Timothy Raymo v. Commonwealth and Associates

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: March 24, 2022
• Docket: 5:20-cv-01474
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 1 of 16 Page ID #:237

1 'O' 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 TIMOTHY RAYMO, CV 20-1474-RSWL-SPx

13 Plaintiff, ORDER re: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 14 v. FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 15 [37] DEFINITIVE CONSULTING 16 SERVICES LLC, et al., 17 Defendants. 18 Plaintiff Timothy Raymo (“Plaintiff”) brings this 19 Action [1] against Defendants Definitive Consulting 20 Services LLC and Justin Laurer (collectively, 21 “Defendants”) for alleged violations of the Fair Debt 22 Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. 23 (“FDCPA”).1 24 25 1 Plaintiff also brought this Action against Defendant Nicholas Engle. See generally First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 26 23. On October 13, 2021, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendant Engle from this Action such that only Defendants 27 Definitive Consulting LLC and Justin Laurer remain. See Notice 28 of Dismissal, ECF No. 29. 1 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 2 of 16 Page ID #:238

1 Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion

2 for Default Judgment (“Motion”) [37]. Having reviewed

3 all papers submitted pertaining to the Motions, the 4 Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: the Court GRANTS 5 the Motion. 6 I. BACKGROUND 7 A. Factual Background 8 Plaintiff alleges the following in his First 9 Amended Complaint (“FAC”): 10 On or about August 1, 2019, Defendants began 11 calling Plaintiff to collect a consumer debt allegedly 12 owed by Plaintiff, a resident of Texas. First Am. 13 Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 7, ECF No. 23. Defendants left a pre- 14 recorded message for Plaintiff, which stated: “There is 15 currently a court order being filed to suspend all 16 activity with your social security number and name. To 17 review all immediate rights and actions, contact us at 18 888-970-1217. Once again, 888-970-1217.” Id. ¶ 8. 19 Plaintiff, harassed and concerned by Defendants’ 20 message, retained counsel. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff’s 21 counsel determined that Defendants had been attempting 22 to collect a consumer debt allegedly owed by Plaintiff. 23 Id. ¶ 11. Defendants admitted that no litigation was 24 pending against Plaintiff. Id. Public records also 25 show that there is no litigation pending against 26 Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 13. 27 Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with the 28 requisite debt validation information pursuant to 15 2 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 3 of 16 Page ID #:239

1 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) within five days of their initial

2 communication with Plaintiff on August 1, 2019. Id. ¶

3 12. Defendants also failed to register as debt 4 collectors in Texas, which they were required to do 5 before engaging in debt collection in Texas. Id. ¶ 14. 6 B. Procedural Background 7 Plaintiff filed the initial Complaint [1] on July 8 24, 2020. On April 19, 2021, the Court granted [17] 9 Plaintiff’s request [14] to engage in discovery prior to 10 the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 26(f) 11 conference to identify and serve Defendants. 12 On August 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed [23] his FAC 13 against Defendants. On October 13, 2021, Plaintiff 14 voluntarily dismissed [29] Defendant Nicholas Engle from 15 this Action. On October 19, 2021, Plaintiff requested 16 [31, 33] the Clerk to enter default against Defendants, 17 which the Clerk did on October 20, 2021 [34, 35]. 18 On March 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed the present 19 Motion for Default Judgment. Defendants did not reply. 20 II. DISCUSSION 21 A. Legal Standard 22 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55(b) 23 authorizes a district court to grant default judgment. 24 Pursuant to Local Rule 55-1, the party moving for 25 default judgment must submit a declaration establishing: 26 (1) when and against which party default was entered; 27 (2) on which pleading default was entered; (3) whether 28 the defaulting party is a minor, incompetent person, or 3 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 4 of 16 Page ID #:240

1 active service member; and (4) proper service. Upon

2 entry of default, all factual allegations in the

3 complaint, except those relating to damages, are assumed 4 to be true. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 5 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting 6 Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 7 1977)). Additionally, if the defaulting party fails to 8 plead or otherwise defend, the court must determine that 9 it has subject matter and personal jurisdiction. In re 10 Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). 11 In exercising its discretion to grant default 12 judgment, the court must consider the following factors: 13 (1) possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) 14 merits of the substantive claim; (3) sufficiency of the 15 complaint; (4) sum of money at stake; (5) possibility of 16 disputes regarding material facts; (6) whether excusable 17 neglect caused the default; and (7) the strong policy 18 favoring decisions on the merits. NewGen, LLC v. Safe 19 Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 20 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 21 1986)). 22 B. Discussion 23 1. Jurisdiction 24 Because Defendants have failed to appear or defend 25 in this Action, the Court must first determine if it has 26 jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. 27 See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). 28 Here, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over 4 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 5 of 16 Page ID #:241

1 this Action for violations of the FDCPA under 28 U.S.C.

2 § 1331. The Court has general personal jurisdiction

3 over Defendants because they allegedly reside in 4 California. See FAC ¶ 2. 5 2. Procedural Requirements 6 Plaintiff has satisfied the procedural requirements 7 for default judgment pursuant to Rule 55. Under Rule 8 55(a), the Court Clerk properly entered default against 9 Defendants on October 20, 2021. See Default by Clerk, 10 ECF Nos. 34, 35. Plaintiff then properly moved pursuant 11 to Rule 55(b) for entry of default judgment. 12 Plaintiff has also met the procedural requirements 13 under Local Rule 55-1.2 See Mot. 2:19-3:4, ECF No. 37. 14 In compliance with Local Rule 55-1, Plaintiff states 15 that: (1) default was entered against Defendants on 16 October 20, 2021 for failure to respond to the 17 Complaint; (2) Defendants are not minors or incompetent 18 persons; (3) Defendants are not service members; and (4) 19 Defendants were served with the Request for Entry of 20 Default. Id. 21 22 /// 23 /// 24 2 Local Rule 55-1 states that an application for default 25 judgment “shall be accompanied by a declaration in compliance” with Rule 55. L.R. 55-1. Plaintiff did not submit a declaration 26 but rather, provided in his Motion the requisite information to satisfy Local Rule 55-1. See Mot. 2:19-3:4. Because no 27 prejudice resulted from this deviation, the Court overlooks this 28 deficiency. 5 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 6 of 16 Page ID #:242

1 3. Eitel Factors

2 a. Factor 1: Possibility of Prejudice to

3 Plaintiff 4 The first Eitel factor concerns whether a plaintiff 5 will suffer prejudice if default judgment is not 6 entered. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471 (citation 7 omitted). The first factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor 8 here. Defendants have failed to appear and defend, thus 9 prejudicing Plaintiff as he would have no recourse to 10 recover on his claims if default judgment is not 11 entered. Valentin v. Grant Mercantile Agency, Inc., 12 2017 WL 6604410, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2017) 13 (finding sufficient prejudice where a defendant did not 14 appear and defend itself). 15 b. Factors 2 and 3: Sufficiency of the 16 Complaint and Merits of the Claim 17 The second and third Eitel factors call for 18 analysis of the causes of action. See Eitel, 782 F.2d 19 at 1471 (citation omitted). When considered together, 20 these factors “require that a plaintiff state a claim on 21 which [he] may recover.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. 22 Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 23 Because default has been entered, all factual 24 allegations in the FAC, except those relating to 25 damages, are taken as true. See TeleVideo, 826 F.2d at 26 917-18. 27 To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must 28 show: (1) the plaintiff is a “consumer” as defined under 6 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 7 of 16 Page ID #:243

1 the FDCPA; (2) the defendant is a “debt collector” under

2 the FDCPA; and (3) the defendant committed some act or

3 omission outlined in the FDCPA. Valentin, 2017 WL 4 6604410, at *3 (citations omitted). The first two 5 elements are met here. While the FAC does not 6 affirmatively plead Plaintiff’s status as a “consumer,” 7 it does state that Plaintiff owed a consumer debt that 8 Defendants were attempting to collect. See FAC ¶ 7. 9 This is sufficient to meet the first element under the 10 FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. 1692a(3) (defining “consumer” as 11 “any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to 12 pay any debt.”). As for the second element, Plaintiff 13 adequately pleads that Defendants “regularly operate as 14 third-party debt collectors. . . .” See 15 U.S.C. 15 1692a(6) (defining “debt collector” as “any person who 16 uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce . . . 17 the principal purposes of which is the collection of any 18 debts, or who regularly collects . . . debts owed . . . 19 .”). Having found the first two elements of an FDCPA 20 claim satisfied, the Court now turns to the third 21 element and assesses whether Plaintiff has sufficiently 22 alleged a violation of the FDCPA. 23 Plaintiff alleges five violations of the FDCPA, but 24 proof of only one violation is sufficient to recover 25 statutory damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); see also 26 Greene v. The Rosenberg Grp., LLC, 2019 WL 7900267, at 27 *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2019) (granting default judgment 28 upon a single violation of the FDCPA where there had 7 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 8 of 16 Page ID #:244

1 been several alleged FDCPA violations). Looking only at

2 Plaintiff’s first cause of action, the Court finds that

3 Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of 4 § 1692d(6). 5 Section 1692d of the FDCPA protects consumers from 6 harassment or abuse by debt collectors. See 15 U.S.C. § 7 1692d. Subsection 1692d(6) specifically states that a 8 violation of the FDCPA occurs when debt collectors do 9 not meaningfully disclose their identity during a 10 telephone call. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6). This district 11 has stated that “meaningful disclosure presumably 12 requires that the caller must state his or her name and 13 capacity, and disclose enough information so as not to 14 mislead the recipient as to the purpose of the call or 15 the reason the questions are being asked.” Hosseinzadeh 16 v. M.R.S. Assocs., Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1112 17 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations 18 omitted). 19 Here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that 20 Defendants violated § 1692d(6) by failing to 21 meaningfully disclose their status as debt collectors 22 attempting to collect a debt. FAC ¶ 16; Mot. 5:11-19. 23 As evidenced by the voicemail that Defendants left 24 Plaintiff, Defendants failed to disclose any identifying 25 information and failed to give information as to the 26 purpose of the call. See FAC ¶ 8. Accordingly, Eitel 27 factors two and three weigh in favor of default judgment 28 here and the Court need not analyze Plaintiff’s 8 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 9 of 16 Page ID #:245

1 remaining FDCPA violations.

2 c. Factor 4: Sum of Money at Stake

3 Under the fourth Eitel factor, “the court must 4 consider the amount of money at stake in relation to the 5 seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, 238 F. 6 Supp. 2d at 1176. “Default judgment is disfavored where 7 the sum of money at stake is too large or unreasonable 8 in relation to defendant’s conduct.” Vogel v. Rite Aid 9 Corp., 992 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2014) 10 (citations omitted). 11 Here, Plaintiff seeks $1,000 in statutory damages, 12 $126.65 in costs, and $13,612 in attorneys’ fees for a 13 total of $14,738.65. Mot. 4:12-13. The Court finds 14 that this amount is neither too large nor unreasonable 15 and concludes that the fourth Eitel factor weighs in 16 favor of default judgment. See Cunningham v. Meridian 17 Credit Grp., LLC, 2019 WL 643966, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18 11, 2019) (finding the fourth Eitel factor to weigh in 19 favor of default judgment where plaintiff sought $16,355 20 for FDCPA violations). 21 d. Factor 5: Dispute of Material Fact 22 The fifth Eitel factor is the likelihood of a 23 dispute as to material facts. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471- 24 72 (citation omitted). To date, Defendants have not 25 answered or otherwise appeared. Since Plaintiff’s 26 factual allegations are presumed true in this context 27 and Defendants failed to move to set aside the default, 28 no factual dispute exists that would preclude the entry 9 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 10 of 16 Page ID #:246

1 of default judgment. See Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at

2 1013; see also Cunningham, 2019 WL 643966, at *6 (“Since

3 Defendant failed to answer the Complaint, the Court 4 finds it unlikely that disputes as to material facts 5 will arise.”). Thus, this factor weighs in favor of 6 default judgment. 7 e. Factor 6: Excusable Neglect 8 “The sixth Eitel factor considers the possibility 9 that the default resulted from excusable neglect.” 10 PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. This factor favors a 11 default judgment when the defendant has been properly 12 served or the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant 13 is aware of the lawsuit. See id. Here, Defendants were 14 personally served with notice of this action. See Proof 15 of Service, ECF Nos. 30, 32. Therefore, the possibility 16 of excusable neglect here is remote and, accordingly, 17 the sixth Eitel factor weighs in favor of default 18 judgment. See Magbanua v. Evans, 2020 WL 2332168, at *7 19 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2020) (weighing the sixth Eitel 20 factor in favor of default judgment where a defendant 21 was properly served with the complaint); Cunningham, 22 2019 WL 643966, at *6 (same); Vogel 992 F. Supp. 2d at 23 1013 (same). 24 f. Factor 7: Public Policy 25 The seventh Eitel factor considers the strong 26 policy favoring rulings on the merits. Eitel, 782 F.2d 27 at 1472 (“Cases should be decided upon their merits 28 whenever reasonably possible.”). Defendants’ choice not 10 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 11 of 16 Page ID #:247

1 to defend themselves renders a decision on the merits

2 “impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp.

3 2d at 1177. Therefore, this factor does not preclude 4 the Court from entering default judgment against 5 Defendants. 6 Thus, on balance, the Eitel factors weigh in favor 7 of granting default judgment against Defendants and the 8 Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion. 9 4. Relief 10 “Once a court concludes that default judgment is 11 appropriate, it must determine what damages or other 12 relief is warranted.” Viet Huynh v. Alliant Cap. Mgmt. 13 LLC, 2018 WL 6137145, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2018). 14 “A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or 15 exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” 16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). The party seeking default 17 judgment “must ‘prove up’ the amount of damages.” 18 PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 19 2002). 20 In his Motion for Default Judgment, Plaintiff 21 seeks: (1) $1,000 in statutory damages; and (2) 22 $13,738.65 in attorneys’ fees and costs. Mot. 16:22-28. 23 Each request for relief is examined in turn below. 24 a. Statutory Damages 25 “The FDCPA provides that any debt collector who 26 violates any provision of the FDCPA is liable for 27 statutory damages of up to $1,000, in addition to any 28 actual damages sustained.” Cunningham, 2019 WL 643966, 11 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 12 of 16 Page ID #:248

1 at *6; 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). In determining these

2 damages, a court must consider “the frequency and

3 persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the 4 nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which 5 such noncompliance was intentional.” 15 U.S.C. 6 § 1692k(b)(1). 7 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “began calling” 8 him on August 1, 2019, but the FAC is silent as to any 9 other communications outside of the August 1, 2019 10 voicemail that gave rise to this action. See FAC ¶ 7. 11 Thus, it appears that the August 1, 2019 voicemail was 12 the only communication from Defendants to Plaintiff. 13 However, taking Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, 14 Defendants intentionally misled Plaintiff into believing 15 that there was a pending court order against him that 16 would have suspended all activity with his social 17 security number and name. See id. ¶ 8. Given these 18 facts, the Court finds it appropriate to award Plaintiff 19 the maximum of $1,000 in statutory damages. See 20 Cunningham, 2019 WL 643966, at *6 (awarding maximum 21 statutory damages in an FDCPA action even though 22 defendant’s communications to plaintiff were infrequent 23 because defendant had misled plaintiff into believing 24 there was a pending lawsuit against her). 25 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 12 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 13 of 16 Page ID #:249

1 b. Attorneys’ Fees

2 Local Rule 55-3 states that where attorneys’ fees

3 are sought under a statute in a motion for default 4 judgment, fees are calculated according to the schedule 5 provided under Local Rule 55-3. L.R. 55-3. Where a 6 party seeks attorneys’ fees in excess of the provided 7 schedule, however, they may request the court to fix the 8 attorneys’ fees. Id. Here, Plaintiff has requested 9 that the Court calculate attorneys’ fees using the 10 lodestar method. Mot. 13:18-14:12. Because attorneys’ 11 fees awards under the FDCPA are generally calculated 12 using the lodestar method, the Court finds that the 13 lodestar method provides for a reasonable basis of 14 calculation here. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 15 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that attorneys’ 16 fees under the FDCPA are generally calculated using the 17 lodestar method). 18 Attorneys’ fees under the lodestar method are 19 calculated by multiplying the hours reasonably spent on 20 the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. See, e.g., 21 Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th 22 Cir. 2013). “[R]easonable hourly rates are . . . 23 calculated according to the prevailing market rates in 24 the relevant legal community for similar services by 25 lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and 26 reputation.” Valentin v. Grant Mercantile Agency, Inc., 27 2017 WL 6604410, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2017) (citing 28 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)). The 13 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 14 of 16 Page ID #:250

1 relevant legal community is the forum in which the

2 district court sits. Carson v. Billings Police Dep't,

3 470 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2006). 4 i. Reasonable Hours 5 According to Plaintiff’s billing summary, 6 Plaintiff’s counsel, Mr. Amador, spent 32.56 hours on 7 this Action and his paralegal spent 7.84 hours. See 8 generally Mot., Ex. C (“Billing Summary”), ECF No. 37-3. 9 The Court notes that in other similar actions, Mr. 10 Amador has spent roughly half the amount of time 11 preparing his case than compared to here. See Magbanua, 12 2020 WL 2332168, at *8 (noting that Mr. Amador spent 13 13.22 hours working on an FDCPA case); Huynh, 2018 WL 14 6137145, at *5 (noting that Mr. Amador spent 12.11 hours 15 working on an FDCPA case). Still, the Court finds that 16 the hours spent here were largely necessary given that 17 Defendants allegedly operated under a fictitious 18 business name and avoided service of process through 19 other means. See Mot. 14:13-15:16. However, the Court 20 concludes that the present Motion could have been 21 effectively drafted in 3.5 hours rather than the 6.5 22 hours that Mr. Amador purportedly spent. See 23 Cunningham, 2019 WL 643966, at *8 (reducing attorneys’ 24 fee award based on belief that a motion for default 25 judgment could have been drafted in 3.5 hours instead of 26 4.7); see also Billing Summary. The Court reduces Mr. 27 Amador’s expended hours to 29.56 (32.56-3) and finds 28 reasonable that his paralegal spent 7.84 hours on this 14 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 15 of 16 Page ID #:251

1 Action.

2 ii. Reasonable Rate

3 Plaintiff seeks to recover attorneys’ fees billed 4 at $400/hour for attorney time and $75/hour for 5 paralegal time. Mot. 13:3-6. Plaintiff cites previous 6 cases where Mr. Amador has been awarded attorneys’ fees 7 of $300/hour for attorney work and $50/hour for 8 paralegal work in arguing that the $400/hour and 9 $75/hour billing rates are reasonable. Id. at 13:14-17. 10 Plaintiff explains that Mr. Amador’s rate increased 11 because Mr. Amador has been practicing for eleven years 12 but does not explain the increase in paralegal billing. 13 Id. at 13:13-16. 14 The Court finds that the $400/hour rate for 15 attorney time is proper because it falls within the 16 range of those deemed reasonable in the FDCPA context. 17 See, e.g., Salazar v. Midwest Servicing Grp., Inc., 2018 18 WL 4802139, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2018) (finding 19 reasonable hourly rates ranging from $450 to $495 in 20 FDCPA case); Yang v. Assisted Credit Servs., Inc., 2017 21 WL 9939710, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2017) (finding 22 reasonable hourly rates of $400 in FDCPA case). The 23 Court reduces the paralegal rate to $50/hour, however, 24 because Plaintiff does not provide support for the 25 paralegal billing increase. 26 In light of the adjusted hours worked and rates 27 billed, the Court calculates the lodestar figure as 28 $12,216 ((29.56 x 400) + (7.84 x 50)) and awards 15 Case 5:20-cv-01474-RSWL-SP Document 41 Filed 03/24/22 Page 16 of 16 Page ID #:252

1 attorneys’ fees in this amount.

2 c. Costs

3 Plaintiff requests $126.65 for the cost of service 4 of process. See Billing Summary. The Court finds that 5 this cost was reasonably incurred and GRANTS Plaintiff’s 6 request to recover the costs of this Action. See Smith 7 v. Ferguson Grp., 2019 WL 850685, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8 21, 2019) (granting costs of FDCPA action where 9 plaintiff sought to recover only the costs of filing and 10 serving the complaint). 11 III. CONCLUSION 12 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS 13 Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment against 14 Defendants Definitive Consulting Services LLC and Justin 15 Laurer who are the remaining Defendants in this Action. 16 The Court enters a total judgment of $13,342.65 ($1,000 17 in statutory damages for FDCPA violation, $12,216 in 18 attorneys’ fees, and $126.65 in costs) against 19 Defendants. Plaintiff shall submit a proposed judgment 20 within seven (7) days of the date of this Order, in 21 conformance with the Court’s procedures. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 24 DATED: March 24, 2022 ___/s_/_ R_o_na_ld_ S_._W_. _Le_w_______________ HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW 25 Senior U.S. District Judge 26

27 28 16