LAY, Circuit Judge.
Reinhart Institutional Foods (Reinhart) appeals the district court’s admission of hearsay through the expert testimony of a vocational rehabilitation counselor. Because we feel the decision to admit the evidence is supported by Federal Rule of Evidence 703, we affirm.
I. Facts and Background
Tina Brennan sued for personal injury arising from an electric shock she received from a coffee maker while working as a
waitress. She brought suit against Rein-hart, as Reinhart had supplied the coffee machine to her employer and a Reinhart employee installed it. She allegedly developed fibromyalgia from the resulting shock. During the course of the trial, the district court
allowed Brennan’s vocational rehabilitation counselor, Rick Ostrander, to mention hearsay statements by Brennan’s physicians in expressing his opinion as to her probable loss of employability and earning capacity due to her injuries.
During the course of Ostrander’s testimony, he stated Dr. P. James Eckhoff, Jr., a rheumatologist, had earlier reported Brennan “as having a permanent partial impairment of eleven percent of the whole person.” (Tr. at 323.) Ostrander also noted that Brennan had been treated by Dr. Myung J. Cho, a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, and she was independently evaluated by Dr. Chris Tountas. Reinhart objected to Ostran-der’s statements as referring to hearsay that was not in evidence and not subject to cross-examination. The district court overruled the objection on the grounds that an expert can rely on matters not in evidence in forming an opinion. Ostrander then explained that Dr. Eckhoffs and Dr. Cho’s reports that Brennan suffered a permanent partial impairment of eleven percent were “significant to [him] as a vocational rehabilitation specialist because [they] indicate[ ] a medical opinion of a permanent condition; one that is not likely to get substantially better or worse in the future.” (Tr. at 324.) Additionally, Os-trander referred in his opinion to a functional capacities evaluation administered to Brennan by an occupational therapist. Reinhart objected on the same grounds, and, again, the district court overruled the objection. The jury found for Brennan, and she received a jury verdict of $256,000.
II. Discussion
The gravamen of this appeal is that the reports'indicating a permanent partial impairment of eleven percent and the results of Brennan’s functional capacities assessment were not otherwise mentioned during the trial. Dr. Eckhoff and Dr. Patricia Matters, a physician of internal medicine who still treated Brennan at the time of trial, did not appear at trial but gave testimony by deposition. Although testimony was given regarding Brennan’s permanent disability by these experts, it does not appear either testified as to the eleven percent evaluation. Ostrander also referred to Dr. Cho’s medical report; however, Dr. Cho did not testify by deposition or otherwise. Thus, it is argued that the district court abused its discretion because it allowed the admission of hearsay medical opinions presented solely through the testimony of Ostrander, the vocational counselor.
The sole issue on appeal involves the proper application of Federal Rule of Evidence 703. It reads:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
We have visited this problem on prior occasions. We have explained that “an expert may rely on otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence in forming his opinion if the facts and data upon which he relies are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in his field.”
Arkwright Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gwinner Oil, Inc.,
125 F.3d 1176, 1182 (8th Cir.1997) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 703;
South Cent. Petroleum, Inc. v. Long Bros. Oil Co.,
974 F.2d 1015, 1019 (8th Cir.1992)). We have also noted that
“[o]nce expert testimony has been admitted, the rules of evidence then place ‘the full burden of exploration of facts and assumptions underlying the testimony of an expert witness squarely on the shoulders of opposing counsel’s cross-examination.’”
Ratliff v. Schiber Truck Co.,
150 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting
Newell Puerto Rico, Ltd. v. Rubbermaid Inc.,
20 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir.1994)). It is, therefore, the “burden of opposing counsel to explore and expose any weaknesses in the underpinnings of the expert’s opinion.”
Ratliff,
150 F.3d at 955 (citing
Newell Puerto Rico,
20 F.3d at 21). Reinhart relies on authority stating it to be error to allow into evidence hearsay statements and medical reports as substantive evidence to prove the fact asserted.
See, e.g., Boone v. Moore,
980 F.2d 539 (8th Cir.1992).
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LAY, Circuit Judge.
Reinhart Institutional Foods (Reinhart) appeals the district court’s admission of hearsay through the expert testimony of a vocational rehabilitation counselor. Because we feel the decision to admit the evidence is supported by Federal Rule of Evidence 703, we affirm.
I. Facts and Background
Tina Brennan sued for personal injury arising from an electric shock she received from a coffee maker while working as a
waitress. She brought suit against Rein-hart, as Reinhart had supplied the coffee machine to her employer and a Reinhart employee installed it. She allegedly developed fibromyalgia from the resulting shock. During the course of the trial, the district court
allowed Brennan’s vocational rehabilitation counselor, Rick Ostrander, to mention hearsay statements by Brennan’s physicians in expressing his opinion as to her probable loss of employability and earning capacity due to her injuries.
During the course of Ostrander’s testimony, he stated Dr. P. James Eckhoff, Jr., a rheumatologist, had earlier reported Brennan “as having a permanent partial impairment of eleven percent of the whole person.” (Tr. at 323.) Ostrander also noted that Brennan had been treated by Dr. Myung J. Cho, a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation, and she was independently evaluated by Dr. Chris Tountas. Reinhart objected to Ostran-der’s statements as referring to hearsay that was not in evidence and not subject to cross-examination. The district court overruled the objection on the grounds that an expert can rely on matters not in evidence in forming an opinion. Ostrander then explained that Dr. Eckhoffs and Dr. Cho’s reports that Brennan suffered a permanent partial impairment of eleven percent were “significant to [him] as a vocational rehabilitation specialist because [they] indicate[ ] a medical opinion of a permanent condition; one that is not likely to get substantially better or worse in the future.” (Tr. at 324.) Additionally, Os-trander referred in his opinion to a functional capacities evaluation administered to Brennan by an occupational therapist. Reinhart objected on the same grounds, and, again, the district court overruled the objection. The jury found for Brennan, and she received a jury verdict of $256,000.
II. Discussion
The gravamen of this appeal is that the reports'indicating a permanent partial impairment of eleven percent and the results of Brennan’s functional capacities assessment were not otherwise mentioned during the trial. Dr. Eckhoff and Dr. Patricia Matters, a physician of internal medicine who still treated Brennan at the time of trial, did not appear at trial but gave testimony by deposition. Although testimony was given regarding Brennan’s permanent disability by these experts, it does not appear either testified as to the eleven percent evaluation. Ostrander also referred to Dr. Cho’s medical report; however, Dr. Cho did not testify by deposition or otherwise. Thus, it is argued that the district court abused its discretion because it allowed the admission of hearsay medical opinions presented solely through the testimony of Ostrander, the vocational counselor.
The sole issue on appeal involves the proper application of Federal Rule of Evidence 703. It reads:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
We have visited this problem on prior occasions. We have explained that “an expert may rely on otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence in forming his opinion if the facts and data upon which he relies are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in his field.”
Arkwright Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gwinner Oil, Inc.,
125 F.3d 1176, 1182 (8th Cir.1997) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 703;
South Cent. Petroleum, Inc. v. Long Bros. Oil Co.,
974 F.2d 1015, 1019 (8th Cir.1992)). We have also noted that
“[o]nce expert testimony has been admitted, the rules of evidence then place ‘the full burden of exploration of facts and assumptions underlying the testimony of an expert witness squarely on the shoulders of opposing counsel’s cross-examination.’”
Ratliff v. Schiber Truck Co.,
150 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting
Newell Puerto Rico, Ltd. v. Rubbermaid Inc.,
20 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir.1994)). It is, therefore, the “burden of opposing counsel to explore and expose any weaknesses in the underpinnings of the expert’s opinion.”
Ratliff,
150 F.3d at 955 (citing
Newell Puerto Rico,
20 F.3d at 21). Reinhart relies on authority stating it to be error to allow into evidence hearsay statements and medical reports as substantive evidence to prove the fact asserted.
See, e.g., Boone v. Moore,
980 F.2d 539 (8th Cir.1992).
In facing this apparent contradiction between Fed.R.Evid. 703 and the inadmissibility of hearsay reports, this court has reconciled the issue by allowing an expert to testify about facts and data outside of the record for the limited purpose of exposing the factual basis of the expert’s opinion. Effective cross-examination can then highlight the weaknesses in the expert’s opinion. Obviously, it is helpful when trial courts instruct juries as to the limited applicability of the hearsay evidence by informing the jury that the hearsay is inadmissible as substantive evidence to prove the truth of the fact asserted.
See South Cent. Petroleum,
974 F.2d at 1019. In the present case, upon overruling Reinhart’s hearsay objection, the district court explained it was overruled “because an expert can rely upon matters that are not in evidence in forming an opinion.” (Tr. at 323.) This statement is certainly sufficient under the standard set forth in
South Central Petroleum
to make the jury aware of the rule. Moreover, our perusal of the record shows that counsel conducted a thorough cross-examination of Ostrander concerning the opinions of the various doctors.
The reports at issue from Dr. Eck-
hoff were available to Reinhart during Os-trander’s testimony and certainly could have been utilized to rebut or impeach if necessary. Furthermore, Ostrander testified that the eleven percent evaluation of the experts was meaningless to him and did not enter into his evaluation of vocational loss. We mention these factors as evidence that defense counsel had available in the examination of Ostrander.
On appeal, defense counsel points out that Brennan argued from the hearsay evaluations during closing argument. We take note there was no objection to this argument and our reading of the record discloses that the challenged argument was in conjunction with Ostrander’s opinion relating to Brennan’s earning capacity.
III. Conclusion
A trial judge is in a unique position to judge the alleged prejudicial effect of this kind of testimony. Judge Piersol wrote a thorough opinion in denying Reinhart’s motion for a new trial, reconciling Fed. R.Evid. 703 and the rule against hearsay. Based on this court’s prior cases and the record we have reviewed, we cannot say that he abused his discretion in admitting Ostrander’s testimony.
Judgment affirmed.