 Ark. 516.
2. Counsel for the defendant assigns as error the action of the court in giving certain instructions, and in refusing others asked by him. He saved the following exception to the refusal to give- said instructions:
“Of which said instructions, the court gave the ninth and eleventh, and refused to give any of the others. To the refusal of the court to give instructions numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,10,12,13,15 and 16, as asked by the defendant, the defendant at the time excepted, and asked that his exceptions be noted of record, which was accordingly done.”
The court, on its own motion, gave nineteen instructions, and counsel for the defendant saved the following exceptions to the giving of the said instructions: “To the giving of instructions numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, \7, 8, 10,12,13,14,15, 16,17, 18,19 and 20 by the court, on his own motion, the defendant at the time excepted, and asked that his exceptions be noted of record, which was accordingly done.”
It has been uniformly held by this court that a general exception to certain instructions will not be entertained on appeal, if any of them be good. It is equally well settled that a general exception to the refusal to give several instructions requested collectively will not be considered on appeal, if any of them are bad. Johnson v. State, 84 Ark. 95; Atkins v. Swope, 38 Ark. 528, 539; Geary v. Parker, 65 Ark. 521, 525; Young v. Stevenson, 75 Ark. 181, 183; Matthews v. State, 84 Ark. 73; Owens v. State, 86 Ark. 317, 333; St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Hambright, 87 Ark. 614, 623. In the application of this rule, without setting out the instructions given and those refused, it may be said that some of the instructions asked by the defendant were argumentative, and others were faulty because they singled out facts, and were properly refused by the court, and it is conceded by the defendant that some of the instructions given by the court were correct.
3. It is claimed by counsel for the defendant that the court erred in permitting Doctor Brown to testify that Mr. Davis told him that he took the defendant’s pistol away from him in his wine cellar. Counsel for defendant, in his cross examination of Doctor Brown, had brought out the fact that early on Monday morning preceding the day of the killing that John B. Davis had come to Ms house with a shotgun and a pistol, and that they had. gone to Pocahontas and turned over the pistol to the assistant prosecuting attorney. Many questions were asked Doctor Brown by the defendant in regard to this pistol, and what was done with it. Doctor Brown was also asked in detail as to the movements and conversation of himself and Davis on that day. Besides this, the defendant proved by other witnesses that the deceased had told them that he had taken the pistol away from the defendant at his wine cellar. Under these circumstances, we do not think that any prejudice'resulted to the defendant, and it is well settled that a judgment will only be reversed for prejudicial errors.
4. The court did not err in allowing parol proof to be made as to what defendant testified to before the coroner’s jury. The evidence on the part of the State tends to show that the defendant voluntarily testified before the coroner’s jury, and the evidence now complained of was introduced for the purpose of contradicting the evidence given by the defendant on the trial of the case. The point is expressly so ruled in the case of Caughron v. State, 99 Ark. 462.
Neither did the court err in permitting the State to prove by the testimony of members of the coroner’s jury contradictory statements made by witnesses for defendant before the coroner’s jury. Caughron v. State, supra.
5. It is next assigned as error by counsel for the defendant that the'court erred in permitting Jesse Cagle to testify that on the Sunday evening preceding the killing on Tuesday that the deceased had told him that a son of the defendant had pleaded terribly hard with him for the pistol, and that he had refused to give it to him, saying that he had won it in a victory. The court did not err in admitting this testimony. Cagle was a witness for the defendant, and in his direct examination the fact was developed that the defendant and deceased had had a quarrel in the wine cellar on Sunday morning, and the witness was asked all about this quarrel, and stated that Davis had told him at that time that the defendant had tried to shoot him, and that he had taken a pistol away from Mm. Everything that occurred in the wine cellar was brought out and introduced in evidence by the defendant. It is well settled that cross examination should be permitted as to all matters developed on direct examination, and it may be extended into all circumstances surrounding or affecting the transaction which the witness has detailed in Ms direct examination.
6. Anme Tiner was a witness for the defendant. She was the wife of Dee Tiner, a son of the defendant, and they had been separated some time prior to the killing. She had resided in the family of Doctor Brown, a son-in-law of the deceased, for about four years prior to her marriage. She was asked this question: “Was Doctor Brown in any way instrumental in 'your separation?” And, over the objection of the State, the court refused to permit her to answer the question. The defendant set out that they would have proved in answer to the question that Doctor Brown was the immediate cause of the separation between herself and husband, and that she had confessed to her husband her criminal intimacy with Doctor Brown. That the deceased had asked her to repudiate that statement, and had declared that he would have the, statement at any cost, and that tMs fact was communicated to the defendant prior to the difficulty. In the first place, it may be said that these answers were not responsive to the question asked. The particular objection made by the counsel for the defendant to the court’s action in refusing to allow the witness to answer the question is, that the deceased had made a threat against the defendant, and tMs threat had been communicated to Mm. The defendant was allowed to introduce evidence of other threats that had been made by deceased and communicated to the defendant, and no attempt was made by the State to disprove them. The defendant was also permitted to prove by other testimony, which was not disputed, that bad blood existed between defendant and deceased on account of the separation of Dee Tiner and Ms wife, and that the deceased had threatened the life of defendant. Therefore, the testimony refused was only cumulative of the other testimony which was admitted, and .which the State did not contradict.
7. It is next insisted that the court erred in permitting the prosecuting attorney to dress a chair in the bloody garments of the deceased, and because three daughters of the deceased sat in front of the jury crying during the closing argument. • The clothing of the deceased was exhibited in evidence before the jury, and there was no error in permitting the prosecuting attorney to use the garments for illustration in his closing argument. Derrick v. State, 92 Ark. 237. The daughters of the deceased had a right to be present at the trial, and the judgment will not be reversed because they shed tears during the argument.
9. Finally, it is insisted by counsel for the defendant that the evidence does not warrant the verdict. We can not agree with him in this contention. It is true there is an irreconciliable conflict in many essential respects between the testimony given by the witnesses for the State and that given iin behalf of the defendant, but it was the peculiar province of the jury to pass upon this conflict. The defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree. The jury found him guilty of murder in the second degree, and fixed his punishment at twelve years in the penitentiary. Therefore, it is manifest that they did not believe the evidence' adduced by either side in its entirety. It is contended by counsel for the defendant that it was a physical impossibility for young James Hurn to have run from the spring in time to have seen the last shot fired. They had measurements made of the distance, and this evidence tended to show that the witness could not have run this distance in the time Stated by him. However, the witness himself gave the distance and his credibility was a question for the jury. It is probable, however, that the jury did not believe his testimony in this respect, or they would have found the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. Even if the jury had. discarded his testimony entirely, There was sufficient evidence to have warranted the verdict of the jury. It is undisputed that bad blood existed between the defendant and deceased on account of the separation of the son of the defendant and his wife, who had formerly lived as a member of the household of the son-in-law of the deceased. They had a quarrel about 'this matter on the Sunday morning preceding the killing. The defendant remained in the wine cellar during Sunday and Monday night preceding the killing on Tuesday with his guns lying at hand, although his home was only a short distance away. It is true, he states, that he stayed there because he was afraid to go home. The jury may not have believed his explanation, and were warranted in believing from the circumstances, as they found them to exist, that defendant had become angered at Davis because of their quarrel at the wine cellar on Sunday morning, and had formed the design of killing him on sight; that the deceased had formed a similar design as to the defendant, and that in furtherance of this design, each began to shoot at the other as soon as they saw each other. The jury was fairly warranted from all the evidence in finding that each had formed the design of killing the other on sight, regardless of the fact of whether or not he believed his own life to be in danger. They may have thought that the parties entered into a mutual combat, and this view of the case warranted the verdict of the jury. If the testimony of the State in its entirety was believed by the jury, they would have been warranted in finding the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. On the other hand, if the evidence adduced by the defendant in its entirety was believed by the jury, a verdict of acquittal would have been warranted.
"We do not deem it necessary to enter into a further discussion of the evidence, but think it sufficient to say that the evidence supported the verdict of the jury.
The judgment will be affirmed.