Tim Roberson, Administrator of the Estate of Christopher Wagoner v. Loy Ray Wagoner Trust, Cindy Honeycutt, Larry Harp, and Sandra Trammell, as Trustees of the Loy Ray Wagoner Trust

2025 Ark. App. 4, 704 S.W.3d 647

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: January 15, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 4 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-22-804

TIM ROBERSON, ADMINISTRATOR OF Opinion Delivered January 15, 2025 THE ESTATE OF CHRISTOPHER WAGONER, DECEASED APPEAL FROM THE NEWTON APPELLANT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 51CV-20-52]

V. HONORABLE JOHNNIE A. COPELAND, JUDGE LOY RAY WAGONER TRUST, CINDY HONEYCUTT, LARRY HARP, AND AFFIRMED SANDRA TRAMMELL, AS TRUSTEES OF THE LOY RAY WAGONER TRUST APPELLEES

N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Chief Judge

This case is about whether a piece of property belongs to the Loy Ray Wagoner Trust or

the estate of Christopher Wagoner (the “Estate”). We affirm the circuit court’s order, which

ruled that the Estate’s claim to the property is barred by the statute of limitations.

I. Background

Loy Wagoner owned more than 1,300 acres in Newton County (the “Property”). He had

one child, Christopher Wagoner. On July 1, 2002, after Loy and his ex-wife had divorced, Loy

established the Loy Ray Wagoner Trust (the “Trust”). His lawyer, Peter DeStefano, set up the

Trust. On the same day, Loy executed a quitclaim deed to himself as trustee of the Trust for a

portion of the Property. On July 1, 2005, Loy executed a second quitclaim deed to himself as trustee of the Trust for the rest of the Property. Collectively, we will refer to these as the “Deeds.”

Loy left the Deeds with DeStefano with instructions to record the deeds after his death.

Loy proceeded to build cabins on the Property and operated them as a commercial

hunting club known as the Buffalo River Hunting Club. During his lifetime, Loy executed two

amendments to the Trust. The second amended declaration of Trust provided that Christopher

would receive a life estate in Loy’s homestead and that the remaining Trust assets were to be

distributed to Christopher’s children. In the event Christopher died without children, the

proceeds of the Trust would be distributed to Loy’s nieces and nephews.

On January 10, 2013, Loy died. DeStefano recorded the Deeds on January 14 and March

4. It is unclear why the Deeds were recorded on different days, but it does not matter for our

analysis. After recording the first deed, DeStefano mailed it, the will, and the Trust documents

to Christopher. Wilma Willis, Loy’s caretaker and significant other, served as successor trustee

and continued operating the hunting club after Loy died. In 2015, Christopher sued Wilma

individually and in her capacity as successor trustee in an attempt to enforce the term of the

Trust bequeathing to him a life estate in Loy’s homestead. The life-estate portion of that 2015

lawsuit was resolved in an agreed order filed on August 8, 2016, which set out that Wilma was

the trustee of the Trust, that the Trust owned certain property, and that Christopher owned

certain other property. Wilma died on December 24, 2019. Christopher died without children

shortly thereafter, on January 4, 2020. Tim Roberson was appointed administrator of the Estate

on January 9.

The Estate filed a petition on November 5, 2020, for declaratory judgment and to quiet

title alleging that the Property passed to Christopher upon Loy’s death by the laws of intestate

2 succession.1 The Estate alleged that the Deeds were null and void for failure of delivery to, and

acceptance by, the Trust. Alternatively, the Estate argued that Christopher is the sole beneficiary

of the Trust. The Trust and the trustees (collectively, the appellees) filed a counterclaim for

slander of title and a declaratory judgment. During the pendency of this litigation, the Property

sold for $2,337,536.83, and the proceeds were deposited into the registry of the circuit court.

The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the circuit

court entered an order declaring that the appellees were entitled to the proceeds from the sale

of the Property. In the order, the circuit court first found that the statute of limitations began

to run when the deeds were recorded, which was March 4, 2013, at the latest. On that basis,

the circuit court ruled that the statute of limitations barred the Estate’s claims relating to the

delivery and acceptance of the Deeds. The circuit court also ruled that, in any event, the Deeds

were delivered by Loy to the Trust, and the Property had become an asset of the Trust at that

time. The Estate filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. Standard of Review

This case involves dueling motions for summary judgment. When both parties move for

summary judgment, they are essentially agreeing that no material facts remain. When the parties

agree on the facts, we simply determine whether the appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Leavell v. Gentry, 2021 Ark. App. 412, 636 S.W.3d 794. In determining the issues of law

presented, our standard of review is de novo. Id.

III. Analysis

1 The Estate alleged that although Loy had executed a will, it was not timely admitted to probate and was now barred by the statute of limitations.

3 A. Finality of Order

We first address the appellees’ contention that the circuit court’s order is not final. We

hold that the summary-judgment order is final and appealable and that this court, therefore, has

jurisdiction.

The Estate brought claims for declaratory judgment and to quiet title. The appellees

brought counterclaims for slander of title and for declaratory judgment. After the circuit court

entered an order to allow the sale of the Property, the Estate filed an amended petition seeking

a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to the proceeds from the sale, but it did not renew

the quiet-title claim, presumably because title could not be quieted in any of the litigants once

the Property had been sold.

On July 28, 2021, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the slander-of-title

counterclaim with prejudice after “being duly advised that the Parties have compromised and

resolved the claim for slander of title.” Both sides moved for summary judgment regarding

ownership of the Property. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the appellees,

entering an order finding that the Property was owned by the Trust before the sale and declaring

the appellees to be the owners of the full amount of the proceeds from the sale of the Property.

Accordingly, there are no issues remaining regarding the ownership of the Property or the

proceeds from the sale of the Property. The only arguable claim remaining at this point was the

quiet-title claim articulated in the Estate’s initial petition. However, the Estate abandoned any

pending but unresolved claim in its notice of appeal pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Appellate

Procedure–Civil 3(e)(vi).

4 The appellees filed a motion for attorneys’ fees after the circuit court granted the

appellees’ motion for summary judgment. The record on appeal does not show that the circuit

court has ruled on the motion for attorneys’ fees. Arkansas appellate courts have consistently

held that the award of attorney’s fees is a collateral matter. Harold Ives Trucking Co. v. Pro Transp.,

Inc., 341 Ark. 735, 19 S.W.3d 600 (2000). Collateral matters remain in the circuit court’s

jurisdiction even after an appeal has been docketed and do not deprive this court of appellate

jurisdiction. Id. The appellees argue that claims for attorneys’ fees are not always collateral

because they can be an element of compensatory damages. However, the appellees have failed

to show that attorneys’ fees were an element of damages for their claims of declaratory judgment

or slander of title, both of which have been resolved. For these reasons, we find that the circuit

court’s order is final and appealable.

B. Mootness

Appellees present an additional procedural hurdle, arguing that the appeal is moot

because the judgment against the Estate was voluntarily paid. We disagree that the payment was

voluntary.

When an appellant voluntarily pays a judgment, any appeal of the judgment by the

appellant becomes moot. Reynolds Health Care Servs., Inc. v. HMNH, Inc., 364 Ark. 168, 182–83,

217 S.W.3d 797, 809 (2005). One of the most important factors to consider when determining

whether a payment is made voluntarily is whether the appellant posted a supersedeas bond at

the time it satisfied the judgment. Id.

It is important to note the timing of events. The circuit court entered its order granting

summary judgment in the appellees’ favor at 4:00 p.m. on Friday, September 9, 2022. The

5 circuit court then entered an order directing the release of funds held in the court’s registry at

2:20 p.m. on Monday, September 12, 2022. Considering that most of the time between the two

orders was over a weekend, appellants had only approximately eight hours to file a notice of

appeal, procure a supersedeas bond, obtain approval of the bond, and post it. That is not a

reasonable expectation. Further, the supreme court has held that when a judgment was satisfied

as a result of a levy on a writ of execution, the appellant was not considered to have voluntarily

paid the judgment. Id. at 183, 217 S.W.3d at 809. That is analogous to what happened here.

The circuit court ordered that the funds be disbursed before the Estate had time to post a bond.

The Estate had no control over the funds that were used to satisfy the judgment because they

were in the registry of the court, and the circuit court ordered that the funds be disbursed.

Considering all these factors, we hold that the judgment was not voluntarily paid, and the appeal

is not moot.

C. Statute of Limitations

We now turn to the merits of the appeal. The statute of limitations to clear a cloud on

title like the one in this case is seven years. Ark. Code Ann. § 18-61-101(a) (Repl. 2015). The

issue in this case is when the statute of limitations accrued.

The circuit court found that the statute of limitations began to run when the Deeds were

recorded, which was January 14 and March 4, 2013. We agree. This court addressed a similar

issue in Griffith v. Juarez, 2022 Ark. App. 206, 645 S.W.3d 339. In that case, Griffith filed a

petition to quiet title alleging that when she was a minor, her mother and stepfather had forged

her signature on a deed. The deed was recorded in 1989. The circuit court found that Griffith’s

2020 quiet-title claim was barred by the seven-year statute of limitations, which began to run

6 when Griffith turned eighteen years old in 1992. This court agreed on appeal, holding that

despite Griffith’s claim that her interest in the property was concealed from her until 2019, she

was charged with constructive notice of the recorded deed when she turned eighteen years old.

We cited the recording statute, Arkansas Code Annotated section 14-15-404(a)(1) (Repl. 2013),

which provides that

[e]very deed, bond, or instrument of writing affecting the title, in law or equity, to any real or personal property within this state which is or may be required by law to be acknowledged or proved and recorded shall be constructive notice to all persons from the time the instrument is filed for record in the office of the county recorder of the proper county.

Here, DeStefano recorded the Deeds in January and March 2013. The mere act of

recording the Deeds provides notice under Arkansas law. Ark. Code Ann. § 14-15-404(a);

Griffith, 2022 Ark. App. 206, 645 S.W.3d 339. In addition to the constructive notice he is

charged with by statute, Christopher received actual notice of the potential cloud on his title

when DeStefano mailed him a copy of the first recorded Deed and the Trust documents after

Loy’s death. The Estate did not file the quiet-title action until November 5, 2020, which was

months after the statute of limitations had expired for either parcel.

The Estate argues that the act of recording the Deeds was not sufficient to start the

running of the statute of limitations. Citing SEECO, Inc. v. Holden, 2015 Ark. App. 555, 473

S.W.3d 36, and Dotson v. Aldridge, 246 Ark. 456, 438 S.W.2d 464 (1969), the Estate contends

that the Trust must have adversely possessed the Property before the statute of limitations would

have begun to run against the Estate’s claims. SEECO, however, involved a statute of limitations

for tax deeds that specifically contains a two-year adverse-possession requirement. See Ark. Code

7 Ann. § 18-61-106 (Repl. 2015). While Dotson involved the statute of limitations at issue here, it

is also distinguishable. Dotson states that until there is an interference with possession, the

statute of limitations will not prohibit “a person in possession from suing to remove a cloud

upon his title.” Dotson, 246 Ark. at 460, 438 S.W.2d at 466. Because the Estate has not

established that it was in possession of the Property, its claims were not shielded from the statute

of limitations.

In its remaining arguments on appeal, the Estate argues that the circuit court erred in

finding that the Deeds were delivered to the Trust. Because the statute of limitations barred the

Estate’s action, we do not reach the delivery issue.

For the reasons stated above, the circuit court’s order is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HARRISON and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Conner & Winters, LLP, by: Todd P. Lewis and Jorge J. Rodriguez, for appellant.

Tim Cullen, for appellees.