Timothy Onkst v. Jennifer Morgan

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided September 11, 2019·No. 03-18-00367-CV·Published

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-18-00367-CV

Timothy Onkst, Appellant

v.

Jennifer Morgan, Appellee

FROM THE 345TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-FM-14-003084, THE HONORABLE TIM SULAK, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Timothy Onkst complains of the trial court’s February 2017 protective order, barring him from communicating with, threatening, harassing, or approaching appellee Jennifer Morgan and several members of her family. The trial court signed a final order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR order) in April 2018, incorporating the protective order. Onkst appeals from the protective order and the provisions of the SAPCR order that incorporate the protective order. As explained below, we will affirm the protective order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court may issue a protective order if it finds that family violence has occurred and is likely to occur in the future. Tex. Fam. Code § 85.001(b). In issuing a protective order against someone who has committed family violence, the court may prohibit that person

from: committing family violence; threatening a protected person or a member of the protected person’s family or household directly or through a third-party; communicating in any way with a protected person or a member of her family or household other than through an attorney or someone appointed by the court; going near the home or workplace of the protected person or a member of her family or household; going near a protected child’s home, child-care facility, or school; engaging in conduct that is specifically directed toward a protected person or a member of her family or household and that is reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass, including following the person; possessing a firearm if the subject of the order is not an actively employed peace officer for a governmental entity; and harming, threatening, or interfering with the care or control of a pet of the protected person or a member of her family or household. Id. § 85.022(b). The court may render a protective order that lasts longer than two years if, as relevant to this case, it finds that the subject of the order was also the subject of at least two previous protective orders that were rendered to protect the current applicant, that the subject had committed family violence, and that the subject is likely to commit family violence in the future. Id. §§ 85.001(d), .025(a-1).

We review a trial court’s issuance of a protective order under the same standards used in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence following a jury verdict. S.N. v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-18-00539-CV, 2019 WL 471069, at *3 (Tex. App.— Austin Feb. 7, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing B.C. v. Rhodes, 116 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.)). In reviewing legal sufficiency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s determination, indulging all reasonable inferences in its favor; in reviewing factual sufficiency, we consider all of the evidence and will uphold the finding unless the evidence is too weak to support it or the finding is so against the

overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Id. The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and we will not substitute our judgment simply because we might reach a different conclusion. Id.; B.C., 116 S.W.3d at 884.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Onkst and Morgan were divorced in 2013, 1 when the trial court signed a decree that included possession and child-support provisions related to their child, “Billie,” who was born in 2011.2 Soon after the decree was signed, Onkst and Morgan began filing motions for enforcement and petitions to modify the parent-child relationship. In October 2012 and January 2015, Morgan obtained two protective orders against Onkst that each had two-year terms. In February 2017, the trial court held a hearing on Morgan’s request for a third protective order.

At the hearing, Travis County Deputy Constable Kasben Harris testified that she provides security at a facility called PlanetSafe, 3 the service that Onkst and Morgan use to

1 Although Onkst states that the parties were divorced on March 4, 2014, and Morgan says they were divorced in 2012, the record reflects that the trial court initially heard the case in March 2013, that further hearings were held in July and August 2013, and that the trial court heard the parties’ agreement as to possession and signed the final decree on December 12, 2013.

2 To protect her privacy, we will refer to the child by the alias of “Billie.” When other adults involved in this case share the same surnames as Morgan and Onkst, we will refer to them by their first names.

3 PlanetSafe is a Travis County Supervised Visitation and Safe Exchange Program. The record contains the PlanetSafe manual, which explains that there are separate entrances for custodial and noncustodial parents, that there would be “physical and visual separation” between parents, and that “[o]nly family members named on the Court Order may have access to visitation services.” Harris testified that PlanetSafe has two parking lots—one for custodial parents and one for noncustodial parents—and that a parent dropping off a child is required to wait inside the facility for about thirty minutes after relinquishing custody of the child. The

supervise their exchanges of Billie for visitation. In early January 2017, she saw a “suspicious male person” go behind the building and investigated when she did not see him come out within a few minutes. Harris found Onkst’s father, Raymond Dwight Onkst, who goes by “Dwight,” in a parking lot adjacent to the facility, “looking down the alleyway to” the custodial-parent parking lot used by Morgan, having positioned himself to have a “clear view of those leaving” the facility. Harris, who knew that Morgan had arrived at the facility to pick up Billie, asked what he was doing and why he was there. He told her “that he was not on PlanetSafe property” and “that it was public property and he could be there.” She said he should leave, and he “was a little defiant at first.” He then walked away and stood across the street until he left in a car with Onkst. Harris testified that after that interaction, she learned that Morgan “had just left before” Harris saw Dwight watching the parking lot. Harris testified that Dwight’s behavior violated PlanetSafe’s policies.

Harris stated that during Onkst’s supervised exchanges, he has called her “the N word” and “Shaniqua,” rather than using her name, which is written on her nametag, and that he has said “that I probably had 50 million kids and didn’t know the fathers.” She further testified that Dwight has “called me stupid” and told her that he had “never seen someone like myself being so unprofessional when all I was asking was for them to empty their pockets, which is the process.” Harris said she had not had any similar problems with other noncustodial parents and testified, “As a matter of fact, on one of those occasions, a couple of the fathers, they were bothered by the statements . . . [the Onksts] were saying to me, and started an exchange. And I had to intercede and ask them to just, you know, ignore them.”

parent who is picking up the child generally leaves immediately after getting the child, although the custodial parent may opt to speak to a counselor first.

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Related

B.C. v. Rhodes Ex Rel. T.L.R.
116 S.W.3d 878 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2003)