Timothy Lewis v. State of Florida

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: July 2, 2025
• Docket: 3D2025-0396
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed July 2, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D25-0396 Lower Tribunal No. F08-43801 ________________

Timothy Lewis, Appellant,

vs.

The State of Florida, Appellee.

An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Ramiro C. Areces, Judge.

Timothy Lewis, in proper person.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, MILLER, and GOODEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Ford v. State, 402 So. 3d 973, 981 (Fla. 2025) (“Erlinger

was a direct-appeal case—not a postconviction case like Ford’s—and it

involved required jury findings regarding an element. Based on these

fundamental distinctions, it is clear that Erlinger provides no support for

vacating Ford’s death sentences.”); Tanzi v. State, 407 So. 3d 385, 394–95

(Fla. 2025) (finding postconviction review of defendant’s sentence based on

Erlinger was improper); Figarola v. State, 841 So. 2d 576, 577 n.3 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2003) (citation omitted) (“Apprendi was characterized as a procedural

rule by the Supreme Court. Since announcing Teague, the Supreme Court

has not given retroactive effect to any decisions announcing new

constitutional rules of criminal procedure.”); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S.

545, 581 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“No Court of Appeals, let alone

[the Supreme Court], has held that Apprendi has retroactive effect.”); Schriro

v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004) (“Ring announced a new procedural

rule that does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review.”);

Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 926 (Fla. 1980) (“[T]he essential considerations

in determining whether a new rule of law should be applied retroactively are

essentially three: (a) the purpose to be served by the new rule; (b) the extent

of reliance on the old rule; and (c) the effect on the administration of justice

of a retroactive application of the new rule.”); Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d

2 837, 847–48 (Fla. 2005) (concluding Apprendi does not apply retroactively);

Luton v. State, 934 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (noting defendant did not

object that jury, not judge, must determine his HVFO qualifications and

therefore issue was not preserved); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(a)(1) (“A court

may at any time correct an illegal sentence imposed by it, or an incorrect

calculation made by it in a sentencing scoresheet, when it is affirmatively

alleged that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to

that relief . . . .”); Jackson v. State, 803 So. 2d 842, 844 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)

(quotations and alterations omitted) (“To raise an illegal sentence claim

under Rule 3.800(a), 1) the error must have resulted in an illegal sentence,

2) the error must appear on the face of the record, and 3) the motion must

affirmatively allege that the court records demonstrate on their face an

entitlement to relief.”); see, e.g., Theophile v. State, 967 So. 2d 948, 949

(Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citation omitted) (“Relief under rule 3.800(a) is

precluded where an evidentiary determination is required. For this reason,

Appellant could not demonstrate entitlement to relief under rule 3.800(a)

without citing to facts established in the trial transcript or otherwise apparent

on the face of the record.”); see also Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90, 94 (Fla.

2014) (“A claim of error under Apprendi and Blakely is subject to a harmless

error analysis.”).