FILED Mar 20 2024, 8:47 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Timothy L. Hall, Jr., Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
March 20, 2024 Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-CR-3007 Appeal from the Allen Superior Court The Honorable David M. Zent, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 02D06-2006-MR-000019
Opinion by Judge Felix Judges Pyle and Kenworthy concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 1 of 18 Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case1 [1] On June 13, 2020, Timothy L. Hall, Jr. was attending a birthday party with his
toddler son at the home of Hall’s sister and her fiancé, Manuel Mendez, in Fort
Wayne. Mendez and Hall argued, and Hall shot Mendez 18 times, killing him,
before Hall fled in his car with his son. A jury found Hall guilty of murder,
criminal recklessness, resisting law enforcement, and neglect of a dependent.
Hall now appeals his convictions and sentence, raising three issues for review:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it refused to allow him to “fully” impeach a witness; 2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut Hall’s self- defense claim; and 3. Whether his sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of his offenses and his character.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] On June 13, 2020, Hall and his two-year-old child arrived at a birthday party
hosted at 2136 Gilmore Drive in Fort Wayne, the home his sister, Kayla Cyrus
(“Sister”), shared with her fiancé, Manuel Mendez, and their children. Hall
1 We heard oral argument in this case on February 9, 2024, at Frankton Junior/Senior High School in Frankton. We thank the students, administration, faculty, and staff of the school for their hospitality and assistance. We would also like to thank counsel for the high quality of their oral presentations.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 2 of 18 noticed that his sister had a black eye. When Hall asked her about it, she said
nothing had happened, but Hall believed Mendez had caused the black eye.
[3] Hall consumed alcohol during the party. Sister testified Hall was being “loud,
obnoxious, joking around,” “fell down a few times,” and was “very
intoxicated.” Tr. Vol. II at 65. Others at the party observed him “falling
backwards onto the ground” because he couldn’t stand up, id. at 120, and
“rolling around on the ground,” id. at 89.
[4] Mendez arrived home from work around midnight, while people were still
gathered at the home. Sometime thereafter, while Mendez was in the house,
Hall attempted to leave, taking his child with him. Hall’s vehicle was parked
on the street in front of Sister’s home. When Sister saw Hall attempting to
leave in his car, she tried to get Hall to stay because she was concerned over his
level of intoxication. Hall became upset because he wanted to leave. Sister
then suggested Hall just leave his child. Hall “began like getting really mad and
yelling” and “not making sense.” Tr. Vol. II at 66. Hall put his child in the car
seat in the back of the car, but Sister removed the child when Hall walked to the
driver side of the vehicle. Sister testified that Hall then came around from the
driver side with a gun, pointing it at her, and demanded she return his son to
him. Sister returned the child to Hall and walked away, going inside her home.
[5] Mendez came out of the house and asked Hall to talk. Hall and Mendez spoke
in the front yard, where it was dark. A witness testified that Hall became
“angry” while he and Mendez spoke. Tr. Vol. II at 92. The witness further
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 3 of 18 testified that Hall “must have said something to [Mendez] because [Mendez]
was pulling up his pants like they were gonna fight.” Id. Hall testified that he
had confronted Mendez about Sister’s black eye and heard Mendez say
something like “kill you.” Tr. Vol. III at 78. Hall further testified that he saw
Mendez grab something, and then Mendez swung at him, after which Hall felt
a “sting” on his finger. Id. at 79. Hall said he tried to back away, but Mendez
swung at him a second time, after which Hall felt a sting on his finger again.
Hall believed Mendez had a knife. He testified that he was afraid of Mendez, it
was dark enough he could barely see Mendez, Mendez was a gang member,
and Mendez had told Hall he stored guns at someone else’s house and had
previously shot someone.
[6] Hall said he felt like Mendez was going to kill him, so Hall grabbed the gun he
had behind his waist, pulled the slide back to load a round in the chamber, and
fired at Mendez. Hall said Mendez was still coming toward him, so he
“panicked” and “kept shooting.” Tr. Vol. III at 80. However, witnesses who
were present at the time testified that Hall fired once at Mendez and missed;
fired a second time, causing Mendez to fall; and then walked around Mendez
and emptied the clip into Mendez’s body. Another witness testified that Hall
said, “I shot him.” Tr. Vol. II at 205. Hall then got in his car with his son and
left the scene. More than one witness called 911. Hall shot at Mendez eighteen
times, and Mendez died from the multiple gunshot wounds he received.
[7] After leaving Sister’s house, Hall drove through Fort Wayne, making several
turns. He saw headlights in his rearview mirror and believed he was being
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 4 of 18 chased. A law enforcement officer located Hall and began pursuit. Former
Detective Everett White2 observed Hall increase his speed, drive on the wrong
side of the road, drive through yards, strike a parked car in a driveway, drive
through a red light, and strike vehicles at Larry’s Auto Sales when Hall was
unable to negotiate a turn. When Hall ultimately stopped, his car was no
longer drivable. Hall’s two-year-old child was in the car throughout the pursuit.
[8] Meanwhile, back at Sister and Mendez’s home, law enforcement officers
“searched [the yard] extremely carefully on multiple occasions” but “[t]here
were no weapons of any kind recovered from the area of the yard” around
Mendez’s body. Tr. Vol. III at 56. In other words, the knife Hall claimed that
Mendez used against him was not recovered. Additionally, Hall did not have
any “marks, bruises, cuts, or welts” on his hands. Tr. Vol. II at 205. There was
nothing that corroborated Hall’s claim that he felt “stings” on his fingers.
[9] The State charged Hall with murder;3 pointing a firearm as a Level 6 felony;4
criminal recklessness as a Level 6 felony;5 resisting law enforcement as a Level
2 Sometime before trial, Detective White changed his name to Diesel Black. Detective White left his job at the Fort Wayne Police Department before the trial. 3 Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. 4 Id. § 35-47-4-3. 5 Id. § 35-42-2-2.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 5 of 18 6 felony;6 and neglect of a dependent as a Level 6 felony. 7 The State also filed
an information seeking an enhanced sentence for use of a firearm.8
[10] At trial, Sister testified that she had gone back inside her home after her attempt
to keep Hall from leaving, and then she heard Hall yelling “look at my sister[’]s
face, that’s why she has a black eye,” Tr. Vol. II at 72. Sister also testified she
did not hear Mendez speaking with Hall before she heard gunshots and denied
that she had told Mendez that Hall had pointed a gun at her. Hall’s attorney
attempted to use the testimony of Detective Brent Roddy of the City of Fort
Wayne Detective Bureau to impeach Sister’s testimony:
Q: Detective, in your conversation with [Sister] she discussed [Hall] pointed a gun at her, correct?
A: Correct.
Q: And she told you that after [Hall] pointed the gun at her, she ran in the house, correct?
A: That’s what she told me, yes.
6 Id. § 35-44.1-3-1. 7 Id. § 35-46-1-4. 8 Id. § 35-50-2-11.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 6 of 18 Q: And [Sister] then told you that after she ran in the house she told [Mendez] that [Hall] pointed a gun at her and was really drunk, correct?
A: That’s what she told me.
Q: [Sister] also told you that [Mendez] then ran out to confront [Hall], correct?
Tr. Vol. III at 62–63.
[11] At this point, the State objected on hearsay grounds. When Hall’s attorney
argued that he was attempting to impeach [Sister’s] testimony, the State replied
that the impeachment was already complete so any answer to the last question
posed would be hearsay because the defense had not asked Sister about the
same issue (Mendez running out to confront Hall) when she had previously
testified. The trial court struck the last question quoted above.
[12] A jury convicted Hall on all counts except the charge of pointing a firearm and
found the evidence was sufficient to support the firearm enhancement. On
November 18, 2022, the trial court sentenced Hall as follows: 55 years for
murder and 2 years for criminal recklessness, to be served consecutively; 2 years
for resisting law enforcement and 2 years for neglect of a dependent, to be
served concurrently to each other and consecutively to the sentences for murder
and criminal recklessness; and 15 years on the enhancement for using a firearm
in the commission of an offense. In total, the trial court imposed an aggregate
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 7 of 18 74-year executed sentence to the Indiana Department of Correction. Hall now
appeals his convictions and sentence.
Discussion and Decision 1. The Trial Court Did Not Prevent Hall from Impeaching a Witness
[13] Hall contends that the trial court erred when it refused to allow him to fully
impeach Sister’s testimony through the testimony of Detective Roddy.
“‘Impeachment’ is defined as ‘[t]he act of discrediting a witness, as by catching
the witness in a lie or by demonstrating that the witness has been convicted of a
criminal offense.’” Taylor v. State, 840 N.E.2d 324, 330 n.1 (Ind. 2007)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 768 (8th ed. 2004)).
The Indiana Rules of Evidence allow the impeachment of a witness, see Ind.
Evidence Rule 607, including through the use of extrinsic evidence, see Id. 613
[14] “Trial courts may consider a variety of relevant factors in making the
determination to admit or exclude extrinsic evidence” under Evidence Rule
613, such as “the availability of the witness, the potential prejudice that may
arise from recalling a witness only for impeachment purposes, the significance
afforded to the credibility of the witness who is being impeached, and any other
factors that are relevant to the interests of justice.” Hall, 177 N.E.3d at 1195–96
(citing Griffith, 31 N.E.3d at 973). “We review a trial court’s decision to
exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the court
misinterprets the law.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 488 (Ind. 2023).
However, any error in the admission or exclusion of evidence is harmless
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 8 of 18 “when it results in no prejudice to the ‘substantial rights’ of a party.” Hall, 177
N.E.3d at 1197 (quoting Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018)).
[15] Hall argues that the trial court prevented him from fully impeaching Sister, a
“key witness with a material prior inconsistent statement.” Appellant’s Br. at
10. Specifically, he contends that he elicited testimony from Detective Roddy
to impeach Sister’s testimony that, after attempting to stop Hall from leaving
with Hall’s child, she had neither seen Mendez in the house nor told Mendez
that Hall had pointed a gun at her. However, Hall asserts the trial court was
“in error” when it refused to allow Detective Roddy to testify further to
impeach Sister’s testimony by eliciting testimony that she had told Detective
Roddy she had seen Mendez leave the house to “confront” Hall. Appellant’s
Br. at 13. Hall further argues that the error was not harmless because the State
relied on Sister’s testimony for the sequence of events and to “refute Hall’s
claims that Mendez was a gang member, had guns, and had previously shot
someone.” Id. at 14.
[16] The trial court correctly determined that Hall had completed the impeachment
of Sister’s testimony before his attorney asked Detective Roddy whether Sister
had told him that Mendez had left the house to confront Hall. Hall’s counsel
asked Sister on cross-examination whether she had seen Mendez in the house
after Hall had pointed the gun at her and whether she had told Mendez that
Hall had pointed a gun at her. Sister answered both questions in the negative.
Hall’s counsel later elicited testimony from Detective Roddy that Sister had told
him during the investigation of the shooting that she had seen Mendez in the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 9 of 18 house after Hall had pointed the gun at her and that she had informed Mendez
of the gun incident. At this point, the impeachment of Sister was complete
because Detective Roddy’s testimony about Sister’s statements during the
investigation directly contradicted her trial testimony. See Taylor, 840 N.E.2d at
330 n.1 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 768). Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it sustained the State’s objection to Hall’s additional
question asking Detective Roddy whether Sister had reported to him that
Mendez had then gone outside to confront Hall.
2. Hall Has Not Shown Error Regarding His Self-Defense Claim
[17] Hall next contends that the State failed to rebut his claim of self-defense. Our
Supreme Court has described the law on self-defense as follows:
A defendant can raise self-defense as a justification for an otherwise criminal act. I.C. § 35-41-3-2; Miller [v. State], 720 N.E.2d [696,] 699 [(Ind. 1999)]. When self-defense is asserted, the defendant must prove [1] he was in a place where he had a right to be, [2] “acted without fault,” and [3] reasonably feared or apprehended death or great bodily harm. Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 699–700. The State must then negate at least one element beyond a reasonable doubt “by rebutting the defense directly, by affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief.” Lilly v. State, 506 N.E.2d 23, 24 (Ind. 1987). We will reverse a conviction only if no reasonable person could say the State overcame the self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 670 (Ind. 2021). Indiana Code section 35-41-3-
2(c) describes the allowable use of force to protect one’s person or property:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 10 of 18 A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person:
(1) is justified in using deadly force; and
(2) does not have a duty to retreat;
if the person reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third person or the commission of a forcible felony. No person, employer, or estate of a person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means necessary.
“The amount of force that an individual may use to protect himself must be
proportionate to the urgency of the situation. When a person uses more force
than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances, the right of self-defense is
extinguished.” Pinkston v. State, 821 N.E.2d 830, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
(citing Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)), trans.
denied.
[18] When considering a claim of self-defense, it is “within the province of the jury
to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility in arriving at its verdict.”
Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 576 (Ind. 2018) (citing Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d
130, 133 (Ind. 2016)).
When a defendant alleges the State did not sufficiently rebut his self-defense claim, we do not reweigh evidence or assess witness
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 11 of 18 credibility, and only look “to the evidence most favorable to the judgment.” Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind. 1999). “[W]here such evidence and reasonable inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value sufficient to support the judgment,” we affirm. Id.
Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at 667 (alteration in original).
[19] Hall’s argument on appeal assumes that he met the requirements to assert a
claim of self-defense. Hall concentrates solely on whether he had a reasonable
fear of death or great bodily injury. In support of his reasonable-belief
argument, Hall relies on testimony from others who were nearby immediately
before and at the time of the shooting. Specifically, Hall cites testimony that a
neighbor heard Mendez in a “conflict immediately prior to the gun shots.”
Appellant’s Br. at 16 (citing Tr. Vol. II at 132). He further points to another
witness’s testimony that “Mendez was pulling up his pants like they were gonna
fight,” Tr. Vol. II at 92, and Mendez had given his phone to a bystander, id. at
96. There was also testimony that Mendez “swung” at Hall. Id. at 92.
[20] Even assuming for the sake of argument that Hall demonstrated all three
elements necessary to claim self-defense, we conclude that he has not
demonstrated that his response was proportionate to the perceived threat. The
evidence regarding Hall’s altercation with Mendez is telling. Hall briefly
acknowledges that his self-defense argument was based on his belief that
Mendez had been swinging a knife at him, but no knife was found at the scene.
On appeal, Hall attempts to explain the lack of a knife being found at the scene
by stating that the scene was not secure immediately after the shooting. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 12 of 18 However, the jury heard Hall’s testimony that he believed Mendez had swung a
knife at him but clearly rejected Hall’s self-defense claim because it found him
guilty of murder. Hall’s self-defense appellate argument amounts to a request
that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Larkin, 173 N.E.3d at
667 (citing Miller, 720 N.E.2d at 699). There was substantial evidence of
probative value that at the time Hall shot Mendez he was not defending himself
in a proportionate manner. Hall has not shown error regarding his claim of
self-defense.
3. Hall’s Sentence Is Not Inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)
[21] Finally, Hall contends his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offenses and his character. The Indiana Constitution authorizes us to
independently review and revise a trial court’s sentencing decision. Faith v.
State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019) (citing Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; McCain
v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1066, 1067 (Ind. 2018)). That authority is implemented
through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is
“inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender.” Faith, 131 N.E.3d at 159 (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)).
[22] Our role under Appellate Rule 7(B) is to “leaven the outliers,” Faith, 131
N.E.3d at 159–60 (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind.
2008)), and we reserve that authority for “exceptional cases,” Mullins v. State,
148 N.E.3d 986, 987 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Faith, 131 N.E.3d at 160). When
gauging inappropriateness under Appellate Rule 7(B), we “focus on the forest— Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 13 of 18 the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent,
number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count. Brown v.
State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8 (Ind. 2014) (citing Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225). Thus,
we consider a variety of sentencing tools, such as probation and home
detention, in our Appellate Rule 7(B) analysis. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d
1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010). Generally, a trial court’s sentencing decision prevails
unless it is “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the
nature of the offense . . . and the defendant’s character.” Stephenson v. State, 29
N.E.3d 111, 111–12 (Ind. 2015). In conducting this analysis, “we are not
limited to the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court.” Brown, 10
N.E.3d at 4.
[23] When considering the nature of the offense, we start with the advisory sentence
to determine the appropriateness of the sentence. Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 4 (citing
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007)). Hall was convicted of and
sentenced for murder, criminal recklessness as a Level 6 felony, resisting law
enforcement as a Level 6 felony, neglect of a dependent as a Level 6 felony, and
a firearm enhancement. The trial court imposed the advisory sentence for
murder, 55 years;9 two years on each of the Level 6 felonies, for which one year
9 I.C. § 35-50-2-3.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 14 of 18 is the advisory sentence;10 and 15 years for the firearm enhancement, for which
courts may enhance a sentence between 5 and 20 years.11
[24] “Generally, ‘it is within the trial court’s discretion whether to order sentences to
be served concurrently or consecutively.’” Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1143
(Ind. 2022) (quoting Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069, 1082 (Ind. 2015)). In
addition, an offense involving multiple victims “is highly relevant to the
decision to impose consecutive sentences.” Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1069,
1082 (Ind. 2015). An enhancement for use of a firearm under Indiana Code §
35-50-2-11 must be served consecutively. I.C. § 35-50-1-2(f).
[25] Hall first contends that his sentence is inappropriate given the nature of the
offenses. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 74 years executed.
Hall argues that his 74-year total sentence is an outlier considering the nature of
the offense. Specifically, he contends the trial court erred by “conflating the
standard for self-defense with the standard for finding as a mitigating factor that
the victim induced the offense.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. However, in his single-
paragraph analysis, Hall cites no law in support of his argument that this was
error. The failure to support an argument on appeal with citation to relevant
authority can result in waiver of the issue. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Nevertheless,
we address Hall’s argument on the merits.
10 Id. § 35-50-2-7. 11 Id. § 35-50-2-11.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 15 of 18 [26] We are not persuaded that Hall’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
of the offenses. After drinking to the point of falling-down intoxication, Hall
engaged in an altercation with Mendez; shot Mendez, who fell to the ground;
and then unloaded his clip into the fallen Mendez. A later law enforcement
search found no weapons in the yard around Mendez’s body. Hall fled the
scene with his toddler in the car, leading law enforcement officers on a chase
through Fort Wayne. Despite pursuit by law enforcement, Hall increased his
speed, drove on the wrong side of the road, drove through yards, struck a
parked car in a driveway, drove through a red light, and struck vehicles in a car
sales lot when he was unable to negotiate a turn. When law enforcement
officers apprehended Hall, his car was no longer drivable. On these facts, Hall
has not demonstrated that his 74-year aggregate sentence for murder, criminal
recklessness, resisting law enforcement, and neglect of a dependent, including a
15-year firearm enhancement, is inappropriate in light of the offenses.
[27] Hall also contends that his sentence is inappropriate considering his character.
In support, he argues that he is only 29 years old, has no adult criminal history,
timely completed probation in a juvenile matter but was never adjudicated a
delinquent, has a young son, reports having a good relationship with his family,
has demonstrated a good work history, and scored as low risk to reoffend on
the Indiana Risk Assessment System evaluation. He also notes the letters of
support filed prior to his sentencing, which describe him as “always there to
help when needed,” having a “happy spirit despite the odds against him,”
friendly, and respectful. Appellant’s Br. at 20.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 16 of 18 [28] While this is Hall’s first criminal conviction, and he has otherwise led a law-
abiding life, the positive aspects of his character do not outweigh the severity of
the offense he committed. Additionally, Hall’s evidence of good character does
not establish much more than he has simply not committed crimes in the past.
There is nothing in his past that shows he has been a positive influence on his
community, his friends, or even his family. Finally, Hall’s conduct on the night
of the offense endangered other partygoers who witnessed the shooting; anyone
on Fort Wayne streets while he was fleeing from law enforcement officers; and
even his young son, who was in the vehicle during the car chase. Hall’s actions
leading up to the shooting reflect poorly on his character, namely, going to a
children’s party with a loaded firearm, getting falling-down drunk, and
choosing to drive with his toddler in the vehicle despite Sister’s intervention to
protect the toddler. Despite Hall’s otherwise clean record and family support,
Hall has not demonstrated that his character mitigates the severity of the
offense to an extent that demonstrates his aggregate sentence is inappropriate.
Conclusion [29] The trial did not court err when it prevented an additional question Hall asked
of a witness to impeach Sister’s testimony. Hall also has not shown error
regarding his claim of self-defense. Finally, Hall’s sentence is not inappropriate
in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Therefore, we affirm
Hall’s convictions and sentences.
[30] Affirmed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 17 of 18 Pyle, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Aaron J. Stoll The Law Office of Aaron J. Stoll, LLC Fort Wayne, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Catherine E. Brizzi Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-3007 | March 20, 2024 Page 18 of 18