Timothy M. Brown III v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 21, 2018
Docket18A-CR-1327
StatusPublished

This text of Timothy M. Brown III v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Timothy M. Brown III v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Timothy M. Brown III v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 21 2018, 10:48 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Kimberly A. Jackson Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Angela N. Sanchez Assistant Section Chief, Criminal Appeals Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Timothy M. Brown III, December 21, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-1327 v. Appeal from the Knox Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Sherry B. Gregg Appellee-Plaintiff. Gilmore, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 42C01-1707-F5-39

Pyle, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1327 | December 21, 2018 Page 1 of 7 Statement of the Case [1] Timothy Brown, III (“Brown”), appeals the three-year sentence imposed after

he pled guilty to Level 5 felony escape.1 Brown specifically argues that: (1) the

trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him; and (2) his sentence is

inappropriate in light of his character and the nature of his offenses.

Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Brown,

and that his sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm the trial court’s sentencing

order.

[2] We affirm.

Issues 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Brown.

2. Whether Brown’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character.

Facts [3] In July 2017, Brown was serving a sentence at the Wabash Valley Regional

Community Corrections Facility (“the Facility”) for two misdemeanor

convictions. While on an authorized smoke break in the parking lot, Brown

1 IND. CODE § 35-44.1-3-4.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1327 | December 21, 2018 Page 2 of 7 walked away from the facility without authorization. When a corrections

officer found Brown walking in the street approximately fifteen to eighteen

minutes later, Brown refused to get into the officer’s van. The State charged

Brown with Level 5 felony escape.

[4] At the May 2018 plea acceptance and sentencing hearing, Brown testified that

he had left the facility to go home and talk to his fourteen-year-old son, who

was associating with a bad crowd. However, Brown also testified that he knew

that he could have used the facility’s telephone to contact his son.

[5] The evidence at the sentencing hearing further revealed that Brown has a

seventeen-year criminal history that includes eight felony and twenty-eight

misdemeanor convictions. Brown’s felony convictions include attempted

robbery, possession of a controlled substance, sale of a controlled substance,

uttering a forged instrument, possession of methamphetamine, and residential

entry. His misdemeanor convictions include battery resulting in bodily injury,

criminal trespass, possession of drug paraphernalia, theft, disorderly conduct,

and operating a motor vehicle without ever receiving a license. Brown has also

been unsuccessfully discharged from probation several times.

[6] The trial court found that Brown’s criminal history was an aggravating factor.

The court also found as an aggravating factor that there were violent offenses in

Brown’s criminal history. The trial court found Brown’s guilty plea and

expression of remorse to be mitigating factors.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1327 | December 21, 2018 Page 3 of 7 Thereafter, the trial court concluded that there were “arguments on both sides

of the aisle,” and sentenced Brown to the Level 5 felony advisory sentence of

three (3) years in the Department of Correction. (Tr. 44). Brown now appeals.

Decision 1. Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[1] Brown first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him.

Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court.

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d

218 (Ind. 2007). So long as the sentence is in the statutory range, it is subject to

review only for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs if the

decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances

before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn

therefrom. Id. at 491. A trial court may abuse its discretion in a number of

ways, including: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a

sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are

unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits

reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing

statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-

91.

[2] Here, Brown argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to

find the circumstances of his offense to be a mitigating factor. Specifically,

Brown claims that he “merely walked from the work release center toward his

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1327 | December 21, 2018 Page 4 of 7 family home for purpose of talking to his wayward son and trying to ensure his

son did not repeat Brown’s mistakes.” (Brown’s Br. 8). According to Brown,

he intended to return to the work release center after talking to his son. Brown

also points out that he was only gone from the facility for fifteen to eighteen

minutes and that he was wearing a GPS tracking device.

[3] However, a trial court is not obligated to accept a defendant’s claim as to what

constitutes a mitigating circumstance. Rascoe v. State, 736 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ind.

2000). A trial court has discretion to determine whether the factors are

mitigating, and it is not required to explain why it does not find the defendant’s

proffered factors to be mitigating. Haddock v. State, 800 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2003). A claim that the trial court failed to find a mitigating

circumstance requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is

both significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at

493.

[4] Here, our review of the record reveals that Brown left the Facility without

authorization. When the officer found him and told him to get into the officer’s

van, Brown refused. Brown also admitted that he could have contacted his son

by telephone. Based on these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

failing to consider the circumstances of the offense as a mitigating factor.

2. Inappropriate Sentence

[5] Brown further argues that his three-year sentence is inappropriate. Indiana

Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1327 | December 21, 2018 Page 5 of 7 statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character

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Related

McCullough v. State
900 N.E.2d 745 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2009)
Cardwell v. State
895 N.E.2d 1219 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2008)
Anglemyer v. State
875 N.E.2d 218 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2007)
Anglemyer v. State
868 N.E.2d 482 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2007)
Childress v. State
848 N.E.2d 1073 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2006)
Rascoe v. State
736 N.E.2d 246 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2000)
Haddock v. State
800 N.E.2d 242 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2003)
George Moss v. State of Indiana
13 N.E.3d 440 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2014)

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