Timothy Jetson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: June 23, 2021
• Docket: 2:21-cv-04904
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 TIMOTHY JETSON, Case No. 2:21-cv-04904-MCS-KES

12 Petitioner, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY 13 v. PETITION SHOULD NOT BE

14 SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS DISMISSED AS MIXED AND ANGELES COUNTY, et al., UNDER YOUNGER V. HARRIS 15 Respondents. 16

18 I.

19 BACKGROUND

20 In June 2021, the Court received from Timothy Jetson (“Petitioner”) a

21 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody pursuant to 28

22 U.S.C. § 2254. (Dkt. 1 [“Petition”].) In 2018, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to 23 possession of a firearm by a felon, and a jury convicted him of voluntary 24 manslaughter related to the same crime. (Id. at 2); see also People v. Jetson, No. 25 B292229, 2020 WL 4251334 (Cal. Ct. App. July 24, 2020). 26 Petitioner appealed, apparently raising the following claims: (1) insufficient 27 evidence supported his conviction for voluntary manslaughter; (2) the trial court 28 abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s continuance request; (3) the trial 1 court’s evidentiary rulings violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights; (4) the 2 prosecutor misstated the law of self-defense; (5) Petitioner’s sentence and 3 enhancements were unconstitutional; and (6) the trial court erred in denying 4 Petitioner’s petition for juror information. See Jetson, No. B292229, 2020 WL 5 4251334. In July 2020, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction but 6 vacated two enhancements, remanding for a new trial on the prior serious felony 7 conviction and, if found true, resentencing. See id. at *29. In October 2020, the 8 California Supreme Court denied his petition for review. See 9 https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search.cfm?dist=2 (search for Case No. 10 B292229). The status of Petitioner’s case on remand to the trial court is unclear; 11 the online docket shows that the last event was on February 24, 2021. See 12 http://www.lacourt.org/criminalcasesummary/ui/Selection.aspx (search for Case 13 No. KA106873). 14 In his federal Petition, Petitioner raises the following grounds: (1) the trial 15 court erroneously excluded evidence of another gang member’s prior convictions 16 and that he absconded from parole; (2) the trial court erroneously excluded most of 17 Petitioner’s interview with police; (3) a felon may legally possess and use a firearm 18 in self-defense; (4) the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Petitioner’s 19 motion to disclose juror identifying information; (5) the prosecutor misstated the 20 law on self-defense; (6) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Petitioner’s 21 gang membership; and (7) the trial court erred in excluding a gang member’s 22 statement to Petitioner’s private investigator. (Petition at 3-5.) Based on the 23 California Court of Appeal’s decision on direct appeal, Petitioner raised all of these 24 grounds on direct appeal except for the third. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 II. 2 DISCUSSION 3 A. The Petition Includes an Unexhausted Ground, Making It Subject to 4 Dismissal. 5 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), habeas relief may not be granted unless a 6 petitioner has exhausted the remedies available in state court. Exhaustion requires 7 that the petitioner’s contentions were fairly presented to the state courts, see Ybarra 8 v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 991 (9th Cir. 2011), and disposed of on the merits by 9 the highest court of the state, see Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 10 2002). Exhaustion can be accomplished by presenting a claim to the California 11 Supreme Court either through the initial direct appeal, an appeal following a 12 remand, or state habeas proceedings; regardless of the type of proceedings used to 13 accomplish exhaustion, a claim has not been fairly presented unless the prisoner has 14 described in the state court proceedings both the operative facts and the federal 15 legal theory on which his claim is based. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365- 16 66 (1995) (per curiam). As a matter of comity, a federal court will not entertain a 17 habeas petition unless the petitioner has exhausted the available state judicial 18 remedies on every ground presented in it. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518- 19 19 (1982). 20 A federal court may raise a habeas petitioner’s failure to exhaust state 21 remedies sua sponte. See Stone v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 968 F.2d 850, 855-56 22 (9th Cir. 1992) (as amended). Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating he has 23 exhausted available state remedies. See Williams v. Craven, 460 F.2d 1253, 1254 24 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). Here, because Petitioner has apparently not presented 25 all his claims to the California Supreme Court, the Petition is subject to dismissal. 26 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (explaining that “a state 27 prisoner’s federal habeas petition should be dismissed if the prisoner has not 28 1 exhausted available state remedies as to any of his federal claims”). 2 In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005), the Supreme Court held that, 3 in certain “limited circumstances,” a district court may stay a mixed petition and 4 hold it in abeyance while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust his 5 unexhausted claims. The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court also “has the 6 discretion to stay and hold in abeyance fully unexhausted petitions” under Rhines. 7 Mena v. Long, 813 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2016). The prerequisites for obtaining a 8 stay under Rhines while the petitioner exhausts his state remedies are: (1) that the 9 petitioner show good cause for his failure to exhaust his claims first in state court; 10 (2) that the unexhausted claims not be “plainly meritless”; and (3) that petitioner 11 not have engaged in “abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.” 554 U.S. at 12 277-78. The Supreme Court has not precisely defined what constitutes “good 13 cause” for a Rhines stay. See Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 980-81 (9th Cir. 14 2014). The Ninth Circuit has found that “good cause” does not require 15 “extraordinary circumstances.” Dixon v. Baker, 847 F.3d 714, 720 (9th Cir. 2017). 16 Rather, “good cause turns on whether the petitioner can set forth a reasonable 17 excuse, supported by sufficient evidence, to justify” the failure to exhaust. Blake, 18 745 F.3d at 982. 19 It is unclear whether Petitioner can meet the Rhines requirements. In any 20 event, he has neither requested a stay nor made the three necessary showings under 21 Rhines. In light of Mena, however, the Court will give Petitioner an opportunity to 22 move for a Rhines stay, if he wishes to do so. 23 If Petitioner does move for a Rhines stay, his motion should set out facts 24 explaining why he meets the three prongs—specifically, that he had good cause for 25 failing to exhaust this claim earlier, that his claim is not plainly meritless, and he 26 did not intentionally delay bringing this claim. Petitioner should focus in particular 27 on the first two prongs. For example, the Court notes that his unexhausted claim 28 could be deemed “plainly meritless.” He pleaded “no contest” to the “felon in 1 possession” charge. “When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open 2 court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not 3 thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional 4 rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 5 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); see also Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137-38 (9th Cir. 6 1992) (principle applies equally to defendants who plead no contest). 7 Petitioner’s claim may be “plainly meritless” for another reason. In limited 8 circumstances California law permits felons to use firearms in self-defense, but 9 only where the felon “reasonably believes himself” to be in imminent peril of great 10 bodily harm. See People v. King, 22 Cal. 3d 12, 24 (1978). In Petitioner’s case, 11 however, the jury found that his belief was objectively unreasonable. See Jetson, 12 No. B292229, 2020 WL 4251334, at *5 (“By acquitting Jetson of murder, the jury 13 found Jetson subjectively believed he was in danger of imminent harm, but by 14 convicting him of voluntary manslaughter, the jury found that belief objectively 15 unreasonable.”). Petitioner does not challenge this finding in the Petition. Thus, 16 the Court is hard-pressed to see how Petitioner could show any prejudice from any 17 error, because the jury would not have concluded that Petitioner was a felon who 18 reasonably believed himself to be in imminent peril of great bodily harm. See 19 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (holding that to obtain habeas 20 relief, petitioner must generally show that error had substantial and injurious effect 21 or influence in determining the jury’s verdict). 22 Nonetheless, if Petitioner is intent on requesting a stay to pursue his 23 unexhausted claim, then he should exhaust his state remedies as soon as possible 24 and does not need to wait for the Court to rule on that stay motion. 25 The Court also notes that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 26 Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a one-year limitation period applies to a federal 27 petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in state custody. See 28 U.S.C. 28 § 2244(d)(1). Generally, this one-year period runes from the date a criminal 1 judgment becomes final. It is unclear whether Petitioner’s criminal proceedings are 2 in fact final. If Petitioner is represented by counsel in any current criminal 3 proceeding, he can ask his counsel whether proceedings are ongoing, whether a 4 direct appeal is likely to occur, and when the criminal judgment will become final. 5 B. Younger Abstention May Be Appropriate. 6 Petitioner’s criminal case may still be pending before the state courts, 7 meaning that this Court should consider whether to dismiss the Petition without 8 prejudice pursuant to the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 9 (1971). 10 Younger espouses “a strong federal policy against federal-court interference 11 with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” 12 Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. V. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 13 (1982). Younger abstention is required when (1) state proceedings, judicial in 14 nature, are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve important state interests; and 15 (3) the state proceedings afford adequate opportunity to raise the constitutional 16 issue. See id. at 432. A fourth requirement has also been articulated by the Ninth 17 Circuit: that “the federal court action would enjoin the state proceeding or have the 18 practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding in a way 19 that Younger disapproves.” SJSVCCPAC v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 20 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing cases). 21 Younger abstention may be appropriate here. First, state proceedings appear 22 to be ongoing. Second, the state criminal proceedings implicate important state 23 interests in administering its criminal justice system. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 24 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (“[T]he States’ interest in administering their criminal justice 25 systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the 26 considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” 27 (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45)). Third, there are no allegations in the Petition 28 to suggest Petitioner does not have an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional 1 issues in the state judicial system. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 2 (1987) (to determine whether state proceedings meet the third Younger criterion, “a 3 federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in 4 the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary”). Fourth, the practical effect 5 of granting habeas relief in this action might interfere with the ongoing state court 6 proceedings1 in that it would imply the invalidity of the conviction and require this 7 Court to make findings about whether the underlying conviction violated 8 Petitioner’s constitutional rights. Finally, Petitioner has not alleged any other type 9 of special circumstance that would warrant federal intervention. 10 III. 11 CONCLUSION 12 IT THEREFORE IS ORDERED that within twenty-eight (28) days of the 13 date of this Order, Petitioner must show cause why the instant federal Petition 14 should not be dismissed as mixed and under Younger. 15 In response to this Order to Show Cause, Petitioner must complete and mail 16 back to the Court the enclosed “Notice of Election” form, which sets out his three 17 options.2 Those options are: (1) voluntarily dismiss his third ground (the “felon in 18 possession” claim) and proceed on the remaining claims, in which case the Court 19 will likely order service of the Petition on Respondent; (2) request a Rhines stay; or 20 (3) explain why the Court is incorrect to conclude that his “felon in possession” 21 claim is unexhausted. Petitioner should also fill out the portion of the Notice of 22 Election form regarding the status of his state criminal proceedings. 23 // 24 //

25 1 Again, the Court is not presently aware of the status of his state criminal 26 proceedings. It is unclear how and whether the Court’s Younger analysis would change based on this status and if Petitioner dismisses his unexhausted claim. 27 2 If Petitioner is represented by counsel in his criminal proceedings, he may wish to 28 show this order to show cause to his counsel. 1 Petitioner is expressly warned that his failure to timely comply with this 2 | order may result in the Petition being dismissed for the reasons stated above 3 | and for failure to prosecute. 4 5 | DATED: June 23, 2021 "Phra 6. Sct? 6 KAREN E. SCOTT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28