Timothy Simon v. 1166 Federal Credit Union

• Court: District Court, D. New Jersey
• Decided: April 9, 2026
• Docket: 1:25-cv-14692
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CAMDEN VICINAGE

TIMOTHY SIMON, i HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS Plaintiff, Civil Action v. No. 25-14692 (KMW-MJS) 1166 FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Defendant. ! WILLIAMS, District Judge: This matter comes before the Court by way of pro se Plaintiff Timothy Simon’s (“Plaintiff”) Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“IFP Application’) (Dkt. No. 3-4) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); and THE COURT NOTING that, having reviewed Plaintiff's IFP Application, Plaintiff declares that his average monthly income is $263.00 and his average monthly expenses are approximately $913.00, IFP Application {J 1, 8. Plaintiff does not have other liquid assets, nor does he list a spouse to contribute income or share in expenses, id. JJ 1-8; and WHEREAS, here, the Court finds that Plaintiff's monthly income, savings, and expenses as set forth in his IFP Application establish that he cannot pay the costs of litigation; and THE COURT FINDING that because Plaintiff's income is modest, the Court GRANTS the IFP application, The Court is now required to screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B),! and dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or otherwise

1 “The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)0B)(ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F, App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012),

seeks relief from an immune defendant. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. WHEREAS, Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendant 1166 Federal Credit Union (“Defendant”) for unlawful discrimimation, denial of financial services in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (““ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, and civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Compl., Dkt. No. 1-2); and WHEREAS, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant denied his applications for “business loans and credit cards .. . without valid explanation, or [his] applications weren’t submitted” despite his “basic eligibility and having an active account in good standing.” Cd. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s decision was “discriminatory in nature, as [Plaintiff| was profiled and treated differently based on [his] race.” (/d.); and WHEREAS, Plaintiff further asserts that, because of Defendant’s denial, he was “forced to seek alternative funding elsewhere, which led [Plaintiff] into a fraudulent scheme where [he] received a bad check,” ultimately resulting in criminal charges against Plaintiff, his incarceration, financial hardship, reputational damage, and emotional distress. (/d.); and WHEREAS, pursuant to ECOA, it is “unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction .. . on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marifal status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract).” 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (a). “To establish a prima facie case under ECOA, [a plaintiff] must show that (1) plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) plaintiff applied for credit from defendants; (3) plaintiff was qualified for the credit; and (4) despite qualification, plaintiff was denied credit.” King v. NASA Fed. Credit Union, No. 26-00743, 2026 WL 368927, at *2 (D.NJ. Feb, 10, 2026), The Third Circuit has held that “while a discrimination complaint need not allege

facts establishing each element of a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss, .. . it must at a minimum assert nonconclusory factual matter sufficient to nudge its claims across the line from conceivable to plausible to proceed.” Shahin v. PNC Bank, 625 F. App’x 68, 70 (3d Cir, 2015) (quoting E.E.0.C. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & NJ, 768 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2014)); and THE COURT FINDING that, here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain weli-pleaded facts showing that Plaintiff is within the narrow class of persons entitled to assert rights pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1691 or that he was qualified for the credit he sought from Defendant. See King, 2026 WL 368927, at *2; (see generally Compi., Dkt. No. 1-2); and WHEREAS, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff “must allege facts in support of the following elements: (1) [that plaintiff] is a member of a racial minority; (2) intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) discrimination concerning one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute[,] which includes the right to make and enforce contracts,” Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 Gd Cir, 2001); and THE COURT NOTING that Plaintiff does not ailege that he is a member of a racial minority, (See generally Compl.) Nor does Plaintiff allege any facts that suggest intentional discrimination. (See id.); see also Brown, 250 F.3d at 797, and CONSEQUENTLY, for all the foregoing reasons, and for good cause shown; Iv IS this) aay of April 2026, hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's IFP Application (Dkt. No. 3-4) is GRANTED, and further ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1-2) is DISMISSED without prejudice; and further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel* (Dkt. No. 10) is DENIED as moot; and further ORDERED that Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 13, 14) are DENIED as moot; and further ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Complaint within 30 days of issuance of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to address the deficiencies noted herein. Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to do so may result in the dismissal of his Complaint with prejudice; and further ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order upon Plaintiff by regular U.S. mail,

Go dae KAREN M, WILLIAMS — UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2 Regarding Plaintiff's Motion te Appoint Counsel (Dkt. No. £0), the Court notes that “an indigent Htigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs,, 452 U.S, 18, 26-27 (1981), Otherwise, the Court must determine as a threshold matter that an indigent litigant’s claim has “some merit in fact and law” to warrant the appointment of counsel. Tabron y. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993), Here, because Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), Plaintiff's Motion (o Appoint Counsel is denied without prejudice.