Opinion issued February 19, 2026
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00210-CR ——————————— TIMOTHY ERIC GULLEY, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 268th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 22-DCR-101165
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Timothy Eric Gulley appeals from his conviction for aggravated robbery.
Gulley argues we must reverse on two grounds.
First, he argues the State failed to introduce evidence corroborating the
testimony of an accomplice who implicated him in the robbery. Article 38.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires such evidence. But we reject his
argument because the State introduced non-accomplice evidence that tends to
connect Gulley to the aggravated robbery, satisfying Article 38.14.
Second, Gulley argues the trial court reversibly erred in admitting evidence
that, he argues, was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. Gulley did not preserve his
evidentiary complaints for our review.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Prosecution’s Case
The State prosecuted Gulley for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon.
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.03(a)(2). The robbery took place at the Katy Mills Mall.
There, another man, Isaihpeter Mwange, robbed a woman at gunpoint. The State
alleged Gulley was guilty as a party to the offense in his role as the getaway driver.
See id. §§ 7.01, 7.02(a)(2); see also Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012) (affirming aggravated robbery conviction in case in which
defendant was prosecuted as party to offense based on his role as getaway driver).
Accomplice Trial Testimony
One of the State’s principal witnesses at trial was Mwange, who agreed to
testify against Gulley in the hope of receiving a more lenient charge or sentence for
2 his own role in the robbery. Per his agreement with the State, none of his testimony
in this case could be used in a later trial against him for aggravated robbery.
Among other things, Mwange testified that he, his roommate, Clareesa
Mosha-Brown, and Gulley agreed to rob someone (no one in particular, just
someone). Gulley then drove them all to Katy Mills Mall in order to do so.
Based on Mwange’s testimony, each of the three of them played a distinct
role. Mwange was the gunman who would do the actual robbing. Gulley was the
wheelman who would drive Mwange away from the scene of the crime afterward.
Mosha-Brown’s role was to coordinate with Mwange by cell phone as needed.
Per their roles, Mwange eventually identified a victim and robbed her at
gunpoint. Mwange then exited the mall, calling Mosha-Brown for pick-up. Gulley
picked Mwange up in the parking lot and drove away from the scene.
The Operation and Arrests
On the day of the robbery, the Katy Police Department was conducting a
retail-crime theft-prevention operation at the mall. Mwange’s behavior aroused
officers’ suspicion, and their suspicion was confirmed when the robbery was
reported shortly afterward. At least two members of the Department saw Gulley pick
up Mwange and hurriedly drive away from the mall.
3 Law-enforcement officers pulled over Gulley, Mwange, and Mosha-Brown
not long afterward, at which point officers arrested all three. The items that Mwange
took from the victim in the robbery were in plain view inside the car.
Jury Verdict and Appeal
The jury found Gulley guilty. Taking into account two prior felony
convictions (one for another aggravated robbery and one for theft), the jury assessed
Gulley’s punishment at 50 years of confinement in prison. Gulley appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Article 38.14’s independent-corroboration requirement is satisfied. Relying on Article 38.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Gulley
argues that his conviction cannot stand because the State failed to introduce evidence
that connects Gulley to the offense apart from the testimony of an accomplice. Not
so.
A. Under Article 38.14, a conviction cannot rest on accomplice testimony unless the testimony is corroborated by non-accomplice evidence that tends to connect the defendant to the crime.
Article 38.14 provides that “[a] conviction cannot be had upon the testimony
of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the
defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it
merely shows the commission of the offense.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.14.
4 In evaluating whether Article 38.14 has been satisfied, we disregard any
accomplice testimony admitted at trial and examine the rest of the trial record “to
see if there is any evidence that tends to connect the accused with the commission
of the crime.” Malone v. State, 253 S.W.3d 253, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(quoting Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). The
evidentiary bar is not a high one: there must simply be “some non-accomplice
evidence tending to connect” the accused to the crime. Joubert v. State, 235 S.W.3d
729, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (emphasis in original); see also Malone, 253
S.W.3d at 257 (“no set amount of non-accomplice corroboration” is required; non-
accomplice evidence “must simply link the accused in some way to the commission
of the crime”).
Our evaluation under Article 38.14 turns on the particular facts of the case
before us. Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Both direct
and circumstantial evidence may provide non-accomplice corroboration. Id.
We do not independently weigh the non-accomplice evidence. Id. Instead, we
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Brown v. State,
270 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). When non-accomplice evidence gives
rise to conflicting views—one tending to link the accused to the crime and one that
does not—we are instructed to defer to the jury’s resolution of the conflict. Smith,
332 S.W.3d at 442; see also Simmons v. State, 282 S.W.3d 504, 509 (Tex. Crim.
5 App. 2009) (inquiry is not how appellate court would weigh the evidence but
whether a rational juror could find that the non-accomplice evidence tends to connect
accused to the crime).
B. Two non-accomplice witnesses offered testimony that tends to connect Gulley to the aggravated robbery.
Setting aside accomplice testimony, the jury heard testimony from two
non-accomplice witnesses—Detective Lieutenant J. Stewart and Detective J.
Darrehshoori—that the jury could have rationally found tended to connect Gulley to
the aggravated robbery. Thus, Article 38.14’s corroboration requirement is satisfied.
1. Detective Stewart testified he saw Gulley pick up Mwange in a car soon after the robbery and hurriedly leave.
On the day of the robbery, the Katy Police Department was conducting a
retail-crime theft-prevention operation at Katy Mills Mall, and Stewart was assigned
to it. During the operation, Stewart was contacted by Darrehshoori, who informed
Stewart of suspicious activity: a man—later identified as Mwange—was leaving the
mall “in a hurry carrying a woman’s purse and shopping bag.”
Based on Darrehshoori’s description, Stewart located Mwange before he left
the premises. Stewart then personally observed Mwange rendezvous with a car.
Stewart testified that he saw “a small, brown color passenger car pull up—pull up to
him hurriedly, almost kind of passed him up, like it was trying to pick him up in a
hurry.” Mwange got into the back seat of the car, which then drove away.
6 According to Stewart, the car “was traveling at a pretty decent speed through
the parking lot” and “faster than most people” would be driving in the lot. Indeed,
the car was traveling “faster than everyone else in the parking lot.” The car’s rate of
speed and the way in which it initially passed Mwange, requiring him to reach out
to grasp its doorhandle, stood out to Stewart as being “a little bit unusual.”
Once Mwange had gotten into the car, Stewart said that the car’s driver—later
identified as Gulley—pulled away so near pedestrians that it came “extremely close
to striking them, failing to stop for them” or to “yield the right-of-way to the
pedestrians walking through the parking lot.” At one point, pedestrians had to yield
to the car to keep from being hit by it because Gulley did not stop for them.
Similarly, when the car exited the parking lot onto the roadway, Gulley did
not “yield and slow down and look for oncoming traffic.” Later, Gulley “just rolled
right through” a stop sign without slowing “very much at all for the type of
intersection” at issue and “the volume of cars” that were in the vicinity.
At this point, Stewart had only received Darrehshoori’s report of suspicious
activity; he did not yet know of the robbery. Even so, Stewart testified he knew
something was afoot and told Darrehshoori so based on his observation of the car’s
departure, “I don’t know what they’ve done, but they’re trying to get out of here.”
Shortly afterward, it was communicated to Stewart that an aggravated robbery
had occurred. Law enforcement officers stopped Gulley’s vehicle and detained
7 Gulley and the car’s other two occupants—Mwange and Mosha-Brown (who the
State also alleges is an accomplice but who did not testify at trial). The items
obtained in the armed robbery by Mwange were in plain view inside the car.
Based on Stewart’s personal observations—in particular, his observation of
Gulley’s “driving behavior” throughout this episode—Stewart opined that Gulley
was involved in the robbery, in the role of “the getaway driver.” This opinion was
consistent with Stewart’s experience with crimes involving multiple participants, in
which each one has a distinct role, such as the getaway driver.
2. Detective Darrehshoori also testified he saw Gulley pick up Mwange in a car soon after the robbery and hurriedly leave.
Darrehshoori is assigned to a police substation in the Katy Mills Mall. He led
the retail-crime theft-prevention operation conducted on the day of the robbery.
Darrehshoori tailed Mwange as he left the mall and approached the car driven
by Gulley. Like Stewart, Darrehshoori testified that Gulley drove so fast through the
parking lot that he initially passed by Mwange as Mwange tried to get into the car.
After Mwange got in, Gulley drove off, failing to yield for pedestrians.
In his work at the mall substation, Darrehshoori had already investigated
“between 15 and 25” crimes involving getaway drivers. Based on his experience, he
testified that Gulley’s hurried pick-up of Mwange and the rate of speed at which
Gulley was driving “is not normal for that mall” but “is normal for people that
8 typically commit crimes”—“the way that they pull up, jump in, and go.” Like
Stewart, Darrehshoori opined that the car appeared to be “a getaway vehicle.”
3. The detectives’ testimony tends to connect Gulley to the robbery by indicating that Gulley was a getaway driver.
In sum, two non-accomplice witnesses—both of whom testified based on their
law-enforcement experience and personal observation of the events as they
unfolded—opined that Gulley acted as the getaway driver in connection with the
armed robbery committed by Mwange. In doing so, they relied on specific facts,
which they conveyed to the jury. Both witnesses noted the hurried manner in which
Gulley pulled up to pick up Mwange almost immediately after Mwange exited the
mall. They noted that Gulley drove with such speed that Mwange had some
momentary difficulty getting into the car. They also noted the car’s relatively rapid
departure afterward, at a rate of speed unusual for a mall parking lot and in disregard
of pedestrian safety.
Mere presence at or near the scene of a crime around the time of its
commission does not, standing alone, satisfy Article 38.14’s corroboration
requirement. See Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 443. But when proof of presence is combined
with additional suspicious circumstances, this evidence “may tend to connect the
accused to the crime so as to furnish sufficient corroboration to support a
conviction.” Id. One such additional suspicious circumstance is flight, from which a
rational juror may infer consciousness of guilt. See Archie v. State, 340 S.W.3d 734,
9 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (flight from traffic stop several days after murder
evinced consciousness of guilt for crime more serious than moving violation and
thus was evidence connecting defendant to murder); Passmore v. State, 617 S.W.2d
682, 684–85 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981) (“Sufficient corroboration of the
testimony of an accomplice to warrant a conviction may be furnished by the
suspicious conduct of a defendant such as flight after a crime was committed.”),
overruled in part on other grounds by Reed v. State, 744 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1988); see also Hernandez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997) (citing Passmore with approval and describing it as standing for the
proposition that “evidence presented at trial which shows flight serves to corroborate
accomplice testimony”).
Another suspicious circumstance is association with the accomplice at or near
the time when or the place where the crime took place—facts from which a rational
juror may infer the accused’s involvement. See Cockrum v. State, 758 S.W.2d 577,
581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (“Evidence that a defendant was in the company of the
accomplice at or near the time or place of a crime is proper corroborating
evidence.”).
Here, the non-accomplice witness testimony about Gulley’s role as getaway
driver is evidence that tends to connect him to the aggravated robbery by establishing
both that (1) Gulley was in Mwange’s company at or near the scene of the crime
10 around the time that it was committed, and (2) Gulley left the scene of the crime
rapidly afterward. See Passmore, 617 S.W.2d at 684–85 (presence of accused in
company of accomplice and flight after commission of crime may link defendant to
crime); see also DeBlanc v. State, No. 01-17-00231-CR, 2018 WL 3384633, at *7
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 12, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (evidence that defendant fled in car from police after robbery at high
rate of speed and disregarded traffic signal was one circumstance tending to connect
him to robbery). Article 38.14’s corroboration requirement is satisfied in this
instance.
4. Gulley’s counterarguments are without merit.
Gulley counters that these additional suspicious circumstances are also
susceptible to more innocent explanations. For example, he argues that a rational
juror could also find that he was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, merely
having agreed to give an acquaintance a lift without foreknowledge of the robbery.
Perhaps this is so.
But Gulley’s argument disregards the standard of review. In reviewing
whether some non-accomplice evidence corroborates accomplice testimony for
purposes of Article 38.14, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
jury’s verdict. Brown, 270 S.W.3d at 567. It is the jury’s role to choose between two
conflicting reasonable explanations of the evidence, one that tends to connect the
11 accused to the crime and another that does not. Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 442. We cannot
second-guess the jury’s resolution of this conflict. See id. (“The court of appeals
improperly supplanted the jury’s verdict with its own view of the evidence, offering
alternative, seemingly innocent explanations in certain instances, in direct
opposition to the jury’s implicit determination in this case.”).
Gulley also argues that the non-accomplice evidence must show that he
knowingly participated in the crime before or during its commission, and that the
non-accomplice evidence here only relates to his conduct after the aggravated
robbery had already taken place and thus is insufficient for purposes of Article 38.14.
But this misstates the law. To begin, the statute makes no such temporal distinction.
It requires only “evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense
committed.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.14. Thus, in arguing for a temporal
distinction, Gulley asks us to impose a limitation on the statute’s corroboration
requirement that its words do not express. This we cannot do. See Cockrell v. State,
721 S.W.3d 448, 455 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (interpretation of unambiguous statute
begins and ends with its text, unless this leads to absurdity, a narrow exception
applicable only to results the Legislature could not possibly intend); Mason v. State,
663 S.W.3d 621, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (an unambiguous statute means what
its text expresses, and the courts cannot add to or subtract from its language).
12 Consistent with the statute’s unqualified text, caselaw interpreting Article
38.14 instructs that events or conduct occurring after the commission of a crime may
satisfy the corroboration requirement, just as events or conduct occurring before or
during the commission of the crime may do so. See Smith, 332 S.W.3d at 445–47
(suspicious behavior before or after crime may satisfy corroboration requirement);
see also Lydic v. State, No. 14-23-00918-CR, 2025 WL 1587760, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] June 5, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (citing Smith for this proposition); Haynes v. State, No. 11-11-00197-
CR, 2013 WL 3089373, at *9 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (same). Indeed, events and conduct occurring
after the crime, standing alone, may be suspicious enough to provide sufficient
corroboration in a given instance. For example, in Brown the Court of Criminal
Appeals concluded that the testimony of the defendant’s non-accomplice girlfriend
about events after the crime—defendant’s unusual behavior, his request for an alibi,
and his admission to being present at the scene—was some evidence that tended to
connect him to the crime. 270 S.W.3d at 567–58. And, as we have already discussed,
it is settled that flight in particular, a circumstance that necessarily arises only after
the crime, may furnish sufficient corroboration to satisfy Article 38.14. Passmore,
617 S.W.2d at 684–85; accord Killough v. State, 718 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986). Contrary to Gulley’s contention, non-accomplice evidence need not
13 relate solely to events or conduct occurring before or during the commission of the
crime to satisfy Article 38.14’s requirement that accomplice testimony be
independently corroborated.1
We overrule Gulley’s first appellate issue.
II. Gulley did not preserve his evidentiary complaints for appellate review.
Gulley argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Stewart and
Darrehshoori to testify about (1) “jugging”—a form of targeted robbery in which the
1 Gulley argues he could not be convicted as a party to the aggravated robbery unless the State proved he committed a culpable act before or during its commission. We agree. See Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181, 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (defendant’s conduct after crime is relevant to status as party to offense but is not sufficient; there also must be sufficient evidence of understanding or common scheme to commit crime). But this is immaterial. Gulley does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction as a party to the offense. He only challenges whether non-accomplice evidence corroborates accomplice testimony as to his involvement in the robbery, as required by Article 38.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated robbery as a party to the offense is a separate and distinct issue from whether some non-accomplice evidence exists that tends to link him to the robbery in satisfaction of Article 38.14. See Torres v. State, 137 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (“A challenge of insufficient corroboration is not the same as a challenge of insufficient evidence to support that verdict as a whole.”); see also Casanova v. State, 383 S.W.3d 530, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“We have long held that corroborative evidence need not be legally sufficient in itself to establish a defendant’s guilt.”). Because Gulley does not challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence as to his status as a party to the offense, we need not examine the record to ensure the evidence suffices to prove that he committed a culpable act before or during the robbery. That is not before us. But we note that Mwange testified that Gulley knowingly participated in the robbery from its outset, and criminal liability for the conduct of the primary actor—the robber—is not controversial under circumstances like these. See Rodriguez v. State, 521 S.W.3d 822, 828 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (“Courts have repeatedly upheld convictions under the law of parties when the evidence establishes that the defendant participated in the commission of the offense by driving the getaway vehicle.”).
14 perpetrators identify a victim in advance based on where she is coming from or going
to, such as a bank or shopping center, and lay in wait—and (2) organized retail theft.
He argues these topics are irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.
A. A party must object in the trial court to preserve error. To preserve an error in the admission of evidence for appellate review, the
defendant must timely object in the trial court, specifying the grounds for the
objection unless they are apparent from context. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); TEX.
R. EVID. 103(a)(1); Lopez v. State, 253 S.W.3d 680, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008);
see also Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (preservation
requires that complaint made on appeal comport with complaint made at trial).
Unless the defendant obtains a running objection to the evidence or a ruling on his
objection in a hearing outside the jury’s presence, the defendant must object each
time the evidence is offered to preserve error. Lopez, 253 S.W.3d at 684.
B. At trial, Gulley did not make the required objections.
At trial, Gulley did not object to testimony about organized retail theft in
general. Both Stewart and Darrehshoori testified about this topic without objection.
Therefore, Gulley has not preserved this complaint for appellate review. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(1); Lopez, 253 S.W.3d at 684; see also
Martinez v. State, 98 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (record did not
contain general objection to admission of any and all gang-related evidence, and
15 objection to two particular photographs did not amount to such, so that defendant
did not preserve error apart from the objection he made to the two photographs).
Stewart testified about jugging, but Darrehshoori did not. Gulley objected
when Stewart first referred to jugging. But Gulley only objected on the basis of
relevance, not undue prejudice. And he did not renew his relevance objection when
Stewart repeatedly referred to jugging later in his testimony. He did not obtain a
running objection or a ruling in a hearing outside the presence of the jury. So Gulley
likewise has not preserved this complaint for appellate review. See Lopez, 253
S.W.3d at 684.
We overrule Gulley’s second appellate issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Jennifer Caughey Justice
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey, and Dokupil.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).