Timmons v. Grand Strand Water and Sewer Authority

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedAugust 27, 2024
Docket4:24-cv-04528
StatusUnknown

This text of Timmons v. Grand Strand Water and Sewer Authority (Timmons v. Grand Strand Water and Sewer Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Timmons v. Grand Strand Water and Sewer Authority, (D.S.C. 2024).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Wondell Timmons Jr., ) C/A No.: 4:24-4528-JD-KDW ) Plaintiff, ) ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION v. ) ) Grand Strand Water and Sewer Authority, ) ) Defendant. ) )

Wondell Timmons Jr. (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this Complaint against Grand Strand Water and Sewer Authority asserting a personal injury claim. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the Complaint. I. Factual and Procedural Background Plaintiff contends the Grand Strand Water and Sewer Authority exposed him to perfluoroalkyl substances/contaminates in the water when he showered, washed laundry, washed dishes, and prepared his food. ECF No. 1-1 at 1. Plaintiff says he dialed 911 on July 11, 2024, and made a verbal report to the Mullins Police Department concerning this chemical exposure. Id. Plaintiff states he informed the responding officer he believed the water caused him to be sick after seeing a North Carolina news story. Id. Plaintiff states he was transported to the emergency room by EMS and he was prescribed Zyrtec for diagnosis: exposure to chemical inhalation. Id. Plaintiff seeks two billion dollars in damages. Id. at 2. II. Discussion A. Standard of Review Plaintiff filed his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute

allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially

meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff’s allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990). B. Analysis Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Id. at 352; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss

the action.”). Although the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the case, determining jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999). There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, MD., 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his pleadings. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). To this end, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for

the court’s jurisdiction[.]” When a complaint fails to include “an affirmative pleading of a jurisdictional basis[,] a federal court may find that it has jurisdiction if the facts supporting jurisdiction have been clearly pleaded.” Pinkley, 191 F.3d at 399. However, if the court, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to a plaintiff, finds insufficient allegations in the pleadings, the court will lack subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Plaintiff indicates the court has jurisdiction over his claims pursuant to the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. ECF No. 1 at 3. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), the court may exercise jurisdiction if there is complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 nn.13-16 (1978). Plaintiffs Complaint fails to demonstrate complete diversity of parties as Plaintiff alleges he and Defendant are citizens of South Carolina. See ECF No. | at 4. Plaintiff has not shown the court has diversity jurisdiction over his claims, therefore, his Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. Il. Conclusion and Recommendation For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the court dismiss the Complaint without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.

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Timmons v. Grand Strand Water and Sewer Authority, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/timmons-v-grand-strand-water-and-sewer-authority-scd-2024.