Timothy Hoffstead v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp

132 F.4th 503

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: March 20, 2025
• Docket: 23-3420
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-3420 TIMOTHY HOFFSTEAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.

NORTHEAST ILLINOIS REGIONAL COMMUTER RAILROAD CORPORATION, d/b/a METRA, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:21-cv-4335 — Sara L. Ellis, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 21, 2024 — DECIDED MARCH 20, 2025 ____________________

Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and LEE, Circuit Judges. ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Timothy Hoffstead worked for Metra as a canine handler. Hoffstead requires medication to treat his attention deficit disorder (“ADD”), migraines, and a wrist injury. As a result of these medications, Hoffstead tested positive for the presence of amphetamines and opioids dur- ing a work-mandated random drug test. The medical review 2 No. 23-3420

officer (“MRO”) in charge of reporting the test results to Metra sought an explanation for the positive test from Hoff- stead, but he was unable to get in touch with Hoffstead. Hoff- stead was ultimately suspended from his position at Metra due to the positive drug test and, when another canine han- dler position became available, Hoffstead was not considered for the position. After several failed attempts to exercise his seniority, Hoffstead returned to service with Metra before ul- timately leaving Metra for other employment. Hoffstead alleges that Metra discriminated against him following his positive drug test by forcing him to complete a rehabilitation and education program, removing him as a ca- nine handler, refusing to consider him for the open canine handler position, and rejecting his exercises of seniority. Be- cause Hoffstead cannot show that Metra’s actions were taken because of his disability, we affirm the holding of the district court. I. The following facts are undisputed or, where the facts are disputed, they are recounted in the light most favorable to Hoffstead, the party against whom summary judgment was granted. Metra hired Hoffstead in 2010. In 2014, Hoffstead began working for Metra as a canine handler with a canine partner, JD. Metra’s canine program is administered in cooperation with the Transportation Security Administration (“TSA”). Although Hoffstead was a Metra employee, the TSA owned JD and would reimburse Metra for expenses associated with JD’s care. Hoffstead received certain benefits for his position that other, non-canine handler officers did not receive, No. 23-3420 3

including higher pay, a Metra-owned vehicle to drive to and from work, and the ability to report to work without having to report to a specific starting location. At Metra, Commander Mack oversaw the administration of the canine program. The parties agree that Hoffstead was a good Metra employee. Hoffstead has ADD, suffers from migraines, and sus- tained an injury to his wrist while on duty. To treat his ADD, Hoffstead takes medically prescribed Concerta and Adderall. To treat his migraines and wrist, Hoffstead takes medically prescribed Norco. Metra’s officers, including canine handlers, are repre- sented by the Metropolitan Alliance of Police, Chapter 267. Metra’s employment policies, along with the collective bar- gaining agreement (“CBA”), governed Hoffstead’s employ- ment, and included Rule G, which governs and restricts Metra employees’ use of drugs and alcohol. Per Rule G, employees who take prescription medications must self-report those medications to Metra through the use of the On-Duty Use of Medication Form. Hoffstead reported his prescriptions to Metra through the form, and Metra approved Hoffstead’s use of all his medications with the restriction that he could not use Norco within eight hours of working. Under Metra’s Drug and Alcohol policy, if Metra dismisses an employee for a Rule G violation wherein no other significant rule violation oc- curred, a companion agreement in the CBA permits the em- ployee to retain his or her employment with Metra by volun- tarily electing to participate in the Rehabilitation/Education Program. Separately, if an officer willfully violates depart- ment or agency policy, or engages in official misconduct or a violation of the law and is discharged by Metra, then Metra must notify the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and 4 No. 23-3420

Standards Board (“ILETSB”), the body responsible for the cer- tification and decertification of law enforcement officers in Il- linois. In July 2018, Metra instructed Hoffstead to report for a random drug test. Metra contracts with an outside vendor to administer the random drug tests. When he reported for the test, Hoffstead told the test administrator that he anticipated that he would test positive for amphetamines due to his pre- scription medication. Hoffstead’s test ultimately yielded pos- itive results for the presence of amphetamines, hydrocodone, and hydromorphone. The MRO tasked with certifying and re- porting the positive results to Metra attempted to contact Hoffstead three times in a forty-eight hour period to deter- mine why Hoffstead’s test returned positive. Hoffstead did not respond to the MRO’s contact attempts, and the MRO re- ported the positive test to Metra on August 3, 2018. That same day, Hoffstead’s superior officers ordered him to report to the Blue Island Police Office. When he arrived, two superior officers met him. One of the officers, Com- mander Windle, began cursing at Hoffstead and telling him that his drug test was positive. Hoffstead explained that his test returned positive because of his prescribed medications, but Commander Windle told Hoffstead that the Metra medi- cal department was unaware of that. Commander Windle then presented Hoffstead with a se- ries of documents to sign. Hoffstead became upset and asked to speak with his union representative. Commander Windle stated that Hoffstead could not speak with his union repre- sentative and that the union could not help Hoffstead “with this.” Later that evening, Commander Mack called Hoffstead and assured Hoffstead that he would not lose his job if he No. 23-3420 5

participated in the Rehabilitation/Education program out- lined in Rule G. Commander Mack also advised Hoffstead that he should contact his union lawyer, and that he could not “guide” Hoffstead. After the call, Hoffstead signed an agree- ment to participate in the Rehabilitation/Education program and a waiver of his right to an investigation and hearing. De- spite Hoffstead’s removal from service, the ILETSB did not decertify Hoffstead as a police officer. Five days later, on August 8, 2018, Hoffstead provided the MRO and Metra’s Chief, Joseph Perez, copies of his prescrip- tion medications, and the MRO revised Hoffstead’s test re- sults from positive to negative. However, Metra still required Hoffstead to complete the Rehabilitation/Education program, despite remarks from the program’s substance abuse profes- sional that the issue was “clerical.” On August 20, 2018, Commander Mack informed the TSA Field Canine Coordinator that Metra had removed Hoffstead from service. The TSA Coordinator told Commander Mack that if JD was going to be out of service for more than thirty days, Metra would need to return JD to the TSA. Commander Mack told the TSA that Hoffstead’s “return to work, if ever, was unknown,” that the TSA could reassign JD, and that Metra would pick a replacement canine handler by October 17, 2018. On September 5, 2018, Metra posted a vacancy announce- ment for the canine handler position. The posting yielded six- teen applicants—none certified as canine handlers. Chief Pe- rez, Deputy Chief Riggio, and Sergeant Major all participated in the selection process, and Commander Mack could review the applications (called “memorandums of interest”) to give Chief Perez a recommendation about whom to hire. 6 No. 23-3420

On September 7, 2018, following completion of the Reha- bilitation/Education program, Metra’s Medical Department cleared Hoffstead to return to work. On September 13, 2018, Hoffstead submitted a memorandum of interest for the canine handler position through his union representative. Hoff- stead’s union representative sent the memorandum to Chief Perez’s administrative assistant who forwarded the email to Deputy Chief Riggio, who is now deceased. Commander Mack did not know that Plaintiff submitted a memorandum of interest for the position. On September 14, 2018, Deputy Chief Riggio sent an email to Commander Mack naming Michael Long, a new officer with less than two years of experience at Metra, as the officer selected for the canine handler position. On September 17, 2018, Metra notified Hoffstead that he was eligible to return to work. On September 19, 2018, Deputy Chief Riggio forwarded Hoffstead’s memorandum of interest in the canine handler position to Chief Perez. The same day, Chief Perez wrote an email to members of Metra’s HR Depart- ment, Medical Department, and Labor Relations Department, as well as Deputy Chief Riggio, expressing concern that Hoff- stead’s memorandum of interest reflected an inability to per- form the duties of a police officer, perhaps due to Hoffstead’s prescription medications. The same email incorrectly stated that the ILETSB reinstated Hoffstead on September 17, 2018, even though the ILETSB never decertified Hoffstead. Between September 18 and September 26, 2018, Hoffstead attempted to exercise his seniority three times. Metra officers exercise their seniority through the protocol outlined in Rule 13 of the CBA. Hoffstead’s attempts to exercise his seniority were unsuccessful because Chief Perez stated that they did No. 23-3420 7

not comply with the provisions of Rule 13. On September 28, 2018, Metra posted a vacant patrolman position, which Hoff- stead applied for and obtained. After filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Em- ployment Opportunity Commission, Hoffstead filed suit against Metra alleging that Metra discriminated against him on the basis of his disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”). The district court ultimately granted Metra’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Hoffstead failed to demonstrate a rea- sonable dispute of material fact that his disability caused Metra’s adverse actions. The district court also found that it could not consider Hoffstead’s claim that Metra thwarted his exercise of seniority under the CBA because doing so would require interpretation of the CBA, and the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. (“RLA”), prohibits courts from inter- preting CBAs. Hoffstead appeals, and we affirm. II. The ADA prohibits the discrimination of qualified indi- viduals on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To demonstrate a violation of the ADA, Hoffstead must show that he (1) has a disability, (2) is otherwise qualified to per- form the essential functions of the job with or without a rea- sonable accommodation, and (3) Metra took an adverse job action because of his disability. Monroe v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 565 (7th Cir. 2016)). The parties only dis- pute the third element; specifically, whether Metra undertook its actions because of Hoffstead’s disability. 8 No. 23-3420

To survive summary judgment, Hoffstead must demon- strate that a “genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether his disability was the ‘but for’ reason for the adverse action.” Monroe, 871 F.3d at 504 (quoting Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010)); Schoper v. Bd. of Trs. of W. Ill. Univ., 119 F.4th 527, 534 (7th Cir. 2024). 1 When evaluating whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, courts must consider the evidence “as a whole, rather than asking whether any particular piece of evidence proves the case by itself.” Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). Hoffstead argues that the district court impermissibly re- viewed each piece of evidence in isolation rather than in the aggregate, as required by Ortiz. Hoffstead Br. at 14–15. We note at the outset that the district court cited Ortiz and accu- rately recounted its directive. See R. 78 at 10. But, in any event, our review of the district court is de novo. Gaddis v. DeMattei, 30 F.4th 625, 630 (7th Cir. 2022). In undertaking this review, we examine the record in the light most favorable to Hoff- stead, the non-moving party, and we draw all reasonable in- ferences in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Yahnke v. Kane County, 823 F.3d 1066, 1070 (7th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Hoffstead alleges that Metra took four adverse actions against him because of his disability: 1) removing him from service and forcing him to complete the

1 The parties do not advocate for an alternative standard, see Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 961 n.1, so we continue to apply the “but for” standard. No. 23-3420 9

Rehabilitation/Education program; 2) removing and reassign- ing JD after the MRO reversed his drug test results; 3) refus- ing to consider him for the vacant canine handler position; and 4) requiring him to exercise his seniority rights under the CBA. We address the first three adverse actions in this section, and we address the fourth adverse action in the following sec- tion. The first three adverse actions suffer from the same defi- ciency; Hoffstead cannot demonstrate that his disability was the “but for” cause of Metra’s action. Monroe, 871 F.3d at 504. Hoffstead was not removed from service because of his diag- noses, or even because of his positive drug test. Metra re- moved Hoffstead from service because of a chain of events that he initiated when he did not respond to the MRO’s at- tempts to contact him, thus causing the MRO to report Hoff- stead’s results as positive to Metra. And then, when con- fronted with the results, Hoffstead waived his right to an in- vestigation and opted to participate in the Rehabilitation/Ed- ucation program instead. R. 64 at ¶¶ 35, 79. Even though Commander Windle’s statements that Hoffstead could not speak with his union representative and that the union could not help him in this situation are troubling, Hoffstead never argued to the district court that he signed these forms under duress. Therefore, this argument has been waived on appeal. See Hoffstead Reply Br. at 4–6; Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012) (“It is a well-established rule that arguments not raised to the district court are waived on ap- peal.”). In sum, it was Hoffstead’s actions—failing to respond to the MRO and then opting to waive his right to an investi- gation—not Metra’s actions, that led to his removal from ser- vice. 10 No. 23-3420

Hoffstead argues that he complied with Metra’s policy by proactively reporting his medications. Based on the record be- fore us, it is true that Hoffstead did comply with Metra’s pol- icy by self-reporting that he was prescribed Norco, Concerta, and Adderall through the use of the On-Duty Use of Medica- tion Form. But Hoffstead does not dispute that self-reporting medications before a positive drug test is not a substitute for providing proof of prescriptions after a positive test. Indeed, such self-reports are not evidence of a valid prescription at the time of the positive test. See R. 64 at ¶ 60. Hoffstead further argues that Metra should not have re- quired him to finish the Rehabilitation/Education program af- ter the MRO revised his drug test results. But Hoffstead does not point to any evidence that Metra’s requirement was moti- vated by discrimination or that he was treated differently from other officers with Rule G violations who voluntarily opted into the Rehabilitation/Education program. Indeed, the Drug and Alcohol policy itself does not have any sort of opt- out provision for revised results, and Metra is entitled to en- force its policy to the letter. See Metra’s Drug and Alcohol Pol- icy, R. 64-35 at 32 (“Once choosing to participate in the treat- ment program, the employee will remain in the status of a dis- missed employee until such time as a favorable recommenda- tion is made by the SAP/DAC that the employee has success- fully completed the recommended course of counseling, edu- cation, and/or treatment. Return to service is also conditioned upon successful completing of a return-to-duty drug and al- cohol test. A return-to-work medical evaluation is also re- quired.”). Even though Metra’s choice may have been ineffi- cient or illogical to an outside observer, “[t]his Court has long championed an employer’s right to make its own business No. 23-3420 11

decisions, even if they are wrong or bad.” Green v. Nat’l Steel Corp., Midwest Div., 197 F.3d 894, 899 (7th Cir. 1999). Hoffstead also cannot demonstrate that Metra failed to consider him for the canine handler position because of his disability. As Chief Perez testified, Hoffstead was ineligible to apply for the position because of Chief Perez’s own mistaken belief that the ILETSB had decertified Hoffstead after Metra’s notice to the ILETSB that Metra removed Hoffstead from ser- vice. R. 64 at ¶ 99. Hoffstead claims that Chief Perez’s mis- taken belief was pretextual, but he does not point to any evi- dence supporting that assertion. When determining whether an employer’s justification is pretextual, “the question is not whether the employer’s stated reason was inaccurate or un- fair, but whether the employer honestly believed the reason it offered to explain” the adverse action. Monroe, 871 F.3d at 505 (quoting Harper v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 311 (7th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pretext requires more than a mistaken judgment; it requires a lie. See id. (quot- ing Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 736 (7th Cir. 2008)). Chief Perez’s belief that the ILETSB would automati- cally decertify Hoffstead upon receiving notice that Metra re- moved him from service is not unreasonable, and Hoffstead has not given us reason to believe that Chief Perez lacked a good faith basis for his belief, particularly considering that Chief Perez repeated his mistaken belief on at least two occa- sions. Green, 197 F.3d at 900. Without a reason to question the good faith, albeit incorrect, basis for Chief Perez’s belief, Hoff- stead’s arguments that the ILETSB never in fact decertified him are irrelevant. Id. Hoffstead argues that Metra’s selection of Officer Long in- stead of him for the canine handler position is also proof of 12 No. 23-3420

discrimination. But Officer Long was not similarly situated to Hoffstead such that Long’s selection for the canine handler position is demonstrative of discrimination against Hoff- stead. To be similarly situated, Hoffstead and Officer Long must be “directly comparable […] in all material respects.” Burks v. Wis. Dep't. of Transp., 464 F.3d 744, 751 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Hoffstead must show that they both “dealt with the same su- pervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had en- gaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mit- igating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them.” Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). Even if two em- ployees engage in misconduct, the misconduct must be simi- larly egregious for the comparison to be appropriate. Monroe, 871 F.3d at 508–09. However, Long and Hoffstead need not be identical. Instead, the question is whether the officers are suf- ficiently similar to “allow for a meaningful comparison in or- der to divine whether intentional discrimination was at play.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there is no evidence that Metra had reason to believe that Officer Long was decertified, and that is enough to pre- vent meaningful comparison between the two. Indeed, Chief Perez testified that Hoffstead was not eligible to apply for the dog handler position because he was not certified at the time of his application. R. 64 at ¶ 99. As discussed supra, Hoffstead has not provided evidence to create a genuine dispute of ma- terial fact that Chief Perez’s incorrect belief was pretextual. And moreover, Hoffstead has not provided any facts from which we might infer that Long could have been similarly dis- qualified and thus should have been similarly precluded from No. 23-3420 13

applying for the position. Absent evidence to show that Hoff- stead and Officer Long were similarly situated, Hoffstead cannot rely on the alleged difference in treatment to allege discrimination. Chief Perez’s mistaken belief also explains the delay be- tween when Metra’s Medical Department cleared Hoffstead to return to work and when Chief Perez called Hoffstead to return to work. Under Chief Perez’s belief, Hoffstead was still decertified by the ILETSB on September 7, and, under Chief Perez’s belief, he was not recertified until September 17, the same day Metra called Hoffstead to return to service. R. 64-9 at 77. Hoffstead has not adequately alleged that the delay was because of his disability. And the delay, without more, does not demonstrate discriminatory intent. See Sklyarsky v. Means- Knaus Partners, L.P., 777 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2015). Similarly, Hoffstead cannot demonstrate that Commander Mack’s statement to the TSA that he was unsure when Hoff- stead would return to work and the subsequent reassignment of JD was motivated by discriminatory intent. Hoffstead ar- gues that because the MRO had reversed Hoffstead’s results before Commander Mack contacted TSA, Commander Mack’s action was fueled by discrimination. Hoffstead Br. at 23. But Metra still required Hoffstead to finish the Rehabilita- tion/Education program including a return-to-work medical evaluation and substance screening, which he did not com- plete until August 27, and he was not cleared to return to work by the medical department until September 7. R. 64 at ¶¶ 83–85. Hoffstead has not pointed to any evidence that Commander Mack’s belief at the time was incorrect or rooted in anything other than good faith. Green, 197 F.3d at 900. 14 No. 23-3420

Examining the evidence as a whole, Hoffstead has not demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact that, but for his disability, Metra would not have undertaken the series of actions that it did. Monroe, 871 F.3d at 504; Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. Indeed, the impetus for Metra’s actions was Hoffstead’s failure to respond to the MRO and his choice to waive an in- vestigation in favor of participating in the Rehabilitation/Ed- ucation program. III. We now turn to Hoffstead’s claim that Metra discrimina- torily applied the CBA’s seniority rules to Hoffstead. We treat these adverse actions separately so that we may first analyze the contours of the RLA and its effect on Hoffstead’s claim. Even though we find that the RLA does not preclude adjudi- cating Hoffstead’s claim, we still find that Hoffstead’s claim fails for the reasons discussed supra. The RLA exists to “promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for re- solving labor disputes.” Haw. Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994). It does so by requiring arbitration of certain claims, including so-called “minor disputes.” Id. at 252–53. Minor disputes are not identified by their importance. BLET GCA UP v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 988 F.3d 409, 412 (7th Cir. 2021). Instead, a dispute is “minor” if its resolution requires interpretation of a CBA, or if it can be “conclusively resolved” by interpreting the CBA. Brown v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 254 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2001). This latter category includes claims that do “not involve rights that exist independent of the CBA.” Haw. Airlines, 512 U.S. at 265. Both the source of plain- tiff’s claim and whether the claim requires interpretation of the CBA are crucial considerations for courts evaluating No. 23-3420 15

whether the RLA preempts a particular claim. Monroe v. Mis- souri Pac. R. Co., 115 F.3d 514, 519 (7th Cir. 1997). But these two crucial considerations do not preclude all claims that involve the CBA. Indeed, if the CBA is merely rel- evant, but not dispositive, to the claim, then judicial resolu- tion is not precluded. Brown, 254 F.3d at 668. And generally, “the RLA does not require arbitration of claims asserting rights established by state or federal law independent of a [CBA].” Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 833 (7th Cir. 2014). Here, the CBA’s seniority rule states that if an employee’s position is abolished, then he or she may displace a more jun- ior employee by following the procedure and requirements set forth in Rule 13 of the CBA. R. 64-31. Hoffstead argues that, by its terms, the seniority rules did not apply to his cir- cumstance and, by forcing Hoffstead to exercise his seniority rights, Metra discriminated against him. Hoffstead also ar- gues that Metra further discriminated against him by reject- ing his exercises of seniority. Metra argues that the RLA pre- cludes us from reaching either of Hoffstead’s arguments. We find Carlson instructive here. In that case, the plaintiff, Carlson, claimed that, among other things, the defendant, CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSX”), discriminated against her when it selected other, unqualified individuals for substitute yardmaster positions. Carlson, 758 F.3d at 823–24. CSX argued that the RLA precluded resolution of Carlson’s claims be- cause they “could be conclusively resolved by an arbitral rul- ing that she was not qualified under the collective bargaining agreement to be a substitute yardmaster.” Id. at 833. This court disagreed, explaining that “[e]ven if Carlson did not have the qualifications specified in the collective bargaining 16 No. 23-3420

agreement, she would still have viable Title VII claims if, as she alleges, the same potentially disqualifying attributes have been overlooked for men or for others who have not com- plained about discrimination.” Id. The same is true here. Even if the CBA justified Metra’s actions, the question is whether Metra undertook its course of action because of Hoffstead’s disability. Monroe, 871 at 503– 04. “[A]n employer cannot ensure the preclusion of a plain- tiff’s claim merely by asserting certain CBA-based defenses to what is essentially a non-CBA-based claim [. . .] or by arguing that the action challenged by the plaintiff is ‘arguably justi- fied’ by the terms of a CBA.” Brown, 254 F.3d at 668 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Haw. Airlines, 512 U.S. at 265–66). But Hoffstead falls short in creating a genuine issue of ma- terial fact that Metra applied the seniority rules to him and rejected his exercises of seniority because of his disability. Even though the district court thought itself precluded by the RLA, we review the district court’s determination de novo, and “[w]e may affirm on any ground supported in the record so long as it was adequately addressed below and the plaintiff[] had an opportunity to contest the issue.” O'Brien v. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923, 928 (7th Cir. 2018). Here, Hoffstead has failed to articulate a link between his disability and Metra’s actions. Indeed, instead of pointing to evidence that Metra ap- plied the seniority provisions of the CBA to him discrimina- torily, Hoffstead argues that “the other circumstantial evi- dence of adverse actions” in combination with the seniority rule’s application to Hoffstead “created a convincing mosaic of unlawful discrimination.” Hoffstead Reply Br. at 12; but see Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765 (“Today we reiterate that ‘convincing mosaic’ is not a legal test.”). The “other circumstantial No. 23-3420 17

evidence” to which Hoffstead refers would not permit a rea- sonable factfinder to conclude that Hoffstead’s disabilities caused Metra’s actions. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. Indeed, as with Metra’s other alleged adverse actions, the impetus was Hoff- stead’s failure to respond to the MRO and his choice to par- ticipate in the Rehabilitation/Education program. IV. For the above reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.