Timaero Ireland Limited v. The Boeing Company

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedMarch 15, 2021
Docket1:19-cv-08234
StatusUnknown

This text of Timaero Ireland Limited v. The Boeing Company (Timaero Ireland Limited v. The Boeing Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Timaero Ireland Limited v. The Boeing Company, (N.D. Ill. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

TIMAERO IRELAND LIMITED, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 19 C 8234 ) THE BOEING COMPANY, ) Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Timaero Ireland Limited (“Timaero”) is an Ireland-based company that buys aircraft from manufacturers and sells or leases them to airlines or other intermediaries. Beginning in 2014, Timaero entered into a series of contracts with Defendant The Boeing Company (“Boeing”) to purchase 22 Boeing Model 737-8 aircraft, also known as the 737 MAX. Timaero had received just two of these 22 airplanes when two 737 MAX aircraft crashed within months of one another, killing more than 300 passengers and leading regulatory agencies around the globe to ground all 737 MAX aircraft indefinitely. In the wake of these events, Timaero sued Boeing for fraud, breach of contract, and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Timaero filed the case in this district, where Boeing’s corporate headquarters are located. Boeing has moved, under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), to transfer venue to the Western District of Washington—the location of Boeing’s commercial aircraft division and most of its aircraft manufacturing facilities. Boeing also moves to dismiss Timaero’s claims for fraudulent concealment, fraudulent inducement, or breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted. Timaero’s breach of contract claim survives this ruling, and Timaero will have leave to file an amended complaint to cure deficiencies identified here. The court also grants Boeing’s motion to transfer venue to the Western District of Washington. BACKGROUND The court summarizes the fact alleged in Timaero’s First Amended Complaint: In 2013, representatives from Timaero and Boeing met in Le Bourget, France, where Timaero signed a letter of intent to purchase twenty 737 MAX aircraft from Boeing for some two billion dollars. (Am. Compl. [42] ¶ 37.) Thereafter, employees from the two companies met in Moscow, Russia and Muscat, Oman, for the purpose of continuing to both market the 737 MAX to Timaero and negotiate the terms of a contract for Timaero’s purchase of 737 MAX aircraft (“Purchase Agreement”). (Id. ¶¶ 39–41.) In these marketing, sales, and negotiation meetings, Boeing employees represented to Timaero that the 737 MAX would have the following features: [T]he 737 MAX would have class-leading fuel efficiency, would not require additional simulator training for pilots already certified to fly its predecessor 737 NG . . . would be easily saleable and leasable, a good value for Timaero, and would be airworthy, safe, free from design defects, and in compliance with appropriate aviation regulations.

(Id. ¶ 41.) Boeing made similar representations to other customers. (Id. ¶¶ 48–50.) On January 10, 2014, the companies entered into a Purchase Agreement in which Timaero committed to purchasing twenty 737 MAX aircraft from Boeing. (Id. ¶ 11.) Between March 22 and March 29, 2014, representatives from Timaero met with Boeing employees in Seattle, Washington, where Boeing employees continued to represent that the 737 MAX aircraft would have the features described above. (Id. ¶ 47.) On September 15, 2016, the two companies entered into a Supplemental Agreement in which Timaero converted a prior order for two 737- 800 aircraft, to an order for two additional 737 MAX airplanes—increasing Timaero’s purchase to a total of 22 of the 737 MAX airplanes. (Id. ¶ 175.) Nearly two dozen of the Boeing employees who participated in marketing, sales, and contracting activities with Timaero currently reside in the state of Washington. (See generally First Decaro Decl., Ex. 1 to Def.’s Mot. to Transfer [33-1] (hereinafter “First Decaro Decl.”); Second Decaro Decl., Ex. 1 to Def.’s Reply to Mot. to Transfer [57-1] (hereinafter “Second Decaro Decl.”).) While many of those individuals continue to work for Boeing (First Decaro Decl. ¶¶ 9, 19, 21; Second Decaro Decl. ¶¶ 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 18), others no longer do. (First Decaro Decl. ¶¶ 7, 16, 20, 22; Second Decaro Decl. ¶¶ 7, 8, 13, 16, 19.) The 737 MAX was short-lived. Over a period of four and a half months in 2018 and 2019, there were two major crashes of commercial 737 MAX aircraft, resulting in the deaths of more than 300 individuals. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 105–06.) Following the second crash, countries worldwide grounded all 737 MAX aircraft indefinitely. (Id. ¶ 126.) According to press reports, the FAA recertified the 737 MAX on November 18, 2020—a year and a half after the MAX was grounded. Tom Costello & Ben Popken, FAA Clears Boeing 737 Max to fly again, NBC News (Nov. 18, 2020 7:00AM CST), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/faa-clears-boeing-737-max- fly-again-n1248090 (last visited Mar. 12, 2021). Following the crashes, investigations revealed that the fallen airplanes had experienced mechanical failures, arising out of a newly implemented software called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (“MCAS”). The purpose of the MCAS was to automatically stabilize a 737 MAX airplane, without pilot input, if the plane unexpectedly started pitching upward. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55, 111.) Instead, the MCAS overreacted, unnecessarily forcing the plane’s nose toward the ground. In each case, the pilot—who was not even aware of the MCAS software— tried to manually stabilize the plane but was thwarted when the automated MCAS repeatedly triggered, continuing to force the plane’s nose downward until the plane crashed. (Id. ¶ 111.) Timaero asserts that the roots of the MCAS problem can be traced to Boeing’s initial decision to begin designing the 737 MAX. In August 2011, Boeing’s Board of Directors worried that the company would soon lose substantial market share to its biggest competitor, Airbus, who was in the process of designing a new commercial aircraft—the A320neo. (Id. ¶¶ 22–24.) Instead of designing an entirely new model of aircraft, Boeing’s board decided to save time and money by simply creating a new iteration in the 737 line of airplanes: the 737 MAX. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) As an added benefit, Boeing hoped to save its customers millions of dollars by convincing the FAA to certify the 737 MAX without requiring pilots of existing 737 models to undergo any additional flight simulator training. (Id. ¶ 48.) Boeing began the design process by placing larger, fuel-efficient engines on the existing 737 frame. (Id. ¶ 51.) These larger engines, however, changed the plane’s aerodynamics, leading it to unexpectedly pitch upward during test flights. (Id. ¶¶ 51–52.) To address this problem, Boeing implemented the MCAS, a system in which two automated “angle-of-attack” sensors (“AOA sensors”) would activate if a plane began unnecessarily pitching upward. The AOA sensors would then notify the MCAS software, which would automatically force the plane’s nose down until the body of the plane was properly parallel to the ground. (Id. ¶¶ 55, 58.) At first, Boeing notified the FAA of this plan—assuring them that the MCAS system was “benign and rarely used.” (Id. ¶ 69.) With this information, the FAA approved the limited use of the MCAS system without requiring additional pilot simulator training. (Id. ¶¶ 64, 69–70.) Instead, the FAA required just one hour of iPad-based training on the differences between the 737 MAX and the older 737 models, failing entirely to mention the MCAS system. (Id. ¶ 70.) By 2016, test flights revealed that the aerodynamics problems were more widespread than previously anticipated. (Id.

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Timaero Ireland Limited v. The Boeing Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/timaero-ireland-limited-v-the-boeing-company-ilnd-2021.