Timothy Taylor v. City and County of San Francisco

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 16, 2023
• Docket: 22-16271
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 16 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY TAYLOR, No. 22-16271

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:20-cv-07692-JSW

v. MEMORANDUM* CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; KEVIN SPORE,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Jeffrey S. White, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 12, 2023** San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, CHRISTEN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

Timothy Taylor appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for leave to

amend his complaint brought against his former employer, the San Francisco

Department of Public Works (DPW), and Kevin Spore, a DPW supervisor. Taylor

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). originally sued the defendants for racial discrimination. After discovery closed, the

defendants moved for summary judgment. Taylor conceded that his race

discrimination claims lacked merit and instead moved for leave to amend his

complaint to allege claims of disability discrimination under California’s Fair

Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12900 et seq. The

district court denied Taylor’s motion for leave to amend. We review that decision

for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

In deciding whether to grant leave to amend under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(a), courts consider five factors: “(1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3)

prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment, and (5) whether plaintiff

has previously amended his complaint.” In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas

Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 738 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Allen v. City of Beverly

Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990)). Although the district court questioned

whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) may govern Taylor’s request for

leave to amend, like the district court we will assume that Rule 15’s more lenient

standard applies because Taylor’s motion fails under Rule 15.

The district court denied leave to amend based on Taylor’s delay in filing his

motion and the resulting prejudice to the defendants. We find these bases were

sufficient, and there was no abuse of discretion. Taylor knew of his disability

2 discrimination claim by at least February 2022, but he did not seek leave to amend

until July 2022, after the defendants had moved for summary judgment on Taylor’s

race discrimination claims and approximately four months after the discovery period

has closed. Taylor has not demonstrated that he acted with diligence in moving to

amend, and allowing a new theory at this stage would likely require the defendants

to engage in additional discovery after the fact discovery period had closed. See

Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A

need to reopen discovery and therefore delay the proceedings supports a district

court’s finding of prejudice from a delayed motion to amend the complaint.”). Based

on Taylor’s undue delay and the prejudice to the defendants, the district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.

AFFIRMED.