Timothy W. Wilson v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 4th District (San Antonio)
• Decided: May 27, 2026
• Docket: 04-25-00311-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas OPINION No. 04-25-00311-CR

Timothy W. WILSON, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022CR4881 Honorable Benjamin Robertson, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Adrian A. Spears II, Justice

Sitting: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice H. Todd McCray, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 27, 2026

AFFIRMED

After a bench trial, Timothy W. Wilson was found guilty of one count of aggravated

robbery and was sentenced to fifty years of imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.03. He

brings two issues on appeal. First, he argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support his

conviction. Second, he argues the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress 04-25-00311-CR

because the surveillance videos obtained by the San Antonio Police Department in the initial

investigation in the case were not produced in their entireties. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On November 5, 2021, Wilson and his co-defendant, Donte Wilson (“Donte”), entered

Rounders but remained only a short time. At the same time, Scott Frazier’s Uber left the parking

lot, a white sedan was seen also leaving the parking lot in the same direction.

When the Uber driver stopped at a security gate to allow Frazier to enter the access code,

the white sedan pulled in behind the Uber. Frazier exited the Uber with a black bag carrying more

than $20,000 and began to enter the access code. A man then exited the white sedan, approached

Frazier with a firearm drawn, and demanded the bag of money. After Frazier handed over the bag,

the man returned to the passenger side of the white sedan and fled. Frazier reentered the Uber and

pursued the white sedan. During the pursuit, the passenger of the white sedan fired two shots from

the passenger side toward the Uber. The white sedan then began emitting smoke, and the driver of

the white sedan pulled into a parking lot. Two individuals exited the white sedan and fled on foot.

While pursuing the white sedan, Frazier called for emergency assistance. Officers with the

San Antonio Police Department arrived shortly thereafter and located a man, later identified as co-

defendant Donte, hiding in bushes in a residential backyard. A search of Donte revealed more than

$10,000 in cash and several identification cards. Donte stated that his foot was injured and asked

officers whether they had “caught the other guy.” Officers also recovered several additional items

at the scene and from the white sedan after it was impounded, including a Rounders card bearing

Wilson’s name, a cell phone later linked to Wilson, several pieces of mail addressed to Wilson,

and a firearm and gun case registered to Wilson’s address.

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Wilson was indicted for aggravated robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.03. At a pretrial

hearing, he orally urged a motion to suppress. At the hearing, Detective Ramos from the San

Antonio Police Department testified about his retrieval of the surveillance videos from Rounders.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. At trial, Wilson

reasserted his motion to suppress during the trial testimony of Rounders’ manager, Scott Lopez.

The trial court again denied the motion to suppress. On February 3, 2025, the trial court issued its

findings of fact and conclusions of law on defendant’s motions to suppress.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

Wilson contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction.

According to Wilson, the evidence fails to identify him as one of the robbers. He further argues

that his conviction cannot stand under the law of parties because the State did not provide any

evidence of a common scheme “or even a single communication between the armed robber Donte

and [Wilson].” Finally, Wilson argues that the evidence is insufficient to show the aggravated

element because “no gun was used or provided to Donte by [Wilson].”

“To satisfy constitutional due process requirements, a criminal conviction must be

supported by sufficient evidence.” Gonzalez v. State, 706 S.W.3d 404, 409 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2024, no pet.). The “appellate standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence is based on a hypothetical rational fact finder, rather than on the actual fact finder’s

particular thought process.” Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). “In

jury trials and in bench trials, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict in

order to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309, 319 (1979),

and Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). “A conviction that is not

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rationally based on the evidence violates the Due Process Clause, whether a judge or jury sits as

the fact finder in the case.” Id.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict of the fact finder and determine whether, based on the evidence and

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, a rational fact finder could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hammack v. State, 622 S.W.3d 910, 914

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Gonzalez, 706 S.W.3d at 409. Our review “includes evidence that was

properly and improperly admitted.” Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

“Direct and circumstantial evidence can be equally probative, and guilt can be established beyond

a reasonable doubt solely by circumstantial evidence.” Gonzalez, 706 S.W.3d at 409 (citing

Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778). The fact finder “is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the

evidence.” Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). “When considering a

claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we must keep in mind that a [fact finder] may choose to believe

or disbelieve all, some, or none of the evidence presented.” Id. “When faced with conflicts in the

evidence, a reviewing court shall presume that the fact finder resolved those conflicts in favor of

the verdict and defer to that determination.” Id. at 656.

“When a defendant waives [his] right to a jury trial, as occurred here, we defer to the [trial]

judge’s role as the fact finder, which includes ‘resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the

evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts.’” Gonzalez, 706 S.W.3d at 409

(quoting Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)). “We consider ‘whether

the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the

evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.’” Id. (quoting Murray, 457

S.W.3d at 448). “We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against ‘the elements of the offense

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as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case.’” Id. (quoting Malik v. State, 953

S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “This standard applies equally to both jury and bench

trials.” Id.; see also Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240 (explaining that the hypothetically correct jury

charge standard applies “uniformly” to bench and jury trials, “whether or not the indictment is

facially complete, and regardless of the specific wording of the jury charge actually given” and

that this standard “ensures that a judgment of acquittal is reserved for those situations in which

there is an actual failure in the State’s proof of the crime rather than a mere error in the jury charge

submitted”). “A hypothetically correct charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized

by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or restrict its theories

of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.”

Gonzalez, 706 S.W.3d at 409.

A person commits aggravated robbery if he or she “uses or exhibits a deadly weapon”

during the robbery. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)(2). A person commits robbery if, while

committing theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property being stolen, such

person (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (2)

intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02. Under section 7.02(a) of the Texas Penal Code, a person is

criminally responsible for an offense committed by another if, “acting with intent to promote or

assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the

other person to commit the offense.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2).

At trial, numerous witnesses presented evidence. On November 5, 2021, Scott Lopez, the

manager of Rounders Card Club, was on duty. Lopez testified that he was acquainted with Frazier.

Lopez was also familiar with Wilson, who held a membership at Rounders. According to Lopez,

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surveillance video showed Wilson arriving at Rounders at 3:43 a.m., which was approximately the

same time Frazier departed.

Lopez testified that the video surveillance showed Wilson entering Rounders, walking to

the restroom, and returning to the front desk. Lopez further testified he spoke with the manager on

duty, who confirmed that Wilson left shortly after returning from the restroom. Lopez stated that

Wilson remained inside Rounders for less than five minutes. The surveillance video captured

Wilson exiting Rounders at 3:48:01 a.m. Lopez testified that a white sedan was parked in the

Rounders parking lot at 3:48 a.m., and surveillance captured an individual on the driver’s side of

the white sedan at 3:48:26 a.m. Lopez further testified that a person could walk from inside

Rounders to the white sedan in approximately twenty-five seconds.

According to Lopez, surveillance video captured Frazier in the parking lot at 3:43:31 a.m.

being escorted by security. The video showed Frazier inside the Uber at 3:49:59 a.m., at which

time the Uber exited the front parking lot toward Wurzbach Road. The white sedan was likewise

captured exiting the parking lot at 3:50:20 a.m. in the same direction as the Uber.

Michael Mahnken, the Uber driver, testified he was dispatched to Rounders and picked up

Frazier. Mahnken testified he stopped at a security gate to allow Frazier to enter an access code.

Mahnken testified that a white sedan pulled in behind the Uber. Frazier then exited the Uber to

enter the access code, carrying a black bag. According to Mahnken, a man exited the white sedan,

approached Frazier with a firearm, demanded the black bag, returned to the passenger side of the

white sedan, and fled.

Mahnken testified that Frazier reentered the Uber, and they pursued the white sedan. Both

Mahnken and Frazier testified that, during the pursuit, the passenger in the white sedan fired two

shots toward the Uber. Frazier testified that the white sedan began emitting smoke, and the driver

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pulled into a parking lot. Frazier and Mahnken both testified that they pursued the white sedan

until it stopped. They did not lose sight of the white sedan. According to Frazier, two individuals

exited the white sedan and fled on foot. He further testified that police officers arrived shortly

thereafter.

Officer Evans testified that on November 5, 2021, San Antonio police officers responded

to a robbery in progress. Officer Evans testified that a man was located hiding in bushes in a nearby

backyard. According to Officer Evans, the man stated that his foot was injured and requested

emergency services. The man also asked whether officers had “caught the other guy.” Officer

Evans testified a search of the man revealed more than $10,000 in cash and identification cards.

Officer Evans further testified that officers recovered a debit card and a Rounders card at the scene.

Detective Ramos testified he later processed a cell phone recovered from the scene that

contained Wilson’s driver’s license. Detective Ramos also testified a wallet recovered from the

scene contained a Rounders card bearing Wilson’s name. Detective Ramos testified that, following

the incident, the white sedan was impounded at Growdon Impound and multiple pieces of mail

addressed to Wilson were found inside. Detective Ramos also testified a handgun was recovered

at the apprehension site.

At trial, the State presented evidence of human DNA recovered from the steering wheel of

the vehicle involved in the robbery. The DNA analysis did not exclude Wilson as the major

contributor.

In viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the

evidence is sufficient to show Wilson was present in and operating the white sedan at the time of

the offense. The fact finder “was entitled to consider the events that took place before, during, and

after the commission of the crime.” Garcia v. State, 486 S.W.3d 602, 612 (Tex. App.—San

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Antonio 2015, pet. ref’d). “Each fact need not point directly to the guilt of the defendant, so long

as the cumulative effect of the facts are sufficient to support the conviction under the law of

parties.” Id. (quoting Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). Rounders’

surveillance video established the timing of Wilson’s arrival and departure in relation to Frazier,

as well as the presence and movement of the white sedan immediately after Wilson exited the

building. Witness testimony identified the white sedan as the vehicle used in the robbery and

described a coordinated sequence in which an individual exited the passenger side, approached

Frazier with a firearm, demanded the bag, and then reentered the vehicle before fleeing. Although

no evidence directly ties Wilson to possession of the black bag, the evidence places him in

connection with the vehicle used to commit the offense. Evidence recovered from the white sedan,

including Wilson’s identification and membership cards and mail addressed to him, links Wilson

to the white sedan, and the presence of his DNA on the steering wheel supports an inference that

he operated the vehicle. When considered together with the temporal proximity between Wilson’s

departure from Rounders and the white sedan’s movements, as well as the uninterrupted sequence

of events culminating in the vehicle’s stop and the suspects’ flight, this evidence permits a

reasonable inference that Wilson was present in and operating the vehicle at the time of the offense.

From this evidence, a rational fact finder could reasonably infer that Wilson was present

with Donte at or near the time of the offense, exercised control over the white sedan used in the

robbery, and participated in a coordinated course of conduct before, during, and after the

commission of the offense. The eyewitness account of the passenger exiting, committing the

robbery, and returning to the white sedan, when considered together with the evidence tying

Wilson to the vehicle itself, permits the reasonable inference that Wilson acted as the driver

facilitating the commission of the offense and the immediate flight. In the aggregate, these

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circumstances support the fact finder determining that Wilson and Donte had a common design to

commit the aggravated robbery and that Wilson acted as the getaway driver. See Rodriguez v.

State, 521 S.W.3d 822, 828–29 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“Courts have

repeatedly upheld convictions under the law of parties when the evidence establishes that the

defendant participated in the commission of the offense by driving the getaway vehicle.”); see also

Williams v. State, 473 S.W.3d 319, 325–27 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d);

see also Thompson v. State, 697 S.W.2d 413, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (“This Court has

sustained convictions where the evidence established that the defendant participated in the

commission of the offense by driving the get-away vehicle”), superseded by statute on other

grounds as stated in Ex parte Patterson, 969 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Wilson argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the entirety

of the Rounders’ surveillance videos obtained by the San Antonio Police Department during the

initial investigation was not produced to the defense. According to Wilson, Officer Ramos viewed

the entire video on the night in question but only saved a “chopped” video containing “snippets of

the night in question that the officer found relevant to the prosecution of the case.” Wilson contends

that the “full video was exculpatory” and supported his “version of events—specifically, that he

was not involved in the robbery.” “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under

a bifurcated standard of review.” Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

First, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s factual determinations. Id. The trial court

“is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given

their testimony.” Id. The trial court “is entitled to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness’s

testimony—even if that testimony is uncontroverted—because” it is the trial court that “has the

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opportunity to observe [a] witness’s demeanor and appearance.” Id. Second, we review de novo a

trial court’s application of law to the facts, and we will affirm a ruling that is “reasonably supported

by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.” Id. at 447–48. When the

trial court makes express findings of fact in a suppression hearing, we afford almost total deference

to those findings as long as they are supported by the record. State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399,

404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Here, the trial court made the following findings:

1. After ascertaining Wilson as a potential suspect of an alleged crime, Detective Ramos began his investigation at Rounders by viewing interior and exterior video surveillance footage.

2. Lopez voluntarily consented to and allowed Detective Ramos to view surveillance footage taken on the day of the alleged incident.

3. Rounders’ exterior surveillance footage was motion-sensor activated with a slight delay that triggered when movement occurred in certain zones. Because of the delay and movement-activated zones, the exterior cameras do not provide a source of continuous, uninterrupted recording.

4. Detective Ramos obtained all videos viewed at Rounders that were then material to his investigation.

5. The video surveillance footage collected by Detective Ramos and turned over to the State, and in turn to the Defendant, are an accurate representation of the video footage Detective Ramos viewed with Lopez.

6. Detective Ramos was not wearing a body camera when he went to Rounders and, therefore, no body camera footage exists.

7. Detective Ramos did not view any video that would derail his investigation into Defendant or exculpate Defendant.

8. No additional footage existed at the time of the motion to suppress hearing.

9. There is no evidence of any bad faith on the part of Detective Ramos or the State.

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10. No evidence has been presented to indicate the State violated Article 39.14(h) or Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), regarding the duty to disclose exculpatory, impeachment, or mitigating evidence. The record shows no violation of Article 39.14(h) or Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

11. No evidence has been presented to indicate that a timely request was made by the Defendant to the State to obtain additional video footage from Rounders.

Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that the surveillance video should not be

excluded.

Wilson does not contest any of the above findings of fact by the trial court. In reviewing

the evidence, we conclude the record supports the trial court’s findings that no additional footage

existed and that there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of Detective Ramos or the State. Under

our standard of review, we must give almost total deference to the trial court’s findings that are

supported by the record. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447. Because no additional video footage

existed, there could be no statutory or Brady violation based on a failure to produce. See Moody v.

State, 551 S.W.3d 167, 171 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (holding that video recordings

containing potentially useful evidence that no longer existed at the time of subpoena did not

demonstrate bad faith by the State and thus did not constitute a Brady violation). Rather, any

complaint regarding the completeness of the surveillance video bears on the weight of the

evidence, not its admissibility. See Robinson v. State, 739 S.W.2d 795, 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)

(explaining that appellant’s complaint of evidence not being accurate goes to weight, not

admissibility, of evidence). On this record, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to

suppress.

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CONCLUSION

Because we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support Wilson’s conviction and

because the trial court did not err in denying Wilson’s motion to suppress, we affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

Adrian A. Spears II, Justice

PUBLISH

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