1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TIMOTHY RAY BAKER, Case No. 23-cv-04391-WHO (PR)
Plaintiff, 8 ORDER OF SERVICE;
v. 9 ORDER DIRECTING DEFENDANTS TO FILE A 10 C. TANORI, et al., DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR NOTICE REGARDING SUCH Defendants. 11 MOTION;
12 INSTRUCTIONS TO CLERK
14 INTRODUCTION 15 Plaintiff Timothy Ray Baker alleges that alleges that correctional officers used 16 excessive force on him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. His first amended 42 17 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint containing these allegations is now before me for review pursuant 18 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 19 Baker has stated cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against 20 Salinas Valley State Prison correctional officers C. Tanori and R. Carrassco. He also has 21 stated a First Amendment retaliation claim and a due process claim against Tanori. All 22 other defendants and claims are DISMISSED. The Court directs defendants Tanori and 23 Carrassco to file in response to the complaint a dispositive motion, or a notice regarding 24 such motion, on or before April 20, 2026. Defendants also shall file an answer in 25 accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 26 No hearing will be held on any motion unless I specifically order one. 27 Baker’s motion for a ruling on his amended complaint is DENIED as moot. (Dkt. 1 No. 32.) 2 DISCUSSION 3 A. Standard of Review 4 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 5 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 6 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 7 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 8 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 9 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 10 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 11 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 12 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 13 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 14 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 15 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 16 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 17 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 18 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 19 (9th Cir. 1994). 20 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 21 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 22 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 23 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 24 B. Legal Claims 25 Baker alleges that on August 18, 2022 at Salinas Valley State Prison correctional 26 officers C. Tanori and R. Carrassco used excessive force on him in violation of the Eighth 27 Amendment. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 24 at 6.) He also alleges that Tanori acted in 1 against him in violation of due process. (Id. at 13, 20.) When liberally construed, Baker 2 has stated Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Tanori and Carrassco; a First 3 Amendment retaliation claim against Tanori; and a due process claim against Tanori. 4 All other claims and defendants are DISMISSED. Baker’s claim that Tanori 5 prevented him from receiving clean laundry because of his race is DISMISSED; Baker 6 provides no facts to sustain a claim of racial profiling. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 24 at 6.) 7 Also, a claim regarding the denial of clean laundry is unrelated to the excessive force and 8 retaliation claims. 9 Baker’s claims against the warden, Trent Allen, and other supervisors are 10 DISMISSED. Defendants cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under 42 11 U.S.C. § 1983 “unless they were integral participants in the unlawful conduct.” Keates v. 12 Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 2018). Furthermore, there is no respondeat superior 13 liability under § 1983. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). It is not 14 enough that the supervisor merely has a supervisory relationship over the defendants; the 15 plaintiff must show that the supervisor “participated in or directed the violations, or knew 16 of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. 17 Nothing in the allegations shows that any supervisory defendant participated in, 18 directed, or otherwise was integral to, the alleged violations. Baker states that he informed 19 Lieutenant J. Parks on August 17, 2022 at a grievance interview that Tanori was likely to 20 retaliate against him because of Baker’s grievances. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 24 at 14-15.) 21 He said that Tanori was likely to interfere with his going to the canteen the next day. (Id. 22 at 14.) He also alleges that Captain Beam, a supervisor, had knowledge of Tanori’s 23 behaviors and should have acted to prevent the use of excessive force. (Id. at 15, 16.) 24 These allegations are insufficient because no one could have known that Tanori would 25 retaliate by using excessive force. The prior acts of retaliation (canteen access interference 26 and denial of laundry) were non-violent and would not have put any supervisor on notice 27 of a violent retaliation. 1 involvement in reviewing an inmate’s administrative grievance does not necessarily 2 demonstrate awareness of an alleged violation, or contribute to the underlying violation. 3 George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). “Only persons who cause or 4 participate in the violations are responsible.” Id. “Ruling against a prisoner on an 5 administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation.” Id. Again, there 6 are no facts showing the grievance reviewers would have known that Tanori would use 7 excessive force against Baker. 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 10 1. The Court orders service of the complaint (Dkt. No. 24), and all attachments 11 thereto, on defendants C. Tanori and R. Carrassco, both correctional officers at Salinas 12 Valley State Prison, and orders these defendants to respond to the cognizable claims raised 13 in the complaint. 14 2.
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TIMOTHY RAY BAKER, Case No. 23-cv-04391-WHO (PR)
Plaintiff, 8 ORDER OF SERVICE;
v. 9 ORDER DIRECTING DEFENDANTS TO FILE A 10 C. TANORI, et al., DISPOSITIVE MOTION OR NOTICE REGARDING SUCH Defendants. 11 MOTION;
12 INSTRUCTIONS TO CLERK
14 INTRODUCTION 15 Plaintiff Timothy Ray Baker alleges that alleges that correctional officers used 16 excessive force on him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. His first amended 42 17 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint containing these allegations is now before me for review pursuant 18 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 19 Baker has stated cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against 20 Salinas Valley State Prison correctional officers C. Tanori and R. Carrassco. He also has 21 stated a First Amendment retaliation claim and a due process claim against Tanori. All 22 other defendants and claims are DISMISSED. The Court directs defendants Tanori and 23 Carrassco to file in response to the complaint a dispositive motion, or a notice regarding 24 such motion, on or before April 20, 2026. Defendants also shall file an answer in 25 accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 26 No hearing will be held on any motion unless I specifically order one. 27 Baker’s motion for a ruling on his amended complaint is DENIED as moot. (Dkt. 1 No. 32.) 2 DISCUSSION 3 A. Standard of Review 4 A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a 5 prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a 6 governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any 7 cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim 8 upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 9 from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. 10 See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 11 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 12 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 13 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial 14 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 15 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 16 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, a court “is not required to accept legal 17 conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably 18 be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 19 (9th Cir. 1994). 20 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 21 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 22 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 23 color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 24 B. Legal Claims 25 Baker alleges that on August 18, 2022 at Salinas Valley State Prison correctional 26 officers C. Tanori and R. Carrassco used excessive force on him in violation of the Eighth 27 Amendment. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 24 at 6.) He also alleges that Tanori acted in 1 against him in violation of due process. (Id. at 13, 20.) When liberally construed, Baker 2 has stated Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Tanori and Carrassco; a First 3 Amendment retaliation claim against Tanori; and a due process claim against Tanori. 4 All other claims and defendants are DISMISSED. Baker’s claim that Tanori 5 prevented him from receiving clean laundry because of his race is DISMISSED; Baker 6 provides no facts to sustain a claim of racial profiling. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 24 at 6.) 7 Also, a claim regarding the denial of clean laundry is unrelated to the excessive force and 8 retaliation claims. 9 Baker’s claims against the warden, Trent Allen, and other supervisors are 10 DISMISSED. Defendants cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under 42 11 U.S.C. § 1983 “unless they were integral participants in the unlawful conduct.” Keates v. 12 Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 2018). Furthermore, there is no respondeat superior 13 liability under § 1983. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). It is not 14 enough that the supervisor merely has a supervisory relationship over the defendants; the 15 plaintiff must show that the supervisor “participated in or directed the violations, or knew 16 of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. 17 Nothing in the allegations shows that any supervisory defendant participated in, 18 directed, or otherwise was integral to, the alleged violations. Baker states that he informed 19 Lieutenant J. Parks on August 17, 2022 at a grievance interview that Tanori was likely to 20 retaliate against him because of Baker’s grievances. (Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 24 at 14-15.) 21 He said that Tanori was likely to interfere with his going to the canteen the next day. (Id. 22 at 14.) He also alleges that Captain Beam, a supervisor, had knowledge of Tanori’s 23 behaviors and should have acted to prevent the use of excessive force. (Id. at 15, 16.) 24 These allegations are insufficient because no one could have known that Tanori would 25 retaliate by using excessive force. The prior acts of retaliation (canteen access interference 26 and denial of laundry) were non-violent and would not have put any supervisor on notice 27 of a violent retaliation. 1 involvement in reviewing an inmate’s administrative grievance does not necessarily 2 demonstrate awareness of an alleged violation, or contribute to the underlying violation. 3 George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). “Only persons who cause or 4 participate in the violations are responsible.” Id. “Ruling against a prisoner on an 5 administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation.” Id. Again, there 6 are no facts showing the grievance reviewers would have known that Tanori would use 7 excessive force against Baker. 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows: 10 1. The Court orders service of the complaint (Dkt. No. 24), and all attachments 11 thereto, on defendants C. Tanori and R. Carrassco, both correctional officers at Salinas 12 Valley State Prison, and orders these defendants to respond to the cognizable claims raised 13 in the complaint. 14 2. Service on these defendants shall proceed under the California Department 15 of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s e-service program for civil rights cases from prisoners 16 in CDCR custody. In accordance with the program, the Clerk is directed to serve on 17 CDCR via email the following documents: the complaint (Docket No. 24) and its 18 attachments; this Order; a CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver form; and a summons. The 19 Clerk also shall serve a copy of this Order on the plaintiff. 20 3. No later than 40 days after service of this order via email on CDCR, CDCR 21 shall provide the Court a completed CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver advising the court 22 which defendant(s) listed in this Order will be waiving service of process without the need 23 for service by the United States Marshal Service (USMS) and which defendant(s) decline 24 to waive service or could not be reached. CDCR also shall provide a copy of the CDCR 25 Report of E-Service Waiver to the California Attorney General’s Office which, within 21 26 days, shall file with the Court a waiver of service of process for the defendant(s) who are 27 waiving service. 1 prepare for each defendant who has not waived service according to the CDCR Report of 2 E-Service Waiver a USM-285 Form. The Clerk shall provide to the USMS the completed 3 USM-285 forms and copies of this Order, the summons and the complaint for service upon 4 each defendant who has not waived service. 5 5. On or before April 20, 2026, if appropriate, defendants shall file a motion 6 for summary judgment or other dispositive motion with respect to the claim(s) in the 7 complaint found to be cognizable above. 8 a. If defendants elect to file a motion to dismiss on the grounds plaintiff 9 failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. 10 § 1997e(a), defendants shall do so in a motion for summary judgment, as required by 11 Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). 12 b. Any motion for summary judgment shall be supported by adequate 13 factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 14 Civil Procedure. Defendants are advised that summary judgment cannot be granted, nor 15 qualified immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If any defendant is of the 16 opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the 17 Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. 18 6. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court 19 and served on defendants no later than forty-five (45) days from the date defendants’ 20 motion is filed. 21 7. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fifteen (15) days after 22 plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 23 8. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 24 No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 25 9. All communications by the plaintiff with the Court must be served on 26 defendants, or on defendants’ counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true 27 copy of the document to defendants or defendants’ counsel. 1 Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local 2 Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery. 3 Plaintiff is reminded that state prisoners may review all non-confidential material in 4 their medical and central files, pursuant to In re Olson, 37 Cal. App. 3d 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 5 1974); 15 California Code of Regulations § 3370; and the CDCR’s Department Operations 6 Manual §§ 13030.4, 13030.16, 13030.16.1-13030.16.3, 13030.21, and 71010.11.1. 7 Requests to review these files or for copies of materials in them must be made directly to 8 prison officials, not to the Court. 9 Plaintiff may also use any applicable jail procedures to request copies of (or the 10 opportunity to review) any reports, medical records, or other records maintained by jail 11 officials that are relevant to the claims found cognizable in this Order. Such requests must 12 be made directly to jail officials, not to the Court. 13 11. It is plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the 14 Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a 15 timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to 16 prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). 17 12. Extensions of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to be 18 extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause. 19 13. A decision from the Ninth Circuit requires that pro se prisoner-plaintiffs be 20 given “notice of what is required of them in order to oppose” summary judgment motions 21 at the time of filing of the motions, rather than when the court orders service of process or 22 otherwise before the motions are filed. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939-41 (9th Cir. 23 2012). Defendant shall provide the following notice to plaintiff when he files and serves 24 any motion for summary judgment:
25 The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment by which they 26 seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your 27 case. 1 Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no 2 genuine issue of material fact — that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for 3 summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end 4 your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 5 testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, 6 you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that 7 contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not 8 submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, 9 may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. 1 . 0 Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-963 (9th Cir. 1998). 11 . . . . 14. The Clerk shall terminate all defendants with the exceptions of Tanori and 12 Carrassco.
© = 8 Baker’s motion for a ruling on his amended complaint is DENIED as moot.
(Dkt. No. 32.)
1S 16. | The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
'7 || Dated: December 22, 2025 . Z 18 19 M H. ORRIC United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28