Tina Marie Samuel v. Commonwealth of Virginia
This text of Tina Marie Samuel v. Commonwealth of Virginia (Tina Marie Samuel v. Commonwealth of Virginia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Lemons ∗ and Frank Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
TINA MARIE SAMUEL MEMORANDUM OPINION ∗∗ BY v. Record No. 2172-98-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK APRIL 25, 2000 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF WILLIAMSBURG AND COUNTY OF JAMES CITY Samuel T. Powell, Judge
Edward Janes Bell, III, for appellant.
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Tina Marie Samuel (appellant) appeals her conviction of grand
larceny after a bench trial on June 26, 1998. On appeal,
appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to prove
that she stole property from a Liz Claiborne store having a value
of $200 or more. We disagree and affirm the conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 30, 1998, Officer Meyers of the James City County
Police Department responded to a report from an outlet mall that a
∗ Justice Lemons participated in the hearing and decision of this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the Supreme Court of Virginia. ∗∗ Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication. black female (Jones) and a person who appeared to be a black male,
later identified as appellant, possibly were shoplifting from
stores in the mall. One of the women was described as wearing a
long denim dress, and the two women were believed to be traveling
in a small, black car with Georgia license plates.
Officer Meyers and Officer Wilson patrolled the shopping
center looking for the suspects. When Officer Meyers drove past
the Liz Claiborne store, she saw a black female, who fit the
description of one of the suspects, inside the shop. Officer
Meyers parked her vehicle and started to approach the Liz
Claiborne store. She noticed a small, black car with Georgia
license plates in the parking lot. In the back seat of the car,
Officer Meyers saw four large duffel bags filled with clothing
that was still on clothes hangers. All of the duffel bags were in
plain view from outside the vehicle.
After appellant and Jones exited the Liz Claiborne store, the
Liz Claiborne employees told Officer Meyers that the women bought
two pairs of pants.
Appellant and Jones next went to the Guess store where
Officer Meyers approached them and told them they were suspected
of shoplifting. Jones was carrying a paper bag from Liz
Claiborne. Officer Meyers asked if she could look in the bag, and
Jones consented. The officer saw two pairs of pants in the top of
the bag, under which were four pairs of pants that were still on
clothes hangers. The pants in the top of the bag were folded over
- 2 - the other four pairs and were tucked around the sides so that the
pants underneath were not visible. The pants had Liz Claiborne
tags on them.
At the scene, a Liz Claiborne employee identified the two
pairs of pants in the top of the bag as the pants the women
purchased. The other four pairs, however, had not been paid for
at the store.
The officer proceeded to advise appellant of her Miranda
rights, and then appellant stated that the pants were stolen and
that there was more stolen clothing in the small black car.
Shortly thereafter, Jones gave the keys to the black car to the
officers, and the officers inventoried the merchandise in the car.
Officer Meyers testified that most of the clothing in the car
still had store tags and price tags attached. Some of the
clothing was marked with Liz Claiborne tags. That clothing, in
addition to the four pairs of pants discovered by Officer Meyers
in the bottom of the bag, was returned to the Liz Claiborne store.
Amanda Hunter, front-end supervisor of the Liz Claiborne
store, testified at trial. She stated that the two women entered
the store on January 30, 1998. Appellant tried on clothing in the
dressing room, and Jones purchased two pairs of men's pants.
Hunter identified the four pairs of pants Officer Meyers recovered
from the bottom of the Liz Claiborne bag as the type of pants sold
in the Liz Claiborne outlet store on January 30, 1998. The pants
- 3 - were a specific brand that was sold only in outlet stores and had
Liz Claiborne tags attached to them.
Hunter further testified that the officers returned eight
additional items of Liz Claiborne merchandise to the store.
Hunter stated that the eight items were labeled with Liz Claiborne
tags that showed the clothing was made for outlet stores only and
was of the type sold in the Liz Claiborne store on January 30,
1998.
Hunter testified that she scanned each of the items returned
by the police through the store's computer system. She explained
that, when a sale is completed, the computer system immediately
subtracts the items purchased from the store's inventory list.
When Hunter scanned the returned items, the computer showed the
quantity of each item of clothing that should have been in the
store. The returned clothing plus the garments in the store added
up to the quantity the inventory list showed for each particular
type of clothing. Hunter testified that the total value of the
clothing returned to the Liz Claiborne store was $888.88. On
cross-examination Hunter admitted, but stated that it would be
almost impossible, that the clothing could have come from another
Liz Claiborne outlet store in Waynesboro if the other store sold
the same item in the same department.
Appellant admitted at trial that she stole the four pairs of
pants from the Liz Claiborne store. Appellant further testified
that the Liz Claiborne items found in the black car belonged to
- 4 - her. Appellant testified that she left Georgia on the morning of
January 30, 1998, drove to North Carolina to visit her father, and
then drove straight to Williamsburg.
II. ANALYSIS
When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal of a criminal conviction, we must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and accord to the evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. The [fact finder's] verdict will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
Traverso v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721
(1988) (citations omitted). "[T]he credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be accorded their testimony are matters solely
for the fact finder who can accept or reject the testimony in
whole or in part." Cooper v. Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 26, 29,
515 S.E.2d 320, 321 (1999) (citing Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3
Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1986)).
"Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to
as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently
convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of
guilt." Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864,
876 (1983).
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