COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS
TIMOTHY OLIVER BROWN, § No. 08-19-00073-CR Appellant, § Appeal from the v. § 109th District Court § THE STATE OF TEXAS, of Crane County, Texas § Appellee. (TC# 1817) §
OPINION
A jury convicted Timothy Oliver Brown of possession of a controlled substance in penalty
group 1, acquitted him of the charged offense of assault on a public servant, and pursuant to
Brown’s request for inclusion of a lesser-included offense to the assault, convicted him of the
lesser-included offense of resisting arrest, search, or transportation. The jury assessed his
punishment at 2 years’ confinement and a $10,000 fine on the possession-of-a-controlled-
substance conviction and at 365 days’ confinement and a $4,000 fine on the resisting-arrest
conviction. The trial court sentenced Brown in accordance with the jury’s verdicts.
Under the above-styled appellate cause number, Brown asserts a single issue on appeal
challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for possession of a
controlled substance only on the basis that the State failed to prove the requisite mens rea for his offense – i.e., that his possession of a controlled substance was intentional or knowing. We affirm.1
BACKGROUND
On July 17, 2017, Lieutenant Aaron Jenkins of the Crane Police Department conducted a
traffic stop of a truck, in which Brown was the front passenger, due to the malfunctioning lights
on a trailer being pulled behind it. Once Lieutenant Jenkins identified the driver and ran the
vehicle’s information through a database, a dispatcher informed Lieutenant Jenkins that the trailer
was reported stolen. Meanwhile, Deputy Cesar Quiroga of the Crane County Sheriff’s Office
arrived to assist.
Deputy Quiroga asked Brown to exit the passenger seat, but Brown refused. Brown’s
demeanor then became aggressive, “altered in manner,” and noncompliant. When Deputy Quiroga
placed a handcuff on one of Brown’s wrists, Brown pulled his arms away, and shortly afterwards,
Brown headbutted Deputy Quiroga by swinging around when Deputy Quiroga tried to conduct a
pat-down. Eventually, Lieutenant Jenkins helped quell Brown’s resistance and helped bring Brown
to the front of a patrol unit so that Deputy Quiroga could perform a full pat-down search.
During the pat-down, the officers found a necklace around Brown’s neck that contained a
“pill pocket” compartment with 0.06 grams of methamphetamine inside. Although it was a hot
July day, Brown wore multiple layers of clothing, and wore a necklace nestled between layers of
his shirts. Brown also had a knife in his shorts. At trial, Lieutenant Jenkins testified that, based on
his training and experience, wearing multiple layers of clothing was a tactic used to conceal items.
In addition, when the officers discovered Brown’s necklace, Brown first said that he “got that from
1 This is a companion case to Cause No. 08-19-00074-CR (TC# 1818) in which Brown appeals from his conviction for resisting arrest, search, or transportation. We issue a separate opinion for each case.
2 somebody,” subsequently claimed to have “found it,” and finally said he “found it when they were
riding around.”
DISCUSSION
In one issue, Brown challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
conviction for possession of a controlled substance. He narrows his challenge to contending only
that there was no evidence he intentionally or knowingly possessed the methamphetamine found
in the compartment of the necklace he was wearing around his neck.
1. Standard of Review
In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we
consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based
on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-
19 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury is the sole judge
of the credibility of witness testimony and the weight to assign that testimony, and the jury may
believe all, some, or none of any witness’s testimony. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2020). The reviewing Court must give deference to the responsibility of the trier of
fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences
from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Each fact need not point directly and
independently to the guilt of the defendant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating
circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Circumstantial evidence is as probative
as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be
sufficient to establish guilt. Id.
3 2. Applicable Law
For Brown’s charge of possession of a substance in penalty group 1, the State was required
to prove the following elements: (1) the defendant; (2) knowingly or intentionally; (3) possessed;
(4) methamphetamine; (5) in an amount, by aggregate weight, including any adulterants or
dilutants, less than one gram. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a), (b) (defining
the state-jail felony offense of possession of a controlled substance in penalty group 1); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.102(6) (designating methamphetamine as a substance in
penalty group 1). Here, the only element at issue is whether Brown “knowingly or intentionally”
possessed the methamphetamine.
By its nature, a culpable mental state must generally be inferred from the circumstances.
Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We cannot read an accused’s mind,
and absent a confession, we must infer his mental state from his acts, words, and conduct. Id.
Inconsistencies in a defendant’s story can provide evidentiary support for a conviction. Id. at 266.
And so too can acts showing a defendant’s consciousness of guilt. See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d
158, 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Castaneda v. State, No. 08-10-00050-CR, 2011 WL
4490960, at *5 (Tex. App. – El Paso Sep. 28, 2011, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).
Furthermore, this Court has previously held, in no uncertain terms, “[w]hen contraband is
found on an accused’s person, or in personal items such [as] a purse, the jury might also infer the
accused knowingly possessed the contraband found there.” Solis v. State, No. 08-18-00101-CR,
2019 WL 3940961, at *4 (Tex. App. – El Paso Aug. 21, 2019, no pet.) (not designated for
publication).
3. Application
4 As this Court has previously held, the fact that Brown wore the necklace containing
methamphetamine is alone sufficient to prove he knowingly possessed the contraband found
inside. See Solis, 2019 WL 3940961, at *4; see also Banks v. State, No. 11-17-00281-CR, 2019
WL 3727550, at *2 (Tex. App. – Eastland Aug. 8, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding that the jury could have rationally inferred that the defendant knowingly
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS
TIMOTHY OLIVER BROWN, § No. 08-19-00073-CR Appellant, § Appeal from the v. § 109th District Court § THE STATE OF TEXAS, of Crane County, Texas § Appellee. (TC# 1817) §
OPINION
A jury convicted Timothy Oliver Brown of possession of a controlled substance in penalty
group 1, acquitted him of the charged offense of assault on a public servant, and pursuant to
Brown’s request for inclusion of a lesser-included offense to the assault, convicted him of the
lesser-included offense of resisting arrest, search, or transportation. The jury assessed his
punishment at 2 years’ confinement and a $10,000 fine on the possession-of-a-controlled-
substance conviction and at 365 days’ confinement and a $4,000 fine on the resisting-arrest
conviction. The trial court sentenced Brown in accordance with the jury’s verdicts.
Under the above-styled appellate cause number, Brown asserts a single issue on appeal
challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction for possession of a
controlled substance only on the basis that the State failed to prove the requisite mens rea for his offense – i.e., that his possession of a controlled substance was intentional or knowing. We affirm.1
BACKGROUND
On July 17, 2017, Lieutenant Aaron Jenkins of the Crane Police Department conducted a
traffic stop of a truck, in which Brown was the front passenger, due to the malfunctioning lights
on a trailer being pulled behind it. Once Lieutenant Jenkins identified the driver and ran the
vehicle’s information through a database, a dispatcher informed Lieutenant Jenkins that the trailer
was reported stolen. Meanwhile, Deputy Cesar Quiroga of the Crane County Sheriff’s Office
arrived to assist.
Deputy Quiroga asked Brown to exit the passenger seat, but Brown refused. Brown’s
demeanor then became aggressive, “altered in manner,” and noncompliant. When Deputy Quiroga
placed a handcuff on one of Brown’s wrists, Brown pulled his arms away, and shortly afterwards,
Brown headbutted Deputy Quiroga by swinging around when Deputy Quiroga tried to conduct a
pat-down. Eventually, Lieutenant Jenkins helped quell Brown’s resistance and helped bring Brown
to the front of a patrol unit so that Deputy Quiroga could perform a full pat-down search.
During the pat-down, the officers found a necklace around Brown’s neck that contained a
“pill pocket” compartment with 0.06 grams of methamphetamine inside. Although it was a hot
July day, Brown wore multiple layers of clothing, and wore a necklace nestled between layers of
his shirts. Brown also had a knife in his shorts. At trial, Lieutenant Jenkins testified that, based on
his training and experience, wearing multiple layers of clothing was a tactic used to conceal items.
In addition, when the officers discovered Brown’s necklace, Brown first said that he “got that from
1 This is a companion case to Cause No. 08-19-00074-CR (TC# 1818) in which Brown appeals from his conviction for resisting arrest, search, or transportation. We issue a separate opinion for each case.
2 somebody,” subsequently claimed to have “found it,” and finally said he “found it when they were
riding around.”
DISCUSSION
In one issue, Brown challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
conviction for possession of a controlled substance. He narrows his challenge to contending only
that there was no evidence he intentionally or knowingly possessed the methamphetamine found
in the compartment of the necklace he was wearing around his neck.
1. Standard of Review
In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we
consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based
on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-
19 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury is the sole judge
of the credibility of witness testimony and the weight to assign that testimony, and the jury may
believe all, some, or none of any witness’s testimony. Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2020). The reviewing Court must give deference to the responsibility of the trier of
fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences
from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Each fact need not point directly and
independently to the guilt of the defendant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating
circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Circumstantial evidence is as probative
as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be
sufficient to establish guilt. Id.
3 2. Applicable Law
For Brown’s charge of possession of a substance in penalty group 1, the State was required
to prove the following elements: (1) the defendant; (2) knowingly or intentionally; (3) possessed;
(4) methamphetamine; (5) in an amount, by aggregate weight, including any adulterants or
dilutants, less than one gram. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a), (b) (defining
the state-jail felony offense of possession of a controlled substance in penalty group 1); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.102(6) (designating methamphetamine as a substance in
penalty group 1). Here, the only element at issue is whether Brown “knowingly or intentionally”
possessed the methamphetamine.
By its nature, a culpable mental state must generally be inferred from the circumstances.
Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We cannot read an accused’s mind,
and absent a confession, we must infer his mental state from his acts, words, and conduct. Id.
Inconsistencies in a defendant’s story can provide evidentiary support for a conviction. Id. at 266.
And so too can acts showing a defendant’s consciousness of guilt. See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d
158, 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Castaneda v. State, No. 08-10-00050-CR, 2011 WL
4490960, at *5 (Tex. App. – El Paso Sep. 28, 2011, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication).
Furthermore, this Court has previously held, in no uncertain terms, “[w]hen contraband is
found on an accused’s person, or in personal items such [as] a purse, the jury might also infer the
accused knowingly possessed the contraband found there.” Solis v. State, No. 08-18-00101-CR,
2019 WL 3940961, at *4 (Tex. App. – El Paso Aug. 21, 2019, no pet.) (not designated for
publication).
3. Application
4 As this Court has previously held, the fact that Brown wore the necklace containing
methamphetamine is alone sufficient to prove he knowingly possessed the contraband found
inside. See Solis, 2019 WL 3940961, at *4; see also Banks v. State, No. 11-17-00281-CR, 2019
WL 3727550, at *2 (Tex. App. – Eastland Aug. 8, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding that the jury could have rationally inferred that the defendant knowingly
possessed the cocaine found in his pocket where: (1) the cocaine was visible to the naked eye; (2)
the cocaine weighed 2.08 grams; and (3) when a detective removed the container with the cocaine
from the defendant’s pocket, the defendant made eye contact with her). However, this case presents
additional circumstances from which a jury could infer Brown’s knowledge and intent to possess
the methamphetamine.
First, Brown’s conduct in wearing multiple layers of clothing on a hot July day, combined
with Lieutenant Jenkins’ testimony on the significance of this conduct, provided support for an
inference that Brown had the requisite culpable mental state. See Nisbett, 552 S.W.3d at 267.
Second, Brown’s inconsistent explanations for how he acquired the necklace – he initially claimed
that he “got that from somebody” and subsequently claimed to have “found it” – also provided
support for the jury to infer a culpable mental state. See id. at 266. Finally, Brown’s aggressive,
non-compliant resistance to Deputy Quiroga’s attempt to remove him from the vehicle and pat him
down also supported such an inference. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12; Castaneda, 2011 WL
4490960, at *5; see also, e.g., Panus v. State, No. 03-17-00719-CR, 2018 WL 4140851, at *4 (Tex.
App. – Austin Aug. 30, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Ridings v.
State, No. 04-16-00370-CR, 2017 WL 603636, at *3 (Tex. App. – San Antonio Feb. 15, 2017, pet.
ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (cases holding that a defendant’s aggressive
5 behavior during an arrest or resistance to an arrest shows a consciousness of guilt).
In his brief, Brown generally points to the lack of certain affirmative links between him
and the contraband, such as the lack of any directly incriminating statements made by him when
he was arrested, the lack of any showing that he was under the influence of narcotics, and the lack
of any other drugs found in the vehicle. However, these arguments all relate to the formerly so-
called “affirmative links” concept that is applicable only in instances where the contraband is not
found on the accused’s person or when the accused does not exclusively possess a container where
the contraband is found. See Saunders v. State, No. 13-18-00589-CR, 2020 WL 3479261, at *2
(Tex. App. – Corpus Christi June 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Utomi v. State, 243 S.W.3d 75, 79 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d). By contrast,
Brown exercised exclusive possession and control of the necklace, and the concept is therefore
inapplicable here.
For the above reasons, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to prove Brown
knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance. Accordingly, we overrule his issue
presented for review.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice August 19, 2020
Before Alley, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
(Do Not Publish)