Timothy F. Watkins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 28, 2017
• Docket: 84A04-1609-CR-2129
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Feb 28 2017, 8:41 am court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK Indiana Supreme Court estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Kay A. Beehler Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Terre Haute, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Matthew B. Mackenzie Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Timothy F. Watkins, February 28, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 84A04-1609-CR-2129 v. Appeal from the Vigo Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable John T. Roach, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 84D01-1602-F6-439 84D01-1602-F6-323

Vaidik, Chief Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1609-CR-2129 | February 28, 2017 Page 1 of 5 Case Summary [1] Timothy F. Watkins admitted to violating his probation by failing to return to a

treatment center at the end of a weekend pass. The trial court revoked his

probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his previously suspended

sentence. Watkins now appeals, arguing that the trial court should have

inquired more fully as to the circumstances surrounding his failure to return to

the treatment center because those circumstances could have impacted its

decision to revoke his probation. We find that the trial court gave Watkins an

adequate opportunity to offer mitigating evidence that his violation did not

warrant revocation and did not need to inquire further. We therefore affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] In June 2016, Watkins pled guilty to Level 6 felony battery by bodily waste in

Cause No. 84D01-1602-F6-439 and Level 6 felony theft in Cause No. 84D01-

1602-F6-323. Pursuant to the plea agreement, several other counts, including a

habitual-offender enhancement, were dismissed. The trial court sentenced

Watkins to consecutive terms of two years for each conviction, suspended the

time (except for time served), and placed Watkins on formal probation. See

Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 38-41. The court also ordered Watkins to

complete treatment at Lighthouse Recovery Center, a nine-month to two-year

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1609-CR-2129 | February 28, 2017 Page 2 of 5 transitional housing/rehabilitation program for addiction, in Washington,

Indiana.1 Id. at 36.

[3] Approximately two months later, on Friday, August 5, 2016, Watkins was

given a forty-eight-hour pass to leave Lighthouse. On Monday, the probation

department filed a notice of probation violation under both cause numbers

alleging that Watkins violated his probation by failing to return to Lighthouse.

A bench warrant was issued for Watkins’ arrest, and he was arrested on that

warrant on August 15. Watkins, however, was “too intoxicated” to appear in

court that day, so his initial hearing on the notice of probation violation was

continued. Id. at 48.

[4] The next day, Watkins appeared in court for his initial hearing without an

attorney. After the trial court advised Watkins of his rights, including his right

to an attorney, Watkins waived them.2 Watkins then explained that he wanted

to admit to violating his probation and “go ahead with [his] sentence” because

“[b]ottom line” he “relapsed” and “violated.” Tr. Vol. II p. 4; Tr. Vol. III p. 4.

The trial court told Watkins that if he admitted to violating his probation, he

“could go to DOC or the Vigo County Jail for the balance of [his] time,” and

Watkins said he understood that and was willing to proceed. Tr. Vol. III p. 6.

1 Watkins began treatment at Lighthouse before sentencing, on April 11, 2016. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 33. 2 Watkins does not challenge the waiver of his rights on appeal. Indeed, the trial court strongly encouraged Watkins not to represent himself.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1609-CR-2129 | February 28, 2017 Page 3 of 5 The trial court then asked Watkins if he understood the allegations against him,

and Watkins said yes. Watkins then elaborated:

I left on a [forty-eight-hour] pass, and I didn’t have a ride back and . . . found out shortly after that – there’s a warrant out for my arrest. I walked up to the police Saturday night, Sunday night, and turned myself in.

Id.; see also id. at 4 (“I messed up, relapsed, I left for a weekend.”).

[5] The trial court revoked Watkins’ probation and “sentenced [him] to the balance

of his time in the Department of Correction.” Id. at 7; see also Appellant’s App.

Vol. II pp. 49-50.

[6] Watkins now appeals.

Discussion and Decision [7] Watkins contends that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Probation

revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must determine that a

violation of a condition of probation actually occurred. Woods v. State, 892

N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008). Second, the court must determine if the violation

warrants revocation of probation. Id.

[8] Where, as here, a probationer admits to the violation, the court can proceed to

the second step of the inquiry and determine whether the violation warrants

revocation. Id. But even a probationer who admits the allegations against him

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1609-CR-2129 | February 28, 2017 Page 4 of 5 must still be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence suggesting that

the violation does not warrant revocation. Id.

[9] Watkins argues that the trial court “should have inquired more fully as to the

circumstances which surrounded [his] failure to return to treatment at the end

of [his] week-end pass” because had the court done so, it “may well have”

decided not to revoke his probation. Appellant’s Br. p. 7, 9 (emphasis added).

We, however, find that the trial court gave Watkins an adequate opportunity to

offer mitigating evidence that his violation did not warrant revocation and did

not need to inquire further. Watkins explained that, two months after being

ordered to complete treatment at Lighthouse, he was given a forty-eight-hour

pass, left the center, “messed up,” “relapsed,” and then was arrested on a

warrant a week after the pass expired (at which point he was too intoxicated to

appear in court). Tr. Vol. III p. 4. In addition, Watkins did not ask for an

opportunity to present additional testimony about his progress at Lighthouse up

to that point or the circumstances surrounding his relapse, nor does he tell us

what that testimony would have been had he asked for and been given such an

opportunity. We therefore affirm the revocation of Watkins’ probation and the

imposition of the balance of his previously suspended sentence.

[10] Affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Brown, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 84A04-1609-CR-2129 | February 28, 2017 Page 5 of 5