Timothy Olmos v. Charles Ryan

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 30, 2025
• Docket: 23-15892
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 30 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY PAUL OLMOS, No. 22-16804

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-03665-GMS

v. MEMORANDUM* CHARLES L. RYAN; DAVID SHINN, Director,

Defendants-Appellees.

TIMOTHY PAUL OLMOS, named as No. 23-15892 Timothy Olmos, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-03665-GMS

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN, named as Charles Ryan; et al.,

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Submitted June 18, 2025**

Before: CANBY, S.R. THOMAS, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Arizona state prisoner Timothy Paul Olmos appeals pro se from the district

court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various claims. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915A. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm

in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The district court properly dismissed Olmos’s due process claim regarding

compensation (Claim 3) and his access-to-courts claims (Claims 4 and 6) because

Olmos failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v.

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be

liberally construed, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a

plausible claim for relief); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-53 (1996)

(explaining that an access-to-courts claim requires a plaintiff to show that

defendants’ conduct caused an actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Olmos monetary

sanctions under its inherent authority because the district court found that the

record did not reveal bad faith and this finding was not clearly erroneous. See

** The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 22-16804 & 23-15892 Jones v. Riot Hosp. Grp., LLC, 95 F.4th 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2024) (setting forth

standard of review); In re Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Before

imposing sanctions under its inherent sanctioning authority, a court must make an

explicit finding of bad faith or willful misconduct.”); see also City of Los Angeles,

Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001)

(explaining that the law of the case doctrine is “wholly inapposite” and “simply

does not impinge upon a district court’s power to reconsider its own interlocutory

order provided that the district court has not been divested of jurisdiction over the

order”). Because the magistrate judge did not award Olmos sanctions under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, we do not consider Olmos’s contentions that

he is entitled to monetary sanctions under that rule.

The district court denied Olmos’s request to extend the deadline to file a bill

of costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(A). However, the district

court cited case law applying Rule 16, which focuses on the diligence of the

moving party. Under Rule 6, “requests for extensions of time made before the

applicable deadline has passed should normally . . . be granted in the absence of

bad faith on the part of the party seeking relief or prejudice to the adverse party.”

Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 2010)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (setting forth the standard of

review). Because Olmos demonstrated good cause and the record does not reflect

3 22-16804 & 23-15892 that Olmos acted in bad faith or that an extension of time would prejudice

defendants, we reverse the denial of the extension and remand for further

proceedings on the bill of costs issue only.

We reject as without merit Olmos’s contention that the district court

improperly denied his requests for excerpts of record.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions are denied.

The parties will bear their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

4 22-16804 & 23-15892